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^^ Mbstract
This thesis examines processes of Europeanisation in the German shipbuilding 
industry between 1980 and 2002. In particular, it analyses the impact of European Union 
(EU) shipbuilding policy on German shipbuilding policy and German public and private 
actors. The thesis argues that the specific salient features of the shipbuilding industry are 
decisive in explaining what drives Europeanisation in the German shipbuilding industry 
in terms of the response of private actors. Their reaction to EU policy is inextricably 
linked to that of the public actors. Accordingly, the thesis highlights the interactive nature 
of the Europeanisation processes with which domestic public and private actors are 
involved. Thus, it argues that the analysis of ‘EU action’ and ‘German reaction’ in the 
field of shipbuilding needs to consider the impact of German public actors’ responses to 
EU shipbuilding policy on those of domestic private actors, and vice versa.
The response of German public actors -  the Federal and Land governments -  is 
analysed in terms of German shipbuilding policy content and institutional developments. 
German shipbuilding policy is shown to meet and exceed EU shipbuilding policy 
requirements. The impact of EU shipbuilding policy on private actors -  German 
shipbuilding firms and the German shipbuilding association -  is explored in terms of 
their interest representation activities and the shipbuilding projects for which they seek 
state support. German shipbuilding firms look increasingly to the EU as the channel 
through which to air their concerns and further their interests. Such a response is based on 
the realisation that the EU is able to secure benefits that the domestic governments cannot 
provide. Empirical analysis also shows that German shipbuilding firms have engaged in 
shipbuilding projects of the type encouraged by EU policy.
This thesis suggests that Europeanisation processes are contingent and 
differentiated and due attention should be paid to various sets of domestic actors.
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Chapter One
EUROPEANISATION OF THE 
GERMAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY:
IMPACT ON POLICY CONTENT AND POLICY ACTORS
1.1 WHAT’S GOING ON BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
GERMAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY?
German shipbuilding firms operate in a context that is governed by regional 
(Land), national (Federal) and supranational (European Union) authorities. For 
instance, whether or not a German shipbuilding firm receives state aid depends not 
just on the Federal and/or the relevant Land govemment(s), but on the EU as well. 
This thesis examines the processes by which relevant public and private actors in 
Germany have adapted to the participation of the EU as a governance actor in the 
German shipbuilding industry. This thesis analyses the response of German public 
actors to EU shipbuilding aid policy in terms of German shipbuilding policy content 
and institutional developments. The responses of German private actors to EU 
impulses in the shipbuilding policy field are explored in terms of their interest 
representation activity and the nature of the shipbuilding projects that they pursue and 
for which they seek state aid.
Now considering that the Federal Republic of Germany was one of the six 
founding member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and 
that it was heavily involved in the formulation of the EEC Competition Policy, one 
would think that that there was very little to ‘Europeanise’ in the corresponding 
German policy field. After all, many of the pro-competition tenets of the EU state aid 
policy resound well with the ‘Ordoliberalism’ predominant in German economic 
policy. To the extent that Germany has successfully ‘uploaded’ or projected its policy 
preferences onto the EU level, one would thus expect that it would be relatively easy 
for Germany to comply with such legislation. One would not expect either very much 
conflict between the EU and Germany or much change or Europeanisation on the 
domestic German level in response to the relevant EU policies. This is where one
encounters a puzzle. Despite extensive German shaping of EU state aid policy, there 
has been considerable non-compliance by Germany with EU law in the state aid 
arena.
This thesis argues that the reaction of the private actors to EU policy is 
inextricably linked to that of the public actors -  the Federal and Land governments -  
that continue to play important roles in governing them and providing them with 
financial support. This thesis analyses the interactive nature of the Europeanisation 
processes of the public and private actors in the German shipbuilding industry. This 
thesis argues that the analysis of ‘EU action - German reaction’ in the context of the 
shipbuilding industry should consider the impact of German public actors’ responses 
to EU shipbuilding policy on those of the German private actors, and vice versa. The 
processes of Europeanisation that actors on the domestic stage experience cannot be 
determined a priori. The impact of an EU public policy on a member state is not 
determined merely by the content and stipulations of that EU policy or even by the 
status quo in the relevant domestic policy field. Rather, the process of 
Europeanisation of a particular set of domestic actors is contingent on the responses 
of other domestic actors to the EU policy. This thesis shows that the explanation of 
what drives Europeanisation in the German shipbuilding industry lies in particular 
salient features of the industry itself.
The rest of this introductory chapter addresses the key concepts that are used 
in this study of the Europeanisation processes that have occurred in the German 
shipbuilding industry. Section 1.2 discusses the main strands of thought in the current 
literature on Europeanisation and clarifies the understanding of the term 
‘Europeanisation’ as used in this thesis. Section 1.3 then analyses the implications of 
EU state aid policy for national industrial policy. Finally, Section 1.4 provides an 
outline of the chapters, while Section 1.5 describes the method and sources employed 
in this thesis.
1.2 STATE OF PLAY OF THE LITERATURE ON EUROPEANISATION
1.2.1 Definitions and Conceptualisations of Europeanisation
The early stages of research on European integration focused on the processes 
involved in the formulation of common policies (see, for example, Wallace 1990; 
Andersen and Eliassen 1993; Wallace and Wallace 1996). This can be conceptualised 
as the ‘bottom-up’ perspective of European integration that focuses on the efforts and 
impact of member states (the bottom level) on what happens at the EU (top) level. 
Over the past decade, there has been a burgeoning interest in the impact of these 
public policies on the EU member states (Olsen 1995; Héritier, Knill and Mingers 
1996; Mény, Muller and Quermonne 1996; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Goetz 
and Hix 2001; Dyson 2002a; Dyson and Goetz 2003a; Featherstone and Radaelli 
2003). This, in turn, can be thought of as a ‘top-down* perspective on the processes of 
Europeanisation -  the study of the impact of the EU on its member states.^ Scholars 
have researched the impact of the EU on practically every aspect of the domestic 
political economy of member states.^
The empirical and systematic analysis of the impact of EU state aid and 
shipbuilding policies on the German shipbuilding policy field requires a 
conceptualisation of Europeanisation that defines the domain of inquiry. A perusal of 
the existing body of literature reveals that there is a multitude of definitions of 
Europeanisation to be found in the academic research on European integration 
(Ladrech 1994: 69; Buhner and Burch 1998: 602; Borzel 1999: 574; Radaelli 2000: 4; 
Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001: 3). Simply put, one can think of Europeanisation 
as the ways in which domestic actors respond to European integration. This basically 
refers to the reception of EU policies and laws by the member states.
* Goetz (2002: 6) notes that this shift in emphasis, from the first to the second-generation analysis of 
the relationship between the EU and member states, is underpinned by a shift away from a focus on 
macro-level system variables to meso and micro-level analysis. This thesis fits into the ‘second 
generation’ of research in its attempts to analyse the impact of EU shipbuilding policy on German 
shipbuilding policy content and on actors in the German shipbuilding industry,
 ^Dimensions that have been examined include the inqjact of EU-induced policy changes on national 
bureaucracies (Page and Wouters 1995; Lequesne 1996; Goetz 2003) and administrative structures 
(Wright 1994; Mény et al. 1996; Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Wallace 1996; Buhner and Burch 1998; 
Hanf and Soetendorp 1998), sub-national governance (Goetz 1995; Kohler-Koch et a l 1997; 
Conzelmann 1998; Borzel 1999; Jeffery 2003), regulatory structures (Majone 1997; Schneider 2000; 
Lodge 2002), political parties (Ladrech and Marlière 1999; Morlino 1999), macro-economic 
institutions (Dyson and Featherstone 1996, 1999; Dyson 2003), national identities (Risse 2001; 
Checkel 2001) and public discourse (Liebert 2000; Marcussen 2000; Schmidt 2000a, 2000b).
This thesis employs the definition of Europeanisation offered in Dyson and 
Goetz (2003b: 20):
Europeanisation denotes a complex interactive ‘top-down ’ and ‘bottom-up ' 
process in which domestic polities, politics and public policies are shaped by 
European integration and in which domestic actors use European integration to 
shape the domestic arena. ”
This description of Europeanisation is useful for this thesis as it is based on 
studying the multiple, inter-connected processes of response and adaptation of actors 
on the domestic level to European integration.
1.2.2 Goodness of Fit -  Enough to Understand Europeanisation in the German
Shipbuilding Industry?
Many studies of Europeanisation share the proposition that there must be some 
“misfit” (Borzel 1999; Duina 1999; Borzel and Risse 2000) or “mismatch” (Héritier, 
Knill and Mingers 1996; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 
2001) between the EU and national policies and institutions for national adaptation to 
occur. ^  These studies argue that the lower the compatibility between the EU and 
domestic processes, policies and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure. 
Along this line of reasoning, misfits can be equated to problems in compliance.
Following this logic of the ‘goodness of fit’, the impact of EU shipbuilding 
policy on German shipbuilding policy content and on policy actors in the German 
shipbuilding industry would depend on the extent and nature of similarities and 
differences between the relevant German and EU policies and institutions. According 
to the goodness of fit argument, in the event that German and EU policies and 
relevant institutions are a perfect match, one could accordingly expect that there 
would be seamless and successful implementation of EU law in the shipbuilding 
policy arena in Germany. As far as the EU and Germany are concerned, there is 
indeed institutional compatibility in terms of horizontal fi-agmentation (Katzenstein 
1997; Knodt and Staeck 1999), congruence in the general styles of regulation (Dyson
 ^Exanples of research based on institutional misfit and subsequent national adjustment include studies 
on relations between the centre and regions (Borzel 1999), on EU social pohcy (Duina 1997; Caporaso 
and Jupille 2001) and on national identity (Risse 2001).
1992) and finally, compatibility between their competition policies (Menon and 
Hayward 1996; Streeck 1997; Gerber 1998; Anderson 1999).'*
There are, however, objections that can be made to this goodness of fit 
argument. Firstly, the entities under the microscope, namely the EU and German 
institutions and policies are neither fixed in time nor do they necessarily lend 
themselves to completely objective interpretation at any point of time. They are, in 
essence, moving targets and it would be quite a task to measure the distance or 
incompatibility, as it is known in the Europeanisation literature, between two objects 
that do not stand still. One of the reasons why the EU policies are moving targets is 
because there often is uploading or export of domestic preferences onto the EU 
template by domestic actors. This naturally affects the degree of fit between the EU 
and domestic versions. It is important to view fit and misfit as dynamic concepts that 
evolve over time. This particular approach loses its usefulness in explaining processes 
o f Europeanisation if  only a static conception of the fit between the national and the 
EU is employed.^
In order to examine the relevance of the goodness of fit argument to this 
particular study, an understanding of the German and EU policy approaches towards 
the provision of state aid to industry is necessary. According to the economic 
principles of the German model of the social market economy or soziale 
Marktwirtschafty market forces are preferred to interventionist policies as the means 
of structural adjustment in the economy.  ^ Ludwig Erhard, the first Economics 
Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany and the mastermind of the German 
‘economic miracle’ (Wirtschaftswunder), instilled the view among the economic and 
political elites of the day that industry should be left alone to be successful.^
The main task of industrial policy in Germany is to set general framework 
conditions (Rahmenbedingungen) which safeguard the functioning of the market 
within which the economic system and its components are to function and interact, 
and to ensure that there is genuine competition among companies. For instance, an 
important element of German industrial policy is its provision of infi*astructural
 ^This conçatibility between EU and German conqjetition policies, however, has been under severe 
strain in the 1990s, as discussed in Lodge (2003).
 ^Borzel and Risse (2003: 74) acknowledge in their recent work that ‘goodness of fit, adaptational 
pressures and domestic responses to Europeanisation are not static phenomena’.
 ^The phrase soziale Marktwirtschaft was coined by Alfred Müller-Armack (1948).
 ^For literature on the soziale Marktwirtschaft or social market economy, refer to Braun (1990); 
Peacock and Willgerodt (1989); Glouchevitch (1992); Smyser (1993); Larres and Panayi (1996).
support including research and development (R & D) aid. A systematic approach to 
industrial policy was only developed in the mid-1960s as a *'StrukturpolitiJ^' 
(structural policy) and even then, the government stance is that it tries to avoid direct 
intervention and to leave industrial reorganisation to the banks whenever possible. 
The market-oriented philosophy of the Federal Economics Ministry which is 
responsible for industrial policy means that “a hands-off approach in industrial policy, 
characterised by the economic adaptation at the level of the firm is clearly preferred to 
governmental intervention” (Buhner and Paterson 1987: 57). There is evidence that 
German economic elites are generally reluctant to engage in extensive subsidisation 
of industry, at least in their official statements. For instance, the members of the 
Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 
(German Council of Economic Experts) consistently criticise subsidies as deviations 
from free competition and from the free interplay of market forces 
(Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 
1971, 2002). Furthermore, the sensitivity of the German public to inflation 
discourages the German government from giving in to demands from industry for 
financial assistance that fuel the inflationary process. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s 
mandate of controlling inflation, up until the launch of European Monetary Union, 
also circumscribed the Federal Government’s ability to prop up industries extensively 
and continuously. However, the greater effectiveness of producers’ expressing their 
interests, when compared with consumers, means that governments often do concede 
to these requests for subsidies from industrial lobbies.
Part of the difficulty in employing the ‘goodness of fit’ approach is that it is 
difficult to arrive at a conclusive answer to the initial question of whether EU state aid 
policy violates German ideas about the role of the government in the economy in the 
first place. There are several components, both at the policy and institutional levels, 
that need to be addressed in looking for goodness of fit. Furthermore, there is the 
further rather intractable question of the gap between policy, rhetoric and practice - 
which is prevalent in the field of provision of state aid to industry in Germany (Kiister 
1974; Black 1986; Horn 1987; Sturm 1989; Kloss 1990). Kassim and Menon (1996: 
275) have observed, for instance, how “discrimination in favour of national firms 
could be detected, such as the contrast between German rhetoric concerning the role 
of the market in energy provision and its protectionist practices”.
If one were to look for fit between the EU and German state aid policies, a 
good place to start would be the role played by Germany in the formulation of the EU 
Competition Policy. Many of the principles of the EU Competition Policy can be 
traced to the German school of thought on competition law. The German 
representatives to the EEC at its founding were instrumental in spreading the German 
Ordoliberal version of neo-liberalism to the EEC arena. For example, Walter 
Hallstein, a founder of the EEC and the first President of the Commission, was 
associated with the Ordoliberals during the 1940s. Hallstein, himself a law professor, 
often referred to Ordoliberal concepts in his speeches on European integration.^ Hans 
von der Groeben, a main drafter of the Spaak Report which laid the basis for the 
Rome Treaty, was also closely associated with Ordoliberalism. He was, in fact, 
appointed as the first Commissioner for Competition Policy of the European 
Commission. Alfred Miiller-Armack, an important figure in the formulation of the 
soziale Marktwirtschaft or social market economy in Germany, was an official of the 
Federal German Government and was influential in shaping EC economic policy in its 
early years.^ In fact, Hans von der Groeben commented, “the German Minister for 
Economic Affairs, Professor Erhard, stated in 1962 that he himself could have written 
the competition provisions of the EEC Treaty” (von der Groeben 1987: 48).
Germany has often been perceived to be a supporter of a stringent EU state aid 
regime (Buhner and Paterson 1987; Grewlich 1987; Menon and Hayward 1996; 
Anderson 1999). The aim of the Federal Government has been to slow down the 
international ‘subsidy race’ because subsidies in other countries had caused financial 
problems for numerous German enterprises which were actually competitive 
(Grewlich 1987: 69). Buhner and Paterson (1987: 53) argued that “the German 
Economics Ministry has acted as the standard bearer of economic liberalism in the EC 
Council of Ministers”. The German government has often approved of the 
Commission’s pledges to scrutinise the subsidy practices of the richer member states 
with greater stringency. It could even be argued that many officials in the Federal 
Government have been grateful for the supranational support provided by the EU for 
their own domestic efforts to limit the granting of aid to industry (Anderson 1999: 
117). Prior to German unification. West Germany was seen to be an ardent supporter
* Hallstein said, “What the Community is integrating is the role of the state in establishing the 
framework within which economic activity takes place” (Hallstein 1972: 28).
® Refer to Alfred Miiller-Armack (1971) for his own personal analysis o f the development of EC 
policies and institutions.
of strict European Commission regulation of state aid. Ironically, as it turned out, 
during the first few years after German unification, Germany maintained its tough 
stance on state aid control at a time when member states like Spain and France were 
pressuring the Commission to soften its approach so as to promote the 
competitiveness of European industry.
The argument that ‘policy misfits essentially equal compliance problems’ 
(Borzel and Risse 2003: 61) is not valid to fully understand the process of adaptation 
on the domestic German level, in that it is reasonable to argue that there is largely no 
policy misfit between the relevant EU and German policies. This search for a 
‘significant misfit’ as a ‘necessary condition providing domestic actors with 
additional opportunities and constraints’ is quite nearly futile in this case (Borzel and 
Risse 2000: 3). When one cannot even definitively arrive at an understanding of the 
compatibility, or lack thereof, between the German and EU policies, it is somewhat 
difficult to pursue the path of goodness of fit. Even when this policy misfit is found in 
sub-sections of policy, this thesis argues that it is not the policy misfit that drives the 
responses of the domestic actors to EU shipbuilding policy.
1.2.3 Compliance with ËU Law as an Indicator of Europeanisation
Along the line of reasoning of the goodness of fit argument, “policy misfits 
essentially equal compliance problems” (Borzel and Risse 2000: 5). Now with EU 
state aid and shipbuilding policies, this approach of measuring compliance is 
potentially useful as the domestic actors are prohibited fi’om carrying out certain 
activities by the EU. For instance, one can track whether the number of Commission 
Decisions on state aid addressed to the German shipbuilding industry has risen or 
fallen over time as a measure of compliance of Germany with EU state aid and 
shipbuilding law. Clothed in policy armour of limited state aid provision, one would 
expect that Germany would fare well in terms of complying with EU state aid law. In 
fact, as shown in Table 1.1, Germany heads the list of EU member states in terms of 
non-compliance with EU state aid law, as measured by the number of Commission 
Decisions on state aid to industry. Commission Decisions address state aid cases in
which the Commission initiated proceedings because it found that the aid was 
potentially not compatible with the Single Market/°
Table 1.1. Commission Decisions on state aid to industry addressed to EU member 
states, 1995-2001
Member
State
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Austria 22 14 11 22 14 21 20
Belgium 15 12 16 9 5 5 24
Denmark 17 143 194 154 124 122 11
Finland 2 3 5 9 8 1 7
France 51 62 53 36 79 79 39
Germany 209 48 38 27 29 47 130
Greece 9 2 2 2 12 11 12
Ireland 3 64 63 77 94 61 7
Italy 93 3 1 3 0 2 39
Luxembourg 1 37 33 38 24 33 3
Netherlands 34 48 32 28 14 26 38
Portugal 12 10 15 15 8 16 15
Spain 110 14 8 8 8 17 73
Sweden 6 7 10 14 8 15 2
UK 35 7 21 18 17 19 31
EU15 619 474 502 460 444 475 451
German 
share of EU 
total (%)
33.8 30.2 38.7 33.5 27.9 25.7 28.8
Source: Author’s calculations based on figures from CEC (1996: 95), (1997a:
73), (1998b: 88), (1999a: 87), (2000a: 90), (2001a: 90) and (2002b: 
105).
The proportion of state aid decisions taken only after a formal investigation 
procedure has been above the EU average in Germany, while the proportion of 
negative decisions for Germany has also been above the EU average (CEC 2001b: 20 
and 22). There is thus empirical evidence that whatever the theoretical ‘fit’ between 
the EU and German state aid policies, there is significant breach of the supposedly 
agreeable EU policy by Germany.
Conçetition Commissioner Karel van Miert commented in 1999, “Germany is the European 
chanqjion when it comes to state aid’ (interview with Leipziger Volkszeitung, quoted in Thielemann 
1999: 408).
However, while such an analysis will provide indicators of the compliance of 
Germany with EU law in this field, it does mask another dynamic at work in this 
relationship between the EU and Germany. Compliance is not the only mechanism by 
which Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding policy field has occurred. This 
thesis shows that the hypothesis that “compliance leads to desired outcomes and 
therefore should be the indicator for successful implementation” (Knill and Lehmkuhl 
1998: 1) is an inadequate basis of inquiry for the study of the Europeanisation of the 
German shipbuilding policy field.
The number of shipbuilding aid cases in Germany indicates the fi*equency and 
level of state aid provision to the German shipbuilding industry. Rising numbers of 
such state aid cases and associated Commission Decisions may indicate that the 
German government has not reduced its provision of aid to its shipbuilding industry in 
response to EU shipbuilding policy. However, this thesis argues that the analysis of 
‘EU action - German reaction’ should not rest merely on statistical measures. 
Quantitative analysis should be supplemented with qualitative analysis, and there 
must be closer analysis of the state aid cases such that changes in the type of state aid 
granted over time are also considered in understanding the process of 
Europeanisation. This thesis shows that even though Germany has consistently not 
fared well in terms of compliance with EU state aid law, there has been increasing 
Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry in terms of policy content and 
the behaviour of policy actors.
1.2.4 Europeanisation of Interest Representation -  Why Does It Happen?
The literature on interest representation activity of European firms discusses 
both the formation of European-level associations and the Europeanisation of 
domestic groups (Mazey and Richardson 1993, 1996; Marks and McAdam 1996; 
Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998). Much of this research attributes the 
Europeanisation of interest representation of national actors to the benefits of 
membership and the costs of non-membership of EU groups (Grant 1991; King 1991; 
Jordan and McLaughlin 1991; van Schendelen 1993; Greenwood 1995, 2002). The 
predominant view in this literature is that the size of the firm is important in 
determining its interest representation activity at the EU level (Coen 1997, 1998;
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Mazey and Richardson 2001; Coen and Dannreuther 2003). In the case of the German 
shipbuilding industry, the lack of differentiation along the lines of firm size is 
noteworthy. Even the largest German shipbuilding firms do not have individual 
representative offices in Brussels, and even the SMEs in the German shipbuilding 
industry participate actively in the EU-wide forums. This anomalous response of 
German shipbuilding firms to the EU in terms of interest representation activity is, in 
fact, a signal that conventional thinking on the Europeanisation of interest 
representation activity is not adequate to account for the dynamics at work in the 
German shipbuilding industry.
At the heart of the discussion of the Europeanisation of firms’ interest 
representation activity is the issue of loss of national competence of domestic public 
actors with regard to the relevant policies. This thesis suggests that it is not merely the 
loss of national competence over the shipbuilding policy field, the gains of 
membership and the costs of non-membership of EU shipbuilding associations that 
explain the Europeanisation of interest representation activity of German shipbuilding 
firms. An important driver of the Europeanisation of German shipbuilding firms has 
been the Europeanisation of public actors with whom they interact on the domestic 
stage.
1.3 A SUPRANATIONAL STATE AID POLICY AND A NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL POLICY: INHERENT CONFLICT
A common approach to the provision of state aid between the EU and 
Germany in terms of a codified competition policy is well and good, but it must be 
acknowledged that there is an inherent tension between a supranational (EU) state aid 
policy and the pursuit of a national industrial policy. State aid policy is ‘a distinctively 
supranational policy’ (Cini and McGowan 1998: 136) in that it does not have a 
counterpart in national competition policy. State aid issues are, however, not 
exclusive to competition policy. Rather, they transcend a number of national 
economic policies, with industrial, regional and technology policies figuring as the 
most important.
Intrinsic tensions result from the different policy and philosophical 
orientations towards the provision of state aid that are inherent in competition and
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industrial policies. State aid can be treated as an economic instrument that is regulated 
within the context of competition policy. In this respect, it bears a negative 
connotation of being the subject of bans or constraints due to its distortive impact on 
competition. Conversely, within the context of industrial policy, state aid occupies the 
position of being an economic tool to achieve the objectives of industrial policy. The 
goal of member states’ competition and industrial policies is to promote, if not to 
maximise, their own national economic interests.
Despite the rhetoric of its economic elites discouraging and even condemning 
the provision of state aid to industry, German industries have been significant 
recipients of state financial support. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study 
warned against the persistently high level of German subsidies even before German 
reunification (International Monetary Fund 1989: 52-54). As Kiister (1974: 65) 
argued, the post-war “recovery of the economy was greatly helped by substantial 
initial state aids for private industry”. The level of subsidies rose almost 
uninterruptedly and by over 50 per cent between the Wende (the change of 
government in 1982) and German unification in 1990 although the German 
government had committed itself to reducing them (Smyser 1993: 114). Kloss (1990: 
119) argues that social reasons and pressures by individual industrial lobbies result in 
large direct or indirect (through tax concessions) subsidies and loans.
Appendix A provides statistics on subsidies in EU member states from 1960 to 
2002. These figures indicate that the Federal Republic of Germany, while not 
occupying the top position, tends to be at the higher end of the league of EU member 
states in terms of subsidies granted, as measured on a per capita basis and per person 
employed. The German amounts have also consistently been above the EU average. 
Empirical data collected by the EU comes to similar conclusions. Table 1.5 provides 
statistics on state aid to the manufacturing sector in EU member states from 1988 to 
2000 as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Table 1.6 in ECU/Euro per person 
employed in the manufacturing sector and Table 1.7 in per capita terms.
" A frequently used definition of industrial policy is that offered in Johnson (1984) who defines 
industrial pohcy as “the initiation and co-ordination o f governmental initiatives to leverage upward the 
productivity and con^etitiveness of the whole economy and of particular industries in it”. A narrower 
definition is offered by Tyson and Zysman (1983) who define industrial policy as “government policy 
aimed at or motivated by problems within specific sectors”.
1 2
Table 1.5. State aid to the manufacturing sector in EU member states as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 1988-2000 (per cent)
COUNTRY 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
Belgium 0.95 0.80 0.79 0.72 0.35 0.45 0.56 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.23 0 . 2 0
Denmark 0.40 0.39 0.32 0.34 0.31 0.52 0.48 0.49 0.44 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.24
France 0.91 0.64 0.54 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.36 0.52 0.42 0.48 0.41 0.40 0.61
Germany 0.78 0.75 0.92 0.92 0.96 1 . 2 1 1.17 0.42 0.33 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.32
Greece 2.84 1 . 6 8 1.69 1.31 1.51 0.62 0.44 0.29 0.29 0.43 0.33 0.36 0.32
Ireland 1.28 1.06 1.03 0.70 0.51 0.51 0.41 0.85 0.71 0.61 0.55 0.49 0.44
Italy 1.33 0.90 1.83 1 . 2 0 1.27 1.44 1.17 0.98 0.59 0.70 0.45 0.35 0.33
Luxembourg 0.58 0.71 0.64 0 . 6 6 0.62 0.38 0.34 0.40 0.30 0 . 2 1 0.79 0.60 0.48
Netherlands 0.58 0.49 0.53 0.33 0.25 0.24 0.23 1.31 0.99 0.78 0.53 0.31 0.28
Portugal 0.44 1.75 1.34 0.46 0.45 0.56 0.79 0.36 0.32 0.31 0.29 0 . 2 0 0.19
Spain 1.43 0.44 0.51 0.27 0.23 0.35 0.37 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.18
UK 0.57 0.43 0.44 0.32 0.25 0.14 0.15 0.35 0 . 2 0 0.23 0.18 0 . 2 1 0.19
EC12 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.48 0.40 0.35 0.33 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 0
German rank 
from the highest
6 "" 5 m 3 rd 3 rd 2 nd 2 nd 3 rd 2 nd 3 rd 2 nd 2 nd 3 rd
Source: Author’s calculations based on statistics on state aid to the manufacturing sector from CEC (1995a: 67), (1998a: 71) and (2002a:
40) and GDP figures from OECD (2003a).
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Table 1.6. State aid to the manufacturing sector in EU member states per person employed in the manufacturing sector, 1988-2000 (ECU/Euro)
COUNTRY 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
Belgium 1657.55 1490.56 1602.43 1548.97 827.25 1175.82 1600.63 702.27 675.61 771.80 695.40 661.36 586.99
Denmark 7140.07 719.65 642.25 700.75 696.39 1257.59 1265.01 1520.91 1437.39 966.52 1079.68 1118.85 904.51
France 1694.29 1269.04 1161.55 963.75 113.40 1294.34 1044.53 1427.93 1375.05 1619.48 1416.54 1440.71 2274.29
Germany 952.35 964.05 1269.42 1210.64 1490.96 1613.55 2333.09 967.86 807.30 1042.62 963.81 913.49 892.80
Greece 4436.42 2920.87 3181.61 2898.67 3604.66 1781.51 1395.14 870.35 956.53 1432.47 1126.93 1299.68 1187.62
Ireland 2048.11 1841.92 1894.80 1325.54 1039.44 1058.18 894.89 1868.66 1628.67 1438.03 1309.55 1194.91 1102.06
Italy 1728.24 1292.68 2825.96 2010.31 2226.02 2328.61 1942.52 1389.70 1008.63 1262.47 828.99 661.02 670.32
Luxembourg 1079.27 1477.93 1431.58 1653.43 1750.57 1126.78 1294.50 888.89 884.69 660.42 2599.97 2141.61 1861.00
Netherlands 1026.80 917.09 1030.12 662.77 548.52 570.63 611.11 2113.02 2034.68 1632.87 1105.56 666.51 629.90
Portugal 171.51 781.23 674.18 263.69 318.36 399.32 595.26 1442.55 1507.74 1572.31 1554.55 1137.20 1115.50
Spain 1643.82 577.05 738.85 437.08 405.10 583.98 618.93 677.78 580.92 522.68 515.70 655.55 654.62
UK 755.10 609.72 654.58 558.83 443.96 268.45 308.94 285.07 201.27 234.85 194.32 228.47 214.82
EC12 1263.93 1002.61 1381.82 1121.54 1242.49 1309.44 1443.26 848.37 798.21 695.02 656.49 400.39 414.27
German 
rank from 
the highest
1 0 “* yth 6 '*^ 6 '" 4 t n 3rd is t 2nd 2nd 4'" 4 t n "  4^ 5 ^
Note: 1988-1995: in ECU and 1996-2000: in EURO
Source: Author’s calculations based on statistics on state aid to the manufacturing sector from CEC (1995a: 67), (1998a: 71) and (2002a:
40) and manufacturing employment figures from OECD (2003a).
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Table 1.7. State aid to the manufacturing sector in EU member states per capita, 1988-2000 (ECU/Euro)
COUNTRY 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
Belgium 125.66 113.86 122.34 116.53 60.23 81.88 108.09 61.40 57.19 64.80 58.96 55.86 49.48
Denmark 70.46 70.11 62.44 66.70 64.52 112.67 111.59 101.23 93.85 61.98 69.34 71.34 57.29
France 134.14 98.70 90.01 73.01 82.56 89.22 69.83 127.94 121.89 142.45 124.74 124.72 195.25
Germany 127.69 102.41 137.45 160.16 181.24 242.63 247.64 78.43 65.96 87.78 81.94 79.19 78.96
Greece 154.83 101.53 108.44 92.45 1 1 0 . 8 8 47.13 35.04 57.99 63.25 93.31 73.10 83.64 76.56
freland 107.03 99.65 105.24 73.93 58.25 59.28 51.21 193.11 163.30 141.83 129.65 116.90 108.57
Italy 163.83 123.70 272.89 196.21 2 1 0 . 1 1 212.45 174.72 83.12 60.11 72.79 49.08 38.67 38.09
Luxembourg 104.14 139.24 136.00 148.38 156.21 103.10 105.83 54.46 55.69 42.92 170.59 140.32 126.61
Netherlands 76.24 68.49 78.55 50.93 41.30 41.24 42.40 189.54 180.60 144.63 99.73 59.84 56.21
Portugal 18.31 85.21 73.69 29.36 33.07 40.17 59.44 115.76 121.75 127.75 128.25 93.25 91.75
Spain 108.81 39.08 50.64 29.60 26.23 36.98 38.64 46.76 39.39 35.75 35.25 44.77 44.67
UK 69.02 55.99 58.66 45.69 34.16 19.74 22.72 28.13 19.92 23.09 19.23 22.38 20.83
EC12 116.48 88.30 1 2 2 . 2 1 103.65 108.55 122.82 116.15 53.18 51.18 46.53 45.49 28.54 30.12
German rank 
from the 
highest
4 th 4th 2nd 2nd 2nd ist ist ist 2nd 3rd 2nd 3rd 3rd
Note: 1988-1995: in ECU and 1996-2000: in EURO
Source: Author’s calculations based on statistics on state aid to the manufacturing sector from CEC (1995a: 67), (1998a: 71) and (2002a:
40) and population figures from OECD (2003a).
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Whilst it was not the member state that granted the most state aid to the 
manufacturing sector, neither was it the member state that granted the least. 
Furthermore, after German unification, Germany often topped the list of member 
states granting such aid. This indicates that while Germany is committed to a social 
market economy in principle, exceptions to market principles do exist in Germany. 
One should, however, note that while competition is a prime tenet of the Ordoliberal 
economic school, no explicit mention is made of the valid provision of state aid in its 
texts.
State aid policy is particularly problematic as it lies at the juncture between 
EU concerns about the functioning of the Single Market and member states’ national 
concerns about industrial policy. As Cini (2000: 9) argues, “Commission decisions 
can, in a very blatant manner, prevent national governments from pursuing their own 
(national) industrial policies”. The objectives of the EU Treaty include the institution 
of “a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted” in 
accordance with Article 3(g). The EU thus aims to ensure that state aid provision is 
supervised and controlled such that Article 3(g) is respected by the member states. 
The EU enforces its competition policy in order to “ensure that anti-competitive 
practices do not engender new forms of local protectionism which would only lead to 
a re-partitioning of the market” (CEC 1985: para. 157).^  ^Laudati (1996: 244) asserts, 
“in contrast to the Community’s policy goals, in the national context, market 
integration plays little or no role in the enforcement of competition law”. It is in the 
very nature of state aid policy that battles between the Commission and individual 
member state governments will, by definition and necessity, emerge. In this area of 
competition policy, it is the member state governments themselves and not merely the 
firms that become the object of scrutiny by the Commission and in case of breach of 
EU law, the subject of EU action (Smith 1996). The analysis of the impact of EU 
shipbuilding aid policy on Germany is thus particularly valuable for the study of 
Europeanisation as it reveals the implications of the shipbuilding aid regime on both 
public and private actors in the German shipbuilding policy field.
Hans von der Groeben, who was the first Conpetition Commissioner, observed in 1961: " It is ... 
beyond dispute ,.. and the authors of the Treaty were fully aware of this -  that it would be useless to 
bring down trade barriers between member states if the governments or private industry were to remain 
firee through economic and fiscal legislation, through subsidies ..., virtually to undo the opening of the 
markets and to prevent, or at least unduly to delay the action needed to adapt them to the Common 
Market” (quoted in Swann 1983: 2).
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1.4 PREVIEW OF THESIS
This thesis argues that the Europeanisation processes of the public and private 
actors in the German shipbuilding industry are interdependent. In order to understand 
the impact of EU shipbuilding policy on German public actors, Chapter 2 explores the 
role of the EU as a governance actor in the German shipbuilding industry while 
Chapter 3 tracks the evolution of German shipbuilding policy over the period 1960- 
2002. Chapters 2 and 3 jointly provide evidence of the ways in which German 
shipbuilding policy has changed over time in line with evolving approaches and 
policy shifts at the EU level. Empirical analysis of German shipbuilding aid cases 
over the period 1960-2002 is used to assess the level and nature of compliance of 
Germany with EU shipbuilding aid law. Chapter 3 explores the non-compliance of 
Germany with EU law despite the apparent lack of a policy misfit between the EU 
and German shipbuilding policies.
The responses of German private actors -  the shipbuilding firms and the 
German shipbuilding association -  to EU shipbuilding policy are examined in the 
following three chapters. By analysing the motivations or drivers of the private actors’ 
responses and the changing interactions of the private and public actors, Chapters 4, 5 
and 6  jointly explore the interdependence of the responses of German public actors 
and those of German private actors to EU shipbuilding policy. This thesis posits that 
an important aspect of the Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry is the 
emergence and increasing role of EU-level shipbuilding forums and organisations. 
Chapter 4 discusses how the EU-wide maritime forums and shipbuilding associations 
have become important and even, decisive players in the EU and national 
shipbuilding policy fields. This chapter also assesses the evidence of Europeanisation 
of the German shipbuilding industry in terms of the focus of its interest representation 
activity. The response of the private actors in the German shipbuilding industry to EU 
shipbuilding policy is shown to be linked to the Europeanisation of German 
shipbuilding policy, rather than to policy misfit. Salient characteristics of the 
shipbuilding industry are also offered as drivers of these processes.
Chapters 5 and 6  take Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG, a large German 
shipbuilding concern, as a case study to analyse how the German shipbuilding 
industry has been Europeanised in terms of the impact of the EU on the orientations
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and strategic interactions of this major German shipbuilding firm of the 1980s and 
1990s. This Europeanisation of the policy actors is studied, firstly, in terms of this 
shipbuilding firm’s interactions with the public actors involved in the shipbuilding 
policy field -  namely, the Federal Government, the Land Government of Bremen and 
the EU. Secondly, the Europeanisation of the orientation of the firm is studied in 
terms of Bremer Vulkan’s awareness of and reference to the EU. Thirdly, the 
Europeanisation process of the firm is studied in terms of the changing orientations or 
strategies of Bremer Vulkan in its interest representation activity. Empirical 
information on several observable implications of the Europeanisation of these policy 
actors is collated and presented. Firstly, the participation of the Federal Government, 
the Land Government of Bremen and the EU are traced over the fifteen major 
occasions of state aid provision that have been identified in this thesis. Tracking the 
participation of the Land Government of Bremen and of the Federal Government in 
the provision of state aid to Bremer Vulkan over these fifteen episodes provides 
evidence of the emerging trends in the domestic shipbuilding policy field. Analysing 
the interactions (meetings, conversations and correspondence) between and among the 
private and public actors over time reveals the importance of the EU in the state aid 
affairs of Bremer Vulkan. The Europeanisation of the orientations of the public and 
private actors in the Bremen shipbuilding industry is studied by analysing references 
to the EU by Bremer Vulkan, the Bremen Land Government and the Federal 
Government over these fifteen state aid cases. The Europeanisation of the orientation 
of the firm is further studied by looking at the number and nature of references to the 
Bremen Land Government, the Federal Government and the EU in Bremer Vulkan’s 
annual reports from 1980 to 1995.
Chapter 7 then brings together the findings from the various chapters and 
provides analysis of the processes of Europeanisation at work in the German 
shipbuilding policy field and industry.
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1.5 METHODS AND SOURCES
A coherent account of causality or impact should specify how the effects are 
exerted on the subject. George and McKeown (1985: 35) refer to an approach called 
“process tracing” in which the researcher looks closely at “the decision process by 
which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes”. This thesis adopts this 
approach of process tracing to study the ways in which the initiatives at the EU level 
have led to changes on the German domestic level in terms of relevant policy content 
and policy actors. Tracing decision behaviour involves studying which actors, 
problems and solutions are brought together. Contact patterns are important in the 
operationalisation of this variable. Understanding who has contact with whom, when, 
how and why sheds light on the processes of Europeanisation at work.
Multiple sources of evidence have been used in this thesis. Both quantitative 
and qualitative data was used. Analysis of official documents, archival records, press 
reports and interviews provide multiple measures of the phenomena under study. The 
impact of the EU shipbuilding policy on the domestic policy content in Germany is 
studied by analysing EU and German legislation on shipbuilding aid. EU documents 
that are analysed include Council Directives and Regulations. Press releases of EU 
institutions (the Commission and the Council), EU state aid surveys, EU competition 
policy reports and EU competition policy newsletters are studied to identify the 
evolving focus and preoccupations of EU policy in this field. The impact of the EU 
policy field on the behaviour of the Federal Government in terms of the provision of 
state aid to its shipbuilding industry is studied empirically by analysing state aid cases 
and European Commission Decisions. This information was obtained firom the 
Official Journal of the European Communities (C and L series). German shipbuilding 
legislation and subsidy reports {Subventionsberichte) issued by the Deutscher 
Bundestag (German Parliament) are examined to explain German shipbuilding 
policy. Information on the increasing EU-level activity in the shipbuilding policy 
field was obtained fi"om the publications and internet websites of the Maritime 
Industries Forum (MIF), the Association of West European Shipbuilders (AWES), the 
Committee of European Union Shipbuilders’ Associations (CESA) and the German 
shipbuilding association, Verband fUr Schiffbau und Meerestechnik (VSM). These
The Stability and Growth Act obliges the Federal Government to publish a subsidy report 
(JSubventionsbericht) every two years which provides information about financial aid and tax 
concessions granted to con^anies and private households.
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publications include the annual reports, press releases and the proceedings of 
conferences of these organisations.
Such analysis of written material was supplemented by interviews conducted 
by the author with officials dealing with the shipbuilding sector in the European 
Commission, including heads of units in the Directorate-General for Competition. 
Interviews were also conducted with German government officials who are involved 
in the regulation of the German shipbuilding industry in the Federal Economics 
Ministry, the Economics and Finance Ministries of Hamburg and Bremen. Members 
of management of German shipbuilding firms, representatives of the Handelskammer 
Bremen, former members of the management of Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG and 
representatives of IG Metall were also interviewed.
The choice of Bremer Vulkan as a single case study is justified because it 
serves as a particularly revealing case study. Due to the fact that there was a relatively 
intense relationship between Bremer Vulkan and the EU over a long period (1980- 
1996), it is possible to trace the increasing impact of the EU shipbuilding policy on 
the German shipbuilding policy field, as manifested by this major shipbuilding firm of 
the 1980s and 1990s. If one adopts the firm as the unit of analysis, Bremer Vulkan 
was the predominant and a repeated subject of Europeanisation over the period 1980- 
1996. In fact, several of the shipbuilding firms that have been the subject of EU 
legislation on state aid have been part of the Bremer Vulkan consortium at one time or 
the other. Not a single year went by between 1980 and 1996 when Bremer Vulkan 
did not receive state aid. There were, in fact, fifteen major occasions on which Bremer 
Vulkan received state aid from either the Federal and/or Land govemment(s) which 
was not scheduled according to either Federal or Land shipbuilding aid programmes. 
Because of the iterative and multi-episodic nature of state aid provision to Bremer 
Vulkan, this shipbuilding firm is a useful case study to analyse changes in the 
decisions and interactions of the public and private actors concerned. Furthermore, it 
played a significant role in the creation of the Maritime Industries Forum that this 
thesis presents as evidence of Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry. 
Bremer Vulkan was of significant general public interest in Bremen from its founding 
in 1893 until its collapse in 1996. The issues that faced Bremer Vulkan vis-à-vis the
Refer to Appendix B for the constituent firms o f Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG.
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EU were important both to the regional political and economic landscape of Bremen, 
in particular, and to Germany as a whole.
The report of the Bremen parliamentary inquiry into Bremer Vulkan Verbund 
AG provides in-depth and comprehensive information on the interactions, both 
official and unofficial, between and among Bremer Vulkan, the Land Government of 
Bremen, the Federal Government and the EU (Bremische Bürgerschafi 1998). This 
report provided the documentary evidence for the analysis of interactions between 
public and private actors in the cases of state aid provision to Bremer Vulkan. As this 
report is the result of an in-depth and lengthy parliamentary inquiry into the collapse 
of Bremer Vulkan, it has been used as an authoritative source of information on the 
activities of Bremer Vulkan during the period of study. The annual company reports 
of Bremer Vulkan fi'om 1980 to 1995 provide further primary written material for 
analysis of the role of the German and EU authorities in the affairs of Bremer Vulkan. 
Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry collectively is studied by 
analysing references and attitudes to the EU in the annual reports of the German 
shipbuilding association, Verband fUr Schiÿbau und Meerestechnik (VSM). The VSM 
serves as a valuable insight into the evolution of orientations of German shipbuilding 
firms.
This research is an inductive study in that it searches for and offers 
explanations for the ‘dynamics of Europeanisation’ based on the empirical findings 
obtained in the study of the changes in the German shipbuilding industry over time. It 
adopts a case study method. The study of Europeanisation does not always lend itself 
to ‘the language of dependent and independent variables and the logic of regression 
analysis’ (Olsen 1996: 271). Instead, the case study approach is particularly 
appropriate for answering the questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ in the study of the 
Europeanisation of German shipbuilding policy content and policy actors. A detailed 
case study provides evidence for the analysis of these processes of Europeanisation by 
studying the behaviour of relevant actors in detail and continuously over the period of 
study. Admittedly, the case study approach runs the risk of being purely descriptive 
and non-generalisable. The limitations of the case study method are addressed by 
observing and analysing several dimensions of the process of Europeanisation. To
The legislation o f the Federal Government, the publication of German institutions like the Deutscher 
Bundestag, the parliamentary inquiry report on Bremer Vulkan, the annual reports of Bremer Vulkan 
Verbund AG and of the VSM are all in German, and the translations used in tiiis thesis are the author’s 
own.
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increase the construct validity of this case study, multiple sources of evidence 
(documents, archival records and interviews) have been used to establish a chain of 
evidence to substantiate the arguments forwarded in this thesis. Information on as 
many observable implications of the object under study (impact on national policy 
content, responses of public actors, responses of the firms and of the industrial 
association) has been collated to offer an analysis of the ways in which public and 
private actors in the domestic realm have responded to European integration in the 
shipbuilding policy field.
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Chapter Two
THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A GOVERNANCE ACTOR IN 
THE GERMAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the EC played the role o f a supranational 
governance actor that policed the provision of shipbuilding aid in member states. In 
the last decade, however, the EU has also emerged as the arena in which the private 
actors of the shipbuilding industries of its member states could voice their interests 
effectively. The 1990s saw the emergence and increased importance of European 
maritime forums and cross-national shipbuilding projects. Private actors in the 
German shipbuilding industry, namely the shipbuilding firms themselves and the 
German shipbuilding association, then realised that the EU was now not just shaking 
the proverbial stick but was also dangling a carrot out to them. The EU has thus not 
only developed an extensive regulatory apparatus in the shipbuilding policy field, it 
has also increasingly taken on a proactive role in shaping the priorities and direction 
of the shipbuilding industries of its member states.
The study of the ways in which German shipbuilding policy and relevant 
policy actors have been affected by European integration in the shipbuilding policy 
field requires an investigation of the growth of EU competences in this field. This 
chapter analyses the ways in which the EU is a governance actor in the German 
shipbuilding industry. Section 2.1 first analyses EU legislation on the provision of 
shipbuilding aid, changes of such laws from 1969 to 2002 and other goals pursued by 
the EU in its shipbuilding policy. Then, the role of the EU in addressing shipbuilding 
issues on a global scale is discussed. The importance of German unification for 
understanding the impact of EU shipbuilding policy on the unified German 
shipbuilding industry is also discussed in Section 2.2. This chapter argues that the 
opportunities presented by European integration to the German shipbuilding industry 
go beyond its shipbuilding policy. Section 2.3 thus explores the way in which EU 
maritime transport, research and technology, fisheries and development aid policies 
are relevant for the German shipbuilding industry. The final section of this chapter 
then offers evidence of the Europeanisation of actors in the German shipbuilding
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policy field in terms of German shipbuilding policy content and the compliance, or 
lack thereof, of the Federal Republic of Germany with EU shipbuilding aid 
legislation. By carefully tracing EU shipbuilding policy content, the stance of the EU 
with regard to shipbuilding issues and the characteristics of German shipbuilding aid 
cases over time, this chapter offers evidence of Europeanisation processes in the 
German shipbuilding industry.
2.1 EU GOVERNANCE OF THE EUROPEAN SHIPBUILDING
INDUSTRY
2.1.1 EU Policy on the Provision of Shipbuilding Aid
Time and time again, the European Commission has issued statements about 
the undesirable impact of state aid on the internal market. As the Commission is 
convinced that state aid is in principle distortive and does not necessarily help an 
industry to improve its competitiveness, it has pursued a policy aiming at the 
reduction of state aid in the shipbuilding sector. The Commission has also argued that 
in terms of productivity and performance within the shipbuilding sector, “very often 
better results are obtained in member states where direct aid to shipyards plays a less 
prominent part in public support schemes for the maritime sector” (European 
Commission Press Release P/85/81).
This does not mean, however, that the EU institutions are completely blind to 
the motivations for member states providing state aid to their respective shipbuilding 
industries. As early as 1972, the European Commission recognised that compared 
with other industries, shipbuilding could not be protected by conventional commercial 
policy measures like customs duties and quantitative restrictions. Furthermore, it 
acknowledged that the needs of the shipbuilding industry could not be ignored 
“because of the regional and social considerations arising firom the location of a 
number of shipyards” (CEC 1972a: 132). The Commission has acknowledged that 
there were ‘particularly serious problems’ for workers in the shipbuilding industry 
because the shipyards were generally to be found in coastal locations where there
In 1986, for instance, the Commission stated, “the internal market for shipbuilding has all but 
disappeared thanks to the artificial barriers created by the state” (European Commission Press Release 
IP/86/611).
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were few alternative job opportunities (CEC 1978: 140). These concerns for the 
welfare of the coastal communities figure in the rhetoric of the European Commission 
until the present time. The Commission has argued that since the shipbuilding 
industry is often found in regions that qualify for regional assistance, aid to these 
sectors also contributes to more regional support policies (CEC 1999b: 19, 2000b: 
16).
In 1965, the Commission submitted to the Council a draft directive concerning 
the granting of shipbuilding aid with a view to correcting distortions of competition 
on the international shipbuilding market. The directive was only adopted by the 
Council in July 1969. The aims of this first directive were to protect the EC 
shipbuilding industry and harmonise shipbuilding aid granted within the EC (CEC 
1972a: 133). It fixed the ceiling of national aid granted to shipbuilding at 10 per cent 
of the selling price, a percentage which corresponded to the competitive disadvantage 
faced by the EC shipyards as a result of the distortion of competition. This directive 
was to have expired at the end of 1971 but it provided that the Commission could, 
before the date of expiry, submit a report on the international shipbuilding market to 
the Council together with any necessary proposals for measures to be taken. This 
marked the beginning of a long series of Council directives and regulations on 
shipbuilding aid.^^
Operating aid, which is normally not allowed in the EU as it is thought to 
promote economic inefficiency, has been authorised by the Council in the 
shipbuilding sector since the early 1970s. In fact, shipbuilding has been the only 
industrial sector to systematically benefit from operating aid, which tends to distort 
intra-Community competition (European Commission Press Release IP/97/836). The 
aid rates remained extremely high until 1987 when the Sixth Council Directive on aid 
to shipbuilding introduced “a tighter, more restrictive policy” because of the “need to 
ensure increased efficiency and improved competitiveness in the sector, to spur
The Commission acknowledges the fact that “shipyards often form important regional clusters whose 
disappearance would inflict great hardship on coastal communities” (European Commission Press 
Release SPEECH/02/420).
Council Directive 69/262/EEC of 28 July 1969 on the granting of aid to shipbuilding aimed at 
correcting coirqietition on the international market (Official Journal of the European Communities L 
206,15 August 1969, p. 25).
Refer to Appendix C for a summarised description of the various European Council Directives and 
Regulations on aid to shipbuilding from 1969 to 2002.
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restructuring and to ensure fair intra-EU competition” (CEC 2000c: 21).^° The 
objective of the Sixth Directive was to phase out operating aid. This same policy of 
phasing out operating aid was continued by the Seventh Directive of 21 December 
1990.^  ^The Commission’s Vice-President in 1990, Martin Bangemann, stressed that 
“state aid can only be temporary and must disappear in the medium term” and as such, 
the Seventh Directive was intended to remain in force for a shorter length of time than 
its predecessors and laid greater emphasis on the degressive nature of subsidies 
(European Commission Press Release IP/90/504). As mentioned earlier, the 
Commission is not particularly approving of operating aid as it finds it “highly 
questionable whether the expenditure involved represents a cost-effective use of 
limited public resources”, and it also believes that “the aid has tended to distort 
competition within the Common Market” (CEC 2000c: 21).
A new feature of the Sixth Directive of 26 January 1987 was the inclusion of 
all aid for shipbuilding, including that granted to ship-owners, under the aid ceiling. 
This was done to ensure transparency between the different aid systems in different 
member states (European Commission Press Release MEMO/86/168). This 
constrained the ability of member state governments to grant other types of 
shipbuilding aid, like aid for investment. The ceiling for production aid set a 
maximum level of all direct and indirect operating aid for shipbuilding and ship- 
conversion. The ceiling was set annually by the Commission and was expressed as a 
percentage of the contract value before aid. The ceiling was fixed with reference to 
the prevailing difference between the cost structures of the most competitive EC 
shipyards and the prices charged by their main international competitors. The 
Commission reduced the aid ceiling in stages whenever the cost-price gap between 
the EC and the Far East fell. Table 2.1 lists the shipbuilding aid ceilings allowed by 
the EU from 1987 to 1998.
Council Directive 87/167/EEC of 26 January 1987 on aid to shipbuilding (Official Journal of the 
European Communities L 69,12 March 1987, pp. 55-64).
Council Directive 90/652/EEC of 4 December 1990 amending Directive 87/167/EEC on aid to 
shipbuilding (Official Journal of the European Communities L 353,17 December 1990, p. 45).
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Table 2.1. European Union shipbuilding aid ceilings, 1987-1998
Year Aid Ceiling for 
Larger Ships^^
Aid Ceiling for 
Smaller Ships
1987 28 2 0 . 0
1988 28 2 0 . 0
1989 26 16.0
1990 2 0 14.0
1991 13 9.0
1992 9 4.5
1993 9 4.5
1994 9 4.5
1995 9 4.5
1996 9 4.5
1997 9 4.5
1998 9 4.5
Source: Author’s compilation based on respective Council Directives and
Regulations.
Concerns about distortions of competition conditions on the world 
shipbuilding market serve to account for the EU’s tolerance of the provision of 
shipbuilding aid by its member states. As early as 1972, the EC felt that “measures 
had to be taken in the Community, both at the national and Community levels until 
normalisation of competition conditions on a worldwide basis within the OECD” 
could be achieved (CEC 1972a: 133). The low market price levels in the 1980s were a 
problem for the EC shipyards as the pressure from the Japanese and Korean 
shipbuilders kept prices extremely low, and that constituted “the biggest worry for the 
European shipbuilding industry” (European Commission Press Release P/85/81).
Throughout the 1980s, the EC justified the need for ongoing aid by the 
“continuing reluctance among the other major shipbuilding nations outside the 
Community to undertake wholeheartedly the structural adjustments necessary to 
restore normal market conditions to this industry” (CEC 1988: 152). The EU has thus 
traditionally defended its shipbuilding aid policy by pointing to the distorted 
competition on the world market. For instance, the marked deepening of the 
shipbuilding crisis in 1983 and 1984 which resulted in a shrinking of shipyards’ order 
books in several EC member states and the collapse of new ship prices, preventing
“  From 1991, the threshold production cost level distinguishing larger ships from smaller ships was 
raised from ECU 6 million to ECU 10 million.
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shipyards from carrying out the necessary rationalisation unaided, led the Council to 
decide, in November 1984, to extend the term of validity of Council Directive 
81/363/EEC of 28 April 1981 until 31 December 1986 (CEC 1986: 156)/^
This worrying trend for the European shipyards continued until the 1990s. The 
Commission argued that South Korean shipyards, between 1994 and 1996, expanded 
shipbuilding capacities in a way that was not justified by global market conditions, 
and that these distortions needed “to be addressed positively before the market 
balance is finally and irreversibly destroyed” (CEC 1999c: 1 and 16). In the 1990s, 
however, whilst there was tolerance of shipbuilding aid because of the social 
repercussions of neglect of the industry, the EU’s objectives were also “to avoid 
distortion of competition between the shipyards in the member states by curbing the 
escalation of state aids and eventually to reduce the scale of the problem by making 
progressive reductions in capacity and returning to a level of efficiency and 
competitiveness which will allow the industry to operate without assistance” (CEC 
1993a: 124).
On 22 December 1995, the Council adopted Regulation No. 3094/95. '^^ Under 
this Regulation, all measures of support provided, directly or indirectly, to 
commercial shipbuilding were prohibited except those expressly provided for under 
the ‘OECD Understanding on Export Credits for Ships and Domestic Credits on 
Equivalent Terms’, namely aid for R & D, social aid related to closure and export 
credits for ships. Aid for restructuring was generally not allowed except for a 
transitional period for Portugal and Spain. The new Regulation was to be applicable 
from the entry into force of the ‘OECD Agreement on Normal Competitive 
Conditions in Commercial Shipbuilding and Ship-Repair, Including the Elimination 
of Production Subsidies’. This had been due on 1 January 1996 but although the EU 
ratified the OECD agreement in December 1995, entry into force was delayed 
because of hold-ups in the ratification process by the United States. The Council 
therefore decided that the rules of the Seventh Directive on aid to shipbuilding should 
continue to apply ad interim, and at the latest until 1 October 1996 (CEC 1996:
^ Council Directive 81/363/EEC of 28 April 1981 on aid to shipbuilding (Official Journal of the 
European Communities L 137, 23 May 1981, p. 39); Council Directive 85/2/EEC of 18 December 
1984 extending Directive 81/363/EEC on aid to shipbuilding (Official Journal of the European 
Communities L 2, 3 January 1985, p. 13),
Council Regulation (EC) No. 3094/95 of 22 December 1995 on aid to shipbuilding (Official Journal 
of the European Communities L 332, 30 December 1995, pp. 1-9).
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206)/^ On 27 September 1996, the Council issued Regulation No. 1904/96.^^ The 
Council decided that since the OECD agreement had not entered into force due to 
delays in US ratification, the Seventh Directive should be prolonged ad interim until 
31 December 1997 at the latest (CEC 1997a: 59). The Commission’s commitment to 
phasing out operating aid for shipbuilding was thus impeded by the continued absence 
of ratification of the OECD shipbuilding agreement by the United States.
In June 1998, the Council adopted a Regulation establishing new rules on aid 
to shipbuilding to succeed the Seventh Council Directive.^^ It entered into force on 1 
January 1999 and applied until 31 December 2003. The Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1540/98 provided the final two-year extension of operating aid, expiring as of 1 
January 2001, and permitted for contracts signed until 31 December 2000 and for 
ships delivered until 31 December 2003. This Regulation also introduced a new set of 
measures that were applicable until the end of 2003. These new forms of aid included 
the following:
- rescue and restructuring aid that was compliant with the ‘Community Guidelines 
on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty’
- closure aid which included social aid to mitigate the social consequences of 
adjustment and aid to cover other normal expenditure occasioned by total or 
partial closures;
- regional investment aid, that was compliant with the ‘Community Guidelines on 
National Regional Aid’, and that was meant for upgrading or modernising existing 
shipyards with the objective of improving the productivity of existing installations 
for shipyards that are situated in eligible regions;^^
- aid for R & D;
- investment aid for innovation where up to 1 0  per cent of the costs for 
expenditure were related to the innovative part of a project;
- aid for environmental protection expenditure;
Council Directive 93/115/EEC of 16 December 1993 amending Directive 90/684/EEC on aid to 
shipbuilding (Official Journal of the European Communities L 326, 28 December 1993, p. 62).
“  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1904/96 of 27 September 1996 amending Regulation (EC) No. 3094/95 
on aid to shipbuilding (Official Journal of the European Communities L 251, 3 October 1996, p. 5).
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1540/98 of 29 June 1998 establishing new rules on aid to shipbuilding 
(Official Journal of the European Communities L 202,18 July 1998, pp. 1-10).
^  Official Journal of the European Communities C 288, 9 October 1999, pp. 2-18.
Official Journal of the European Communities C 74,10 March 1998, pp. 9-31.
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- aid in the form of development assistance to developing countries that was 
compliant with OECD rules on such aid, and
- state-supported credit facilities to national and non-national ship-owners for 
shipbuilding that were compliant with the ‘OECD Understanding on Export 
Credits for Ships’.
The willingness to support the shipbuilding industry was thus considerably 
enhanced in 1997. Two reasons induced the Commission to come forward with a new 
strategy for shipbuilding. The Seventh Directive on aid to shipbuilding was to cease to 
apply at the end of that year. On the other hand, the OECD Shipbuilding Agreement, 
which was intended to abolish shipbuilding aid on a global level, was unlikely to enter 
into force by then, due to the reluctance of the United States to ratify it. Therefore, the 
Commission had to take precautions in order not to have a legal void after that date. 
Furthermore, there were still difficult market conditions like depressed prices, 
overcapacities outside the European Union and unfair practices of some competitors. 
The Commission felt “to close the competitiveness gap between European 
shipbuilders and their main competitors in Japan and South Korea, they need for a 
certain period further supportive measures” (European Commission Press Release 
IP/97/836). The Commission’s objective was to direct its efforts into defending the 
industry from the anti-competitive behaviour of shipbuilders in third countries, and to 
help the industry to increase its competitiveness in promoting research, development 
and innovation and supporting closer industrial co-operation (European Commission 
Press Release IP/97/836).^°
The above longitudinal analysis of EU shipbuilding aid legislation from the 
1960s to 2002 shows that it is not possible to classify EU shipbuilding policy as either 
completely interventionist or entirely prohibitive of state aid. EU shipbuilding policy 
is riddled with inconsistencies when viewed in terms of its rules on the provision of 
state aid. Individual directives and regulations generally allow the provision of certain 
types of aid but within certain limits and under certain conditions. Furthermore,
This attitude of providing shipbuilding aid to protect shipbuilders from international conçetition 
was, however, not shared throughout the Commission. In 1978, a clash of approaches emerged between 
Conq)etition Commissioner Vouel who favoured a shipbuilding policy based on restricting state aid 
and Industry Commissioner Davignon who preferred capacity restrictions and market-sharing 
arrangements (Philip 1986: 16). The Conçetition Commissioner, Mario Monti, has been quite critical 
of the use of state aid to protect industries, whilst the Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, has been 
quite tolerant, if  not approving, of state aid programmes for the shipbuilding sector (Michael Maim and 
Francesco Guerrera, ‘Monti and Lamy clash over aid for shipbuilders’, www.FT.com. 23 April 2002; 
Matters Marine, http://www.clvdesite.co.uk/mattersmarine. accessed on 16 February 2001).
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shifting the focus of analysis fi'om the policy content of individual directives to 
changes from one directive to the next complicates the assessment yet further. The 
summary description of the various shipbuilding aid directives and regulations reveals 
that there have been ‘ebbs and flows’ in the EU’s attitude towards the provision of 
shipbuilding aid by its member states. EU shipbuilding policy can be described as a 
mix of prohibition, tolerance and promotion of the provision of shipbuilding aid. EU 
shipbuilding policy thus does not offer an unambiguous or unitary message to 
member states in this regard. It is a moving target. As argued in Chapter 1, the 
usefulness of the ‘goodness of fit’ tool for explaining the Europeanisation process is 
diminished when the object under the microscope -  in this case, EU shipbuilding 
policy -  is neither fixed in time nor unequivocal in its prescription.
2.1.2 EU Policy on Downsizing the European Shipbuilding Industry
One of the main elements of EU policy towards the shipbuilding sector is the 
promotion of the downsizing of the industry in response to its overcapacity. As early 
as 1986, the Commission stated that if  the EC was to maintain a profitable 
shipbuilding industry, it would have to shed a further third of its production capacity. 
The Commission asserted that the Fifth Council Directive of 28 April 1981 was based 
on the objective of reducing the overcapacity and doing something “to restore the 
industry to viability” (European Commission Press Release P/86/81). The 
Commission decided that the Sixth Directive of 26 January 1987 should be based on a 
selective aid strategy designed to orientate Community shipbuilding towards those 
market segments where their competitive disadvantage was lowest and where the 
linkages to sub-contractors and supply industries were greatest (European 
Commission Press Release IP/86/611; CEC 1987: 146). The Commission advocated 
that “shipyards with no prospect of ever regaining their competitiveness on the world 
market” should be closed down, whilst those that “yield the best returns by having 
specialised in a production mix exploiting the advantage which their technological 
know-how gives them over their competitors” should be maintained (European 
Commission Press Release P/86/81).
While the industrial strategy of the EC entailed “controlling, substantially 
reducing and making more effective use of state aid to shipyards”, it also concentrated
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on building technologically-advanced vessels. For instance, the Sixth Directive 
encouraged the concentration of production on specialised, high-technology ships 
(European Commission Press Release IP/87/233).
The EU has tried to downsize the European shipbuilding industry to a core of 
specialised, high-technology, highly-competitive production activity by promoting R 
& D activity in this sector. The EU promotes research and technological development 
in the shipbuilding sector in member states not merely by approving national aid for R 
& D in this sector. The EU goes one step further by providing R & D aid of its own to 
the European shipbuilding industry. Section 2.3.2 of this chapter provides an analysis 
of the relevance of EU Research and Technology Policy for the shipbuilding industry. 
The EU is involved in shaping the research and technological priorities of the 
European shipbuilding industry directly via its shipbuilding aid directives and 
indirectly via the types of R & D projects that it promotes with its Research and 
Technology Policy. The promotion of particular types of shipbuilding activity and 
technology by the EU has, in turn, contributed to the specialisation of European 
shipyards in particular niche markets.
2.1.3 EU Policy on Unfair Competition from International Competitors
Unfair business and trading practices by international competitors in the 
shipbuilding market have disadvantaged the European shipbuilding industry in the 
past thirty years. Korean shipbuilders especially have offered below-cost prices for 
ships on the world market, and the shipbuilding sectors in both Japan and South 
Korea are characterised by deep and opaque state involvement. As discussed in 
Section 2.1.1 of this chapter, a major justification for both the provision of 
shipbuilding aid by EU member states and the approval of such aid by the EU has 
been the need to correct the distortions of competition created by the subsidisation 
practices of competitor shipbuilding countries.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1540/98 of 29 June 1998 calls upon the 
Commission to provide the Council with a regular report monitoring the market 
situation, and to propose appropriate measures to the Council, should EU industry be
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harmed by unfair trade practices.^^ The conclusions of the six reports thus far do not 
vary substantially. They single out anti-competitive practices of South Korean 
shipyards, leading to excessive production and increasing over-capacity in the market. 
According to these reports, South Korean producers benefit fi-om unfair trade 
practices, including debt forgiveness, debt moratoria, advantageous refimd credits, 
fi"esh credits and guarantees for new shipbuilding projects that allow Korean 
shipyards to offer ships on the world market at below-cost prices.
The European Commission has been very important to the European 
shipbuilding industry in its efforts to address these issues that adversely affect its 
competitiveness. The Commission has pursued three avenues to resolve these issues 
of competition distortion and unfair trade practices.
(a) Response 1: Bilateral Negotiations with the South Korean Government
The Commission has embarked on numerous efforts to secure binding 
commitments firom the South Korean Government with regard to its ‘non­
intervention’ in the financing of shipbuilding activities. The goals of the Commission 
in undertaking these negotiations have been “to promote fair and competitive market 
conditions in the world market and to work together to stabilise the market and 
thereby help raise the level of ship prices to ones that are commercially sustainable” 
(CEC 2000d: 3). The financing of shipbuilding in South Korea is opaque and the 
possibility for government intervention is strengthened by state ownership of large 
parts of the banking sector and irregular commercial risk assessment. Following a 
Council request, the former Commissioner for Industrial Affairs, Martin Bangemann, 
visited South Korea in May 1999 to discuss the disputed issues with representatives of 
the Korean Government and shipbuilding industry (CEC 1999c: 14).
Subsequently, three rounds of talks between the Commission and the Korean 
Government and representatives of Korean shipbuilding firms in December 1999, 
February and March 2000 finally resulted in the signing of the ‘Agreed Minutes 
between the Commission and the Government of the Republic of Korea Relating to 
the World Shipbuilding Market’ on 22 June 2000. These Agreed Minutes focus on 
non-subsidisation, banking, financial transparency with regard to international
The European Commission has issued six shipbuilding reports from 1998 to 2002: CEC (1999c), 
(2000c), (2000d), (2001e), (2002c) and (2002d).
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accounting standards, commercial pricing practices and an effective consultative 
mechanism. The Commission insisted that “the accumulated losses of Korean 
shipyards should be neither directly nor indirectly cleared by the Korean Government 
and market principles should be fully applied” (CEC 2000c: 20).^^ More talks were 
held after the signing of the agreement in order to implement the principles laid down 
in the agreement. However, no common approach to the problems could be found and 
the bilateral talks with Korea have so far ended without results.
The Commission’s efforts in market monitoring have, nonetheless, yielded the 
kind of information that the EU shipbuilding industry has been able to use to file a 
complaint under Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94 (Trade Barriers Regulation) 
with the Commission on 24 October 2000 (Official Journal of the European 
Communities C 345, 2 December 2000, pp. 5-7).^^ Based on this complaint, the 
Commission has conducted a thorough investigation of Korean trading practices in 
the shipbuilding sector. The investigation concluded that substantial subsidies had 
been granted to Korean shipyards through both export and domestic programmes 
which contravene the WTO’s 1994 subsidies agreement. The investigation also 
concluded that there was evidence that the subsidies had caused adverse effects to EU 
industry within the meaning of the WTO subsidies agreement and were, therefore, 
actionable (European Commission Press Release IP/01/656). Despite further rounds 
of talks between the Commission and the Korean Government on 26 and 27 August 
2002 in Seoul and firom 24 to 27 September 2002 in Brussels, the parties have been 
unable to reach a negotiated solution. Consequently, the Commission has initiated 
WTO action/"
Council Decision 2000/409/EC of 19 June 2000 on the signing and conclusion of Agreed Minutes 
between the European Community and the Government of the Republic o f Korea relating to the world 
shipbuilding market (Official Journal of the European Communities L 155, 28 June 2000, pp. 47-48).
Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 lays down EU procedures in the field of 
Common Commercial Policy in order to ensure the exercise of the EU’s rights under international trade 
mles, in particular those established under the auspices o f the WTO (Official Journal o f the European 
Communities L 349, 31 December 1994, pp. 71-78).
Commission Decision 2002/818/EC of 8 October 2002 under the provisions of Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 3286/94 concerning trade practices maintained by Korea affecting trade in commercial 
vessels (Official Journal of the European Communities L 281,19 October 2002, pp. 15-17).
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(b) Response 2: Negotiations in International Organisations
The EU has made use of two major international organisations as avenues to 
pursue its goals with respect to challenging Korean state intervention in shipbuilding. 
These are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The European Commission held two 
meetings with IMF representatives in 1999. The first meeting was conducted upon the 
request of the Federal Government with the Director of the IMF Asia and Pacific 
Department (interview 1). The second meeting took place in Korea with the local IMF 
representative. The IMF position on the matter was that it was not responsible for 
monitoring sectoral activities and thus had no evidence of unfair competition 
practices, directed lending or hidden subsidies to Korean shipyards (CEC 2000e: 7). 
The Commission has not let the matter rest and has provided the IMF with additional 
information and questions so as to urge the IMF to investigate the nature of 
government involvement in Korean shipbuilding. The Commission has also used the 
OECD Working Party Six meetings as a forum in which to air its concerns about 
South Korean state aid to shipbuilding. For instance, this was done at such meetings 
in December 1999, December 2000 and July 2001 in Paris.
The EU has also been involved in international negotiations for a multilateral 
agreement on shipbuilding between the world’s most important shipbuilding nations 
under the auspices of the OECD. The aim of realising such an agreement has been to 
phase out all direct and indirect public support measures for shipbuilding, ship- 
conversion and ship-repair and to remove all obstacles to establishing normal 
competitive conditions in the shipbuilding sector (European Council Press Release 
PRES/93/66). Examples of international barriers to competition in the world 
shipbuilding market that the Commission has fought against include the national 
building requirement contained in the Jones Act of the USA and the soft aid elements 
of the government-sponsored shipbuilding programmes in Japan (European 
Commission Press Release IP/91/1181).
The talks in the OECD shipbuilding group. Working Party 6  (WP/6 ), with the 
aim of bringing about normal competitive conditions in the shipbuilding and ship- 
repair industry, were initiated in June 1989 and ended in July 1994. The OECD 
Agreement on Respect of Normal Competition in the Commercial Shipbuilding and 
Repair Industry was finally signed on 21 December 1994 by the EU, the USA,
35
Norway, Japan and South Korea/^ These five signatories between them build 60 to 80 
per cent of all new merchant ships sold on the world market (European Commission 
Press Release IP/95/1128). The OECD Agreement was expected to enter into force on 
1 January 1996 and the EU ratified the Agreement in December 1995. However, 
delays in the ratification process by the USA have delayed its entry into force. The 
EU Council even passed Council Regulation 3094/95 of 22 December 1995 on aid to 
shipbuilding which was intended to give effect to the state aid provisions of the 
OECD Agreement.
(c) Response 3: EU Directives and Regulations on State Aid to Shipbuilding
The Commission has persistently argued that its strategy is to set the aid 
ceiling “low enough to encourage EC shipyards to become more competitive while at 
the same time providing external protection against unfair competition by setting the 
ceiling high enough to compensate for the cost-price gap between the most efficient 
EC shipyards and their main Far Eastern competitors” (European Commission Press 
Release IP/87/566). In 1989, the Vice-President of the Commission, spelt things out 
when he stated that the Commission’s decisions on aid to shipbuilding were meant to 
send a clear signal to the EC’s international competitors (European Commission Press 
Release IP/89/988).
It has been the Council’s practice to extend existing legislation on 
shipbuilding aid beyond their expiry date whenever there is lack of progress in 
reaching agreement on shipbuilding issues on the international fi’ont. The Seventh 
Directive was extended for a further twelve months until 31 December 1994 as the 
outcome of the OECD negotiations on the multilateral agreement to eliminate state 
aid to shipbuilding was still pending (European Commission Press Release 
IP/93/1216). Even when the Agreement had been signed and it was expected to enter 
into force on 1 January 1996, the Commission decided to extend the Seventh 
Directive until 31 December 1995 so that there would be no void period between EU
” In accordance with the OECD Agreement, no aid other than that allowed by the OECD Agreement 
shall be authorised by its signatories. All support measures specifically provided to commercial 
shipbuilding are prohibited except for the following: 
aid for R & D;
social aid related to closures, and
export credits and loan guarantees for ships in accordance with the revised OECD 
Understanding on Export Credits for Ships and Domestic Credits under Equivalent Terms 
and Conditions.
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and OECD legislation. Then, delays in the ratification of the OECD Agreement by the 
USA led the EU Industry Council to decide on 7 November 1995 that if the OECD 
Agreement did not enter into force on 1 January 1996, the Seventh Directive should 
continue to apply until it did, and at the latest until 1 October 1996. This story 
repeated itself in September 1996 when the Council again extended the Seventh 
Directive until entry into force of the OECD Agreement, and until 31 December 1997 
at the latest by passing Regulation 1904/96 of 27 September 1996. Once again, the 
record played itself out in 1997 when the Council passed Regulation 2600/97 and 
extended the Seventh Directive until 31 December 1998, with the understanding that 
the Directive lapsed automatically as soon as the OECD Agreement was ratified by 
the USA.
The latest response by the EU in this saga of hope, disappointment and 
retaliation vis-à-vis the entry into force of the OECD Agreement has been a 
temporary defence mechanism for shipbuilding. As early as 1993, the Commission 
had asserted that “in the absence of any OECD agreement to date, EC shipyards 
continued to require a defensive instrument against unfair competition” (European 
Commission Press Release IP/93/1216). As a direct response to the Korean 
competitive challenge, a temporary defensive mechanism for shipbuilding was 
authorised by Council Regulation 1177/02 on 27 June 2002 for certain market 
segments and for a limited period fi-om 3 July 2002 until 31 March 2004.^^ These 
market segments were those that the Commission investigation ended up identifying 
as considerably harmed by unfair Korean trade practices and included the markets for 
container ships, product and chemical tankers and liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
carriers. The time period chosen was thought to be the period necessary for the 
conclusion of the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Direct national aid for the 
construction of the above-mentioned vessels may be authorised by the Commission 
up to a level of 6  per cent of the contract value.
The German government had emphasised to the European Commission the 
need for the re-introduction of temporary subsidies for shipbuilding.^^ German 
Maritime Co-ordinator, Dr. Axel Gerlach, welcomed the steps taken by the EU in
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1177/2002 of 27 June 2002 concerning a temporary defensive 
mechanism for shipbuilding (Official Journal of the European Communities L 172, 2 July 2002, pp. 1-
3).
 ^ ‘Promoting the Maritime Industry’, The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of 
Germany, http://www.bundesregierung.de/en/News-bv-subject/Intemational-. I l l  27/Promoting-the- 
Maritime-Industr.htm. 22 August 2001.
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2002. He said, “This is an important step towards strengthening the competitiveness 
o f German shipyards. Temporary subsidies will restore fair conditions of competition 
for contract-bidding and help keep jobs safe in coastal regions” (Bundestag Press 
Release, 2 July 2002).
The Council has also issued Regulation No. 385/96 on protection against 
injurious pricing of vessels. The Regulation follows the OECD Agreement 
concluded on 21 December 1994. Annex II to that OECD Agreement contains a 
Shipbuilding Injurious Pricing Code which was adopted in response to the need to 
provide for an effective means of protection against sale of ships below their normal 
value. For instance, where a EU shipyard believes that a third-country shipbuilder has 
won a contract only by unfair pricing, it can make a complaint to the European 
Commission. The Commission will then investigate the matter and if it finds that 
there has been unfair competition, it can recommend to the Council that a fine be 
imposed on the third-country shipyard concerned. If this fine is not paid within 180 
days, or no promise to pay is made, then the injurious pricing instrument allows the 
Commission to prevent the ship concerned and any other ships built by the same 
shipyard from loading and unloading at any EU port for a period of up to four years. 
This instrument can be used against signatories of the OECD Agreement and non­
members of the WTO (European Commission Press Release IP/95/1128).
The growth of EU competences to encompass the resolution of trade disputes 
with competitor shipbuilding countries has been important for public actors in the 
German shipbuilding industry. The Federal Government has chosen to address the 
issues of distorted competition conditions in the world shipbuilding market by making 
use of the European Commission as a channel of communication and conflict 
resolution. The Federal Government has not had any recorded independent bilateral 
meeting with the South Korean government regarding shipbuilding issues. Rather, the 
Federal Government has requested the European Commission to arrange meetings 
with the IMF, as it did in 1999, and with the OECD.
Council Regulation (EC) No, 385/96 of 29 January 1996 on protection against injurious pricing of 
vessels (Official Journal of the European Communities L 56, 6 March 1996, pp. 21-33),
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2.2 EU POLICY ON SHIPBUILDING AID FOR THE EAST GERMAN
SHIPYARDS
Apart from the general rules that apply to all EU member states, the EU has 
also passed legislation that is addressed specifically to the Federal Republic of 
Germany. German unification of 1990 and the consequent incorporation of the East 
German shipyards necessitated this Germany-specific legislation. While the 
Commission insisted that Article 87 should apply to all the assistance measures of the 
German public authorities as with all previous accessions, it did agree that “the 
desolate state of the GDR economy, the absence of an economic structure adequate 
for a market economy, the requirement to rebuild, modernise and gear up industry and 
services and the need to improve the environment significantly” were reasons enough 
for a special approach to be adopted towards the East German Lander vis-à-vis state 
aid policy (CEC 1992a: 74).
When the Seventh Directive was adopted in 1990, the Council and the 
Commission acknowledged that the particular problems of the shipbuilding industry 
in the new Lander might, during a transitional period, require aid support beyond the 
scope of that Directive. Council Directive 92/68/EEC of 20 July 1992 was thus 
adopted amending Directive 90/684/EEC on aid to shipbuilding.^^ The 1992 Directive 
contained a derogation in favour of shipyards located in the former GDR allowing 
operating aid paid before the end of 1993 which exceeded the general operating aid 
ceiling defined in Article 4 of the 1990 Directive. This derogation [Article 10(a) of 
the 1992 Directive] allowed operating aid for the shipbuilding and ship-conversion 
activities of the East German shipyards until 31 December 1993, provided that the aid 
did not exceed a maximum ceiling of 36 per cent of a reference annual turnover. The 
German Government was also supposed to carry out by 31 December 1995, according 
to a timetable approved by the Commission, a genuine and irreversible reduction of 
capacity of 40 per cent of the capacity of 545,000 compensated gross tonnes (cgt) 
existing on 1 July 1990. Table 2.2 summarises these EU capacity limitations and the 
number of jobs guaranteed by the shipyards in the privatisation process executed by 
the Treuhandanstalt.
Official Journal of the European Communities L 219,4 August 1992, pp. 54-55.
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Table 2.2. Capacity limitations and job guarantees of East German shipyards, 1990- 
1995
Shipyard New-building capacity 
in million cgt
Employment
1989 EU
Limit
1 July 
1990
1 Sept 
1992
1 Sept 
1994
31
Dec
1995
Meeres Technik 
Werft
87,272 100,000 6,212 2,832 2,389 2,275
Kvaemer Wamow 
Werft
133,804 85,000 5,722 3,070 2,475 2,175
Peene Werft Naval
Shipbuilding
35,000 3,656 1,161 987 880
Volkswerft Stralsund 183,030 85,000 7,899 3,434 2,693 2,450
Elbe Werft 
Boizenburg
38,228 22,000 1,875 835 426 380
Neptun Industrie 
Rostock
97,042 Ship-
repair
787 1,178 1,397 1,200
Dieselmotorenwerke
Rostock
- - 2,775 1,054 610 400
TOTAL 539,376 327,000 36,012 13,864 10,977 9,760
Source: CEC (1992c: 3)
The German Government was also supposed to provide evidence to the 
Commission, in the form of annual reports by an independent chartered accountant, 
that aid payments were strictly limited to the activities of the East German shipyards. 
Pursuant to Articles 6 and 7 of the 1992 Directive, the Commission also approved 
restructuring aid in the form of investment aid and closure aid for these shipyards. 
The Commission approved restructuring aid in tranches, provided that it was shown 
that the aid was necessary to carry out the restructuring plan, that the subsidised 
investments were carried out according to the plan approved by the Commission, that 
there was no spill-over effect on other shipyards, and that the reduction in capacity for 
the individual shipyards was respected (CEC 1996: 207).
On 2 June 1997, the Council adopted Council Regulation 1013/97 which 
allowed for additional operating aid for shipyards under restructuring in the East 
German Lander and Spain. Article 2 of Council Regulation 1013/97 set out a 
programme established for the monitoring of the actual use of operating and
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1013/97 of 2 June 1997 on aid to certain shipyards under restructuring 
(Official Journal of the European Communities L 148, 6 June 1997, pp. 1-3).
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investment aid, compliance with the restructuring plan and enforcement of capacity 
limitations by the East German shipyards. This included on-site monitoring by the 
Commission assisted, if  necessary, by independent experts. Germany was expected to 
supply the Commission until the end of June 1999 with quarterly reports on progress 
towards completing the restructuring programmes benefiting fi-om aid and with 
information on the specific beneficiary shipyards. This information was to include the 
following elements: use of aid, investments, productivity performance, capacity 
reductions and limitations, employment reductions and financial viability (European 
Council Press Release PRES/99/123).
The German Government made the commitment to ensure that the capacity 
limitations would be fully respected until the end of the year 2000, and extended this 
limitation until the end of 2005 unless the Commission authorised an earlier 
termination of the limitations. The Federal Government in 1992 was actually quite 
enthusiastic about the approach adopted by the European Commission with regard to 
the East German shipbuilding industry. In October 1992, the German Government 
sent the Commission a restructuring plan for the shipbuilding industry in 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. It stated that, given the 1991 maximum aid ceiling 
of 13 per cent, it would not seek an exemption firom the provisions on operating aid 
under the Seventh Directive in view of the competitiveness of the shipbuilding 
industry in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania at that time. The German Government, 
however, reserved its position on the question whether the East German shipyards 
could follow a future reduction in the level of the Directive’s maximum common aid 
ceiling (CEC 1992a: 136).
Capacity limitations imposed by the European Commission on the East 
German shipyards were strictly enforced. For instance, the Commission noted that the 
output of the Meeres Technik Werft in 1997 slightly exceeded the limit set at 100,000 
compensated gross tonnes. When the Commission approved the first tranche of 
restructuring aid in July 1997, it required a compensatory reduction in output for 1997 
and a cut of DM 720,000 in operating aid (CEC 1998b: 70).
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2.3 OTHER EU POLICIES THAT BEAR UPON THE GERMAN
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Previous sections of this chapter have explored the ways in which the EU state 
and shipbuilding policy regimes impact on the German shipbuilding industry. The 
Commission itself highlights the fact that “it would be wrong to look at the 
Community’s competition policy in isolation from its other policies”, and that “where 
the Commission under the competition rules has to assess ... state aids, it will take a 
more favourable view if they pursue an objective which is in line with the 
Community’s policy in the relevant area” (CEC 1992a: 39). This section analyses 
how other EU policies affect the provision of aid to the shipbuilding sector without 
actually being themselves aimed specifically and/or directly at it.
2.3.1 EU Maritime Transport Policy
Up to the late 1970s, Germany had generally pursued its objective of 
promoting global liberalisation in the maritime sector through international 
organisations but had limited the involvement of the EC in such efforts. However, as 
it became increasingly apparent that its individual efforts to counter the protectionist 
practices of other countries were not bearing finit, Germany began to look to the EC 
as a main conduit of change. In 1977, the Council adopted a Decision which 
established a procedure enabling Member States to consult one another on maritime 
relations with third countries and to coordinate joint action within international 
organisations."^^
EU maritime policy today covers the promotion of EU shipping, external 
relations and maritime safety, together with shipbuilding and maritime technology. 
The aim has been to ensure freedom of access to shipping markets across the world 
for safe and environmentally-fnendly ships, preferably registered in EU Member 
States with EU nationals employed on board. The common shipping policy of the EU, 
which was introduced in 1986 with four fimdamental regulations, the so-called 
‘Brussels package’ and the continuing hberalisation of maritime shipping in the EU
Council Decision 77/587/EEC of 13 September 1977 setting up a consultation procedure on relations 
between member states and third countries in shipping matters and on action relating to such matters in 
international organisations (Official Journal of the European Communities L 239,17 September 1977, 
pp. 23-24).
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have enhanced the position of European shipping in international maritime 
transport/^ In particular, maritime transport within the EU has been gradually 
liberalised and cabotage within the EU has basically been permitted.
The Commission communication ‘Towards a New Maritime Strategy’ of 1996 
concluded that the objective of improving safety and achieving international open 
markets and fair competition would help reduce distortion of competition, whilst 
efforts in training and employment policy and in R & D would enhance the 
competitiveness of the EU shipping sector. The Commission did, however, 
acknowledge that support measures may nevertheless be required for the present to 
maintain and to develop the Community’s shipping industries (CEC 1997a: 63). The 
strategy proposed was supported by the Council in a Resolution agreed in December 
1996. The Commission subsequently adopted revised guidelines for state aid in the 
maritime transport sector. These guidelines concern the support provided to 
European ship-owners for operating ships. The approach adopted was designed to 
reverse the trend towards the re-registration of vessels outside the EU and to stop the 
decline in employment and know-how in the maritime transport sector (CEC 2000a: 
101).
The EU has also supported the shipbuilding industry via its increased support 
for inland waterway shipping in the 1990s. During the period 1996-1999, the inland 
waterways sector could exploit Council Regulation 2255/96 that allowed, under 
certain conditions, aid if it concerned investment in infrastructure of inland waterway 
terminals or in fixed or mobile equipment for transhipment from and to waterways." "^  ^
Since 1999, a specific Community instrument, namely Council Regulation (EC) No. 
718/1999 on a Community-fleet capacity policy to promote inland waterway
The 1986 package (Official Journal of the European Communities No. L 378, 31 December 1986, pp. 
1, 4 ,14 and 21) consists of four Council Regulations:
- Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4055/86 applying the principle of freedom to provide maritime 
transport between Member States and between Member States and third countries, as last amended by 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3573/90 (Official Journal o f the European Communities L 353, 17 
December 1990, p. 16);
- Council Regulation (EEC) No, 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application o f Articles 85 
and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport, as last amended by the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland 
and Sweden;
- Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4057/86 on unfair pricing practices in maritime transport, and
- Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4058/86 concerning coordinated action to safeguard free access to 
cargoes in ocean trades.
Official Journal of the European Communities C 205, 5 July 1997, pp. 5-15.
^ Council Regulation (EC) No. 2255/96 of 19 November 1996 amending Regulation No, 1107/70 on 
the granting o f aids for transport by rail, road and inland waterway (Official Journal o f the European 
Communities L 304, 27 November 1996, pp. 3-4).
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transport, has encouraged member states to take certain measures to promote inland 
waterway transport."^  ^The White Paper on European Transport Policy for 2010 sets 
out the broad lines and priorities of EU transport policy (CEC 200Id). It calls for 
priority to be given to shifting the balance in modes of transport. This is to be done, 
for example, by promoting modes of transport that are less harmful to the 
environment and have unused capacity available, such as inland waterway transport. 
Inland waterway shipping is concentrated in six member states: Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. This means that EU initiatives in 
favour of inland waterway transport positively impact upon the German shipbuilding 
industry.
The European Commission also has an active policy to promote short sea 
shipping. In 1999, it presented a communication with a comprehensive approach to 
increase the use of the mode. Furthermore, the White Paper on European Transport 
Policy for 2010 has emphasised the role of short sea shipping in maintaining an 
efficient transport system in Europe. Short sea shipping and its inter-modal integration 
generally require new or specially-adapted vessels and advanced ship designs, which 
are a speciality of German shipyards. The market for these ship types is also more 
regional than that for ocean-going vessels. This demand is therefore beneficial for 
German shipbuilders. As the Commission has outlined in its Communication on the 
development of short sea shipping in Europe, “the EU and member states both have to 
contribute to improve the necessary infrastructure to make short sea shipping an 
interesting alternative for shippers” (CEC 1995b). This requires better port 
infi'astructure and management and adequate plant for intermodal transport.
The EU has decided on two lines of action, namely devising a global strategy 
to make the EU fleet competitive again, by means of ‘positive measures’ and 
secondly, improving on-board safety and environmental protection through strict 
enforcement of international standards within the EU. The EU safe seas policy aims to 
improve equipment on board vessels entered in Member States’ registers, and to 
promote the use of safe and clean ships by providing incentives to upgrade EU- 
registered ships to standards which exceed the mandatory safety and environmental 
standards laid down in international conventions (CEC 1993b).
Official Journal of the European Communities L 90, 2 April 1999, pp. 1-5.
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The EU’s safe seas policy promotes the use of safe and clean ships by 
ensuring that aid is given only to ships built in the EU with very high safety standards. 
The replacement needs stemming from new EU maritime safety legislation serve as 
demand for new shipbuilding for shipyards (European Commission Press Release 
IP/02/1661). The Commission believes that the strict enforcement of safety 
regulations for ships, alongside port state control forbidding the entry of substandard 
ships to EU ports, would bring about both improvement of safety at sea and the 
elimination of substandard vessels, thereby enhancing the demand for new, safe ships. 
In accordance with the EU approach to state aid for maritime transport, investment aid 
may be authorised in accordance with EU policy on safety at sea where it is a matter 
of improving on-board equipment or promoting the use of reliable, non-polluting 
ships."*^
The initiatives by the EU in formulating a common safe seas policy is to the 
benefit of the German shipbuilding industry. German shipbuilders have a world-wide 
reputation for building vessels of high safety standards. The Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research has compared the German output of national standards to the 
number of EU standards issued for individual economic sectors. In the shipbuilding 
sector between 1995 and 2000, there have been more national standards than EU ones 
(Federal Ministry of Education and Research 2002: 144). An EU policy that 
emphasises ship and maritime safety standards thus enhances the competitive 
advantage of the German shipbuilding industry.
2.3.2 EU Research and Technology Policy
The Commission takes a favourable view of R & D as technological 
development is one of the priority objectives of EU policy aimed at improving the 
competitiveness of European industry. The Single European Act included research 
and technological development among the Community’s main objectives. The 
Commission’s communication on industrial policy in an open and competitive 
environment also stresses the crucial and complementary roles of technological and 
competition policies in ensuring the competitiveness of European industry and 
accordingly, considers as compatible with the Common Market certain aid to facilitate
^ Official Journal of the European Communities C 205, 5 July 1997, pp. 5-15.
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the development of R & D activities by firms (CEC 1990). This is because a number 
of factors discourage R & D investment by firms, including the uncertainty of returns 
on the investment made, the limited extent to which firms can retain ownership of the 
results of research, the time needed to achieve a return on investment and the scale of 
financial resources required. Furthermore, the Commission is of the opinion that aid 
for R & D, by its very nature, is less prone to distort trade between member states 
than aid for investment which has a direct impact on production capacities and 
volume. The Commission argues that an uncoordinated approach to R & D leads to 
waste and duplication (CEC 1986: 173).
Commissioner Bangemann announced in 1990 that the Commission was 
prepared to support the shipbuilding industry’s own efforts and advocated that the 
European shipyards join forces to defend their lead in R & D (European Commission 
Press Release IP/90/504). In order to enhance this effort, the Commission set up the 
Task Force “Maritime Systems of the Future”. The Task Force works in close 
collaboration with industry to define together priorities for R & D. The Task Force 
began its work in 1995 and has defined priorities for an integrated R & D masterplan. 
The work was focused on four areas: shipbuilding, shipping, ports and harbours, and 
marine resources. The Task Force has the key role in co-ordinating all Commission 
research programmes in the maritime sector and is their single interface and contact
. , 47pomt.
The promotion of R & D by the EU is directed not only toward improvement 
of the production process itself, but also the development of safe and efficient ships. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the EU supports ‘quality shipping’, a policy aiming to 
ensure that maritime transport is efficient, safe, environmentally-friendly and well- 
linked to other modes of transport. The EU has sponsored, with industry, several 
applied R & D programmes to enforce safety of shipping and protection of the 
environment. Some ECU 30 million has been devoted to quality shipping and until 
1998, thirty-three R & D waterborne-related projects were being funded involving 
400 European industrial companies, universities and research institutes. A maritime 
navigation simulator has resulted from the research project called Advanced 
Technology to Optimise Maritime Operational Safety or ATOMOS II, sponsored by
The European Commissioners who led the Task Force at its inception were the Commissioners for 
Information and Telecommunications Technologies (Martin Bangemann), for Research, Education and 
Training (Edith Cresson) and for Transport (Neil Kinnock).
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the EU within its Fourth Framework Transport Research and Technological 
Development Programme (1994-1998).
The Commission included in its proposal concerning the Fifth Framework 
Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration Activities, 
the Key Action ‘Marine Technologies’ (CEC 1997c). The objective of Key Action 2 
‘Sustainable Mobility and Intermodality’ was to achieve greater innovation in 
transport by promoting use of new technologies on a modal basis, that is, on road, rail, 
air, and inland waterway transport. The fields of research in Key Action 3 included 
advanced technologies for the development of ships and offshore platforms in order to 
improve the safety of persons and installations and to protect the environment; use of 
the sea and inland waterways to transport goods and passengers; the development of 
automated vessels and port infirastructure in order to cut operating costs and 
technologies for the rational and sustainable management of the sea.“^  ^ The Sixth 
Framework Programme for Research and Development included a significant increase 
in maritime R & D under the heading of ‘Sustainable Surface Transport’ for which a 
total budget of 610 million Euro was allocated (European Commission Press Release 
SPEECH/02/420).
The Leonardo da Vinci programme of the EU supports the development of 
training courses for the maritime transport sector and for shipyards. Through the co­
financing of pilot projects and mobility fellowships, this programme contributes to 
transnational initiatives. The EU also promotes the exchange and development of 
knowledge among research workers, and between the research sector and industry 
with the Marie Curie programme which supports training abroad and the transfer of 
knowledge through fellowships at post-graduate and post-doctoral level. This support 
for training researchers within the industry facilitates the development of commercial 
research knowledge, and the exchange of knowledge between industry and academia.
The support provided by the EU for R & D activity in the shipbuilding 
industry should not be underestimated. The latest and most modem ships are massive 
sophisticated engineering products that are typically launched as one-of-a-kind or in 
very short series. Ships are sold on the basis of their concept designs, which are far 
fi*om representing a complete product definition. Consequently, the major part of
Council Regulation 1999/169/EC of 25 January 1999 adopting a specific programme for research, 
technological development and demonstration on conq)etitive and sustainable growth (1998 to 2002) 
(Official Journal of the European Communities L 64, 12 March 1999, pp. 40-44),
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product development, and of the research, development and innovation activities is 
carried out after the signing of the sales contract. In fact, it is only after concluding the 
contract that the shipyard is in a position to clarify the specific research, development 
and innovation needs of the concept design. Naturally, these activities have to be 
performed in the shortest possible time with the lowest possible costs. Funding of 
research, development and innovation activities in shipbuilding is thus an important 
aspect of developing, designing and building prototype ships that will subsequently be 
of commercial application. This specialisation, and even dependence, on high- 
technology market niches requires considerable and consistent investments in 
research, development and innovation. The adoption of specific innovative solutions 
during the concept design phase establishes the crucial competitive advantages which 
allow German shipbuilders to be successful in competing against Far Eastern 
shipbuilders who tend to offer “off-the-shelf’ solutions.
2.3.3 EU Fisheries Policy
The EU Fisheries Policy also provides a positive impulse to the European 
shipbuilding industry. Under Council Regulation No. 3944/90 of 20 December 1990, 
support can be given for the renewal and modernisation of the fisheries fleet. 
Member states establish permanent arrangements for entries to and exits fi-om their 
fleet under which entries attracting public aid (such as construction aid) are permitted 
only if linked to withdrawals without aid, except in the case of small-scale coastal 
fishing. Member states may, however, receive aid to improve safety, navigation at 
sea, hygiene and working conditions, provided there is no increased pressure on 
resources.^® Council Directive 87/167/EEC of 26 January 1987 on aid to shipbuilding 
itself includes construction and conversion of fishing vessels of not less than 100
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3944/90 of 20 December 1990 (Official Journal of the European 
Communities L 380, 31 December 1990, p. 1) which amended Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4028/86 
on Community measures to inqjrove and adapt structures in the fisheries and aquaculture sector 
(Official Journal of the European Communities L 376, 31 December 1986, p. 7),
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying down detailed rules and 
arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector (Official Journal of the 
European Communities L 337, 30 December 1999, pp. 10-28) amended by Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1451/2001 of 28 June 2001 (Official Journal L of the European Communities 198, 21 July 2001) 
and Council Regulation (EC) No. 179/2002 of 28 January 2002 (Official Journal o f the European 
Communities L 31,1 February 2002).
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gross tonnes as eligible for shipbuilding aid/^ An EU fisheries policy that allows 
financial support for the construction of fishing vessels is beneficial for the German 
shipbuilding industry.
2.3.4 EU Development Aid Policy
In 1989, the Commission decided that “a mere application of the OECD list of 
countries eligible for public development aid did not always ensure that objective 
development criteria, in accordance with Community policy in that respect, prevailed” 
(CEC 1989: 163). The Commission therefore established its own more comprehensive 
list of developing countries qualifying for development assistance in the form of 
shipbuilding aid under Article 4(7) of the Sixth Directive.^^ The EU thus enhanced the 
opportunities for German shipbuilding firms to receive shipbuilding orders for 
development aid projects.
2.4 EVIDENCE OF EUROPEANISATION OF GERMAN SHIPBUILDING
AID CASES
This section offers empirical evidence of the ways in which the German 
shipbuilding industry has been affected by EU policies with regards to the provision 
and use of state aid.
Empirical analysis of the number of shipbuilding aid cases and Commission 
Decisions should reveal the extent to which EU policy is complied with in the 
German shipbuilding industry. There have been a significant number of state aid cases 
in the German shipbuilding sector that have been the subject of EU examination. 
There have been 191 German shipbuilding aid cases fi*om 1971-2002. In fact, 
Germany accounts for 35 per cent of all shipbuilding aid Commission Decisions and 
31 per cent of all shipbuilding aid cases in the EU fi’om 1961 to 2002.^^ The data 
presented in Graph 2.1 and Table 2.3 indicate that the numbers of German
Commission letter to member states SG (88) D/6181 of 26 May 1988,
A circular letter was sent to all EC member states in January 1989 (Commission letter to member 
states SG (89) D/311 of 3 January 1989).
Author’s conq)ilation based on conq>ilation of Commission Decisions on shipbuilding aid (Appendix 
D) and of shipbuilding aid cases (Appendix E) across EU member states from 1961 to 2002,
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shipbuilding aid cases registered with the European Commission and of Commission 
Decisions, respectively, have risen over time.
Graph 2.1: Shipbuilding Aid Cases in EU Member States, 1961-2002
250
200
150
I lumber of Cases
100
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland LuxemboiNgtherlands
Portugal Spain gyveden
Member State
Source: Author’s compilation of shipbuilding aid cases from various issues of
the Official Journal of the European Communities (C and L series), 
European Commission Competition Policy Reports and the EU State 
Aid Register. '^^
Refer to Appendix E for a detailed catalogue of these shipbuilding aid cases.
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Table 2.3. Commission Decisions on shipbuilding aid addressed to EU member 
states, 1961-2002
COUNTRY Number of Commission Decisions
Austria 0
Belgium 2
Denmark 1
Finland 0
France 4
Germany 13
Greece 0
Ireland 0
Italy 9
Luxembourg 0
Netherlands 4
Portugal 0
Spain 2
Sweden 0
UK 2
TOTAL 37
Source: Author’s compilation from various issues of the Official Journal of the
European Communities (L series).
Furthermore, as Graph 2.1 and Table 2.3 show, Germany continues to head the 
list of EU member states, both in terms of the number of shipbuilding aid cases and 
Commission Decisions. If one takes compliance to be a measure or indicator of 
Europeanisation, then it could be argued that there has been little Europeanisation of 
the German shipbuilding industry in this context.
However, adopting a compliance approach to assess the success of 
implementation of EU policies in the German shipbuilding industry reveals only part 
of the picture of Europeanisation. The underlying assumption of the compliance 
approach is that compliance by member states with EU policy and EU law leads to 
EU-desired outcomes. Keeping score in a game in which the goalposts are constantly 
shifting becomes increasingly complex. It is not merely the number of state aid cases 
that reveals the extent of compliance with EU law. The type of aid granted is also of 
relevance to the analysis of whether EU shipbuilding policy has had an impact on the 
provision of aid to the German shipbuilding industry.
Closer examination of the various shipbuilding aid cases in Germany over 
time reveals that R & D aid has become increasingly frequently granted. This is
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exactly the type of aid that the EU has been allowing in its more recent shipbuilding 
directives and regulations. A survey of the German shipbuilding aid cases from 1971 
to 2002 reveals that the number of shipbuilding aid cases related to R & D has 
increased significantly since 2000. The statistics in Table 2.4 indicate that the first 
such case occurred in 2000 after the EU Council Regulation No. 1540/98 which 
approved R & D aid and elaborated on the benefits of R & D activity in the 
shipbuilding sector.
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Table 2.4. Shipbuilding aid cases related to R & D in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 1971-2002
Year Shipbuilding Aid Cases Related to 
R & D
1971 0
1972 0
1973 0
1974 0
1975 0
1976 0
1977 0
1978 0
1979 0
1980 0
1981 0
1982 0
1983 0
1984 0
1985 0
1986 0
1987 0
1988 0
1989 0
1990 0
1991 0
1992 0
1993 0
1994 0
1995 0
1996 0
1997 0
1998 0
1999 0
2000 1
2001 2
2002 7
Source’. Author’s calculations based on shipbuilding aid cases compiled from 
the Official Journal of the European Communities (C series) and 
presented in Appendix E.
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that the stipulations of the EU 
shipbuilding aid directives encouraging European shipbuilders to focus on high- 
technology production (discussed in Section 2.1.2 of this chapter) has prompted
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increased R & D  expenditure in the shipbuilding industry in Germany. Tables 2.5, 2.6 
and 2.7 all indicate increased R & D  activity, whether measured in absolute amounts, 
in terms of R & D expenditures as a percentage of production, or as a percentage of 
total physical investment (gross fixed capital formation), in the German shipbuilding 
industry.
Table 2.5. R & D  expenditures in shipbuilding in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
1973-1995 (million DM)
Year R & D  Expenditure 
in Shipbuilding
1973 55.0
1974 18.3
1975 8.6
1976 10.8
1977 22.5
1978 30.0
1979 34.6
1980 36.8
1981 40.4
1982 50.4
1983 62.0
1984 74.6
1985 86.0
1986 77.1
1987 55.0
1988 57.0
1989 59.0
1990 64.9
1991 67.0
1992 88.0
1993 109.0
1994 110.6
1995 147.0
Source: OECD (2003b).
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Table 2.6. R & D  intensity in shipbuilding production in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1980-1995 (per cent)
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
R & D  intensity 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.83 1.03 1.25 1.17 0.84 0.93 0.84 0.85 0.87 1.15 1.50 1.42 1.85
Source: OECD (2003a).
Table 2.7. R & D  investment ratio in shipbuilding in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1980-1994 (per cent)
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
R & D  investment ratio 18.54 21.49 20.37 28.03 55.99 54.84 37.91 34.64 25.04 24.55 22.26 28.36 33.33 47.05 43.79
Source: OECD (2003a).
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Admittedly, there can be complementary explanations for this increased R & 
D activity in the German shipbuilding industry. However, these increased R & D 
expenditures are not explained by an increase in the significance of the German 
shipbuilding industry either in terms of its share of employment or of production of 
the manufacturing sector, as shown by Tables 3.1 and 3.2 of Chapter 3.
A survey of the German shipbuilding aid cases from 1971 to 2002 also reveals 
that the number of maritime transport state aid cases has increased. Table 2.8 shows 
the first such case occurred in 1993 after the EU had passed legislation in favour of 
maritime transport.
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Table 2.8. Shipbuilding aid cases related to maritime transport in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1971-2002
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Maritime 
transport- 
related 
shipbuilding 
aid cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Maritime 
transport- 
related 
shipbuilding 
aid cases
0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 1 1 2 1 1 3
Source: Author’s calculations based on shipbuilding aid cases compiled from the Official Journal of the European Communities (C series)
and presented in Appendix E.
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2.5 PROPER USE OF COMPLIANCE INDICATORS TO UNDERSTAND
EUROPEANISATION
The measurement of German compliance with EU shipbuilding aid law in 
terms of the numbers of shipbuilding aid cases and Commission Decisions gives the 
impression that Germany has not been compliant with EU law. The conclusion that 
could follow from such an empirical exercise is that there has been little 
Europeanisation of German public actors in the shipbuilding policy field. Looking 
merely at the number of state aid cases, however, does not reveal the willingness of 
the Federal and various Lander governments to grant such aid. The possibly 
decreasing propensity of these public authorities to grant aid to the German 
shipbuilding firms is masked by the statistics.^^
This chapter argues that comphance with EU law, in and of itself, is not an 
adequate measure of Europeanisation in the case of the German shipbuilding industry. 
The detailed analysis of German shipbuilding aid cases over time has revealed 
Europeanisation of the German public actors involved in terms of the type of 
shipbuilding projects for which they have granted state aid.
This also indicates that the type of projects for which German shipbuilding 
firms seek aid has changed in line with the priorities of EU shipbuilding policy. The 
EU impulses of linking the maritime transport and shipbuilding industries and of 
emphasising R & D activity in the shipbuilding industry have been taken up by the 
German shipbuilding firms, as manifested by their projects which are fimded by 
German state aid.
Europeanisation of German shipbuilding firms has occurred not by them 
requesting or receiving shipbuilding aid less frequently as the goals of EU state aid 
and shipbuilding policies would suggest, but rather by them engaging in shipbuilding 
activity that is encouraged by segments of EU shipbuilding policy. This chapter has 
thus highlighted the need for careful use of compliance indicators to understand 
Europeanisation of a member state.
Chapters 5 and 6 address this issue by examining an individual shipbuilding firm, Bremer Vulkan 
Verbund AG, and its record of receipt of state aid over a sixteen-year period.
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Chapter Three
GERMAN SHIPBUILDING POLICY AND 
DOMESTIC GOVERNANCE
A study of German shipbuilding policy and of the actions taken by relevant 
German policy actors over time is crucial to telling the tale of EU action - German 
reaction in the shipbuilding policy field. The longitudinal study of the subject of 
Europeanisation -  German shipbuilding policy -  provides evidence of the ways in 
which German public actors have responded to EU impulses in the shipbuilding 
policy field.
Section 3.1 of this chapter offers an overview of the key features of the 
German shipbuilding industry and the challenges it has faced over the past four 
decades. Section 3.2 then analyses the principal objectives of German shipbuilding 
policy in response to these various challenges and to the demands for state support 
fi'om private actors. Subsequently, Section 3.3 provides an analysis of the various 
policy instruments employed by the Federal and Lander governments in their efforts 
to provide financial support to the German shipbuilding industry. The changes in the 
key features of German shipbuilding policy over time are taken as manifestations of 
the changing attitude of German public actors towards state support of the 
shipbuilding industry. Section 3.4 then explores the main trends in German 
shipbuilding policy fi'om 1961 to 2002. These policy trends, along with the German 
institutional response to EU shipbuilding policy in 2001, are then analysed as 
evidence of the Europeanisation of public actors in the German shipbuilding industry.
3.1 A PROFILE OF THE GERMAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
From a country-wide perspective, the shipbuilding industry has been of little 
economic significance to Germany since the 1970s. The shipbuilding industry 
accounted for only between 0.93 and 0.39 per cent of the value of production of the 
manufacturing sector in Germany between 1978 and 2001, as shown in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1. Production of the shipbuilding sector as a share of the production of the
manufacturing sector in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1978-2001 (per cent)
Year Share of Production of Manufacturing 
Sector
1978 0.52
1979 0.45
1980 0.51
1981 0.58
1982 0.93
1983 0.70
1984 0.50
1985 0.47
1986 0.45
1987 0.44
1988 0.40
1989 0.42
1990 0.42
1991 0.49
1992 0.46
1993 0.48
1994 0.47
1995 0.45
1996 0.42
1997 0.40
1998 0.39
1999 0.40
2000 0.39
2001 0.44
Source: Author’s calculations based on figures from OECD (2003b).
Employment statistics also indicate that the shipbuilding industry accounts for 
only a small share of the employment of the manufacturing sector in Germany, as 
shown in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2. Shipbuilding employment as a share of total employment in the
manufacturing sector in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1971 - 2000 (per cent)
Year Shipbuilding’s Share of Total 
Employment in M anufacturing
1971 1.0
1972 1.0
1973 0.9
1974 1.0
1975 1.1
1976 1.0
1977 1.0
1978 0.9
1979 0.8
1980 0.8
1981 0.5
1982 0.5
1983 0.5
1984 0.5
1985 0.5
1986 0.4
1987 0.4
1988 0.4
1989 0.4
1990 0.4
1991 0.6
1992 0.5
1993 0.5
1994 0.5
1995 0.5
1996 0.4
1997 0.4
1998 0.3
1999 0.4
2000 0.4
Source: Author’s calculations based on figures on employment in the
manufacturing sector fi'om United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO) (2003), and figures on employment in the 
shipbuilding industry fi'om various issues of the annual reports of the 
VerbandfUr Schiffbau und Meerestechnik (VSM).
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From a regional or Land perspective, by contrast, the shipbuilding industry has 
been an important sector of employment in the coastal Lander of Bremen and 
Hamburg, as shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3. Shipbuilding employment as a share of total employment in the 
manufacturing industry in the four coastal Lander, 1975-1994 (per cent)
Year Bremen Hamburg Lower Saxony Schleswig-
Holstein
1975 15.4 6.3 1.1 0.06
1976 15.2 6.2 1.1 0.04
1977 14.1 5.9 1.0 0.04
1978 13.0 5.8 1.0 0.04
1979 11.6 5.7 0.9 0.04
1980 10.3 5.2 0.9 0.04
1982 10.8 5.5 1.0 0.03
1984 8.6 4.5 1.0 0.03
1985 8.3 4.2 0.9 0.04
1986 7.6 3.9 0.9 0.04
1987 7.0 3.6 0.8 0.04
1988 6.7 3.2 0.8 0.03
1989 5.7 3.1 0.8 0.03
1990 5.8 3.1 0.8 0.02
1991 6.7 3.0 0.6 0.02
1992 6.5 3.0 0.7 0.02
1993 6.3 2.8 0.6 0.02
1994 6.4 2.7 0.6 0.02
Source: Author’s calculations based on figures on employment in the
manufacturing industry from the International Statistical Yearbook 
2003, and figures on employment in the shipbuilding industry from 
various issues of annual reports of the Verband fu r  Schiffbau und 
Meerestechnik (VSM).
This is because shipbuilding is regionally concentrated within Germany. More 
than 90 per cent of German shipbuilding production and employment is concentrated 
in a few locations within the four coastal Lënder of Hamburg, Bremen, Schleswig- 
Holstein (concentrated in the cities of Flensburg, Kiel, Liibeck, Rendsburg and 
Norderdithmarschen) and Lower Saxony (concentrated in the districts of Aurich and 
Oldenburg). The regional employment significance of shipbuilding is, in fact, even 
greater than these figures reveal. A large proportion of gross production value of
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shipbuilding is the output of other local industrial sectors. The machine tool, steel and 
electro-technical industries, for instance, receive significant demand and employment 
impulses from the shipbuilding industry.^^ Industries that are spatially concentrated 
have regional political significance, and this feature is important in understanding the 
provision of shipbuilding aid by both the Federal and Lander governments. Grewlich 
(1987: 69) argues that “in cases where radical adjustment in certain sectors would 
have led to intolerable economic and socio-political consequences, the government 
has been prepared to cushion such developments” and he cites the provision of 
subsidies to the shipbuilding and steel industries as such cases.^^
Apart from the regional concentration of the shipbuilding industry, there has 
also been concentration within the industry in the large shipbuilding firms. Between 
1972 and 1977, the five largest shipyards together accounted for a 70 per cent share of 
the turnover of German shipbuilding (Strâth 1987: 26). These five shipyards were AG 
Weser (which also controlled the Seebeck shipyard in Bremerhaven), Bremer Vulkan 
in Bremen, Nordseewerk in Emden, Blohm + Voss in Hamburg and Howaldtswerke 
Deutsche Werfr in Kiel and Hamburg. This consolidation of the German shipbuilding 
industry was due to the numerous mergers that have occurred. In 1845, there were 
five hundred shipbuilding firms in Germany. One hundred years later, there were only 
five big firms and about forty medium-sized shipyards (Heseler and Kroger 1983: 
21). This process of mergers has meant that the shipbuilding firms that have 
survived this process of concentration have more expressive power and ‘clout’ in the 
interest intermediation process than would be the case in a situation where the 
industry is fragmented and characterised by a large number of small enterprises.
Table 3.4 provides a statistical summary of the distribution of shipbuilding and 
ship-repair firms in the world. The Federal Republic of Germany has the seventh 
greatest number of shipbuilders and ship-repairers in the world, with a 4.2 per cent 
share of the world total and a 13.3 per cent share of the EU total. Among the EU
The High Level Advisory Group on LeaderSHIP 2015 has estimated that 70 to 80 per cent of the 
value of complex ships is developed by shipyards together with suppliers (CEC 2003: 9).
Corden and Eels (1976: 216) refer to this as the ‘principle of sectional income maintenance’ whose 
aim is ‘preventing severe falls in incomes of any significant section of the community’.
The following is a quick run-down of the more significant mergers in the past fifty years. In 1966, 
Blohm + Voss in Hamburg took over H.C. Stiilcken Werft. In 1968, Deutsche Werft AG, 
Howaldtswerke Hamburg AG and Kieler Howaldtswerke merged to become Howaldtswerke Deutsche 
Werft AG. In 1972, Schichau-Unterweser AG and Schichau GmbH merged to become Schichau 
Unterweser AG.
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member states, only the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have more shipbuilders 
and ship-repairers than Germany.
Table 3.4. Distribution of shipbuilders and ship-repairers in the world, 2003
Country Number
of
Shipbuilders 
and Ship- 
Repairers
Percentage 
Share 
of World 
Total
Percentage
Share
ofEU13
Total
USA 247 11.1 -
United Kingdom 192 8.6 27.4
Japan 154 6.9 -
People’s Republic of China 114 5.1 -
Netherlands 107 4.8 15.3
Norway 103 4.6 -
Federal Republic of Germany 93 4.2 13.3
Italy 57 2.6 8.1
Spain 55 2.5 7.8
Greece 52 2.3 7.4
South Korea 43 1.9 -
France 33 1.5 4.7
Sweden 29 1.3 4.1
Denmark 28 1.3 4.0
Finland 21 0.9 3.0
Portugal 15 0.7 2.1
Belgium 13 0.6 1.9
Ireland 6 0.3 0.9
EU13 701 31.4 100.0
World 2,234 100.0 -
Source: Author’s calculations based on figures firom
//directory.fairplay.co.uk/showarea.asp?area=shipbuilder+%26+Repair 
accessed on 6 November 2003.
Four phases of shipbuilding production can be identified in the post-war 
period in Germany. Firstly, until 1958, there was expansion of shipbuilding capacity 
and production. Between 1958 and 1963, there was stagnation and the 1963 level of 
ship production was equivalent to that of 1958. There was then accelerated growth of 
shipbuilding until 1975. Since 1975, shipbuilding production has fallen drastically. 
These trends are shown in Graph 3.1.
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Graph 3.1: Shipbuilding Production in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1956-1988
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Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (1973: 68-69) and (1989: 36-37).
The decline in shipbuilding in Germany was mainly due to the falling world 
demand for ships. From 1975 to 1984, German shipyards, especially the larger ones, 
were forced to reduce their capacity by as much as 60 per cent. The remaining 
capacity was concentrated on special ships which included container ships, heavy 
goods ships and roll-on-roll-off or ro-ro ships (VDS 1984: 125). The level of 
production reached was, however, much lower than that of the early 1970s.^^
Shipbuilding has always been characterised by severe cyclical fluctuations. A 
sense of ‘feast and famine’ tends to plague this industry. Supply capacity cannot 
increase much in the short run, while large variations in prices of raw materials lead to 
large variations in freight prices and rapidly changing demand for ships. There thus 
often tends to be an overreaction of ship-owners and shipbuilders to economic cycles. 
The imbalance of demand and supply in the world shipbuilding market has been a 
persistent problem for the past thirty years. These excess supply conditions have 
inevitably led to overcapacity in the world shipbuilding market.
The shipbuilding industry, however, displays some particular characteristics 
that do not permit a correction of imbalances of supply and demand, as would 
normally occur in a market environment. Firstly, shipbuilding offers developing 
economies an avenue to earn export revenues. It also offers significant employment
Refer to Appendix F on levels of shipbuilding production from 1956 to 1988 in the principal 
shipbuilding countries.
65
and technological opportunities as shipbuilding can be undertaken at various levels of 
the technological ladder. Furthermore, many countries perceive shipbuilding to be a 
strategic industry that they would like to preserve for trade and strategic interests. The 
fact that shipbuilding often, if not always, forms important regional cluster economies 
whose decline would bring great and immediate difficulty to coastal populations 
ingrains the situation yet further into the political psyche and process of state aid 
provision. Protection of the shipbuilding industry by national authorities against these 
demand and supply forces and global competition is carried out through a limited set 
of measures as traditional trade policy instruments like customs tariffs and quotas are 
not applicable in this sector. Thus, state support, in various forms, emerges as the 
instrument of choice to prop up this industry throughout the world.
The West German shipbuilding industry has consistently received high levels 
of state aid since the 1950s. Within the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
shipbuilding industry received the highest level of subsidies among the manufacturing 
industries in the 1980s when measured as a percentage of value added (Donges, 
Schmidt and Gundlach 1988: 216). It also continued to receive a significant amount of 
state aid in the 1990s.^° Graph 3.2 shows that the German shipbuilding industry has 
received more state aid per employed person than all economic sectors on average 
from 1973 to 1995.
“  Appendix G provides data on the amount of state aid provided to the German shipbuilding industry 
from 1970 to 2002.
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Graph 3.2: Federal Subsidies per Person Employed in Germany,
1967-1995 (DM)
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Deutscher Bundestag (1985: 18-19), (1995: 17), (1999: 16).
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While the level of subsidy given to shipbuilding is relatively high within 
Germany when compared with other industrial sectors, it is quite a different story 
when it comes to making comparisons across West European countries. In 1981, the 
German shipbuilding association, the Verein Deutscher Schiffswerften (VDS), as it 
was known then, conducted a study on the value of subsidies and financing aid for 
ship-owners as a percentage of building price in various West European countries. 
The results of this study are shown in Table 3.5. This study found that Germany 
offered the lowest level of such aid to ship-owners. The Deutscher Bundestag came to 
similar conclusions in 1989 when it found that only the Netherlands provided less 
shipbuilding aid as percentage of value added than Germany for the period 1981 to 
1986, as shown in Table 3.6. The EU compared shipbuilding aid as a percentage of 
contract value of ships from 1992 to 1999 across EU member states. The EU data is 
shown in Table 3.7, and while these statistics do not paint exactly the same picture as 
the Bundestag statistics, they do indicate that Germany, has over the years, been at the 
lower end of the league of shipbuilding-aid providers.
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Table 3.5. Subsidies for shipbuilding in West European countries, 1981 (per cent of 
building price)
Country Direct Subsidies Value of Financing Aid
Foreign
Ship-owners
Domestic
Ship-owners
Foreign
Ship-owners
Domestic
Ship-owners
Denmark - - 37.8 54.6
Belgium - - 16.2 41.4
Italy 32-49 32-49 39.2 38.5
Ireland 24.5 24.5 27.0 27.0
Sweden 31.0 30.0 13.5 26.8
France 23.0 38.0 21.6 21.6
Greece - - - 21.5
Spain 29.5 29.5 14.4 20.7
UK 27-28 27-28 14.9 14.9
Netherlands 13.0 29.5 5.4 5.4
Germany - 12.5 5.4 3.9
Source: VDS October 1982 published in Bremer Vulkan (1982: 5).
Table 3.6. Shipbuilding aid as a percentage of value added in EC member states, 
1981-1986 average (per cent)
EC Member State Shipbuilding Aid as a 
Percentage of 
Value Added
France 56.6
Italy 34.2
Denmark 33.8
Belgium 27.7
United Kingdom 21.6
Germany 12.3
Netherlands 10.7
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (1989: 55).
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Table 3.7. Shipbuilding aid in EU member states, 1992-1999 (per cent of contract 
value of ships)
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Belgium 0.0 6.0 4.3
Denmark 8.5 7.3 7.3 8.2 8.9 8.9 8.1 8.6
Germany 8.2 6.6 6.1 6.5 6.6 6.3 6.4 6.3
France 0.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 8.6 9.0
Spain 5.0 8.3 6.6 7.8 7.4 3.9
Finland 5.3 3.1 9.0
Italy 0.0 9.0 8.2 8.8 8.7 8.9 8.9 9.0
Netherlands 4.7 4.5 3.8 3.2 3.2 3.6 4.1 4.7
Portugal 0.0 0.0 8.8
United Kingdom 6.1 8.5 1.1 8.2 6.0 8.7
Source: CEC (1997b: 12), (1999b: 12), (2001c: 38).
3.2 OBJECTIVES OF GERMAN SHIPBUILDING POLICY AND
DOMESTIC GOVERNANCE OF THE INDUSTRY
The main justification employed by the German government for provision of 
state aid to shipbuilding has been that other countries subsidise their shipbuilding 
industries and that German subsidies should counteract the resulting distortions of 
competition.^^ After the revaluation of the Deutsche Mark (DM) in 1969, the 
subsidies of other countries further negatively impacted on German shipbuilding.^^ 
The Federal Government has consistently argued in its subsidy reports 
(Subventionsberichte) that “the situation of the German shipyards is made difficult as 
the competition on the world shipbuilding market is significantly distorted by state 
interventions which include financing aid, direct building-cost subsidies, loss 
takeovers and compensations, and linking of ship-owner contracts to domestic 
shipyards” (Deutscher Bundestag 1985: 45, 1987: 37, 1989: 38, 1991: 32, 1993: 34).
During the 1880s, there was declining investment of ship-owners. In response, twelve shipyards 
founded the Verein Deutscher Schiffswerften in December 1884 with its headquarters in Berlin. At this 
meeting, the shipyards discussed a petition to the Reichstag requesting that the subsidised post steamers 
be new ships built in German shipyards. This initiative led in January 1885 to the Reichstag 
incorporating the requirement that “new ships must be built on German shipyards” in the subsidy bill 
for post steamers {Gesetz betreffend Postdampferschiffsverbindungen mit überseeischen Landem) 
(VDS 1984: 15). The justification for this state measure was the alleged higher subsidisation of British 
shipyards by the British government.
The revaluation of the DM meant that German-built ships became relatively more expensive on the 
world market because of the strengthened value o f the German currency.
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The Federal Government has stated that the primary and urgent goal of German 
shipbuilding policy is “to achieve a normalisation of the market through the reduction 
of state aid in international agreements” since its third subsidy report of 1971 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1985: 45, 1987: 37, 1989: 38, 1991: 32, 1993: 35). Similar 
arguments can also be found in the Strukturbericht der Bundesregierung or the 
Structural Report of the Federal Government of 1969 (Deutscher Bundestag 1969) 
and in the annual economic reports of the Federal Economics Ministry 
{Wirtschaftsberichte) (Bundesministerium fiir Wirtschafl 1969,1971,1975).
German shipbuilding firms point to the decreasing percentage of new orders 
placed in Germany and the significant rise in corresponding shares in shipbuilding 
countries like Japan and South Korea as evidence of the predatory behaviour of 
foreign governments and shipbuilding industries.^^
An important motive for subsidising industries that are regionally concentrated 
is that employment and income crises that are similarly regionally concentrated are 
politically undesirable. Safeguarding the jobs and income of the people of the coastal 
Lânder has been emphasised by the Federal Government (Deutscher Bundestag 1977: 
133, 1983: 44). Thus, an important motive for shipbuilding aid has been that this 
industry has been perceived to be one that had to be protected for regional political 
and economic reasons.
The shipbuilding sector is a truly global economic sector in that no 
shipbuilding nation can or does produce for its own national market. Similarly, buyers 
in this market look to multiple sources all over the world when placing orders for 
ships. The adjustment pressure to gaps in demand and supply conditions in the world 
shipbuilding market is part of the explanation for the demand for state aid by 
shipbuilding firms. The annual economic reports of the Federal Government list the 
“facilitation of adoption of new contracts and the adjustment to diminished demand” 
(Bundesministerium fur Wiitschaft 1980: 15) and “the support of shipyards in a 
necessary adjustment process” (Bundesministerium fur Wirtschafl 1978: 19) as 
objectives of shipbuilding aid. However, it is often not clear when the aim is 
adjustment or maintenance. There are also associated issues of classification of 
instruments and objectives. For instance, what was classified as adjustment aid in the
Refer to Appendix H for figures on percentages of shipbuilding orders placed in the principal 
shipbuilding countries from 1970 to 1993.
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first subsidy report (Deutscher Bundestag 1967) became described as conservation aid 
from the second subsidy report onwards (Deutscher Bundestag 1970).
The Lander governments have also argued that the conservation of the 
German shipbuilding industry allows the safeguarding of a merchant fleet (Schleswig- 
Holsteinischer Landtag 1981: 4). The goals of ship-owner aid have included 
“safeguarding the basic utilisation of the German shipbuilding industry” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1985: 151), “adjustment of the competitive circumstances of German 
shipping to international circumstances and the rationalisation and modernisation of 
the German merchant fleet” (Deutscher Bundestag 1985: 151) and the “strengthening 
of international competitive ability” (Deutscher Bundestag 1987: 123). Strategic goals 
include ensuring security and national supply in times of political and economic 
crisis. Sea shipping has been favoured, according to the subsidy reports, because it 
“fulfils general economic functions that are necessary for human living” which 
include the supply of the economy with energy and raw materials and foreign trade 
transport (Deutscher Bundestag 1987: 42). Furthermore, naval shipbuilding occupies 
a privileged position in government considerations because of its contribution to 
military strength and national security. The argument runs that in a military crisis, 
there is a need for the merchant fleet and warships to be secured.
A ship is a long-term investment good. A ship-owner or shipping firm only 
amortises his/hers/its investment after several years. Thus, very few purchasers of 
ships are able or prepared to finance a ship out of his/hers funds alone. Financing 
conditions and contract price are paramount considerations for the purchaser in this 
particular industry. There is thus a vociferous call from firms in the shipbuilding 
industry for either demand-aiding (aid to ship-purchasers) or supply-aiding (aid to 
shipbuilders) state support measures.
The calls for subsidies emerge not just from the shipbuilding firms and the 
ship-owners alone. Workers in shipbuilding firms logically have a vested interest in 
the sustainability of the shipbuilding industry, and have frequently and persistently 
agitated for state aid for shipbuilding. At the national shipbuilding conference of IG 
Metall in March 1978, the union argued that capacity should not in the short term be 
adapted to low demand which they saw as a cyclical phenomenon. Their preferred 
strategy was to increase the demand for ships with government measures. They asked 
the Federal Government to prepare an ‘intermediate plan’ guaranteeing full 
employment at the shipyards and in the regions in which they were located (IG Metall
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1978). The works councils’ efforts in the 1980s were also almost exclusively directed 
towards politicians, and little was said about the role of private enterprise (IG Metall 
1982). A study conducted by the University of Bremen in 1980 examined the reaction 
of shipbuilding workers to the shipbuilding crisis of the late 1970s. This study 
revealed that the crisis had not been a spur to collective action at a grassroots level 
directed against the employer. Rather, most workers looked towards the state for some 
solution to the crisis (Zoll 1980).
The consistent calls for either demand-aiding or supply-aiding government 
support measures by German shipbuilders, ship-owners and shipbuilding workers 
exert pressure on both the Federal and Lander governments to provide shipbuilding 
aid. While it is commonplace for those in declining industries to make vociferous 
demands for state aid and to be recipients of significant amounts of such financial 
support, this section has shown how particular characteristics of the shipbuilding 
industry, including its regional concentration, its associated strategic advantages, the 
world-wide nature of its market, the unfair trade and business practices of competitor 
shipbuilding countries, and the inefficacy of traditional trade policy instruments, 
explain why these demands for state aid are often of key political significance for the 
relevant government authorities. The following section describes the various measures 
that the Federal and Lander governments have, in turn, provided to the German 
shipbuilding industry fi'om the 1960s to 2002.
3.3 GERMAN SHIPBUILDING AID PROGRAMMES, 1961-2002
Since the beginning of the 1960s, the Federal and Land governments have 
adopted several measures to counteract the trends of declining world market share and 
loss of employment in the German shipbuilding industry. The following analysis of 
Federal and Land measures in support of the German shipbuilding industry is meant 
to serve two purposes. Firstly, one can acquire an understanding of the goals of 
German shipbuilding policy and the methods and instruments which are employed to 
achieve those goals. Secondly, such an exercise serves to illustrate the roles played by 
the Federal Government (Bundesregierung) and the regional governments of the 
Lander (Landerregierungen) in the provision of state aid to the shipbuilding industry.
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3.3.1 Shipbuilding-Specific Measures
Firstly, the Federal Government supports the German shipbuilding industry 
via measures that are targeted directly at the shipbuilding industry. This section 
provides an analysis of the various German shipbuilding aid programmes 
implemented from 1961 to 2002 in chronological order.
(a) Financing Aid under the Werfthilfeprogramm (Shipyard Aid Programme)
There was a fundamental change in ship-financing in Germany in 1961. Until 
then, it was common that a ship-owner paid the contract price of a ship in instalments 
between the signing of the contract and the delivery of the ship. Long-term financing 
of ships only became an option with the introduction of the Werfthilfeprogramm by 
the Federal Government in 1961. Under this programme, the Federal Government 
provided financing aid to the shipyards for the reduction of the cost of credit to the 
purchasers of ships by granting interest allowances and interest-reduced loans. The 
justification of the Federal Government for this financing aid was that it “countervails 
the competition distortions that are disadvantageous to the shipyards in Germany” as 
“foreign shipyards receive massive state aid” (Deutscher Bundestag 1985: 127). The 
financing aid supported individual shipyards and was allocated according to the 
shipyard’s annual turnover (Deutscher Bundestag 1983).
The Kreditanstalt fu r  Wiederaufbau (KfW) provided interest-reduced credits 
for the financing of ship exports. In the framework of the Werfthilfeprogramm^ the 
interest rate for such long-term credits has been as much 2 to 2.5 percentage points 
below the market interest rate.^ Such funding was mixed in that the KfW credits 
represented 30 to 40 per cent of the amount to be funded (which can be up to 80 per 
cent of the ship’s selling price). The remainder of the funding came from banks, 
including the Schiffshypothekenbank, Girozentralen and Geschaftsbanken of the 
coastal Lander (Bundesministerium fur Wirtschafl 1968a). The KfW credits were 
given in the ratio of 4:1 as purchaser credit directly to the ship-owner and as 
supplier/vendor credit to the exporting shipyard. The loan part of the
^ A two per cent financing aid, ceteris paribus, is equivalent to a subsidy value o f five per cent of the 
price of a beneficiary ship, where the subsidy value is calculated as the cash value o f the interest 
savings as a percentage of the selling price.
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Werfthilfeprogramm was phased out in 1983. Until then, loans in the amount of a total 
of DM 1,822 million had been disbursed (Deutscher Bundestag 1985: 127).
This export financing aid was initially supposed to be only for exports of new 
ships to non-EC countries. The seventh Werfthilfeprogramm of 1971 favoured for the 
first time exports to EC member states. Since 1973, contracts of domestic German 
buyers could also benefit fi'om this financing aid (Deutscher Bundestag 1973). Such 
financing aid has also been applied since 1977 to ships delivered under development 
aid. Such financing aid has been used not only for development aid projects but for 
so-called “matching cases” as well (Deutscher Bundestag 1979: 117). For instance, 
when a German shipyard competes with foreign shipyards for a contract and the 
foreign shipyards are being subsidised by state aid, the German shipyards are 
correspondingly subsidised. There have been eight extensions of the 
Werfthilfeprogramm between 1962 and 2002. Table 3.8 shows that the amount of aid 
disbursed under the Werfthilfe programme declined steadily between 1985 and 1987 
and since 1993.
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Table 3.8. Werfthilfe disbursed in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1983-2002 
(million DM)
Year Amount of Werfthilfe
1983 289.9
1984 167.6
1985 230.0
1986 200.0
1987 135.7
1988 149.8
1989 169.8
1990 200.8
1991 246.3
1992 289.2
1993 299.5
1994 285.2
1995 284.2
1996 267.3
1997 234.3
1998 208.2
1999 96.5
2000 77.9
2001 70.6
2002 50.5
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (1985: 126), (1989: 106), (1991: 112), (1993:
109-110), (1995: 104-105), (1997: 108-109), (1999: 101) and (2001: 
63).
(b) Aid for Financing Adjustment Investments
In 1967, the Federal Government decided to provide aid for financing 
investment in shipyards. This investment aid programme was only in force fi'om 31 
October 1967 until 31 December 1970. The provision of such aid was attached to a 
number of conditions. The investment had to be for the building of new types of ships 
or bigger ships, the strengthened transition to section and compact design and series 
manufacturing, production control or the processing of new materials. Replacement 
investment and investment for the purpose of expansion of production was not 
subsidised. DM 70 million was provided fiom the European Recovery Programme 
(ERP) budget in the form of interest-reduced credits. This sum represented 25 per cent 
of the supported investment. A further 25 per cent was provided by the coastal Lander
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governments. The rest was financed by the shipbuilding firms themselves 
(Bundesministerium fur Wirtschafl 1968b: 1).
This second shipbuilding aid programme marked a distinct shift in German 
shipbuilding policy. Unlike the earlier Werthilfeprogramm^ this aid programme was 
limited in duration, was not extended and required co-financing by the Lander 
governments.
(c) Auftragshilfeprogramm (Contract Aid Programme)
Contract-related shipbuilding aid was introduced by the Federal Government 
in January 1979. The contract aid programme that was “conceptualised as a crisis- 
limited aid” expired as plaimed at the end of 1981 (Deutscher Bundestag 1985: 46). 
Shipyards could, when accepting contracts, prearrange a provision of up to 20 per 
cent of the agreed price. The limit was changed to 15 per cent in 1981. The shipyards 
were supposed to repay the received aid, up to half of their total profits of the years 
1983-1988. The contract aid programme was co-financed by the Federal Government 
and the governments of the Lander in which the shipyards were located. Three- 
quarters of the aid came fi'om the Federal Government and one-quarter from the 
Lander governments. This shipbuilding aid programme provided allowances for the 
building of “technologically high-order sea-ships” (Deutscher Bundestag 1979: 30). 
Oil tankers and cargo freighters were excluded from this provision. Otherwise, all 
other new building of ocean-going ships could be financed so long as the ship had a 
minimum size of 150 gross tonnes and had more than one hull.
The Auftragshilfe programme continued in the same vein as the investment aid 
programme of 1967-1970. It too was limited in duration and required Lander co­
financing. The emerging trend in German shipbuilding policy by 1979 was, therefore, 
one of the Federal Government increasingly shifting the burden of state support of the 
shipbuilding industry to the relevant Lander governments.
After efforts of the Lander governments for the continuation of the Federal- 
Lander government contract aid programme of 1979-1981 failed in the face of 
opposition from the Federal Government, the coastal Lander governments in October 
1983 decided on their own contract aid programme, whereby building-cost grants, 
from 6 per cent until the end of 1984 and from 4 per cent until the end of 1985, were
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provided (Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Freie Hansestadt Hamburg, Land Niedersachsen, 
Land Schleswig-Holstein 1983).
(d) Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm (Competition Aid Programme)
After the order situation for German shipyards worsened further in 1986, the 
Federal Government introduced the Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm (competition aid 
programme) on 1 July 1987 so that German shipyards could “counter the competition- 
distorting subsidies of other shipbuilding countries” (Deutscher Bundestag 1987: 
103). The programme initially consisted of grants of up to 20 per cent of the contract 
price in new shipbuilding and conversion of merchant ships. The aid was provided for 
both domestic and foreign contracts. Unlike contract aid, it was not necessary for 
shipbuilders to repay competition aid. The Federal Government paid two-thirds of 
competition aid, and the remaining one-third was provided by the Land in which the 
contract-receiving shipbuilding firm had its base.
The aid programme was originally planned to expire on 31 December 1990 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1987: 103). However, “because of the persistent competition 
distortions, an extension of the Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm for a further two years 
became necessary” (Deutscher Bundestag 1991: 32). The funding rate was reduced to 
9.5 per cent of the contract price for this two-year extension that lasted until 31 
December 1992 (Deutscher Bundestag 1991: 112). Since 1994, the Federal 
Government has been stating that its competition aid programme would expire as 
soon as the OECD Agreement on Normal Competitive Conditions in Commercial 
Shipbuilding and Ship-Repair came into force. As this did not come to pass from the 
initially expected date of 1 January 1996 up to the year 2000, the competition aid 
programme was extended eight times. Table 3.9 provides the validity periods and the 
funding rates of these eight extensions of the Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm.
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Table 3.9. Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm -  validity and funding rates, 1987-2000
Programme Validity Funding Rate 
(in per cent of 
contract price)®^
I 1 July 1987 -  31 December 1990 20
n 1 January 1991-31 December 1992 9.5
III 1 January 1993 -  31 December 1994 7.5 and 4.7
IV 1 January 1995 -  31 December 1996 7 and 4.7
V 1 January 1997 -  31 December 1997 7 and 4.7
VI 1 January 1998 -  31 December 1998 7 and 4.7
VII 1 January 1999 -  31 December 1999 7 and 4.7
vm 1 January 2000 -3 1  December 2000^^ 7 and 4.7
When the Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm was first introduced, the Federal 
Government was responsible for two-thirds of the funding and the Lander 
governments for one-third. With the extension of the HI. Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm 
for 1993/1994, the rules were changed and the fund allocation became half each by 
the Federal Government and the Lander (Deutscher Bundestag 1993: 35). In 1995, the 
proportion of Lander government funding was increased yet further with the Lander 
governments being responsible for two-thirds of the competition aid and the Federal 
Government providing one-third of the amount. The changing rules on the funding 
responsibilities of the Federal and Lander governments provide evidence of the 
gradual withdrawal of the Federal Government from the provision of shipbuilding aid. 
The transfer of the greater part of the burden of the provision of shipbuilding aid to 
the Lander governments has, in fact, made the granting of shipbuilding aid less likely 
in Germany. Schleswig-Holstein, for example, has not disbursed Wettbewerbshilfe 
since the change of the funding law in 1993. According to the official in charge of 
shipbuilding affairs in the Bremen Economics Ministry, the Land Bremen did not 
have enough money to match the funds that the Federal Government was prepared to 
supply in 2001 and 2002. As such, the allocation to Land Bremen for these years was 
only half utilised (interview 2).
Just as with the Werfthilfe programme, the amount of aid granted under the 
Wettbewerbshilfe programme declined steadily from the early 1990s, as shown in 
Table 3.10.
From 1987 to 1992, there was only one funding rate for all ships. From 1993, however, two funding 
rates were applied: a higher one for new shipbuilding o f a contract value of at least DM 10 million and 
a lower funding rate for new shipbuilding under DM 10 million and for conversions,
^  The last extension of the competition aid programme allows for conçetition aid to be provided for 
contracts that were conqileted by 31 December 2000, with deliveries by 31 December 2003,
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Table 3.10. Wettbewerbshilfe disbursed in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1988-
2002 (million DM)
Year Amount of 
Wettbewerbshilfe
1988 100.0
1989 121.3
1990 180.0
1991 265.4
1992 167.1
1993 119.7
1994 106.1
1995 110.3
1996 88.0
1997 70.1
1998 70.8
1999 37.1
2000 47.2
2001 86.9
2002 63.9
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (1985: 126), (1989: 106), (1991: 112), (1993:
109-110), (1995: 104-105), (1997: 108-109), (1999: 101) and (2001: 
63).
German reunification in 1990 marked a watershed in the development of the 
German shipbuilding industry .T he basic principle of Article 28 of the Unification 
Treaty that the new Bundeslander were to be included in the existing rules of the 
Federal Government on state aid apply to shipbuilding aid as well. The Federal 
Government launched a separate shipbuilding aid programme for the East German 
shipyards, known as the Wettbewerbshilfe Ost programme in response to German 
unification. The Lander Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt were 
only responsible for one-third of the funding (Deutscher Bundestag 1991: 113). This 
Wettbewerbshilfe Ost programme which was endowed with a total of DM 779.6 
million was in operation from 1991 to 1995 (Deutscher Bundestag 1997: 109). 
Thereafter, the East German shipbuilding firms were eligible for programmes that 
applied to the West German firms.
67 Refer to Section 5.1 of Chapter 5 for a detailed analysis of the East German shipbuilding industry.
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(e) Reederhilfe (Ship-Owner Aid) for the Purchase of Merchant Ships
Alongside the direct provision of aid for shipbuilding via financing, contract 
and competition aid, shipbuilding has also been indirectly supported via measures 
supporting the demand for shipbuilding. The Federal Government provided aid from 
1962 until 1987 to German ship-owners for the purchase of merchant ships.^* The 
grants that the ship-owners were provided amounted to 10 per cent of the cost of new 
construction and 20 per cent of conversion costs until 1975. The funding rate for new 
construction was raised to 12.5 per cent in 1975 (Deutscher Bundestag 1987: 123). 
The accumulation prohibition was abolished in 1976. Until then, a ship-owner could 
only receive such a grant if the shipyard that had produced the ship had not received 
any subsidy. With the removal of this prohibition, a ship could in essence be 
subsidised twice.
Although formally there was no tie between ship-owner aid and the awarding 
of orders to German shipyards, in practice, the ship-owner aid was provided almost 
exclusively for shipbuilding orders for German shipyards (Land Schleswig-Holstein 
1986: 4). The preferential treatment of German shipyards was to be found in the fact 
that the aid gave them leeway in price. The shipyards could offer ships to the aided 
ship-owners that were more expensive than foreign competitors up to the level of the 
aid, without running the risk of losing the contract. The fact that the ship-owner aid 
ultimately was primarily an aid to German shipyards is confirmed by the fact that the 
suspension of ship-owner aid in 1987 was explained by the Federal Ministry of 
Finance as the shipyards from then on being provided with competition aid 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1987: 123). Furthermore, the objective of ship-owner aid has 
been acknowledged by the Federal Ministry of Finance as the ‘funding of the building 
of merchant ships’ (Deutscher Bundestag 1971: 22).
(f) Tax Allowances for Commission or Acquisition of Merchant Ships
The carriers of merchant ships are provided with tax allowances that indirectly 
favour shipyards. These include income and corporate tax allowances. For instance, 
such tax allowances include the reduction of foreign salaries’ unlimited taxability 
from the commission of merchant ships in international traffic, halving the average
Initially, the ship-owners only received interest-reduced loans. Later they also received grants for 
purchases of ships. From 1979, the ship-owner aid was only provided in the form of direct grants.
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tax rate (§34c Einkommensteuergesetz and §26 Korperschaftsteuergesetz) as well as 
the valuation freedom for merchant ships (§82f Einkommensteuer- 
DurchfUhrungsverordnung).^^ The property tax rate is favourable for firms that have 
merchant ships in international traffic (§117a Bewertungsgesetz) and they enjoy a 
reduction of taxable amount (§11 and §13 Gewerbesteuergesetz).
The Federal Ministry of Finance has argued that these measures should 
improve the competitive situation of sea shipping (Deutscher Bundestag 1985: 222- 
224). Insofar as the improved competitive position of the shipping carriers results in 
more ships being ordered at German shipyards without direct shipbuilding 
allowances, shipbuilding firms in Germany profit as well. The Federal Finance 
Ministry has argued that from their perspective as aid-provider, this was a further 
reason for giving such tax allowances (Deutscher Bundestag 1983: 44).
Originally, losses could be allocated in unlimited amounts. For limited 
partners who participated in shipbuilding, loss allocations of over 300 per cent of the 
designated capital were allowed. These high percentages that were not reached in 
most other economic sectors resulted from the freedom of valuation for merchant 
ships. The participation was almost without risk because the investor, in the case of 
firm collapse or bankruptcy, only seldom lost money and was even likely to make 
profits. This was the case until 1985. As the demand for new construction through 
German contract-givers fell drastically in 1985, the tax allowances were restricted to 
assigned losses. This new tax regulation restricted the tax loss calculations in the 
acquisition of limited capital. This change in the general tax environment worsened 
the financing possibilities of shipbuilding as the attractiveness of new shipbuilding as 
investment and depreciation objects was diminished. Kiesel (1997: 100) argued that 
the Rickmers shipyard (which had been successful in obtaining state aid from the City 
Bremerhaven and Land Bremen) initiated insolvency proceedings in February 1986 as 
a consequence of the changed tax law on loss allocation.
(g) Guarantees for Own Resources
The Federal and the Lander governments often provide guarantees for credits 
for financing the building of new ships or larger reconstruction/conversion. For
This special tax write-off is provided to sea-fishing vessels and aircraft in international traffic as 
well.
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instance, at the beginning of 1985, Land Schleswig-Holstein took over, in addition to 
the securing of foreign financing, the securing of domestic and own resources for new 
shipbuilding through Land guarantees. Bremen and Lower Saxony have also adopted 
such measures since 1985. According to a statement of the Land Government of 
Schleswig-Holstein, these aids were, in the mid 1980s, the crucial existence basis for 
its shipyards (Land Schleswig-Holstein 1986).
(h) State Ownership of Shipyards
Individual Lander governments, communes and even the Federal Government 
have participated as owners of shipyards. For example, in the 1970s, the state-owned 
Salzgitter steel concern owned 75 per cent of the capital share of Howaldtswerke 
Deutsche Werft AG and the Land Schleswig-Holstein owned the remaining 25 per 
cent. In 1984, the Hansestadt Bremen owned shares in Schichau-Unterweser AG in 
the amount of 39 per cent and 25 per cent in AG Weser. In 1986, the City of 
Flensburg held 15.5 per cent of Flensburger Schiffbaugesellschaft mbH.
The subsidy element of state ownership of shipyards is to be found in the fact 
that such enterprises that received public funds would probably not, or only under 
difficult terms, have found such capital on the capital market. Waivers on the 
distribution of profits can also be seen as subsidies. For instance, the Land 
Government of Schleswig-Holstein, as co-owner of Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werfl 
AG, pronounced such waivers on profits in the more profitable years of the firm in the 
1970s (Schleswig-Holsteinischer Landtag 1983).
(i) Federal Government as Purchaser for Shipyards
Public orders serve as state support for an industry. There is a subsidy element 
in such state orders when the price paid by the state is higher than the normal market 
price or the prices offered by foreign shipbuilders. Contracts funded by the Federal 
defence budget and development aid projects are important for German shipyards.
contracts from the defence budget
The Bundesministerium der Verteidigung or the Federal Ministry of Defence 
makes significant expenditures on the procurement and maintenance of naval ships. 
However, there is no official documentation that the Federal Ministry of Defence is
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willing to pay higher prices to German shipyards than to foreign shipyards. On the 
other hand, the fact that nearly all these orders go to German shipyards must imply 
favouritism and an indirect subsidy element in the contracts. However, it must be 
conceded that only very few western industrial countries can meet the cost levels of 
German shipyards and it is only these countries that have the technological and 
security-political requirements to fulfil such contracts.
There have been occasions on which the Federal Government has spent more 
for individual frigates than anticipated at the time of awarding the contract. For 
instance, this was done to remedy the financial difficulties at Bremer Vulkan. Bremer 
Vulkan received an additional payment of DM 220 million from the frigate 
programme of the defence budget of 1981 (Heseler 1983: 113; Lammers 1989: 135).
ships as development aid projects
Ships are often delivered to developing countries as development aid. In the 
framework of financial co-operation with developing countries, these countries 
receive grants and generous credits to buy ships from German shipyards. Without 
such aid, no such contracts would be issued. For development aid delivery cases, the 
OECD countries are not bound by the conditions of the OECD Understanding on 
Export Credits for Ships. Thus, the sale of ships to developing countries is much more 
highly subsidised than ships that are sold to other countries. In such development aid 
projects, the contract price is often above the market price.^^
3.3.2 Measures that Are Not Shipyard-Specific
Shipbuilding, apart from sector-specific aid, also receives funds from non- 
sectoral programmes of the Federal Government.
(a) Regional Support
Subsidy policy also exists within the framework of the Joint Task for the 
Improvement of Regional Economic Structures {Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung 
der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur). The shipbuilding industry of Lower Saxony and
In the mid 1960s, it was found that in 3 out of 20 cases of ship deliveries to Pakistan, the price was 
over the market price by 33, 35 and 57 per cent (Lammers 1989: 138).
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Schleswig-Holstein is located in assisted regions of the regional action programmes 
‘Nordwest-Niedersachsen’, ‘Schleswig-Unterelbe’ and ‘Holstein*. The entire eastern 
coast of Schleswig-Holstein belongs to the ZonenrandgebieteJ^ Since many of the 
shipyards of Schleswig-Holstein are located in the Zonenrandgebiete, they can be 
aided through the investment allowance law. Apart from investment allowances, the 
assisted regions can also be aided by Gemeinschaftsaufgabe funds in the form of 
investment subsidies and loans from the Bundesanstalt fu r  Arbeit.
(b) R & D A i d
Shipbuilding receives aid from the R & D aid programmes of the Federal 
Government. The emphasis of the Marine Research and Technology Programme 
(Meeresforschung und Meerestechnik) of the Federal Ministry for Education and 
Research of 1979-1981 was ship technology, and the shipbuilding industry was 
specifically named as an addressee of funding. The next research programme of the 
Federal Ministry for Education and Research in favour of the shipbuilding industry 
came only in 1994 with the “Marine Technology” concept which covered ship 
technology, shipping and coastal engineering. The “Shipping and Marine Technology 
for the Twenty-First Century” research programme spanning from 2000 until 2004 
followed. Its funding priorities are nautical engineering (upgrading shipping as a 
mode of transport, boosting the competitiveness of shipyards), shifting transport to 
coastal waters and inland waterways and marine engineering (Bundesministerium fur 
Bildung und Forschung 2000: 148). The modernisation and rationalisation of the 
German merchant fleet was facilitated by subsidies within the R & D framework of 
“The Ship of the Future”. Shipbuilding appears to have disappeared from the Federal 
Government’s list of priority sectors for R & D investment after 1981 and re-emerged 
only in 1994.
The border area of the Zonenrandgebiete is territorially defined in the annex to paragraph 9 of the 
German law referring to the development of the Zonenrandgebiete (Gesetz fur Forderung des 
Zonenrandgebiets vom 5 August 1971).
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3.4 DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN GERMAN SHIPBUILDING POLICY
Table 3.11 provides a summarised description of the various shipbuilding aid 
programmes implemented by the Federal and Lander governments from 1961 until 
2002.
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Table 3.11. German shipbuilding aid programmes, 1961-2002
AID
PROGRAMME
DURATION FUNDED ACTIVITIES AID RATE SOURCE OF 
FINANCING
Financing aid 
{Werfthilfe)
1961 - 2002 Sale of newly built merchant ships; until 
1970 only for deliveries to non-EC 
countries; from 1971 until 1972, for all 
deliveries abroad; from 1973, for all 
domestic and foreign deliveries
For normal deliveries: variable 
according to conditions on the 
capital markets; for deliveries to 
developing countries: at least 25 
per cent of the project costs
Federal Government
Adjustment 
investment aid
31 October 1967 
- 31 December 
1970
Building of new types or bigger ships, 
section and compact design series 
manufacturing
Up to 50 per cent of the supported 
investment
Federal Government 
half and Land 
government half
Contract aid 
{Auftragshilfe)
1979 - 1981 Building of ocean-going ships with steel 
hull (minimum size 150 gross tonnes), 
excluding oil tankers and freighters
Up to 20 per cent of the contract 
price
Federal Government 
three-quarters and 
Land government one- 
quarter
8 6
AID
PROGRAMME
DURATION FUNDED ACTIVITIES AID RATE SOURCE OF FINANCING
Ship-owner aid 
(Reederhilfe)
1962 - 1987 Contracts for building or 
conversion of merchant 
ships from German ship­
owners
Variable; in 1987, 12.5 
per cent of new building 
costs and 20 per cent of 
conversion costs
Federal Government
Competition aid 
( Wettbewerbshilfe)
1987-2000 Building or conversion of 
technologically high- 
value ships
Up to 20 per cent of the 
contract price until 
1980; up to 15 per cent 
of contract price in 1981
From 1987 to 1992: Federal Government two- 
thirds and Land government one-third; 1993: 
Federal Government and Land government half 
each; 1994: Federal Government 40 per cent and 
Land government 60 per cent;
From 1995: Federal Government one-third and 
Land government two-thirds
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AID PROGRAMME DURATION FUNDED ACTIVITIES AID RATE SOURCE OF 
FINANCING
Shipbuilding grants 
(coastal Lander 
programme)
1983 - 1985 Building of sea-going ships with metal hull (minimum 
size 150 gross tonnes), excluding oil tankers and 
freighters; conversion of ships with metal hull 
(minimum size 1000 gross tonnes)
1983-1984: 6 per cent 
of contract price; 1985: 
4 per cent of contract 
price
Land government
Source'. Author’s compilation based on various issues of Subventionsberichte.
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Systematic analysis o f these German shipbuilding aid programmes reveals 
several trends. Figure 3.1 presents the shipbuilding aid programmes in force over this 
period.
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Figure 3.1. German shipbuilding aid programmes, 1961-2002
Firstly, there has been a decline in the number of such programmes offered 
over the time period studied. Not only has there been a decline in the number of 
shipbuilding aid programmes in force, the funding rates of these programmes have 
also fallen over time. For instance, in 1982, Germany reduced its upper limit for 
interest reduction from 2.5 to 2 per cent (VSM 1982: 18). Because of the low market 
interest rate in recent years, no new commitments have been made by the Federal 
Government in terms of Werfthilfe since 2000. The funds provided in the budget plan 
of 2001 were meant only for the execution of obligations made earlier (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2001: 33). The aid rate of the Auftragshilfeprogramm (contract aid 
programme) was reduced from 20 to 15 per cent in 1981. The aid rate of the 
shipbuilding grant programme of the coastal Lander was also reduced from 6 to 4 per 
cent of contract price in 1985. As discussed earlier, the types and amounts of losses 
that are subject to tax allowances have also been restricted. Moreover, the state 
ownership of shipyards, which was once an important way of supporting the
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shipbuilding industry, has ail but disappeared in Germany since the mid 1990s. 
Furthermore, more conditions have been attached to the provision of shipbuilding aid. 
Both the adjustment investment aid and the Auftragshilfe (contract aid) programmes 
impacted directly on the activities of the shipyards by encouraging the construction of 
particular types of vessels and by specifying production techniques and requirements. 
The Wettbewerbshilfe (competition aid) programme, for instance, only funded the 
production of technologically high-value ships.
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Figure 3.2. Assessment of German shipbuilding aid programmes, 1961-2002
Figure 3.2 graphically presents the increasing conditionality and stringency of 
German shipbuilding aid programmes over time. On balance, these various 
programmes have become less favourable for German shipbuilding firms over the 
past forty years.
The amounts of state aid disbursed under the various programmes have also 
fallen over time. Graph 3.3 presents the amount of Werfthilfe and Wettbewerbshilfe 
disbursed from 1983 to 2002. These statistics show that there has been a downward 
trend in the amounts of both types of aid disbursed.
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Graph 3.3: German Shipbuilding Aid, 1983-2002 (million DM)
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Source: Author’s compilation based on figures from Deutscher Bundestag
(1985: 126), (1989: 106), (1991: 112), (1993: 109-110), (1995: 104- 
105), (1997: 108-109), (1999: 101) and (2001: 63).
Table 3.12 shows that while shipbuilding aid was climbing in the ranking of 
different types of aid in Germany in terms of amount disbursed until 1992, it has 
fallen in such ranking since 1994. Furthermore, Table 3.12 shows that the amount 
estimated for shipbuilding aid in the Federal budget drafts fell from 1992 onwards.
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Table 3.12. Ranking of shipbuilding aid in Germany and amounts estimated for
shipbuilding aid in Federal Government budget drafts, 1986-2000
Year Ranking of Shipbuilding 
Aid
Estimates of 
Shipbuilding Aid in 
Federal Budget Drafts 
(million DM)
1986 17 200
1988 11 280
1990 10 375
1992 9 707
1994 10 515
1996 11 442
1998 15 291
2000 15 260
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (1985: 26), (1987: 26), (1989: 26), (1991: 20),
(1993: 26), (1995: 18), (1997: 17) and (1999: 20).
The second important observation that emerges firom the analysis of the 
German shipbuilding aid programmes is that the ‘burden’ of supporting the German 
shipbuilding industry appears to have shifted fi'om the Federal Government to the 
Lander governments. As discussed earlier, when the Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm was 
first introduced, the Federal Government was responsible for the major part of the 
funding. With the extension of the III. Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm for 1993/1994, the 
rules were changed and the fund allocation became half each by the Federal 
Government and the Lander governments (Deutscher Bundestag 1993: 35). In 1995, 
the proportion of Lander government funding increased yet further with the Lander 
governments being responsible for two-thirds of the Wettbewerbshilfe aid and the 
Federal Government providing only one-third of the amount. Moreover, the later 
shipbuilding programmes required the Lander governments’ participation in the 
provision of funding to a fairly significant degree. The Federal Government’s share of 
shipbuilding aid until the 1970s has been estimated to be more than 95 per cent. 
However, since 1979, the engagement of the coastal Lander governments increased 
significantly to 19 per cent in 1984 (Gutowski, Thiel and Weilepp 1984: 39).
The Lander have also provided ad-hoc state aid for individual shipyards. For 
example, the Land Government of Schleswig-Holstein supplied DM 93 million to 
cover the losses of Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG fi’om 1983 to 1985 (Land
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Schleswig-Holstein 1986). In 1988, the Land government provided a further DM 37.5 
million to this same firm to cover a part of the losses from an order for the 
construction of three container ships for a purchaser from the USA 
(Landeshaushaltsplan Schleswig-Holstein 1988). In December 1981, the Bremen 
Senate provided state aid to Bremer Vulkan which faced bankruptcy after 
miscalculations on a luxury cruiser and as a general contractor for a frigate 
programme of the Federal Navy (Strâth 1987: 246). As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
Land Government of Bremen has been a provider of significant amounts of 
shipbuilding aid to the Bremen shipbuilding firms, including Bremer Vulkan Verbund 
AG. The Federal Government, on the other hand, has not provided significant 
amounts of such ad-hoc aid to shipyards in crisis since the mid 1980s.
Shipbuilding has been a matter of relatively small importance at the Federal 
level but of much greater significance in the coastal Lander. Thus, the intensity of the 
debate has often been between the levels of government {Bund and Land). The strong 
demands for government intervention at the local level, where the crisis has been 
more immediately experienced, have been ‘mentally diluted’ in the higher levels of 
the hierarchy which also had to consider the problems of many other German 
industries.
This chapter has traced the content of German shipbuilding policy from the 
1960s to 2002. The main observation is that there has been a decline in government 
support for the German shipbuilding industry over this period. Initially, during the 
1960s and 1970s, the demands of the union and the shipbuilding firms were positively 
received by the Federal Govemment.^^ However, by the mid 1980s, the strength of the 
constituency pressuring the Federal Government for the provision of shipbuilding aid 
had declined.^^ The predominant view of the shipbuilding industry in the 1990s was 
that a German industrial policy concept in favour of shipbuilding was lacking 
(Heseler 1993; Hecht et al. 1995). A study commissioned by the German shipbuilding 
association and the Federal Government found that “German shipbuilding has no 
recognisable agreed policy ... and this has in recent years led to uncertainty of the 
shipbuilding industry” (Little and Berger 1993: 87).
The Federal Minister of Finance, Hans Matthoffer, stated in 1978, “By and large, we made the 
industry’s proposal our own” (Bundesministerium fur WirtschaA 1978).
The former chairman of the board of directors of Howaldtswerke Deutsche WerA commented in 
1984, “There is no functioning restoration concept for shipbuilding in Germany any more” 
(Handelsblatt, 1 February 1984).
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Secondly, there has been a greater sharing of the responsibility of providing 
shipbuilding aid between the Federal and Lander governments over time. This second 
trend has served to make the provision of shipbuilding aid in Germany more complex 
and thus less likely.
3.5 INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE OF GERMAN PUBLIC ACTORS TO
EU SHIPBUILDING POLICY
The response of German public actors to EU shipbuilding policy has not been 
limited merely to adaptation in terms of shipbuilding policy content. The Federal 
Government has also responded in institutional terms. The First National Maritime 
Conference in Germany was held in June 2000. This conference was the initiative of 
Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroder who, as a former Prime Minister of Lower 
Saxony, has intimate knowledge of the German maritime sector. A consensus 
emerged at this conference in Emden that new initiatives and incentives were required 
to stabilise and strengthen the maritime sectors of the shipbuilding, shipping, ports 
and ancillary industries and services.
Federal Chancellor Schroder appointed Secretary of State of the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Labour, Dr. Axel Gerlach, as Co-ordinator of the 
Maritime Economy in 2001 with a view to co-ordinate the maritime efforts of all 
competent Federal and Lander industries.^"* That same year, the Federal Government 
endorsed the ‘Guidelines for Promoting the Maritime Industry’ that were proposed by 
the Maritime Co-ordinator. A steering committee (Lenkungsgruppe) composed of the 
Secretaries of State of Federal ministries with maritime competencies was set up. 
These ministries are the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, the Federal 
Ministry of Finance, the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Housing, the 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. So was an expert group 
(Fachgruppe) with representatives from the maritime industries and the Lander 
governments. Special thematic groups (Themengruppe) on shipbuilding policy, 
networking and image-building have been formed. The series of national maritime 
conferences has also continued. The second such conference was held in Rostock-
Georg-Wilhelm Adamowitsch took over as Co-ordinator of the Maritime Economy in July 2003.
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Wamemünde on 6 November 2001 and the third in Liibeck on 26 May 2003. 
Achievements of the Maritime Co-ordinator include a new concept for maritime 
safety in Germany and a shipping promotion programme. He has also been credited 
with successfully persuading the EU to lift the capacity limits on the East German 
shipyards.^^
The Federal Ministry of Education and Research has set up ‘Ma-tec-netz.de’, a 
network of public and private actors in the shipping and maritime technology 
industries. It was this forum that formulated and proposed the R & D programme 
“Shipping and Maritime Technology for the 2U* Century*' to the Federal Government. 
A second network, the Deutsches Maritimes Kompentenz Netz, consisting of partners 
from industry and government institutions, has also been established. These German 
maritime networks provide evidence of the Europeanisation of German public actors. 
These networks closely resemble the Maritime Industries Forum (MIF) that is 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 4 and that was established jointly by the 
European Commission and European shipbuilding firms.
3.6 EUROPEANISATION OF PUBLIC ACTORS IN THE GERMAN
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
The analysis of German shipbuilding policy over time reveals that there has 
been a decline in the number of German shipbuilding aid programmes, and that 
whatever programmes were implemented became less generous over time, with 
conditions attached to the granting of aid and lower funding rates. This is entirely in 
keeping with the trends in EU shipbuilding policy. The juxtaposition of German and 
EU shipbuilding policies thus reveals that there has been successful downloading of 
EU policy onto the German policy template. For instance, Germany has incorporated 
the EU policy objective of progressively reducing the aid rate allowed in its 
Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm. As can be seen from Table 3.13 which presents the 
German and EU upper limits on shipbuilding aid rates from 1987 to 2002, the German 
upper limit on its shipbuilding aid rate has consistently been below the EU limit over 
this period.
‘Promoting the Maritime Industry’, The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of 
Germany, http://www.bundesregierung.de/en/News-bv-subiect/Intemational-. 11127/Promoting-the- 
Maritime-Industr.htm. 22 August 2001.
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Table 3.13. German and EU upper limits on shipbuilding aid rates compared, 1987-
2002 (per cent)
Year German Upper Limit 
on Aid Rate
EU Upper Limit 
on Aid Rate
1987 20.0 28
1988 20.0 28
1989 20.0 26
1990 20.0 20
1991 9.5 13
1992 9.5 9
1993 7.5 9
1994 7.5 9
1995 7.0 9
1996 7.0 9
1997 7.0 9
1998 7.0 9
1999 7.0 9
2000 7.0 9
2001 7.0 9
2002 7.0 9
Source: Author’s compilation based on Council Directives and Regulations and
various issues of Subventionsberichte.
Germany has thus been very compliant in adapting its domestic law to 
conform to EU law. If Europeanisation is taken to refer to the adaptation of domestic 
policy to match EU policy, and EU shipbuilding policy is understood as limiting state 
aid, then there has been significant Europeanisation of German shipbuilding policy 
content.
The EU initiative of linking the maritime transport sector to the shipbuilding 
industry has also been pursued by the German government. The impact of the EU 
shipbuilding R & D policy on the German government can also be seen in the 
implementation of the German R & D programme ‘Marine Technology’ in 1994 and 
of the R & D programme ‘Shipping and Marine Technology for the Twenty-First 
Century’ spanning fi'om 2000 to 2004. The R & D programme introduced by the 
Federal Government in 2000 linked the shipping and shipbuilding sectors together in 
its allocation of aid.
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The objectives behind the German R & D programmes in ship technology and 
shipping are to strengthen the competitiveness of the maritime industry, improve the 
traffic situation in Germany and Europe via intensified use of waterways and to 
reduce environmental stresses caused by ship transport (Bundesministerium fur 
Bildung und Forschung 2002: 242). These objectives mirror those of Council 
Regulation No. 1540/98 and of the White Paper on European Transport Policy 2010.
These have been the ways in which German public actors -  the Federal and 
Lander governments -  have responded to EU shipbuilding policy.^^ The decline in the 
generosity of German shipbuilding aid programmes and the increasing conditionality 
of such aid throughout the 1980s and 1990s has made the context in which German 
shipbuilding firms operate less favourable. The national fi'amework conditions in 
which they are expected to conduct business have become increasingly stringent over 
time.
However, this is only the first half of the tale of ‘EU action - German reaction’ 
in the shipbuilding policy field. As discussed in Chapter 2, EU shipbuilding policy in 
the 1990s has been marked by attempts to revive the European shipbuilding industry. 
Whilst it was perceived to be and treated as a declining sunset industry in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the European shipbuilding industry since the mid 1990s has been the 
fortunate recipient of EU initiatives aimed at its growth and increased global 
competitiveness. The European Commission took a constructive view o f subsidies in 
the shipbuilding sector during the 1990s, allowing EU shipbuilders and ship-operators 
to compete with third-country firms.
In 2000, the German government raised aid for the shipbuilding sector by DM 
80 million to DM 320 million. Lander resources brought the total amount of available 
funds to just below DM 1 billion. The Federal Government has also actively 
supported the EU Commission in enforcing the Shipbuilding Agreement signed by the 
EU Commission and the South Korean government. The German Maritime Co­
ordinator has consistently urged the EU to create a legal basis for the continuation of 
shipbuilding subsidies if  the OECD shipbuilding agreement does not restore fair 
market conditions to international shipbuilding. Furthermore, the German government
There are, without doubt, domestic factors that explain these changes in German shipbuilding policy. 
This thesis, however, focuses on the intact of European integration in the shipbuilding policy field on 
the corresponding German pohcy field and on its public and private actors.
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has pressed the EU Commission to take appropriate steps under the WTO in the event 
that the agreement between the EU Commission and South Korea failed/^
The creation of a maritime department within the Federal Economics Ministry, 
the appointment of a Maritime Co-ordinator and the opening of a Short Sea Shipping 
Promotion Centre Deutschland in July 2001 are the various ways in which the 
German Government has responded to EU initiatives to revive the European 
shipbuilding and shipping industries. The Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology, in conjunction with the VSM, held a workshop on Co-operation in the 
Maritime Industry on 5 April 2001. It consolidated the results of the first German 
maritime conference in Emden. This was the first such form of co-operation between 
a Federal ministry and the German shipbuilding association. A second workshop on 
‘Initial and Continuing Training in the Maritime Industry’ was conducted the 
following year.
The Federal Government has also decided to launch an interim programme to 
subsidise German shipping companies directly firom 2001 to 2005. The government is 
again allocating funds for German maritime shipping in the budget plan which 
extends to 2005. The German government has also provided funds to support EU co­
ordinated wreckage actions. The Federal Government provided DM 60 million in 
wreckage premiums fi'om 1995 to 1997 to assist the EU programme of wrecking 
German inland ships on the waiting list (Deutscher Bundestag 1995: 124).
The Europeanisation of public actors in the German shipbuilding policy field 
has been analysed in terms of policy content and initiatives in favour of the 
shipbuilding industry. The concept of policy misfit appears of limited use to this study 
of Europeanisation as both the EU and German shipbuilding policies do not send 
unitary messages on the question of state support for the shipbuilding industry. This 
chapter has highlighted the importance of distorted competition on the world 
shipbuilding market and salient characteristics of the shipbuilding industry in 
explaining the policies adopted. German shipbuilding policy has been ‘Europeanised’, 
not because there was a ‘fundamental misfit’ but because the prescriptions of the EU 
addressed the shipbuilding issues of the day.
‘Promoting the Maritime Industry’, The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of 
Germany, http://www.bundesregierung.de/en/News-bv-subiect/Intemational-.Ill27/Promoting-the- 
Maritime-Industr.htm. 22 August 2001.
98
Chapter Four
FROM THE DOMESTIC TO THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
REORIENTATION OF GERMAN SHIPBUILDING FIRMS
While EU shipbuilding aid policy impacts on national and regional 
governments in that it circumscribes the state aid they award to the shipbuilding 
industry, it is the shipbuilding firms themselves that ultimately ‘bear the brunt’ of 
such EU legislation. EU shipbuilding aid policy determines the type and amount of 
state aid that shipbuilding firms receive from their national and regional government 
bodies and thereby influences their business activity. The opportunities and 
constraints of EU shipbuilding policy, in combination with those of German 
shipbuilding policy, have affected the actions and strategies of German shipbuilding 
firms. It is important to explore the responses of the private actors -  the German 
shipbuilding firms, the actual recipients of the shipbuilding aid -  to fully understand 
the various dimensions of Europeanisation at work in the German shipbuilding 
industry.
Chapter 2 has shown the declining support given both by the Federal and Land 
governments to the German shipbuilding industry over time, as manifested in policy 
terms. There has been a decline in the number and in the generosity of German 
shipbuilding aid programmes, and an increasing number of conditions have been 
attached to the provision of state aid. This has made the national framework 
conditions (Rahmenbedingungen) under which the German shipbuilding industry 
operates increasingly difficult.
The predominant view of the shipbuilding industry in the early 1990s was that 
a German industrial policy concept in favour of shipbuilding was lacking (Heseler 
1993). The European Commission was seen to be more successful in integrating the 
shipbuilding sectoral policy into a maritime industrial policy concept that was 
favourable for the competitiveness of the German shipbuilding industry. The 
contention of many German shipbuilding firms was that “a comparable industrial 
policy concept as that of the EU is still lacking for the German shipbuilding industry”
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(Hecht et al. 1995: 23). This chapter explores the Europeanisation of German 
shipbuilding firms in terms of their reorientation fi*om the domestic context to the EU. 
The drivers of these Europeanisation processes are investigated by analysing the 
contributions of European shipbuilding associations to the strengthening of the 
competitiveness of the European shipbuilding industry.
4.1 INTEREST REPRESENTATION BY GERMAN SHIPBUILDING
FIRMS
State aid is, by definition, granted by state authorities and thus, it is a logical 
conclusion that the German shipbuilding industry requests its Federal and Land 
governments to grant it more state aid. However, the provision of state aid in EU 
member states is, as discussed before, controlled by the EU and policed by the 
European Commission. Thus, the EU creates an overarching framework in which 
state aid can be provided in the member states.
The German shipbuilding industry accordingly represents its interests to the 
EU and its institutions. German shipbuilding firms can pursue one or more of the 
following four strategies to represent their interests to the EU. A German shipbuilding 
firm can represent its interests to the EU directly on an individual basis via an EU 
lobby office. Another option is for the German firms to coalesce as an interest 
grouping in the form of the German shipbuilding association, and employ one, both or 
all of the following three approaches in their EU interest representation activity. 
Firstly, the German shipbuilding association can represent the interests of the German 
shipbuilding industry directly to the EU institutions. Secondly, it can form new or join 
existing EU interest groupings. Thirdly, the German shipbuilding association may 
choose to focus its interest representation efforts on the relevant German government 
institutions, and then entrust these German government bodies to voice the interests of 
the German shipbuilding industry to the EU institutions.
Several authors have studied how national actors strive to channel their 
interests into the EU policy-making process (Mazey and Richardson 1993, 1996; 
Marks and McAdam 1996; Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998). As Richardson (1999: 
22) argues, the empirical fact is that “the centre of gravity of lobbying has shifted 
firom the national to Brussels, simply because that is the locus of many public policy
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decisions nowadays”. The literature on European pressure groups addresses both the 
formation and consolidation of European-level associations, and also the 
Europeanisation of domestic groups (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Cowles 2001). 
Much of this literature attributes the Europeanisation of interest representation to the 
benefits of membership of EU-level groups and the costs of non-membership for 
firms (van Schendelen 1993; Greenwood 1995, 2002; Aspinwall 1998; Aspinwall and 
Greenwood 1998; Jordan 1998). However, this thesis argues that it is also important 
to consider the industry’s characteristics, the issues confronting it and industry’s 
assessment of the efforts of the domestic authorities to address these issues to 
understand the Europeanisation processes of German shipbuilding firms.
The following sections analyse the activity and performance of the German 
and European shipbuilding associations, and examine the trends in orientation of the 
German shipbuilding industry in terms of its focus of interest representation. By 
studying the participation of German shipbuilding firms in European shipbuilding 
associations, this chapter explores the Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding 
industry in terms of the reconfiguration of the constellation of the actors and of their 
interactions in interest representation activity.
4.2 PARTICIPATION OF GERMAN SHIPBUILDING FIRMS IN
GERMAN AND EUROPEAN SHIPBUILDING ASSOCIATIONS
Relations between the German shipbuilding industry and the EU are 
conducted via shipbuilding associations. In the case of the German shipbuilding 
industry, there is the national shipbuilding association, the Verband fUr Schiffbau und 
Meerestechnik (VSM) or the German Shipbuilding and Ocean Industries Association. 
Then, there are European associations in which the national shipbuilding associations 
and the shipbuilding firms of EU member states come together. This section provides 
an overview of first the German, and then the European, shipbuilding associations of 
which German shipbuilding firms are members.
lOI
4.2.1 Verband fur Schiffbau und Meerestechnik (VSM) — German Shipbuilding 
and Ocean Industries Association
The Verband fiir Schiffbau und Meerestechnik (VSM), which is based in 
Hamburg, represents the political and commercial interests of the German maritime 
industry which is made up of shipyards building ocean-going and inland waterway 
vessels and marine equipment suppliers. According to its statutes, the responsibilities 
of the German shipbuilding association include providing members with specialist 
advisory and support services, and representing their interests in public and vis-à-vis 
political institutions. The VSM also promotes technical and commercial developments 
in the shipbuilding and ocean industries in Germany.^^
The VSM represents its members nationally and internationally. It is a 
member of the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e. V. (BDI), the Federation of 
German Industries, of the major European shipbuilding organisations, namely the 
Committee of European Union Shipbuilders’ Associations (CESA), the Association of 
European Shipbuilders and Ship-Repairers (AWES) and the European Marine 
Equipment Council (EMEC). In 2003, the VSM had 120 members. The VSM’s work 
is performed by specialist committees that deal with issues affecting the shipbuilding 
sector, for instance in the fields of law, financing, technology and marketing.
The VSM does not, however, include any department or committee dedicated 
to relations with the EU. It also does not have a representative office in Brussels. 
Thus, there has been no tangible manifestation of the Europeanisation o f the German 
shipbuilding association in terms of its organisational structure. There is also very 
little documented official bilateral interaction between the VSM and the European 
Commission. Apart firom not having a physical presence in Brussels, the VSM does 
not declare relations with the EU and direct representation of its interests to the EU 
institutions to be a primary function. This is confirmed in its statutes and in its limited 
bilateral relations with the EU institutions.
The annual reports of the VSM fi*om 1980 to 2002, while replete with 
comments about the advantages and disadvantages of EU shipbuilding policy for the 
German shipbuilding industry, do not include any reference to bilateral meetings with 
the European Commission. Officials in the European Commission too have not 
admitted to having very close relations with the VSM. As an official in the
The statutes o f the VSM can be found at the URL http://www.vsm.de/mainpage.htm
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Competition Directorate-General said, “We are very happy to talk with the German 
shipbuilding association but when we have organisations like CESA, AWES and 
especially the MIF, there’s really very little point” (interview 3).
This is, of course, not to deny the continued relevance of the German 
shipbuilding association. As will be shown later in this chapter, the VSM is of 
particular significance to German shipbuilding firms that approach the European 
shipbuilding associations via their national association and then, represent their 
interests on the European stage as a national group rather than as individual firms. 
The remainder of this section now turns to the analysis of the European shipbuilding 
associations.
4.2.2 Committee of European Union Shipbuilders’ Associations (CESA)
National shipbuilding associations of EU member states have the right to 
admission to the Committee of European Union Shipbuilders’ Associations (CESA). 
In addition, Norway and Poland are associated members.
According to its statutes, the purpose of CESA is:
- to intensify the co-operation amongst the shipyards of the national member 
associations of shipbuilders and ship-repairers in Europe;
- to promote the interests of the shipbuilding and ship-repair industry within 
Europe and to study any matters which the shipbuilding and ship-repairing 
industry of Europe is faced with;
- furthermore, AWES shall participate in and/or promote any studies;
- as a general rule, to make any endeavour in order to maintain and promote 
the activity of the shipbuilding and ship-repair industries in the countries of 
Europe.^^
CESA consists of working groups on R & D (COREDES), on market 
monitoring, on co-operation, on social dialogue and a trade barrier regulation task 
force. CESA has itself declared that it promotes its policies with the authorities of the 
European Union regarding shipbuilding, ship-repair and marine industries, and 
promotes initiatives and supports them with other organisations or institutions outside 
the EU. CESA opened its Brussels office in September 2000.
This can be found at the URL http://www.cesa-shipbuilding.org/index.phtml
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A breakdown of the shipyards that are members of CESA in 2003 shows that 
the Germany has the largest share of CESA’s shipyard membership with 24.4 per 
cent. Germany only accounted for 11.6 per cent of the shipbuilders and ship-repairers 
in the AWES member countries in 2003. This indicates that German shipbuilding 
firms display a keen interest in the membership of CESA.
Table 4.1. Membership of CESA by country, 2003
COUNTRY NUMBER OF 
SHIPYARDS
PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP
Germany 60 24.4
Netherlands 53 21.5
United Kingdom 53 21.5
Spain 30 12.2
Italy 21 8.5
Denmark 11 4.5
France 9 3.7
Greece 3 1.2
Finland 2 0.8
Ireland 1 0.4
Portugal 1 0.4
Norway 1 0.4
Poland 1 0.4
TOTAL 246 100.0
Source: Author’s calculations firom http://www.cesa-
shipbuilding.org/shipvard ub.phtml. accessed on 1 November 2003.
4.2.3 Association of West European Shipbuilders and Ship-Repairers (AWES)
The purpose of the Association of West European Shipbuilders and Ship- 
Repairers (AWES) is identical to that of CESA, with the qualification that AWES 
consists of European, both EU and non-EU, shipbuilding associations. National 
shipbuilding associations of European countries have the right to admission. Apart 
fi’om Germany, associations of the following countries are members of AWES: 
Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom. Norway and Poland have full 
member status in AWES, as opposed to only associate membership in CESA. 
Furthermore, Croatia and Romania are members of AWES while they are not
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represented in CESA. The broader membership of AWES allows it to incorporate the 
concerns of these countries which are not member states of the EU. AWES thus 
provides a platform on which the German shipbuilding industry acquires knowledge 
of the nature and of the interests of competitor shipbuilding industries, that may 
possibly at some stage, become part of the EU shipbuilding industry. The Secretary- 
General of CESA and the Director of AWES have traditionally been the same person. 
AWES includes a working group on substandard ships, one on market and forecast, 
an interyard co-operation group on ship-repair, a delegation to the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMG), and a delegation to the OECD.^°
Just as with CESA, Germany has the largest share of the shipyard membership 
of AWES with 23.5 per cent. This points to a similar assessment as with CESA -  
German shipbuilding firms account for a larger share of European shipbuilding 
associations than statistics on the size of the industry in terms of the number of 
enterprises would suggest.
Table 4.2. Membership of AWES by country, 2003
COUNTRY NUMBER OF 
SHIPYARDS
PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP
Germany 60 23.5
Netherlands 53 20.8
United Kingdom 53 20.8
Spain 30 11.8
Italy 21 8.2
Denmark 11 4.3
France 9 3.5
Romania 6 2.4
Croatia 3 1.2
Greece 3 1.2
Finland 2 0.8
Ireland 1 0.4
Norway 1 0.4
Poland 1 0.4
Portugal 1 0.4
TOTAL 255 100.0
Source: Author’s calculations from http://www.awes-shipbuilding.org/.
accessed on 1 November 2003.
80 Information on AWES can be found at the URL http://www.awes-shipbuilding.org/index.phtml
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4.2.4 Maritime Industries Forum (MIF)
The Maritime Industries Forum (MIF) was created in 1992, jointly by the 
European Commission and representatives of the maritime industries in EU member 
states. The intention was to exchange views on a European maritime strategy and to 
bring shipbuilding and shipping on the map (Maritime Industries Forum 2000a). The 
then Commissioner Martin Bangemann and Dr. Friedrich Hennemann, the chairman 
of the board of directors of the German shipbuilding group, Bremer Vulkan Verbund 
AG, had an important role to play in this initiative.
Talks began in 1991 between Commissioner Martin Bangemann and Dr. 
Friedrich Hennemann on the creation of a European Maritime Forum. Looking to the 
ESA, the European Space Agency, Dr. Hennemann envisaged a similar grouping for 
the maritime industry, an EMA, so to speak, or a European Maritime Agency. 
Shipyards, sub-contractors, suppliers, ship-owners and maritime research institutes 
constitute a network of interest in the shipbuilding sector. Dr. Hennemann knew this 
well and wanted to institutionalise it on the European level.
Commissioner Martin Bangemann was a partner with whom Dr. Hennemann 
could create such a European agency for maritime affairs.*^ Bangemann was the Vice- 
President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Industrial Affairs at the 
time. He had, over the years, been perceived to be in favour of the European 
shipbuilding industry while Federal Economics Minister Mollemann had appeared 
strictly against shipbuilding aid. As such, the national governmental avenue to the 
creation of a European maritime agency did not seem to be a particularly attractive 
option. Direct contact with the European Commission appeared to be a much 
smoother path to take.
Thanks to his good relationship with European Commissioner Bangemann, 
Dr. Hennemann succeeded in placing his maritime and economic visions in Brussels. 
The relations between Bremen and Brussels in the persons of Dr. Hennemann and 
Commissioner Bangemann had clear effects on their approach to shipbuilding. Dr.
** Martin Bangemann had been a member of the Deutscher Bundestag from 1972 to 1978, Member of 
the European Parliament from 1973 to 1984, Federal Minister of Economic Affairs from 1984 to 1988, 
member of the Deutscher Bundestag from 1986 to 1989, Vice-President of the European Commission, 
responsible for the internal market, industrial affairs and relations with the European Parliament from 
1989 to 1993 and Member of the European Commission, responsible for industrial affairs and 
information and telecommunication technologies from 1993 to 1994.
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Hennemann’s vision of the future of the oceans can be found in the maritime 
industrial policy schemes of Bangemann’s term of office in the European 
Commission. These included the focus on marine resources, maritime transport policy 
and energy reserves. Dr. Hennemann’s vision of the sea as a living space appeared 
regularly in the lectures and writings of Bangemann. Bangemann often argued that the 
EU needed a reliable and efficient fleet so as not to be dependent on the outside 
world, especially in times of crisis (Bangemann 1992). Bangemann supported Dr. 
Hennemann’s vision of the development of a maritime future with R & D funds from 
the EU. This spanned from interest in life on the sea to increased use of hydro-energy. 
After the decline in trade of armaments technology, the maritime sector became the 
new focus of R & D in the EU during Bangemann’s term of office in the EU.
Many of the principles of the EU R & D framework programmes in the 
shipbuilding sector were identical to the ideas proposed by the Bremen Senate to the 
Federal Government in previous years. The fact that Bremer Vulkan was the largest 
shipbuilding firm in Bremen placed it in a prime position to provide economic 
concepts and strategy papers to the Land Government of Bremen. The latter often 
passed these on to the Federal Government.*^
Members of the MIF include representatives from the European shipbuilding 
industry, the national shipbuilding associations of EU member states, the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and regional bodies, together with affiliated 
organisations and observers. The main objective of the MIF is to address topics which 
are of common interest to the maritime industry sectors, and which seek to enhance 
their competitiveness.
The Forum functions via working groups which were initially led by the 
Commission services, and later by specialist panels with industry chairmen. Once the 
MIF had been firmly established and it had a sizable membership base, the leadership 
functions could be transferred to representatives of the industry themselves. Both 
Commission officials and industry leaders felt that it was preferable for the firms to be 
steering the forum to create an environment in which representatives of the maritime 
sector felt comfortable to express their views in a “direct, unbiased and unfiltered
Philipp (1998: 35) provides a colourful description of the personal links between Dr. Hennemann and 
Martin Bangemann. He reports that the Ministerial Director responsible for shipbuilding in the Federal 
Economics Ministry, Melitta Büchner-Schôpf, was often surprised by the arguments of the European 
Commission with regard to shipbuilding as they looked very much like arguments she had received 
from the Bremen Senate and very similar to papers published by the department for firm planning and 
strategy of Bremer Vulkan.
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way” (interview 4). The MIF functions by means of annual plenary sessions. The 
achievements of the working groups, together with the conclusions of each plenary 
session, are presented in the proceedings of the respective plenary sessions. The MIF 
is guided by a steering committee, under which a co-ordination group provides day- 
to-day management of the work of the Forum. The cost of the various panels is met 
by the participants. The annual meetings are organised and paid for by the European 
Commission.
The MIF has the following mission statement:
- provide a permanent interface to the Commission for the industry, in 
particular SMBs;
- foster the creation of synergies between maritime activities in various 
sectors;
- provide input to the political debate and support the decision-making 
process;
- improve the involvement of member states in maritime policies;
- keep the European Parliament advised of developments/problems of 
maritime industries and involve MEPs where appropriate;
- maintain and promote a competitive maritime cluster for Europe, including 
maritime know-how, and
- enhance the visibility of maritime industries towards the general public.^^
The goals and priorities of the MIF are thus more concretely formulated than
those of AWES and CESA. The MIF also makes more specific and targeted reference 
to relations with EU institutions, namely the European Commission and the European 
Parliament, than do AWES and CESA. Furthermore, by coalescing all maritime- 
related sectors under the umbrella of the MIF, the MIF strengthens the credibility and 
economic weight of the demands of the shipbuilding industry. These contributions of 
the MIF and those of AWES and CESA to the nature and success of interest 
representation efforts of the German shipbuilding industry are analysed in Section 4.3 
of this chapter.
The MIF mission statement can be found at the URL http://www.mif-eu.org/
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4,2.5 Association of Maritime Regional Interests in Europe (AMRIE)
A resolution was adopted at the first ‘High Level Conference on Maritime 
Regional Interests in Europe’ on 20 April 1993 by a number of Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) who recommended that a maritime alliance should be 
formed. The Association of Maritime Regions in Europe (AMRIE) was then formally 
established at the second ‘High Level Conference* held in Bremen in November 
1993. AMRIE’s stated purpose is ‘to provide a co-ordinated and effective political 
voice for the maritime regional interests within Europe to achieve an integrated 
maritime s t r a t e g y A M R I E  too has its office in Brussels.
AMRIE consists of four specialist working groups covering regional aspects 
of short sea shipping, shipping quality, centres of excellence, and European ports 
policy. The work done thus far has concentrated on providing comments, and making 
submissions to the plenary sessions of the European Parliament and to its committees, 
and on generally advocating measures to support the EU shipping industry which are 
likely to contribute to high standards in the operation and condition of ships.
4.3 WHAT THE EUROPEAN SHIPBUILDING ASSOCIATIONS DO
THAT THE VSM DOES NOT
It is, however, not merely the membership of European shipbuilding 
associations that serves as evidence of the Europeanisation of the German 
shipbuilding industry. The important point is that German shipbuilding firms have 
found that the national shipbuilding association, the VSM, is either unwilling or 
unable to address certain pressing issues confi-onting the German shipbuilding 
industry, and have found the European shipbuilding associations to be a more 
effective platform from which to represent and realise their interests.
This section describes how a number of functions are performed either 
exclusively or more effectively by one or more of these European associations than by 
the German shipbuilding association. Admittedly, all shipbuilding associations, 
whether national or European, discuss and are concerned with these issues. What is
This can be found at http://www.anirie.org
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being examined here is concrete action and direct contact with the relevant bodies to 
tackle the issues that are raised by the European shipbuilding industry.
4.3.1 Constant and Effective Dialogue with the European Commission
The intention to institutionalise closer communication between the European 
shipbuilding industry and the European Commission served as the impetus for the 
establishment of the Maritime Industries Forum (MIF). While the European 
shipbuilding associations of AWES and CESA had their offices in Brussels, they did 
not focus their efforts on direct and constant communication with the European 
Commission. Individuals who were largely responsible for the establishment of the 
MIF, including Dr. Friedrich Hennemann of the German shipbuilding firm, Bremer 
Vulkan, and Conunissioner Martin Bangemann, felt that a new organisation that 
brought together interested parties in the maritime sector -  including both 
shipbuilding firms and representatives of EU institutions -  was needed (interview 6).
From its first year of operation in 1992, the MIF has asserted that there was a 
need for periodic meetings of the maritime industries with the Commission, and for 
the governments of the member states of the EU to exchange views on maritime 
policy matters. The aim was that regular meetings would “enable the Commission and 
the Member States to be aware of, and to take into account the needs of the maritime 
industries in the formulation of their policies” (Maritime Industries Forum 1992: 27). 
In the early years of the MIF, the then Vice-President of the European Commission, 
Martin Bangemann, and Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert convened the 
High Level Panel of the MIF to “provide an interface on such matters with 
governments and Community institutions” (Maritime Industries Forum 1993: 3). 
While the panels were composed of industry representatives, the Commission was 
invited to attend all meetings, which it did. The High Level Panel received interim 
reports from the individual specialist panels of the MIF.
The shipbuilding industry representatives have, however, not been satisfied to 
merely voice their concerns to the Commission. At the Rotterdam plenary session of 
the MIF in 1994, the Commission presented a report on actions and initiatives taken 
as a result of the recommendations of the MIF. However, it was produced only shortly 
before the MIF meeting itself and was not the subject of debate. Representatives of
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European shipbuilding firms then demanded that the Commission and the Member 
States provide evidence that their recommendations had been “at least seriously 
considered and at best have resulted in some sort of positive action” (Maritime 
Industries Forum 1994: 2). On 5 December 2000, the European Council of Ministers 
for Industry instructed the Commission to organise a discussion on the problems in 
world shipbuilding during the subsequent plenary session of the MIF. The MIF 
plenary session in Valencia in 2001 was thus the venue for the first Annual European 
Debate on Shipbuilding, organised by the European Commission.
The MIF has also convincingly clarified to the Commission the problems 
associated with obtaining credits for building and buying ships. Firstly, while ship­
owners commonly seek to borrow 80 per cent of the purchase price of a ship, bankers 
often lend only some 60 per cent. Secondly, a ship is a long-term investment which 
needs long-term financing, of normally at least twelve years. However, the banks can, 
in many cases, refinance at fixed rates only for a maximum period of eight to ten 
years. The MIF has recommended the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the 
European Investment Fund (EIF) to the Commission as possible sources of finance for 
the European shipbuilding industry (Maritime Industries Forum 1994: 11).
Most importantly, the MIF has enabled both formal and informal contacts to 
be developed between industry leaders and Commissioners and senior Commission 
officials. A report by the industrial participants of the MIF in 1998 on their evaluation 
of the work of the MIF up to then concluded that the Forum had been of value both to 
the industry and to the Commission, and that “it had enhanced the co-operation of the 
industry and the Commission, and the understanding by both of the constraints and 
priorities of the other” (Maritime Industries Forum 2000b: 8). By 2000, the MIF 
arguments had surfaced in the rhetoric of Commissioners. The industry 
representatives of the MIF, in fact, felt that the revision by the Commission of the 
Guidelines on State Aid in the Maritime Sector resulted fi*om discussions in the 
Forum (Maritime Industries Forum 2000b: 11).
Commission Vice-President Mrs. de Palacio felt that “only continuation o f operating state aid could 
seek to ensure the continued existence of the European industry, until the time normal competitive 
conditions would be restored worldwide” (Maritime Industries Forum Newsletter No. 1, November 
2000).
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The Commission itself has acknowledged the valuable input that it receives 
from the shipbuilding industry via the MIF.^^ In 1999, Commissioner Bangemann 
spoke about how the report which the Commission was preparing together with 
industry on the market assessment would be used in the discussion on long-term 
issues in shipbuilding in the Industry Ministers Council. The advice of the MIF 
panel on shipbuilding financing issues was of great use in the OECD discussions, and 
in the negotiations with Korea. Commissioners have, in fact, repeatedly pledged their 
support of the European maritime industry and their willingness to reflect the 
industry’s ideas in EU policies.^^ Conversely, the support of the industry leaders of 
the MIF facilitated the passage of maritime legislation through the EU institutions. 
For instance, a representative of the Commission DG for Energy and Transport in 
2002 expressed that “thanks to the MIF's practical support, we managed to get our 
proposal on IMO FAL (Facilitation) forms through Council and Parliament very 
quickly indeed”.^ ^
The MIF has also involved the European Parliament in its deliberations. There 
has been regular participation by MEPs at meetings of the Forum. The MIF influence 
on the European Parliament was, in fact, so significant that the Parliamentary 
Intergroup on Shipping and Shipbuilding was reorganised into an Intergroup on the 
Maritime Industries (Maritime Industries Forum 1993: 13). There was yet another 
dimension of success of EU-level activity with the co-operation between AMRIE and 
the MIF. The Third High Level Conference of Maritime Regions in Europe, which 
was AMRIE’s first Annual General Assembly was held in Genoa in November 1994 
and was attended by senior representatives of the Commission. The link with the MIF 
was emphasised by the appointment of Commissioner Bangemann as honorary 
president of AMRIE. The meeting identified the themes of information technology
The Commission itself declares that it “has always been an institution open to outside input. The 
Commission believes this process to be fundamental to the development of its pohcies. This dialogue 
has proved valuable to boÂ the Commission and interested outside parties. Commission officials 
acknowledge the need for such outside input and welcome it” (CEC 1992b: 3).
Speech by Commissioner Martin Bangemann to the MIF, ‘Shipbuilding Policy Developments’, 
Southampton, 1999.
** Speech by Mr. Erkki Liikanen, European Commissioner for Enterprises and Information Society, 
‘The Maritime Industries Forum and Its Contribution to Maritime Policies’, MIF Plenary Session, 
Helsinki, June 2000; Speech by Jom Keck, Deputy Director-General, Enterprise Directorate-General o f 
the European Commission, ‘The Situation in World Shipbuilding’, MIF Plenary Session, Valencia, 29- 
30 October 2001; Speech by Mrs de Palacio in the MIF Plenary Session, Naples, 29 October 2002.
Address to the Meeting of the Steering Committee of the Maritimes Industries Forum, Brussels, 26 
June 2002.
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and maritime affairs as having a close connection. The result of this meeting was to be 
the genesis of the MARIS project (Maritime Industries Forum 1995: 21).
In February 1995, the European Commission convened a G-7 ministerial 
conference in Brussels to discuss the development of the global information society. 
The Brussels conference resulted in the definition of eleven pilot projects. One of 
these pilot projects was the Maritime Information Society (MARIS) initiative, jointly 
hosted and coordinated by Canada and the European Commission. The MARIS 
initiative is a framework under which sub-projects, proposed by different G-7 (now 
G-8, including Russia) countries, demonstrate concrete applications in various 
maritime fields, and is concerned with the use of modem information and 
communication technologies in maritime applications. MARIS is a prominent 
example of world-wide co-operation in maritime matters, and an important tool to 
promote the application of information technologies in the maritime sector.^^
MARIS encompasses a number of projects, including the MARVEL project 
for intelligent manufacturing of ships interlinking shipyards and their suppliers in a 
common global network, SAFEMAR, a project on maritime safety and the protection 
of the maritime environment and MARTRANS, a logistics and multimodal transport 
project. The Federal Ministry of Transport, German maritime firms and research 
institutes were involved in all three projects. In fact, the Federal Ministry of Transport 
was the co-ordinator of the SAFEMAR and MARTRANS projects. German 
shipbuilding firms also participate in BOPCOM, a regional programme in the Baltic 
Sea area that is supported by the Commission. The first pilot project of this 
MARTRANS initiative is operating in Liibeck. Germany and Sweden are also co­
operating on the BAFEGIS (Baltic Ferry Guidance and Information System) project. 
Workshops and seminars have also been organised and sponsored. Overall co­
ordination has been with the MARIS Secretariat at the Enterprise Directorate-General 
of the European Commission. MARIS has four regional offices in Bremen in 
Germany, Bilbao in Spain, Helsinki in Finland and Genoa in Italy. On 22 May 1997, 
the four fora in co-operation with the European Commission signed a Collaboration 
Agreement for the constitution of the ‘European MARIS Network’ in order to
^ The G8 initiative for MARIS presented its results at the World EXPO ’98 -  ‘The Oceans: A Heritage 
for the Future’ in Lisbon, Portugal on 8 September 1998 (European Commission Press Release 
IP/98/790).
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implement MARIS activities in Bilbao for the Atlantic Arc, in Bremen for the North 
Sea, in Genoa for the Mediterranean and in Helsinki for the Baltic Sea, respectively.
The MIF thus serves as a platform from which German shipbuilding firms can 
expect constant and effective dialogue with the European Commission. Admittedly, 
they can approach the Commission via their respective national shipbuilding 
associations, but such contacts are ad-hoc and do not enjoy the same degree of 
endorsement and promotion by the Commission as the MIF avenue does.®^  EU-wide 
interest groups tend to enjoy more privileged access to the European Commission. As 
Greenwood (2000: 80) argues, “the Commission hands out places on its advisory 
groups to Euro groups first, which provides a considerable membership incentive”.
4.3.2 Tackling of International Competition Issues in the World Shipbuilding
Market
One of the most pressing challenges facing the competitiveness and even 
viability of the German and European shipbuilding industries is the overcapacity on 
the world shipbuilding market that is largely attributable to the price-dumping and 
subsidisation practices of the South Korean shipbuilding industry. Chapter 2 has 
provided a detailed discussion of how the EU has tackled this issue in the WTO. This 
section explores the role played by the Committee of European Union Shipbuilders’ 
Associations (CESA) in this process.
The top managers of several European, including German, shipbuilding firms 
met in Frankfurt on 18 January 1999 to discuss with European politicians measures 
regarding the financing crisis in Korea and its impact on the world shipbuilding 
market. This meeting was conducted on the initiative of the German shipbuilding 
association, and under the auspices of CESA. CESA was the chosen European 
shipbuilding organisation as the membership of AWES included national shipbuilding 
associations from countries which are not EU member states. The MIF too was not an 
appropriate option as it included public actors like MEPs, European Commission and 
national government officials, in its membership. The managers of the shipbuilding 
firms wanted to ensure that the weight and credibility of their complaint to the
The Commission itself has acknowledged that “special interest groups serve as a channel to provide 
technical expertise to the Commission from a variety of sectors, such as the drafting of technical 
regulations” (CEC 1992b: 6),
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Commission was maximised by involving only EU shipyards and their representatives 
(interview 5). CESA demanded that the Commission and the national governments 
assume responsibility for the negotiation and enforcement of an agreement linking the 
provision of state aid to limitations in capacity. The Commission was also asked to 
initiate an appropriate instrument for fair competition in world shipbuilding. CESA 
also itself proposed measures to the Commission “to counteract the behaviour of the 
competitors which are considered aggressive and unfair by the European shipyards” 
(CESA Press Release, 18 January 1999).^^ CESA was very important in representing 
the views of the EU shipbuilding industry on visits by former Commissioner 
Bangemann to South Korea in June 1999. Mr Bangemann was accompanied by the 
chairmen of the European shipbuilders’ and ship-owners’ associations, CESA and 
ECSA, respectively, in his meetings with Korean government ministers (VSM Press 
Release, June 1999).
CESA was also the main initiator of the complaint under the Trade Barriers 
Regulation (TBR). On 6 March 2000, CESA threatened that if  Korea used the talks 
later that month to stall or to continue to refuse to find a solution to the problems of 
global over-capacity and under-pricing in the shipbuilding industry, CESA would 
immediately lodge a complaint under the European Trade Barriers Regulation with 
the view that the EU would bring the case to the WTO, and seek a remedy for Korea’s 
unfair competition (CESA Press Release, 6 March 2000). On 24 October 2000, CESA 
finally filed a complaint with the European Commission, pursuant to Articles 3 and 4 
of the EU Trade Barriers Regulation, on behalf of the EU shipbuilding and ship- 
repairing enterprises. CESA’s complaint concerned illegal subsidies granted to 
Korean shipbuilding companies by the Government of the Republic of Korea that 
were in violation of international trade rules established by the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).^^ CESA argued that these illegal 
subsidies had caused injury to the Community shipbuilding industry through 
“significant price undercutting, price suppression and price depression by Korean 
companies, lost sales by European shipbuilders and sharply lower market shares for 
various ship-types held by European shipbuilders” (CESA Press Release, 24 October
CESA again called for EU action in April 1999 when the Kvaemer group announced its withdrawal 
from shipbuilding, which CESA saw as die result of the predatory behaviour of the Korean government 
and shipbuilding industry (CESA Press Release, 16 April 1999).
These subsidies were either export subsidies that were strictly prohibited under Article 3.1(a) of the 
ASCM or actionable subsidies that had adversely affected CESA members in violation of Article 5 of 
the ASCM.
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2000). CESA filed this TBR complaint as the first step towards a WTO action to 
require Korea to bring its subsidy practices into conformity with the WTO 
Agreement. The Commission subsequently decided on 9 May 2001 that CESA’s 
complaints against Korean trade distortions were “not only factually correct but also 
legally justified” (CESA Press Release, 9 May 2001).
It was thus the EU shipbuilding association, CESA, that ultimately took the 
necessary action to bring the dispute with the South Korean Government to the WTO, 
in an attempt to rectify the distorted competition conditions on the world shipbuilding 
market. The VSM has been equally concerned with these issues but logically, the 
capacity to act of CESA proved to be greater than that of the VSM. Section 4.4.3 
addresses the role played by German actors in the EU shipbuilding associations at 
such key moments.
4.3.3 Linking Together Previously ‘Separate’ Sectors of the Maritime Industry
The European shipbuilding associations have also been distinct in their 
contribution to the increasing of political support for the European shipbuilding 
industry in the way that they have effectively linked together sectors of the maritime 
industry that were previously not perceived to be pertinent to the shipbuilding debate 
in Germany. Such sectors include the maritime transport, marine equipment, and 
marine resource sectors. By subsuming all these related sectors under the umbrella of 
the maritime industry, the European shipbuilding associations have both successfully 
eliminated the stigma associated with the shipbuilding industry as a sunset industry, 
as well as increased its perceived contribution to the European economy and society. 
The MIF has, since its inception in 1992, advocated the allocation of greater funds to 
such fields as maritime transport and maritime research.
(a) Shipping
Central to the work of the MIF has been the emphasis on the relationship 
among the shipping, shipbuilding and marine equipment manufacturing industries. 
The MIF has constantly tried to highlight to the Commission that the prosperity of the 
European shipbuilding industry depends on the health of the European shipping 
industry (Maritime Industries Forum 1992: 8, 1993: 7,1995: 2). By 1997, such efforts
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by the MIF resulted in the Commission implementing measures whose objective was 
the maintenance and development of a competitive EU merchant fleet.
The MIF has also emphasised the importance of creating an economic 
environment in which EU ship-owners can operate profitably under an EU flag. It has 
thereby extended the parameters of the issue from purely the location of shipbuilding 
to the questions of ship-ownership and operation. The MIF launched a campaign on 
the promotion of short sea shipping in 1992 (Maritime Industries Forum 1992: 2, 14 
and 17). It has successfully created political support for short sea shipping, resulting 
in the Commission’s communication on short sea shipping, and the consequent 
Council resolution and conclusions.^"^ The White Paper on Transport Policy 2010 also 
encourages shifting transport from the road to alternative modes, like short sea 
shipping. The MIF has identified practical hindrances to the use of short sea services 
and has succeeded in getting some of them removed (Maritime Industries Forum 
1995: 15).
The MIF has also campaigned for the removal of sub-standard ships from EU 
waters on the grounds of maritime safety and the protection of the EU marine 
environment. This has been part of the drive to implement ‘quality shipping’ 
measures in the EU. Whilst such legislation on sub-standard ships is motivated 
primarily by safety and environmental reasons, the elimination of such ships (for 
example, single-hull tankers) has also benefited the European shipbuilding industry.
(b) Maritime Research
The European shipbuilding associations have campaigned for increased 
funding of maritime research by the EU. R & D activity at the EU level has been 
emphasised for its contribution to increasing the competitiveness and safety of 
European-built vessels. The MIF has advanced the argument that the interdependence
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - The Development of Short Sea Shipping in 
Europe: Prospects and Challenges, COM(95)317 final of 5 July 1995; Council Resolution of 11 March 
1996 on short sea shipping (Official Journal of the European Communities C 99, 2 April 1996, pp. 1- 
2); Council Resolution o f 14 February 2000 on the promotion of short sea shipping (Official Journal of 
the European Communities C 56, 29 February 2000, pp. 3-4).
Commissioner Bangemann advocated closing the gap between old and new ships in terms of safety 
by refitting existing ships or building new ones so that European coasts are safe from shipping 
accidents, arguing that it “could give a new lease of life to German shipyards”. He announced that he 
would put the safety issue at the top of the agenda for the High Level Panel of the Maritime Industries 
Forum with his fellow Commissioners for conçetition policy, transport and the environment in 
Hamburg on 16 March 1993 (European Commission Press Release IP/93/98).
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of the shipbuilding, shipping and marine equipment manufacturing industries in the 
field of R & D should be developed on an EU level. The MIF has also fi'equently 
called for increased research into marine technology and resources (Maritime 
Industries Forum 1995: 24,1996: 3). Oil and gas exploration and extraction have been 
promoted as industries that are important customers for the European shipbuilding 
and marine equipment industries. Similar arguments have been employed for 
supporting the fishing industry.
The potential benefit from a co-ordination of the major R & D facilities that 
already exist in the member states has also been highlighted in meetings of European 
shipbuilding associations. The R & D Co-ordinating Group of the MIF has created 
greater political and technical support for maritime R & D. The relationship that has 
developed between the R & D Co-ordinating Group and the Commission influenced 
the formulation the Fifth EU Framework Programme (Maritime Industries Forum 
1997: 2). As a direct result of the MIF, three so-called ‘interface meetings’ have taken 
place between representatives of the MIF and the Commission to discuss the contents 
of the Framework Programme. Documents were issued by the MIF containing 
strategic targets for R & D, and comments on specific programmes (Maritime 
Industries Forum 1994: 6). The Masterplan published by the R & D Co-ordinating 
Group of the MIF in 1999 has, in fact, become a recognised reference document for 
both the shipbuilding industry and the Commission. To measure the success of the 
Masterplan, the R & D Co-ordinating Group has, with the assistance of COREDES of 
CESA, developed a tool called ‘Implementation map of the maritime industry R & D 
Masterplan through the EU Framework Programme V’. The tool is a database 
compiled by the members of the R & D Co-ordinating Group tracking the relationship 
between R & D projects authorised under the Fifth Framework Programme and 
recommendations made in the Masterplan. In 2000, the R & D Co-ordinating Group 
identified 25 such projects awarded in the first call of the Fifth Framework 
Programme.^^
These attempts by the MIF to link together the various maritime sectors has 
apparently had its impact on the projects pursued by German shipbuilding firms. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, a survey of the German shipbuilding aid cases in Appendix E 
reveals that the 1990s have seen shipbuilding projects on R & D improvements in
^  Report of the R & D Co-ordinating Group, MIF Helsinki Plenary Session, June 2000.
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maritime transport. German shipbuilding firms increasingly present their projects not 
merely as advances in shipbuilding production methods and processes, but rather as 
contributions to the improvement of maritime transport and ship safety.
4.3.4 Facilitation of Co-operation with Other European Shipbuilding Firms
Technological developments and the pressures on the world shipbuilding 
market have made it necessary for European shipbuilders to offer technologically 
high-value added vessels to maintain a stronghold in certain market segments. Often, 
the building of such vessels requires the co-operation of several shipyards. Joint 
contracts among shipbuilding firms have become increasingly common in recent 
years. Coming together on a single stage has facilitated the co-operation of 
shipbuilding firms on an EU-wide basis. European shipbuilding associations facilitate 
the meeting of minds and of shipbuilding order contracts. The MIF has consistently 
recommended increasing co-operation amongst shipbuilders (Maritime Industries 
Forum 1998: 2).
In 1997, the European shipbuilding industry established a co-operation 
programme among nineteen companies fi*om seven different EU member states. 
Euroyards, a partnership of five large EU shipyards, has together developed European 
products, like ‘Eurofast’, a ship designed for short sea shipping and ‘Eurocorvette*, a 
European military vessel, and the E3 (Ecological, Economical, European) Tanker 
(European Commission Press Release IP/96/222). In 2003, CESA launched the 
‘LeaderSHIP 2015* initiative. The project brought together major industry players, 
trade unions, and key EU and national policy makers, including seven European 
Commissioners with responsibilities that relate to shipbuilding and two MEPs. 
Commission President Prodi has offered the Commission*s full support for the project 
(European Commission Press Release IP/03/120). LeaderSHIP 2015 was one of five 
sector-related key issues in the Enterprise Policy for 2003. The LeaderSHIP 2015 
High Level Advisory Group was, in fact, called together by Enterprise Commissioner 
Erkki Liikanen in January 2003. The Advisory Group*s task was to identify the key 
issues and to ensure a swift implementation of appropriate policy measures. 
Commissioner Liikanen recognised that for a successful future for shipbuilding, the 
efforts by the industry had to “be complemented with decisive political support, based
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on appropriate policy targets and a longer term vision” (European Commission Press 
Release IP/03/120).
The Commission’s close involvement in the project through the participation 
of several key Commissioners and departments is tangible evidence of the 
Commission’s declared ‘full support’ for this European shipbuilding initiative 
(European Commission Press Release SPEECH/03/53). In contrast, national projects 
that receive national government financial support are liable to investigation by the 
European Commission which can even order the recovery of the state aid awarded to 
such projects if  its investigations reveal that such aid is incompatible with Articles 87 
and 88 of the EU Treaty. By setting up a transnational project, European shipyards 
have benefited from the kind of political and financial support from the EU that it 
very much requires in the current world shipbuilding market.
4.4 EVIDENCE OF REORIENTATION OF THE GERMAN 
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY FROM THE DOMESTIC TO THE EU 
LEVEL
The previous section has explored the contributions of the European 
shipbuilding associations to the interest representation of the European shipbuilding 
industry and the subsequent promotion of the industry by the EU and its institutions. 
This accounts for the motivation for German shipbuilding firms putting greater effort 
into participation in these EU associations. It has also been shown how the challenges 
facing the European shipbuilding industry in the 1990s have been tackled by 
European rather than by national shipbuilding associations.
This section provides empirical evidence of the greater appreciation of private 
actors in the German shipbuilding industry for EU rather than for German 
shipbuilding policy and initiatives. A meso-perspective is first adopted by looking at 
the changing orientations of the German shipbuilding association, the Verband fur  
Schiffbau und Meerestechnik (VSM), over time. Then, the changing orientations of an 
individual shipbuilding firm, Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG, are analysed. Finally, the 
role played by German actors, both public and private, in the European shipbuilding 
initiatives is examined.
1 2 0
4.4.1 Changing Orientations of the German Shipbuilding Association
The annual reports of the Verbandfur Schiffbau und Meerestechnik (VSM) are 
used as a guide to the aggregate views of German shipbuilding firms. A longitudinal 
analysis of the Europeanisation of the attitudes of private actors in the German 
shipbuilding industry is provided by studying the annual reports of the VSM from 
1980 to 2002. Particular attention is paid to statements about German and EU 
shipbuilding policies and aid programmes.
Graph 4.1 presents the frequency with which the VSM called on the Federal 
Government and on the EU to improve the competitive situation of the German and/or 
European shipbuilding industry. There is a definite increase in such calls for EU 
action over time, while those for German action initially dipped, and rose again in 
1997. Part of this increase is explained by the fact that they are calls for joint action 
by the Federal Government and the EU. Graph 4.1 provides evidence of the 
increasing reliance of the German shipbuilding industry on the EU to solve the 
shipbuilding issues of the day. These trends are evidence of the Europeanisation of the 
orientation of the German shipbuilding industry. Earlier chapters have shown how the 
EU acts as a constraint on the national ability to act, both of public and private actors, 
through EU state aid and shipbuilding policies. This chapter shows how the EU is 
perceived not just to be the trouble-maker, but also the potential problem-solver by 
the German shipbuilding industry.
1 2 1
Graph 4.1: Calls for Action from the VSM, 1980-2002
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Further evidence of the Europeanisation of the orientations of German 
shipbuilding firms is their greater appreciation for European shipbuilding policy and 
initiatives than for those of the German government. Graph 4.2 indicates the 
frequency with which the EU and German shipbuilding policies are praised and 
criticised in the VSM annual reports. There is a marked increase in both the VSM’s 
praise for EU shipbuilding policy and in criticism of German policy. On the other 
hand, the VSM’s praise for German policy has fallen over time. The reversal in the 
downward trend in 1999 is explained by the fact that some of the praise was for 
German co-funding of EU R & D projects.
Analysis of these annual reports reveals the increasing appreciation of the 
German shipbuilding industry for EU shipbuilding initiatives, and increasing 
dissatisfaction with German government policy and a c tio n .T h e se  annual reports 
also indicate that the German shipbuilding industry has, over time, placed more 
emphasis on the need for EU action than for German action, in response to the 
challenges confronting it. Furthermore, even when the VSM has called on the German
97 The statements analysed were those relating to efforts to improve the competitiveness of the German 
and/or European shipbuilding industry.
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government to respond to the shipbuilding issues of the day, these were often calls for 
joint action by both political levels, the Federal Government and the EU.
Graph 4.2: Praise and Criticism for German and
EU Shipbuilding Policies, 1980-2002
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These statistical analyses provide an overview of the trends in the changing 
orientations of German shipbuilding firms. The next step is to elaborate on the reasons 
for these changing shifts of focus from the German to the EU level by the German 
shipbuilding industry. Analysis of VSM documents reveals several reasons why the 
German shipbuilding industry has increasingly shifted its focus of attention from the 
domestic to the EU level over time.
Firstly, the German shipbuilding industry has become increasingly dissatisfied 
with what they perceive to be deficiencies in German shipbuilding policy. The VSM 
has frequently criticised the limitations of German shipbuilding aid programmes 
which only partially balanced the high subsidies of competitor shipbuilding countries 
(VSM 1981: 3, 1983: 20, 1984: 23, 1986: 3, 1989: 28-29, 1991: 37, 1995: 36, 1997: 
44). In fact, as Chapter 3 has shown, Germany’s shipbuilding aid rate has always been 
below the EU allowed upper limit, and the VSM has frequently expressed 
dissatisfaction with this (VSM 1991: 37, 1992: 21). The VSM annual reports were 
replete with expressions of disappointment with German shipbuilding policy in the
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1980s. Whilst it was aware of the constraints imposed by EU shipbuilding and state 
aid policies on what member states can and cannot do, the VSM argued that the 
Federal Government has been excessively stringent. As one shipbuilder put it, “The 
German Government is not just obedient. It has gone too far and that is not good for 
us, the industry. Where else do we have to turn -  only the EU can help us now!” 
(interview 6). Furthermore, the VSM has expressed the dissatisfaction that the 
German government’s one-sided reduction of shipbuilding aid measures has not been 
reciprocated by other shipbuilding countries (VSM 1981: 18, 1987: 22, 1991: 37, 
1993: 41). The Federal Government has also not succeeded in its individual efforts at 
achieving international agreements on the reduction of shipbuilding subsidies (VSM 
1981:18,1983: 17,1984: 23).
A second set of reasons why the German shipbuilding industry believes that 
EU action is required in the shipbuilding sector and is, in fact, preferable to national 
measures is the nature of the shipbuilding industry itself. Because of the international 
nature of the shipbuilding market, it is not possible to impose customs duties as a 
form of protection in this industry. Thus, subsidies play an important role in 
maintaining the European shipbuilding industry, and this is where the EU role is 
crucial in allowing the provision of state aid to the industry in view of the distorted 
competition conditions on the world shipbuilding market (VSM 1981: 18,1988: 8).
Furthermore, the VSM has frequently expressed the view in its annual reports 
that as shipbuilding is an international business, it is not possible to solve the 
problems of German shipbuilding on a national basis alone and that only an 
international approach can lead to success (VSM 1981: 18, 1982: 18, 1988: 8, 1991: 
35, 1997: 47). The shipbuilding and shipping industries are ‘political industries’ 
which are heavily subject to general framework conditions. These industries are 
dependent not merely on national economic conditions, but also on completely free 
competition on the world market. The track record has shown, as discussed earlier, 
that the EU, rather than the Federal Government, has the political clout to carry 
through such international negotiations with success (VSM 1997: 47). The negotiating 
power of the EU representing fifteen member states is undeniably far greater than that 
of any individual member state government. Alongside the internal regulatory policy 
within the EU that the German shipbuilding industry is keen to pursue, the VSM has 
also expressed the view that the EU should pursue a foreign trade policy that clarifies 
to competitors like South Korea and Japan that the EU is not prepared to tolerate
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unfair trade practices. Because of the common market of the EU, such a trade policy 
must be pursued by the EU as an economic entity and not by Germany, which is a 
mere component of that bloc (VSM 1994: 2,1997: 42,1998: 2,1999: 3).
Due to this international nature of the shipbuilding market, it is only the EU 
that is in a position to implement measures that can effectively promote the 
shipbuilding industry. For instance, the EC programme of March 1989 that provides 
funding for future wreckage of ships and the ‘old for new’ regulation that restricts the 
amount of new shipbuilding to the amount of wreckage promotes the long-term 
viability of the European shipbuilding industry (VSM 1989: 26). Germany as a single 
country is not able to implement such measures. The Commission also plays an 
important role in the legislation of ship safety and marine environmental protection. 
The VSM’s opinion has been that national or ‘island’ solutions for strengthened 
environmental protection weaken the competitive position of German shipyards. 
Thus, the VSM has been keen to pursue international regulation of the shipbuilding 
industry within the context of the EU (VSM 1998: 27,2000: 9).
The German shipbuilding industry has also realised that there can only be 
sustainable improvement of the innovation and competitiveness of the European 
shipbuilding industry in global competition through strengthened, cross-national co­
operation in maritime research. Co-operation of EU shipbuilding and supplier firms 
would facilitate the application of information technology to shipbuilding and thereby 
increase the competitive chances of the larger German and European shipbuilding 
projects in the world market. European co-operation can fulfil the high logistical 
requirements associated with such contracts. Furthermore, the cross-sectoral approach 
of the Commission, as discussed in Section 4.3.3 of this chapter, increases the 
allocation of funds and thereby the competitiveness of European maritime research 
(VSM 1994: 33, 1997: 55, 1998: 31, 2000: 21). The VSM is of the opinion that the 
overcoming of the relevant administrative obstacles is only enforceable by the 
Commission and the European shipbuilding associations (VSM 1994: 44). The VSM, 
for instance, was very much in favour of the creation of the MIF, as such an initiative 
was an essential step in the realisation of its goals in the maritime transport policy 
domain. In this field, shipbuilding crosses national borders. The expected growth of 
maritime freight traffic, if handled properly at the EU level, could lead to increased 
demand for German shipbuilding.
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It is, however, not merely the international nature of the shipbuilding market 
that makes the EU the more effective platform on which the appropriate framework 
conditions can be created for the shipbuilding industry. Japan and South Korea are not 
the only competitor shipbuilding countries for Germany. EU member states like the 
Netherlands, Italy and Greece are also major shipbuilding nations. The VSM has 
consistently emphasised that the equality of opportunity within Europe is 
indispensable for the German shipbuilding industry (VSM 1982: 18 and 23, 1986: 20, 
1989: 26, 1993: 41, 1994: 44, 1997: 43, 1998: 27, 2000: 9 and 21). The VSM has 
often feared that state aid measures in other EU member states are not transparent, 
and are amenable to misuse. Thus, the goal of the German shipbuilding industry to 
ensure that the endowment of shipbuilding aid in the EU member states occurs in 
equivalent ways can only be achieved on the EU stage. Secondly, as Chapter 3 has 
shown, the German government has shown a consistent tendency of reducing the level 
of state aid provision to its shipbuilding industry. The German shipbuilding firms are 
quite cognisant of this fact, and know too that the shipbuilding industries in other EU 
member states tend to receive higher levels of state aid from their respective national 
authorities. Convinced that Germany has been an 'Obermusterknabe’ (QxtrcmQ model 
student) of EU shipbuilding aid guidelines, the German shipbuilding industry can only 
effectively limit the disadvantageous competition conditions that it is likely to face by 
pushing for stricter control of state aid provision at the EU level (VSM 1982: 23, 
1986: 20).
Admittedly, German shipbuilding firms continue their interest representation 
activity on the domestic level as well. The empirical evidence provided by the 
German shipbuilding industry does agree with the finding that interest groups “pursue 
a dual strategy striving for access and voice in European policy-making through 
national governments and directly through communications with EU institutions” 
(Kohler-Koch 1997: 3).
The German shipbuilding association plays an intermediary role in these 
relations between German shipbuilding firms and the EU. Despite organisational 
density, however, the VSM has displayed limited capacity to act in the field of direct 
interest representation to the EU institutions. On the other hand, no German 
shipbuilding firm, however large, has had a representative office in Brussels. Because
126
of this, the VSM has played an important intermediary role in European shipbuilding 
and maritime associations.^^
The predominant view in the literature on the Europeanisation of interest 
groups is that “different sized firms have different lobbying venues” (Mazey and 
Richardson 2001). Coen and Dannreuther (2003: 256) similarly argue that “firm size 
affects the distinct rules and norms of interest representation with the European 
Commission”. This finding, however, does not apply to the German shipbuilding 
industry. What is noteworthy about the response of German shipbuilding firms in its 
relations with the EU has been the lack of differentiation along the lines of firm size. 
German shipbuilding firms, regardless of whether they are large or small, have 
responded in similar fashion to the EU in terms of their interest representation efforts. 
Even the largest German shipbuilding firms do not have individual representative 
offices in Brussels, and even the SMEs in the German shipbuilding industry 
participate actively in the EU-wide forums. There are German shipbuilding firms that 
are members of the European shipbuilding associations, AWES and CESA, that have 
as many as 3,400 employees and there are others that have as few as eight.^^
4.4.2 Changing Orientations of Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG in the 1980s and
1990s
The Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry at the firm level can 
be studied in terms of the references made by a shipbuilding firm to the EU in its 
official publications over time. Company reports are published annually and provide a 
good basis to observe the preoccupations and orientations of a firm. Bremer Vulkan 
Verbund AG, the largest shipbuilding group in the Federal Republic of Germany 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, is used as a case study to examine the changing 
orientations of German shipbuilding firms. Graph 4.3 shows that there have been 
increasing references to the EU over time in the annual company reports of Bremer 
Vulkan Verbund.
Kohler-Koch (1993: 41-43) discusses the structural conditions that encourage collective lobbying by 
even large firms in Germany.
Refer to Appendix I for the labour force of the German member firms of AWES and CESA.
Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG is studied in detail in Chapters 5 and 6.
127
Graph 4.3: References to the EU in Bremer Vulkan Annual Reports 1980-1994
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4.4.3 Role Played by German Actors in European Shipbuilding Initiatives
Evidence of the Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry is also 
to be found in the key roles played by both German public and private actors in EU 
shipbuilding initiatives over the past ten years.
Firstly, the German MEP, Mrs Brigitte Langenhagen, was one of the three 
founders of the Association of Maritime Regional Interests in Europe (AMRIE). In 
January 1993, she was designated by the Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Consumer Protection to draft an opinion on the Commission 
Communication ‘New Challenges for Maritime Industries’ (CEC 1999b). MEPs 
Langenhagen (Germany), Donnelly (UK) and Spéciale (Italy) eventually came 
together to sponsor the foundation of AMRIE at the first ‘High Level Conference on 
Maritime Regional Interests in Europe’ on 20 April 1993 at the European Parliament, 
where it was agreed that a maritime alliance should be formed. AMRIE was formally 
established at the second High Level Conference held in Bremen in November 1993. 
The Land Government of Bremen was, in fact, one of the first regional authorities to 
join AMRIE.
Secondly, as discussed in Section 4.2.4 of this chapter, the chairman of the 
board of directors of Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG, Dr. Friedrich Hennemann, along
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with the former European Commissioner, Martin Bangemann, were instrumental in 
setting up the Maritime Industries Forum (MIF).
Bernhard Meyer, the German president of CESA in 1999 and managing 
partner of the German shipbuilding firm, Meyer Werfi, organised and chaired the 
meeting of the major European shipbuilders in Frankfurt on 18 January 1999. It was 
at this meeting that CESA started the ball rolling in initiating a Trade Barriers 
Regulation (TBR) complaint against South Korea. Admittedly, it was a matter of 
timing and collection of evidence of South Korean dumping practices that enabled 
CESA to lodge the TBR complaint with the Commission. However, according to an 
interview source in the Commission, the German President of CESA at that time did 
play an active role in expediting the process (interview 4).
When looking at the role played by private actors of the German shipbuilding 
industry in EU shipbuilding associations, German shipbuilding firms consistently 
account for the largest share of shipbuilding firm membership of both European 
shipbuilding associations, CESA and AWES. In 2003, the German percentages of 
shipyard membership of CESA and AWES were 24.4 per cent and 23.5 per cent 
respectively. On the other hand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom both have 
more shipbuilders and ship-repairers than Germany. This indicates that there has 
been relatively significant Europeanisation of German shipbuilding firms, as 
measured in terms of membership of EU shipbuilding associations.
The European Commission strongly advocates co-operation between 
European shipyards and also encourages SMEs to consider not only domestic but also 
transnational links (CEC 1997e). For instance, a condition for receiving funds fi"om 
EU Framework Programmes is that any funded project must involve a minimum of 
three partners firom at least two member states. The promotion of cross-national and 
even EU-wide co-operation in shipbuilding by EU shipbuilding policy and European 
shipbuilding associations has been well received by German shipbuilders. German 
shipbuilding firms have been involved in many European shipbuilding projects, 
including the Eurofast, Eurocorvette, E3 tanker and LeaderSHIP 2015 projects. 
Bernard Meyer, chairman of CESA and managing partner of the German shipbuilding 
firm, Meyer Werfi, has urged European shipyards to co-operate, and to stand their 
ground against Asian competitors. He says that the problem is not that German yards
As discussed in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3, the United Kingdom accounts for 27.4 per cent of all EU 
shipbuilders and ship-repairers, the Netherlands for 15.3 per cent and Germany for only 13.3 per cent.
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must fight against other good European yards. Rather, he argues, “we good European 
yards must stand our ground against Korea, Japan and China” (VSM Press Release, 6 
May 2002). He has argued that cooperative shipbuilding is the only way that 
expensive German shipyards can beat Asian competition.
In this connection, Meyer Werfi hosted a meeting of the European Calypso 
(Computational Fluid Dynamics in the Ship Design Process) research project, which 
is supported by the EU. The Papenburg meeting was attended by shipyard delegates 
fi-om the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK, Sweden, Finland and Germany. German, 
Swedish and Dutch ship research institutes were also represented, as was the EU. 
Managers of other German shipbuilding firms have expressed similar views. Mr. 
Ratzmann of Nordseewerke GmbH has said that the willingness and climate for 
cooperative ventures has increased considerably in recent years. One reason for this is 
that shipyards have become relatively small. That means that no single shipyard can 
handle a large volume order. Examples of co-operation include that between Kvaemer 
Wamow Werfi and Meeres Technik Werfi on a series of 5,000 box ships for P & O 
Nedlloyd, and co-operation between Nordseewerke, Flensburger Schiffbau 
Gesellschafi and Blohm + Voss. The director of Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werfi 
(HDW), Gollenbeck, has also commented that HDW is interested in expanding co­
operation on the European level (Todd 2003).
4.5 EUROPEANISATION OF GERMAN SHIPBUILDING FIRMS: A
MATTER OF CHOICE AND OF COMPULSION
Previous sections of this chapter have analysed various processes of 
Europeanisation at work in the German shipbuilding industry. This thesis argues that 
apart fi*om the benefits of membersip and the costs of non-membership of EU groups, 
it is also important to consider the industry’s characteristics, the issues confi’onting it 
and the industry’s perception of the success with which domestic public actors 
address these issues, to understand the Europeanisation of German shipbuilding firms.
The European shipbuilding associations have made important contributions to 
the tackling of challenges that confi’ont the European shipbuilding industry. Both 
because of the international nature of the shipbuilding industry and the fact that the 
EU is an economic union with a single commercial policy, the EU is best placed to
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address the issues facing the shipbuilding industries of its member states. The EU, 
because of its political weight in the international economic system, can negotiate 
more effectively with competitor shipbuilding countries like South Korea, both in 
bilateral and WTO talks, than can individual governments like the Federal 
Government of Germany. These factors have coalesced to create a situation in which 
the German shipbuilding firms perceive the European shipbuilding associations to be 
the more effective platform from which to voice their interests and to achieve their 
goals.
Employing the concepts of fit and misfit with respect to the comparison of the 
business-govemment relationship prevalent in Germany with that in the EU does not 
yield a meaningful assessment of the impact of EU public policies on public-private 
actor interactions in the German shipbuilding industry. Cowles (2001: 166) concludes 
that “there is a misfit between the German and European business-govemment 
relationship and one can expect there to be some difficulty in terms of the adaptability 
of organised interest”. In the case of the German shipbuilding industry, it has not been 
the similarity, or lack thereof, in the ways that firms interact with public authorities in 
Germany and in the EU that has driven the process of Europeanisation of the German 
shipbuilding firms. Rather, it has been the perceived deficiencies of domestic public 
policy and the challenges confronting the industry on the world market that have 
acted as spurs to the Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding firms.
It has not merely been an issue of loss of national competence that has driven 
the Europeanisation processes of these private actors. This thesis argues that it is the 
Europeanisation of the public actors with whom these German shipbuilding firms 
interact on the domestic stage that explains their own Europeanisation. The successful 
Europeanisation of the German government as manifested by German shipbuilding 
policy content and the stringent provision of shipbuilding aid was, in fact, the driver 
of the Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding firms themselves. Quite simply, 
the fact that the German government behaved as an Obermusterknabe of EU policy 
prescriptions in the 1970s and 1980s drove the German shipbuilding firms to the EU. 
The processes of Europeanisation of the private actors were thus linked to those of the 
public actors.
Falkner (1999) has shown the inportance of the meso level in studying the intact of 
Europeanisation on national patterns of public-private interaction in policy-making. She argues that 
differentiating according to more statist, pluralist or corporatist member states is useful but not 
sufficient.
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It is important to note that the interactions of the German shipbuilding firms, 
the European shipbuilding associations and the EU institutions include not just those 
associated with interest representation, but also with the provision of relevant 
information as well. It is this provision of vital information, including evidence of 
unfair trade practices by Korean shipbuilding firms that has contributed to the agenda- 
setting process in the EU shipbuilding policy field. It is this participation in agenda- 
setting that has been an important aspect of the Europeanisation of the German 
shipbuilding firms. Whilst at the heart of the discussion is state aid and interest 
representation, what has emerged fi*om these interactions between the private actors of 
the German shipbuilding industry and the EU has been broader than that. The firms 
have successfully embedded the question of state aid in wider policy concerns, and in 
the EU maritime policy framework. This has appeared to tie in well with the aims of 
both the European Commission and the shipbuilding firms.
The supranational authority of the EU has served to constrict the behaviour of 
both public and private actors in the German shipbuilding industry via the EU state 
aid and shipbuilding policy regimes. Chapter 2 has shown how EU rules determine 
the level and type of state aid provided to the shipbuilding industries of EU member 
states. In the case of Germany, with German unification and the privatisation of the 
East German shipyards, the EU’s role as a governance actor was further increased 
with the capacity limitations that it imposed on these East German shipyards. Thus, 
by 1991, it would have been quite understandable for the German shipbuilding 
industry to perceive the EU as a trouble-maker in its operation and its struggle for 
competitive survival. Chapters 2 and 3 have described how EU state aid and 
shipbuilding policies have resulted in the Europeanisation of German shipbuilding 
policy content and of policy actors. That has essentially been Europeanisation by 
compulsion. This chapter has explored the ways in which German shipbuilding firms 
have voluntarily looked towards the EU as a source of solutions for the challenges 
confronting them. The changes that we observe in the behaviour of the German 
shipbuilding firms serve as evidence of Europeanisation by choice. What has been of 
interest here is the changing perception of the EU by the German shipbuilding firms 
from nemesis to saviour.
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Chapter Five
BREMER VULKAN VERBUND AG IN THE 1980s: 
A TALE OF LIMITED EUROPEANISATION
This chapter and the next take Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG (hereafter referred 
to as Bremer Vulkan) as a case study to explore the responses of an individual 
German shipbuilding firm to EU shipbuilding policy and initiatives. This analysis of 
the decisions and actions of Bremer Vulkan, the Federal Government and the Land 
Government of Bremen is used to examine the Europeanisation of these policy actors. 
The story of state aid to Bremer Vulkan is a long and variegated one, even when 
limited to the 1980s and 1990s. In terms of the impact of the EU on the German 
shipbuilding industry in general and on Bremer Vulkan in particular, a ‘critical 
juncture’ occurred with German reunification and the consequent privatisation of the 
East German shipyards.^®  ^This chapter analyses the period fi*om 1980 to just before 
German reunification in 1990. The next chapter focuses on the period fi*om 1990 to 
1996, the year in which Bremer Vulkan was declared insolvent.
Because of the iterative and multi-episodic nature of state aid provision to 
Bremer Vulkan, this shipbuilding firm is a useful case study to analyse changes in the 
roles and interactions of the public and private actors concerned and to study the 
Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry. Firstly, the participation of the 
Federal Government, the Land Government of Bremen and the EU is traced over the 
fifteen major occasions of state aid provision that have been identified in these two 
chapters. Secondly, the Europeanisation of the firm, Bremer Vulkan, is studied in 
terms of its awareness of and reference to the EU in cases in which it received state 
aid. Thirdly, the Europeanisation process of the firm is studied in terms of the 
changing orientations or strategies of Bremer Vulkan in its interest representation 
activity.
“Many historical institutionalists ,.. divide the flow of historical events into periods of continuity 
punctuated by ‘critical junctures’, that is, moments when substantial institutional change takes place 
thereby creating a ‘branching point’ from which historical development moves onto a new path 
(Gourevitch 1986; Collier and Collier 1991; Krasner 1984)” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 10). Collier and 
Collier (1991: 29) describe a “critical juncture” as a period of significant change ... which is 
hypothesized to produce distinct legacies”.
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5.1 UNDERSTANDING THE SAGA OF BREMER VULKAN VERBUND AG 
IN BREMEN
The shipbuilding industry plays an important role -  not only in economic 
terms as employer and tax-payer, but also in its political and traditional social role in 
Bremerhaven and the northern city borough of Bremen. The roots of Bremer 
Vulkan itself can be traced to the early nineteenth century. The huge shipbuilding 
consortium Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG started out as a single shipyard founded by 
Johann Lange in 1805. Bremer Vulkan accounted for a significant proportion of 
shipbuilding employment and production in Bremen in the post-World War II period. 
It was assessed to be the second largest shipbuilding concern in Europe in 1993 
(Heseler 1993: 4). Bremer Vulkan remained the single largest shipbuilding employer 
in Germany up to 1994.^°^
Table 5.1 provides statistics on Bremer Vulkan*s shares of Bremen’s and 
German shipbuilding employment from 1979 to 1994. Over these years, Bremer 
Vulkan accounted for at least 30 per cent of Bremen’s shipbuilding employment. 
Bremer Vulkan accounted for 7 per cent of German shipbuilding employment on 
average from 1980 to 1989, and thanks to its takeover of the East German shipyards 
in 1990, Bremer Vulkan Verbund’s employment represented 54 per cent of total 
employment in the shipbuilding industry in Germany in 1993.^°^ Bremer Vulkan was 
also a major shipbuilding firm when measured in terms of its share of shipbuilding 
turnover, both in Bremen and in Germany. Table 5.2 provides statistics on Bremer 
Vulkan’s share of Bremen’s and German shipbuilding turnover from 1980 to 1992. 
Bremer Vulkan’s share of Bremen’s shipbuilding turnover increased from 17 per cent 
in 1980 to 83 per cent in 1992. Bremer Vulkan’s share of Germany’s shipbuilding 
turnover grew similarly from 4 per cent in 1980 to 24 per cent in 1989.
Refer to Appendix J for statistics on shipbuilding production in Germany by Land from 1980 to 
1995.
This is based on figures from Hecht et al. (1995: 17).
Refer to Appendix B for the firms that formed Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG.
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Table 5.1. Bremer Vulkan’s share of Bremen’s and German shipbuilding employment, 1979-1994 (per cent)
Year 1979 1980 1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Bremer Vulkan’s share of Bremen’s 
shipbuilding employment
30.4 30.3 30.5 33.8 34.5 37.5 39.4 38.8 42.2 41.8 35.5 - - -
Bremer Vulkan’s share of German 
shipbuilding employment
7.7 7.4 7.5 7.4 4.2 4.3 10.9 11.0 10.3 17.4 24.3 40.8 53.6 52.5
Note: Employment figures not available for Bremer Vulkan Verbund’s firms in Bremen for 1992-1994.
Source: Author’s calculations based on figures firom Bremer Vulkan Annual Reports 1980-1994 and VSM 1980,1986,1988,1990,1995.
Table 5.2. Bremer Vulkan’s share of Bremen and German shipbuilding turnover, 1980-1992 (per cent)
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Bremer Vulkan’s share of Bremen’s shipbuilding 
turnover
17.3 45.1 22.4 31.8 41.3 47.1 49.3 56.3 47.4 67.2 62.7 71.6 83.0
Bremer Vulkan’s share of German shipbuilding 
turnover
4.3 14.0 5.3 10.4 9.8 13.4 13.0 19.3 17.0 24.3 23.2 20.1 18.2
Source: Author’s calculations based on figures fi*om Bremer Vulkan Annual Reports 1980-1994 and VSM 1980,1986,1988,1990,1995.
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The Bremen shipbuilding firms and their workforce were influential both in 
the organisations of the labour market, and in the Social Democratic Party (SPD) that 
has ruled in Bremen without interruption in the post-war period. There was a dense 
network in which the board of directors, employee representatives of Bremer Vulkan 
and Senators of the Bremen Land Government were all active in the SPD. The 
transfer of Dr. Friedrich Hennemann from the Bremen Senate to the board of directors 
of Bremer Vulkan on 1 March 1987 made the network of SPD-led board of directors, 
representatives of the workforce, the Bremen Senate and the parliamentary majority 
even denser.
The closure of the second largest shipyard in Bremen, AG Weser, in 1983 was 
a key development in increasing Bremer Vulkan’s ability to ‘extort’ the state for 
aid.^°  ^The Bremen Senate felt from then on that such a catastrophic situation should 
not be repeated. It was not conceivable either for Bremen politics or for society that 
no more ships would be built in Bremen. Furthermore, Bremer Vulkan often used 
short-term decision situations as an instrument to blackmail the Bremen Senate. The 
board of directors of Bremer Vulkan had repeatedly -  in December 1983, 
October/November 1985, September 1986 and May 1988 -  requested the Bremen 
Senate for help at the last minute, wielding the threat of complete collapse.
The size and significance of the Werftenverbund or shipyard consortium 
impacted on the firm’s ability to extort the Bremen Senate. The testimony of a former 
member of the supervisory board of Bremer Vulkan, Dr. Andreas Fuchs, to the 
Bremen parliamentary inquiry committee was that “the managers of the shipyards 
knew that the policy of the Land was to do everything possible to maintain jobs” 
(Bremische Bürgerschafr 1998: 179). As Dr. Hans-Helmut Euler, head of the Bremen 
Senate Chancellery, put it, “the threat that if we did nothing, Bremer Vulkan would 
collapse was clear”. Hans-Peter Kiister, a former attorney for Bremer Vulkan, referred 
to the significance of Bremer Vulkan as an employment-intensive enterprise for 
Bremen in his testimony (Bremische Bürgerschafr 1998: 180). The disappearance of 
the shipbuilding industry was, according to members of the Bremen Land 
Government, a taboo in Bremen for political-psychological reasons (Bremische 
Bürgerschafr 1998: 181). The local shipbuilding industry still had a significant share 
of total industrial employment in Bremen in the 1980s. Because of already high
The background to the closure of AG Weser is provided in Section 5.2.2 of this chapter.
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unemployment, any further cuts in employment would have had profound 
consequences for the Land. One must also consider the importance of the shipbuilding 
industry to the supplier and sub-contracting industries in Bremen. A large number of 
apprentices were also employed in these firms. The costs of not supporting the 
shipbuilding industry included the loss of shipyard jobs, the corresponding fall in tax 
income and subsequent increase in social aid. As such, the Bremen Senate felt that it 
was cheaper to ‘buy employment’ with state aid.^°^
The Bremen Senate consistently declared that its aid actions were ‘temporary’, 
‘one-off and ‘for the last time’. In the early years, however, there were no conditions 
attached by the Bremen Senate to the state aid that would have had increase of 
productivity or reduction of losses as an objective, although the Bremen Senate knew 
that the Bremen shipyards had fallen in their productivity. No time limits were set. No 
subsequent qualitative check of the use of the money was conducted. This allowed the 
subsidy mentality that was already prevalent in the shipbuilding industry as a result of 
the world-wide subsidy race to proliferate further in the Bremen shipyards. The policy 
of Bremer Vulkan under the leadership of Dr. Friedrich Hennemann was largely 
directed at winning the subsidy race. Dr. Hennemann had admitted as much to the 
Bremen parliamentary inquiry committee. ‘We can beat the Japanese shipbuilding 
industry every day but not the Japanese finance minister’, he said (Bremische 
Bürgerschafl 1998: 798).
Many of the officials in the Bremen Senate were aware of the subsidy 
mentality of the directors and managers of the Bremen shipyards. As early as 1985, 
Bernhard Theilen, a department head in the Bremen Senate Chancellery, 
acknowledged in a memorandum for the Bremen Senate assembly on 17 December 
1985 the apparent mentality of shipyards to acquire contracts that were not break­
even, and whose end financing was not certain, and which were therefore secured by 
state aid fi*om the Land government (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 63 and 177).
In an assembly of the Bremen Parliament in 1988, the SPD member of the Bremen Parliament, 
Schmurr, said that, “The social question in this discussion is for us as Social Democrats the centre point 
and the social question is also the core of our engagement in this problem... .agreement that the 
rejection of public assistance in plain language would mean an immediate and at least short-term 
collapse of the Bremen shipbuilding industry. This would have devastating effects on the regions 
Bremerhaven and Bremen-Nord. We would have an unenqiloyment rate of 25 per cent in Bremerhaven 
and 23 per cent in Bremen-Nord. Social aid via Finanzausgleich could amount to DM 63-70 million.
By 1988, in the case of bankruptcy of the Werftenverbund, at least DM 450 million in pubhc 
guarantees would fail.” {Bremische Bürgerschaft, 12. Wahlperiode, Sitzungsprotokoll vom 25. August 
1988,p. 1266 and p. 1273).
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Managers of shipyards were first concerned with fulfilling capacity, then second with 
looking for financing for such contracts. Hans-Peter Küster, a former attorney for 
Bremer Vulkan, testified that the subsidy mentality was especially pronounced in the 
shipyards as they had experienced success in previous situations, especially when they 
had a particular weight in the location. Hans Koschnik, Mayor of Bremen and 
President of the Bremen Senate until 1985, testified similarly (Bremische 
Bürgerschaft 1998: 178).
5.2 CASES OF PROVISION OF STATE AID TO BREMER VULKAN,
1980-1989
This section describes the main occasions of state aid provision to Bremer 
Vulkan from 1980 to 1989. Special attention is paid to the participation of the Land, 
Federal and EU authorities in these situations. The detailed and authoritative 
information on these state aid cases was obtained from the report o f the Bremen 
Parliamentary Inquiry Committee into the collapse of Bremer Vulkan that was 
published in 1998 (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998). The criterion used for selecting 
these fifteen state aid cases was that the aid was ad-hoc and tied to specific events or 
developments of the firm. These fifteen state aid cases constitute a complete list of all 
such state aid cases. Scheduled disbursement of aid from Federal or Land 
shipbuilding aid programmes was not considered. Special attention was paid to the 
actions taken by the Federal Government, the Land Government of Bremen and the 
EU and the interactions between and among these various actors. With regard to the 
Land Government of Bremen, the points of interest were its decisions to grant aid to 
Bremer Vulkan, and its relations with the Federal Government regarding the co­
funding of such aid. The Federal Government was studied in terms of its willingness 
to provide aid to Bremer Vulkan, its notification, or lack thereof, of such aid to the 
European Commission, and its relations with the Commission in the event of an 
investigated state aid. The regulatory role of the Commission was analysed in terms of 
its approval and prohibition of the various state aid cases and its associated 
interactions with the German actors.
By the beginning of the 1980s, the golden days of Bremen, and for that 
German, shipbuilding were once and for all over. An important cause of this
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shipbuilding crisis was the increasing competition of the Far Eastern shipbuilding 
nations, South Korea and Japan. Their state aid and low wage costs resulted in over­
capacities on the world shipbuilding market and consequently, market prices lay 
significantly below the costs of German shipyards.
New shipbuilding production in Bremen in 1982 was only 66 per cent that of 
the annual production of 1972.^°  ^Similar trends were to be observed in employment 
figures in Bremen shipbuilding. In 1975, there were 21,099 workers in Bremen 
shipyards. In 1982, this figure had fallen to 14,066 (VSM 1987, 1991). This 
represented a reduction of more than 33 per cent in seven years (author’s calculations 
firom the above-mentioned figures).
5.2.1 Case 1: Bremer Vulkan Losses in 1981
On 1 September 1981, the chairman of the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) of 
Bremer Vulkan informed the Bremen Senate that the shipyard was in such great 
difficulties that it could not solve them, either through its own efforts or with help 
fi*om its owners, the Thyssen concern (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 18). The year 
1981 was, in fact, described in the Bremer Vulkan annual report of that year as one of 
the most difficult in the history of Bremer Vulkan. The building of the cruise vessel 
‘Europa’ and the 1977 fiigate programme for the Federal Marine Authority for 
Armaments and Technology and Procurement had brought Bremer Vulkan financial 
losses of DM 300 million (Bremer Vulkan 1982: 10).
After negotiations between Bremer Vulkan and the Federal Government, the 
budget committee of the Deutscher Bundestag finally approved a grant of DM 190 
million for the fiigate programme and thereby secured the survival of Bremer 
Vulkan.^*® The Bremen Senate decided to come on as a minority shareholder of 
Bremer Vulkan as part of a rescue action because of the losses in frigate and cruise 
shipbuilding. According to the then President of the Bremen Senate, Mayor Hans 
Koschnik, this was done at the request of the Federal Government (Bremische 
Bürgerschaft 1998: 19). The Bremen Senate used the Land-owned company.
Author’s calculations based on statistics from VDS (1973).
According to the Bremer Vulkan annual report of 1981, “only the contract aid programme of the 
Federal and Lander governments prevented the collapse the German shipbuilding industry at this time’ 
(Bremer Vulkan 1982: 5).
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Hanseatische Industrie Beteiligungen GmbH (hereafter referred to as HIBEG), to 
acquire shares in Bremer Vulkan."^ With effect from 1 January 1982, HIBEG 
acquired 25.1 per cent of Bremer Vulkan shares.
In the case of covering the losses of Bremer Vulkan in 1981, both the Federal 
Government and the Bremen Senate were prompt in their provision of financial 
support to Bremer Vulkan. Their willingness to come to the rescue of Bremer Vulkan 
was clear in their decisions to take whatever steps were necessary to bail Bremer 
Vulkan out of financial difficulty. The Federal Government did not notify the 
transactions to the European Commission. The EC played no role at all at this time as 
it did not even question the state aid involved in these transactions.
5.2.2 Case 2: Proposed Merger of Bremer Vulkan and AG Weser, 1982-1983
What is worth noting is that two days after the Bremen Senate’s decision to 
acquire Bremer Vulkan shares, the President of the Bremen Senate, Mayor Koschnik, 
announced the Senate’s plans for the merger of AG Weser and Bremer Vulkan in an 
assembly of the Bremen Parliament (Plenarprotokoll der Bremischen Bürgerschaft 
vom 9. Dezember 1981, pp. 3890-3892). AG Weser was the other large shipyard in 
Bremen at this time. The Bremen Senate saw this move as a survival strategy for the 
Bremen shipbuilding industry to cope with the Far Eastern competition. The trade 
unions and the boards of directors of the two shipyards were, however, against the 
idea of a merger because of possible job losses.
In January 1982, the Bremen Senate instructed the boards of AG Weser and 
Bremer Vulkan to develop a common concept for the safeguarding of the survival of 
the shipyards in Bremen. In response, the main owners of AG Weser and Bremer 
Vulkan (Krupp, Thyssen and HIBEG) commissioned a group of experts with the 
writing of a report on the improvement of the performance and competitiveness of the 
shipyards in Bremen. The goal of the study was the definition of measures 
necessary for the long-term survival capability of both shipyards (Bremische 
Bürgerschaft 1998: 21).
HIBEG was 49,5 per cent owned by the Bremen Senate, 49.5 per cent by the borough 
(Stadtgemeinde) Bremen and 1 per cent by the City of Bremerhaven.
These experts were the consultancy firms Treuarbeit AG, Knight-Wegenstein AG and Kienbaum
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In February 1983, Mayor Koschnik presented the Federal Economics Minister, 
Otto Graf Lambsdorff, and the Federal Finance Minister, Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg, 
with the recommendations of the two boards for a * Verbund' or consortium solution 
(Nordsee Zeitung, 29 April 1982). The Federal Government rejected any involvement 
in the solution of Bremer Vulkan’s financial problems during this visit of the Bremen 
Mayor to Bonn. The Federal Government insisted on concrete plans for a sound 
solution based on reduction of new shipbuilding, with reviewable data and plausible 
recommendations (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 22). It was no longer prepared to 
increase support for the shipbuilding industry without a plan for its restructuring 
(Bremer Vulkan 1984: 7).^ ^^
On 23 February 1983, the chairman of the supervisory board of AG Weser 
informed the President of the Bremen Senate that the Krupp concern had already 
taken over DM 230 million for the compensation of losses of AG Weser, and that it 
would make no further contribution to the preservation of the firm (Bremische 
Bürgerschaft 1998: 22). The response of the Bremen Senate came in the conference of 
economics ministers of the north German coastal Lander that was held in April 1983. 
Taking the cue from the Federal Government’s stance, these Land ministers came to 
the understanding that the future provision of shipbuilding subsidies would be linked 
to the reduction of new shipbuilding capacity. The owners and boards of both 
shipyards requested state aid of DM 115 million to support the proposed merger 
solution -  one-quarter of the amount from the Land Government and three-quarters 
fi"om the Federal Government (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 24). In the assembly of 
5 July 1983, the Bremen Senate agreed, in its double role as shareholder of Bremer 
Vulkan and as Land government, to take on DM 50 million of the anticipated DM 115 
million. The Bremen Economics Senator, Karl Wilhns, informed the State Secretary 
in the Federal Economics Ministry, Dr. Dieter von Wiirzen, of these plans.
On 20 July 1983, the Federal Government held a specialist committee meeting 
on the theme of the ideas for a new structural organisation of the Bremen shipyards. 
The members of this committee expressed readiness to examine the recovery of 
competitiveness of the large Bremen shipyards. The Federal Government did 
recognise the problematic situation in which the Bremen Senate found itself. Von
It is interesting to note here that Dr. Stoltenberg had formerly worked in the Schleswig-Holstein 
Land Government and had intimate knowledge of similar shipbuilding issues in his dealings with 
Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft in Kiel.
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Würzen stated that the Federal Government considered an application of the Bremen 
Senate for financial involvement of the state in the sectoral restructuring processes as, 
in large measure, worthy of examination. At the same time, however, the Federal 
Government raised the objection that small and medium-sized shipyards feared that 
the provision of state aid to large shipyards would distort competition against them. 
Furthermore, the Federal Government criticised documentation fi*om the Bremen 
Senate as not showing how a shipyard complex could produce ships under 
competitive conditions without incurring losses (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 24). 
The Federal Government favoured regional support via the Gemeinschaftsaufgabe 
Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 24). 
German industrial policy tends to emphasise functions (like regional development or 
incentives to SMEs) rather than to target aid to specific sectors. On 28 July 1983, the 
Bremen Senate finally applied for this joint Bund-Ldin.à financing instrument. This 
was, however, only a flanking measure for Bremen Senator Wilhns. He was more 
interested in obtaining direct shipbuilding aid firom the Federal Government 
(Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 24).
The announcement by Thyssen-Bomemisza-Europa n.V., owners of Bremer 
Vulkan, in August 1983 that they were withdrawing fi*om shipbuilding, and that they 
would no longer provide additional resources for future plans precipitated an 
application by the boards of AG Weser, Bremer Vulkan and Hapag-Lloyd to the 
Bremen Senate and the Federal Government for state aid for cross-firm structural 
measures. The Federal Government rejected this application in November 1983 
(Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 26). It was clear that no Federal money could be 
expected (Handelsblatt, 29 and 30 November 1983; die Zeit, 2 December 1983). The 
Bremen Senate, on the other hand, called for further increases to the shipbuilding 
subsidy programme (Handelsblatt, 13 September 1983, 29 and 30 November 1983; 
die Zeity 2 December 1983). The negative attitude of the Federal Government was 
criticised in the Social Democratic Bremen Senate. The general impression in the 
Bremen Senate was that the Federal Government was interested in protecting SMEs 
and not large firms and that furthermore, the Federal Government did not perceive 
shipbuilding to be a national task. The Land Bremen itself could not afford to provide 
more than DM 50 million. AG Weser was thus closed down on 31 December 1983.
The closure of AG Weser led to demonstrations and rallies by shipyard 
workers in Bremen. In the Bremen parliamentary elections that were held in 1984, the
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Social Democrats won 58 out of the 100 seats. This was the best result for the SPD in 
years. Mayor Koschnik had successfully pushed the blame for the collapse of AG 
Weser to the Federal Government. In his election campaign, he had consistently 
emphasised how it was the Federal Government’s reluctance to step in that had 
resulted in this undesirable situation.
Important factors in the choice of preserving the Bremer Vulkan shipyard 
rather than AG Weser were Bremer Vulkan’s tradition of military shipbuilding and 
the empty order books of AG Weser. Even though Bremer Vulkan’s contracts were 
loss contracts, they were contracts nonetheless. Relative productivity and modernity 
of the two shipyards were not the criteria employed to make the decision. Rather, the 
closeness of the relationship of Bremer Vulkan to the Land government appeared to 
seal its fate. In the context of the proposed merger of Bremer Vulkan and AG Weser, 
it is clear to see that the Bremen Senate had an extremely significant role. Not only 
did it initiate the idea, but it also did much within its means to advance it along. 
Representatives of the Bremen Senate informed the Federal Government of such 
plans, were involved in the commissioning of reports, and participated in expert 
forums on the matter. In concrete financial terms, the Bremen Senate agreed to 
provide DM 50 million to Bremer Vulkan, and applied to the Federal Government for 
financing under the Gemeinschaftsaufgabe.
For its part, the Federal Government was somewhat more hesitant in its 
support of these merger plans. Pressure firom Bonn had brought the Bremen shipyards 
and the Bremen Senate together to discuss ideas about the reorganisation of the 
Bremen shipbuilding industry. However, this was not sufficient for Federal 
Economics Minister Lambsdorff who insisted on the elaboration of a plan for the 
restructuring of the whole German shipbuilding industry before he was prepared to 
consider any further assistance {Bremer Nachrichten, 17 February 1983; Weser 
Kurier, 8 February 1983). The Federal Government, for instance, imposed strict 
conditions of reduction of new shipbuilding capacity and insisted that the plans 
included reviewable data. The pressure of the Federal level on the Land government 
was obvious {Handelsblatt, 14 February 1983). The Federal Government displayed 
concern about the Bremen shipbuilding industry when the Federal Chancellor invited 
the works councils of the two shipyards for talks, and in its general attitude towards
Federal Economics Minister Lambsdorff had declared in the course of the Bremen parliamentary 
elections, “Those who cannot sell ships should not build them” (quoted in Philipp 1998: 82).
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the Bremen Senate’s requests for assistance. However, the real clampdown from the 
Federal Government came when it unequivocally rejected the application of the three 
shipyards (Bremer Vulkan, AG Weser and Hapag-Lloyd) for cross-firm structural aid 
at a time when the latter felt themselves to be in dire straits as a result of Thyssen very 
publicly withdrawing from its commitments in the German shipbuilding industry.
This hesitant attitude of the Federal Government soon had its impact on the 
disposition of the Bremen Senate towards further state aid for Bremer Vulkan. In 
April 1983, the Bremen Senate, along with the other north German coastal Lander 
governments, started to link the future provision of shipbuilding aid with the 
reduction of new shipbuilding capacity, just as the Federal Government was doing. 
When things came to a crunch with the Thyssen withdrawal, the Bremen Senate, just 
like the Federal Government, refused to provide further state aid to the shipyards, and 
even instructed the other firms involved not to increase their own engagement. The 
Land government was caught between the conflicting interests of the industry and 
those of the Federal Government.
Furthermore, there was a split of opinion arising from conflicting interests 
between the four coastal Lander (Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony and Schleswig- 
Holstein) and the other seven Lander. In 1981, the Social Democratic Bremen Senate 
demanded an increase in shipbuilding aid from the Federal Government from 12.5 to
17.5 per cent of the cost of ships for ship-owners who ordered ships from German 
shipyards. The governments o f the other three coastal Lander agreed to support the 
Bremen proposal in March 1984. However, the proposal was blocked in the 
Bundesrat. The opponents to this proposal included Social Democratic Hessen and 
Saarland which were keen to ensure that the welfare o f their car and steel producers, 
respectively, was not jeopardised by what they saw as excessive support of the 
shipbuilding industry (Strâth 1987: 35).
The Federal Government did not notify the European Commission of the 
assistance that it was providing Bremer Vulkan because the Gemeinschaftsaufgabe 
had already been approved by the Commission. As with the state cover of Bremer 
Vulkan losses in 1981, the EC was not at all involved in the measures taken by the 
Bremen Senate and the Federal Government in favour of Bremer Vulkan in 1982 and 
1983.
144
5.2.3 Cases 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7: State Aid for the Shipyards Acquired by Bremer
Vulkan, 1983-1986” ®
At the beginning of 1983, the Bremen Senate acquired shares in the 
shipbuilding firm, Schichau Unterweser AG (SUAG). The Bremer Gesellschaft fur  
Wirtschaft und Arbeit acquired 38 per cent of the share capital of SUAG. The aim of 
the Bremen Senate at this time was to maintain the 900 jobs on this shipyard {Senator 
fu r  Finanzen, Unterlagen Sitzungen Bürgschafsanschüsse, Band I, Sitzung vom 10. 
Dezember 1984, p. 1). At the end of 1983, the Bremen Senate decided to grant 
financial aid for another shipyard, Seebeckwerfi AG. The Bremen Senate agreed to a 
guarantee for a capital increase of DM 7.95 million and a repayable loan of DM 25 
million (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 36).
This shipbuilding policy came about as the Bremen Senate recognised the 
‘acute danger’ posed by an unordered collapse of a major part of the Bremen 
shipbuilding industry (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 29). The Land Bremen, after the 
closure of AG Weser, was even more determined to safeguard jobs in the Bremen 
shipbuilding industry. The Bremen Senate, in the persons of Economics Senator 
Wemer Lenz and Senate Director, Dr. Friedrich Hennemann, formulated the strategic 
objective of Bremen shipbuilding policy in 1984. On 10 January 1984, the Bremen 
Senate passed a resolution on aid for the merger of Bremer Vulkan and Hapag-Lloyd 
Werft. The consolidation of shipyards in Bremen into a ^Verbund’ or consortium, 
under the leadership of Bremer Vulkan, was seen to be the prerequisite for the 
survival of the Bremen shipbuilding industry. This aim was pursued with great 
enthusiasm in the years 1984-1987 and with considerable state aid in favour of the 
Verbund. As the formation of a shipyard complex was not sought or pursued primarily 
by the shipyards concerned, not even by the leading Bremer Vulkan shipyard, but 
instead by the Bremen Senate, these huge amounts of state aid were essential to the 
implementation of the Land shipbuilding policy. The Bremen Senate also exerted 
pressure towards the merger of Bremer Vulkan and Schichau in the context of the 
latter’s applications for guarantees for new shipbuilding for four ferry-boats 
(Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 41). A concrete business decision by a private
State aid cases 3 ,4 , 5, 6 and 7 are analysed jointly in this section as they all relate to state aid 
provided to facilitate Bremer Vulkan’s takeover of other shipbuilding firms from 1983 to 1986.
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shipbuilding firm was thus influenced and manipulated by the Bremen Senate with the 
leverage of the provision of a guarantee.
Talks between the Bremen Economics Senator and the chairman of Friedrich 
Krupp GmbH were also not purely devoted to securing guarantees for Bremer Vulkan 
from the Bremen Senate. They also served to be the prelude for the merger of Bremer 
Vulkan and Seebeckwerfi. A meeting of the economics committee of the Bremen 
Senate on 10 December 1985 included a discussion of how situations could be 
avoided in which different Bremen shipyards competed for the same shipbuilding 
contracts. The Bremen Senate believed that a ^Verbund' solution would bring 
‘heightened synergy effects’ that could allow an ‘ordered reduction of capacity’ 
whilst avoiding ‘disruptive developments’ (Bremische Bürgerschafr 1998: 93). Talks 
between the Bremen Senate Director, Dr. Hennemann, representatives of HIBEG and 
of Krupp focused on a model of integration of Seebeckwerfi into Bremer Vulkan. 
Bremen Economics Senator Lenz wrote to Mr. Segebade, the representative of IG 
Metall in Bremerhaven, on 21 April 1986 to appease fears that the merger would 
cause job losses (Bremische Bürgerschafr 1998: 72). On 2 July 1986, Senator Lenz 
for the Bremen Senate and Dr. Wilhelm Scheider for Friedrich Krupp GmbH signed 
the contract for the takeover of Seebeckwerfi shares. So as to appear to be conforming 
with EC state aid law, the Bremen Senate made HIBEG the contract partner for 
Friedrich Krupp GmbH and Bremer Vulkan {Senator fiir Finanzen, Unterlagen 
Sitzungen Bürgschaftsanschüsse, Band III, Sitzung vom 29. August 1986, Vorlage, p. 
2 and Anlage I, p. 77). The Bremen Senate thus played a heavy hand in the takeover 
of Seebeckwerfi by Bremer Vulkan.
In August 1986, Bremer Vulkan took on contracts with American President 
Lines (APL) to build two big container ships. These contracts were however taken at 
a loss and Bremer Vulkan expected state aid from the Bremen Senate. The Bremen 
Senate provided Bremer Vulkan with two guarantees and contract aid for the 
completion of the contract for APL. The Federal Government did not offer any co­
funding of this state aid, and thus did not feel particularly pushed to notify the 
transactions between the Bremen Land government and Bremer Vulkan to the 
Commission. The EC once again did not intervene in this case, and according to an 
official in the Competition Directorate-General, he was of the opinion that the facts 
that the amounts involved were relatively small and that the aid granted was mainly in 
the form of guarantees made the aid ‘less notifiable’ (interview 7).
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The period in which Bremer Vulkan became a consortium of shipyards, that 
by September 1986 included four large shipyards and an 8,000 strong workforce, was 
characterised by consistent and unflinching support of the Bremen Senate. However, 
by this time, the Bremen Senate was also insisting on reduction of new shipbuilding 
capacity in Bremen. The communication issued by the officials from the finance and 
economics departments and the guarantee committees on how the liquidity situation 
in Bremer Vulkan should be improved emphasised ordered capacity reduction 
{Senator fiir Finanzen, Unterlagen Sitzungen Bürgschaftsanschüsse, Band III, Sitzung 
vom 29. August 1986, p. 2). The Federal Government was not at all involved in any 
form whatsoever. The Bremen Senate neither consulted it nor asked for its assistance. 
For a variety of reasons, which might have included ignorance and/or neglect, or 
because it did not disapprove of these state measures, the EC did not intervene in any 
of these transactions.
5.2.4 Case 8: Acquisition of Bremer Vulkan Investments by the Bremen Senate
in 1987 and 1988
In late 1987 and early 1988, the economic conditions for German shipbuilding 
were still difficult. The acceptance of loss contracts had logically led to liquidity 
difficulties in Bremer Vulkan. As a solution, the Bremen Senate stepped in and took 
over Bremer Vulkan’s liquidity-binding financial investments, including ship shares 
and limited partnership or Kommanditgesellschaft loans. The Bremen Senate took 
over these financial investments of Bremer Vulkan without knowing their actual 
market value.
Bremen Finance Senator Grobecker felt that it was preferable to safeguard 
contracts through the receipts of sale of stocks, rather than directly out of the public 
budget funds. It can be gathered from the minutes of a meeting of the Bremen Finance 
Senate that the provision of resources in the form of an increase of capital was a 
reaction to EC state aid law. These minutes read, ‘In view of the EC problem, this 
way is EC compliant’ {Senator fiir Finanzen, Unterlagen Sitzungen 
Bürgschaftsanschüsse, Band III, Sitzung vom 22. Dezember 1986, p. 2). This did not, 
however, preclude the need for this aid to be notified to the European Commission. 
The Commission had written to the Federal Government about what they had come to
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know from an article in the German newspaper, Handelsblatt, on 27 April 1988 about 
the vouching of an operating resources special credit of DM 130 million that had been 
decided by the Bremen Senate. The EC reminded the German government that in 
accordance with Article 10(2) of the Sixth Council Directive on state aid to 
shipbuilding, it had to notify every intended introduction or reconfiguration of state 
aid in a timely manner to the Commission.
The ensuing discussion between the Bremen Senate and the Federal 
Government is important in revealing the comparatively greater acceptance of EC 
shipbuilding aid legislation by the Federal Government than by the Bremen Senate. 
The Bremen Economics Senator informed the Federal Economics Minister that the 
DM 130 million was an advance payment on a partial purchase price for the 
acquisition of financial investments of Bremer Vulkan. He thus argued that the 
measure was not an examinable state aid. The Federal Economics Minister was, 
however, not prepared to adopt the Bremen Senate’s approach and to relay it up to the 
European Commission as the existence of a notifiable state aid was being artlessly 
negated. The Federal Economics Ministry ‘was not prepared to pull the European 
Commission’s leg’ (Bremische Bürgerschafr 1998: 560). The expert department of the 
Federal Economics Ministry was of the opinion that the aid had to be notified to the 
EC. They feared that the European Commission would react negatively if they 
continued their position without any changes, especially as the European Commission 
had learnt about the matter from the press.
The Federal Economics Ministry held that the take-over of guarantees for 
financing an investment credit was difficult. The takeover of investment guarantees in 
the past was possible because of the Sixth Council Directive. Through the stand-still 
agreement in connection with the OECD shipbuilding, this funding should however 
basically be prohibited. An investment aid should in no case lead to an increase in 
capacity. As a rule, the European Commission demanded a reduction of capacity as an 
element of restructuring exercises. Furthermore, it had to be shown that the funded 
programme led to an improvement of the competitiveness of the firm (Bremische 
Bürgerschafr 1998: 565).
The responsibility to notify any state aid to the EU lies with the Federal 
Government and thus, ultimately it was the Federal Government that made the 
decision to notify this particular transaction to the EU. In its notification, the Federal 
Government emphasised its adherence to EC shipbuilding policy goals of capacity
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limitation and the downsizing of the shipbuilding industry. Germany indicated that the 
emphasised capacity reduction would be implemented.^
However, no information was given about the intended acquisition of financial 
investments of Seebeckwerfi. The European Commission again learnt only from the 
press that the financial investments of Seebeckwerfi would be acquired by Bremer 
Vulkan. This project had not been notified to the EC. When questioned by the 
Commission, Germany insisted that this had been notified to the European 
Commission with the earlier communication of 28 June 1988.
Catching on to the game that Germany seemed to be playing, the European 
Commission informed the Federal Government about which measures in favour of the 
Bremer Werftenverbund were included by its notification. These included procedures 
in connection with the financial investments of Bremer Vulkan and Seebeckwerfi but 
excluded procedures from the time of the merger of the Bremen shipyards into a 
Werftenverbund. The Commission indicated that an inquiry was needed for it to be 
able to determine whether the introduction of proceedings was necessary (European 
Commission Press Release IP/89/449).
In July 1989, the European Commission declared that as a result of its 
examinations, it had decided to open proceedings under the then Article 93(2) of the 
EC Treaty. It saw several of the measures as not compatible with the Common 
Market. More than a year later on 26 September 1990, the Commission informed the 
Federal Government that all proceedings were closed, and that it had decided to 
approve the state measures (European Commission Press Release IP/90/754). The 
state aid aggregated 6.4 per cent of turnover of 1988 in civil shipbuilding and ship- 
conversion. Together with the contract-related state aid that Bremer Vulkan obtained 
or that went to ship-owners, the state aid intensity reached in total 12.8 per cent in 
1988, i.e. it lay far below the EC-allowed 1988 limit of 28 per cent. The German side 
had emerged victorious this time in its dispute with the EC. Bremer Vulkan was
The Federal Government did also atten^t to justify the provision of the aid in its communication to 
the EC by pointing out that the public audit firm, Treuarbeit AG, which had determined the productive 
capacity of the concept, found that to comply with the restructuring guidelines, Bremer Vulkan had to 
part with financial investment of book value o f DM 227.5 million. The Bremen Senate was prepared to 
take over these financial investments through HIBEG at their book value. The liquidation of these 
business investments, however, made it necessary to render an amount of DM 130 million in advance 
to Bremer Vulkan (Bremische Bürgerschafl 1998: 586).
The following information was requested from the Federal Government: general information on the 
Werftenverbund, sale of shares of Seebeckwerfi by HIBEG to Bremer Vulkan, acquisition of Bremer 
Vulkan shares by HIBEG, acquisition o f assets of Bremer Vulkan by HIBEG, and acquisition of assets 
of Schichau and Seebeckwerfi by HIBEG.
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allowed to keep the state aid and the argument of the Bremen Senate that the 
transaction did not constitute state aid in the first place was vindicated by the 
Commission. However, the European Commission did point out that while state aid 
had been approved, it should have been notified to the Commission prior to 
implementation.
This marked a significant development in the relations between the European 
Commission and the Federal Government. The EC had only become involved in the 
case because it had leamt about it firom German press reports. The Federal 
Government had not informed the Commission about these transactions voluntarily. 
What is, in fact, even more noteworthy is that the European Commission might not 
even have chosen to intervene had the measure not been so flamboyantly publicised in 
the German media. An official in the Competition Directorate-General of the 
European Commission said in an interview with the author that “it was impossible to 
ignore a breach of EU state aid rules that was in everyone’s face” (interview 4). The 
EU involvement in this Bremer Vulkan state aid case was a matter of maintaining 
credibility. This occasion, along with other subsequent developments, left an indelible 
mark on the government officials in Germany. As an official in the Hamburg 
economics ministry said, “If only our pohticians wouldn’t go around thumping their 
chests, we might not have these issues with the EU” (interview 8).
This state aid case is also important because it provides evidence of the more 
successful penetration of both the attitude and the actions of the Federal Government 
by the EU policy on the provision of shipbuilding aid, when compared with the 
Bremen Land Government. The Federal Government was cognisant of the EC policy 
of downsizing the shipbuilding industry and limited provision of shipbuilding aid, and 
paid credence to these goals in both its discussions with the Bremen Senate and in its 
communications with the European Commission. The Bremen Senate, on the other 
hand, was not as enthusiastic to apply these EC principles, and was more recalcitrant 
in its response, as manifested by the views it expressed in its discussions with the 
Federal Government.
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5.2.5 Case 9: Structural Concept of Bremer Vulkan, 1987-1988
Bremer Vulkan transformed itself from being purely a shipbuilding 
consortium to a maritime technology concern during the years 1988 to 1993.
The board of directors of Bremer Vulkan formulated and adopted the 
‘Guidelines for the Organisational Structure and Co-operation in the Bremer 
Werftenverbund of Shipbuilding Firms Working Together’ in 1987. This came to be 
known as Bremer Vulkan’s structural concept. Its main elements were: 
a repair concept; 
a diversification concept; 
a structural concept for Bremerhaven; 
a structural concept for Bremen-Nord, and 
a rehabilitation concept.
The formulated goals were firstly the medium-term consolidation of Bremer 
Vulkan by reduction of capacity and of jobs to a core portfolio, modernisation 
investments and the increase of non-ship production (Protokoll der Bremer Vulkan 
Aufsichtsratssitzung vom 2. Oktober 1987, p. 17).
During a meeting of the SPD Bremen Senate and the SPD Bremen parliament 
fraction from 1 to 3 February 1988 to discuss this structural concept, the Bremen 
Economics Senator concluded that a further, considerable reduction of shipbuilding 
capacities was indispensable to reduce over-capacity, to make shipbuilding in Bremen 
viable again, and to ensure the security of the jobs in this sector (Bremische 
Bürgerschafr 1998: 132).
The EC Council had published on 12 September 1987 the ‘Report on the 
Industrial, Social and Regional Aspects of Shipbuilding in the Community’. The 
structural concept of Bremer Vulkan and the recommendations of the Bremen SPD 
government thus seemed to resonate well with the direction provided by this EC 
report. This structural concept had the eventual agreement of the individual shipyard 
boards, the supervisory board, IG Metall and the Bremen Senate. The board of 
directors of Bremer Vulkan applied to the Bremen Senate for the financial aid 
required for the implementation of this structural concept (Bremische Bürgerschafr 
1998: 197). The Bremen Senate confirmed that the structural measures of Bremer 
Vulkan would be supported with funding, and that ‘a qualified capital participation of 
the Land’ would be retained (Bremische Bürgerschafr 1998: 142). As a first step, the
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Bremen Senate decided on financial aid of DM 20 million for the diversification 
concept. The Bremen Senate made subsequent decisions on financing of the 
diversification concept with a total of DM 31.1 million (Bremische Bürgerschaft 
1998: 197).
The implementation of the structural concept involved a great deal of state aid 
from the Land Government of Bremen. However, this aid was provided rather 
reluctantly. Furthermore, the Bremen Senate quite clearly pursued the policy of 
capacity reduction that had been recommended by EC shipbuilding legislation and the 
Council’s shipbuilding report of 1987. This marked a shift in the propensity of the 
Land Government of Bremen to provide state aid to Bremer Vulkan. The imposition 
of conditions of capacity reduction and productivity increase signaled a decreased 
willingness of the Land government to prop up Bremer Vulkan.
The experience of the Commission’s investigation of the acquisition of 
Bremer Vulkan’s investments by the Bremen Senate constituted part of the ‘EU 
learning curve’ for the Bremen Land Government. Actual exposure to the 
investigative and regulatory powers of the European Commission had resulted in 
greater credence to relevant EC guidelines by the Bremen Land Government. This 
state aid case also provides evidence of the Europeanisation of the Federal 
Government in its notification of the aid for Bremer Vulkan’s structural concept and 
of the parallel acquisition of Seebeckwerfi investments to the EU on 28 June 1988 and 
26 August 1988, respectively. The EC’s benign neglect of Bremer Vulkan’s state aid 
cases up until 1987 left the German authorities ignorant of the powers of the European 
Commission to investigate and prohibit state aid. The EC’s investigation of Bremer 
Vulkan’s eighth state aid case of the acquisition of Bremer Vulkan’s investments by 
the Bremen Senate (discussed in Section 5.2.4) was significant for the 
Europeanisation of both the Federal and Land governments.
5.2.6 Case 10: State Aid for the Acquisition of Senator Linie GmbH by Bremer 
Vulkan and Its Merger with Deutscher Seereederei (DSR)
A former member of the board of directors of Hapag-Lloyd Werft, Karl-Heinz 
Sager, presented his idea to the Bremen Economics Senator in April 1989 of creating 
a service to steer flows of goods through Bremen harbours that previously mostly
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went through competing harbours (Vorlage Sitzung Biirgschaftsausschiisse am 6. 
April 1989, p. 235). The shipping company, Senator Linie GmbH, was subsequently 
founded on 6 October 1989. The founding of Senator Linie was expected to 
generate demand for container shipbuild ing .F rom  the beginning, however. Senator 
Linie GmbH found itself in financial difficulties -  bankruptcy threatened the firm 
many times. Loans and guarantees of the Land Bremen were required. There was a 
close three-way relationship between the Bremen Senate, Bremer Vulkan and Senator 
Linie GmbH in which liquidity, shares and loans were shuffled back and forth as the 
need arose. Through guarantees for the end-financing of ships, the Bremen Senate 
supported Senator Linie and Bremer Vulkan at one and the same time.
The two shipping firms of Deutscher Seereederei (DSR) and Senator Linie 
were merged on 1 April 1994. HIBEG took over further shares in Senator Linie to 
provide the funds required for the execution of this merger. The Land Government 
also allowed guarantees of DM 23 million. The Bremen Senate acquired 50 per cent 
of the merged shipping company. Furthermore, the shares of Bremer Vulkan in 
Senator Linie of DM 2 million were financed by a loan from HIBEG to Bremer 
Vulkan (Bremische Bürgerschafr 1998: 239).
This particular episode of state aid provision is important in that it marks the 
expansion of Bremer Vulkan business activity into shipping and the active 
involvement of the Bremen Senate in supporting this business development. The 
European Commission did not investigate this state aid. Part of the explanation lies in 
the fact that this transaction was in keeping with the recent EU interest in coupling the 
shipping and shipbuilding industries. Chapters 2 and 4 have shown how the EU 
extended the scope of the shipbuilding sector to incorporate the shipping and supplier 
industries within the ambit of its shipbuilding legislation and policy. Here, the case of 
the provision of state aid by the Bremen Senate to facilitate the takeover of Senator 
Linie by Bremer Vulkan is evidence of the implementation of this EU impulse on the 
domestic German level. Bremer Vulkan incorporated the EC shipbuilding policy
*** Senator Linie GmbH had ten shares of DM 1 million each, of which six shares went to Bremen 
enterprises (two to Bremer Vulkan, one to Lürssen Werft GmbH, one to Unterweser Reederei AG, and 
two to HIBEG).
According to the minutes of the Bremen Senate guarantee committee meeting on 14 April 1989, ‘the 
continuously worsening chartering rate levels from the early 1980s until 1987 had led to considerable 
problems in Bremer Vulkan as lower charter rates led to insufficient profits in shipping conqianies and 
this dançened the demand for new shipbuilding’ (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 239).
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prescription of diversifying into maritime transport activity in its own business 
strategy and this met with the approval and support of the Bremen Senate.
5.2.7 Case 11: State Aid for the Acquisition of Krupp Atlas Elektronik by
Bremer Vulkan
Krupp Atlas Elektronik (KAE), a firm which specialised in the manufacture of 
electronic systems for ships and defence, found itself in financial difficulties in 1989. 
As the Federal Government was planning to issue fewer armaments contracts to 
German industry, and as KAE obtained about two-thirds of its contracts in this market 
segment, it was affected significantly by the revised government policy. As the Krupp 
concern wanted to separate from KAE in Bremen-Sebaldsbruck, the Bremen Senate 
enabled Bremer Vulkan to acquire KAE by providing a capital guarantee of DM 126 
million to facilitate the purchase by Bremer Vulkan AG of a 74.9 per cent share of 
KAE from Krupp AG. This state aid was provided with the justification of avoiding a 
hostile takeover and gaining influence in this important business for Bremen via 
Bremer Vulkan.
Under the roof of Bremer Vulkan, the thus far competitors on the market, 
Systemtechnik Nord and KAE, could now co-operate. Systemtechnik Nord GmbH 
was a maritime technology firm that was founded by Bremer Vulkan in 1989. In fact, 
the genesis of this firm can be traced to the Bremen Senate. The President of the 
Bremen Senate, Mayor Klaus Wedemeier, in a meeting of the north German Minister 
Presidents on 8 November 1989 in Hamburg, had suggested the formation of a 
consortium of companies, Systemtechnik Nord, to counteract the technological- 
structural weakness of the north German Lander (Bremische Bürgerschafl 1998: 224).
It should be borne in mind that the elections to the Bremen Parliament were to 
be held in September 1991. It was an opportune time for politicians to support key 
firms in Bremen. The Federal Government was, however, by this time very concerned 
with German compliance with EU state aid law. In a letter dated 11 September 1991 
to the Bremen Senate, the Federal Economics Minister, Jürgen Mollemann, indicated, 
‘In the framework of the transaction in which HIBEG receives a free-of-charge Land 
guarantee, whose ultimate beneficiary is Bremer Vulkan, I assume that the question of 
an eventual state aid authorisation by the European Commission will be taken account
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of by you’ (Bremische Bürgerschafl 1998: 312). The Bremen Senate itself was 
optimistic on two fronts. Firstly, it was confident that the Federal Government would 
tow its line that the acceptance of the guarantee constituted a non-notifiable aid with 
the EU and secondly, that even if the measure constituted a notifiable state aid, it 
would be approved by the EU as a diversification measure.
The Federal Economics Minister notified the European Commission of the aid 
on 17 December 1991. In the subsequent examination, the Federal Government 
presented the argument that the value of the investment had been ascertained by a 
third party showing that the Land guarantee was not a state aid. Instead, they argued 
that it was an aid for diversification according to the EC-approved structural concept. 
The Federal Government argued that the aid did not represent a sufficient aid to 
shipbuilding and impinged exclusively in the investment field, and could not be 
deployed as a cash inflow for the covering of firm losses. The Federal Government 
also argued that the Land guarantee involved the minimum needed support, an 
argument that does not figure at all in the EU Treaty articles.
After an exchange of correspondence with the Federal Government in which 
further information was asked, the European Commission communicated in writing to 
the Federal Government on 6 May 1992 that it had decided to open proceedings under 
Article 88(2) of the EU Treaty (European Commission Press Release IP/92/363).^^^ 
The European Commission could not accept the argument that the participation of 
HIBEG was in conformity with normal market conditions. The difference between the 
market value and the price paid for KAE by Bremer Vulkan could not be justified by 
pure business considerations. This total difference corresponding to the guarantee had 
to be appraised as state aid. Finally, the European Commission did not see itself able 
to confirm the recipient of the questionable aid on the basis of the information 
presented by the German Government. The Commission thus neither thought that the 
guarantee formally complied with the approved guarantee rules nor could it agree 
with the German assessment that there was a normal market relationship between the 
receipts of the investments and the required funds for the handling of the loan, as the 
guarantee guidelines of 1987 stipulated. The acquisition of existing firms or a part 
thereof could not be classified as a supportable investment in the framework of the
The decision of the European Commission to open the procedure provided in Article 88(2) of the 
EU Treaty was communicated to the German Government by letter SG (92) D/6699 of 20 May 1992 
and published in Official Journal of the European Communities C 171, 7 July 1992, pp. 3-5.
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Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur as the 
German government had not provided any proof that KAE would have had to close if 
it were not sold to Bremer Vulkan.
The decision of the European Commission came surprisingly early on 6 April 
1993, even before talks had taken place in which the arguments of the German 
representatives could be presented. In this decision, the European Commission 
classified the measure of the Land Government of Bremen as non-compatible aid and 
demanded its repayment by the firm as “the aid could not be justified on the grounds 
of regional economic development or of employment, as it served only to facilitate the 
transfer of KAE firom Krupp to Bremer Vulkan, without any change in the business 
being carried on” (European Commission Press Release IP/93/254).
The Federal Government, HIBEG and Bremer Vulkan filed a complaint 
against the Commission at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the grounds that 
insufficient hearing had been given to them in the p ro ceed ings.T he  judgement on 
the complaint of Germany, HIBEG and Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG (Joined Cases 
C-329/93, C-62/95 and C-63/95) was issued by the ECJ on 24 October 1996. The ECJ 
criticised the inadequate substantiation of the decision of the European Commission 
with the consequence that the decision lacked sufficient substantiation under Article 
190 of the EU Treaty. The ECJ annulled Commission Decision 31993D0412 and 
ordered the Commission to pay the costs of the case.^^  ^In light of the Court’s ruling, 
the Commission was obhged to take a new final Decision in order to terminate the 
Article 88(2) proceedings which it had opened in May 1992. It did this with 
Commission Decision 31998D0665 of 25 February 1998, in which it confirmed its 
view that the aid which the Land of Bremen had granted in 1991 to Bremer Vulkan
Commission Decision 31993D0412 of 6 April 1993 concerning aid awarded by German 
Government to HIBEG and by HIBEG via Krupp GmbH to Bremer Vulkan AG, facilitating the sale of 
Krupp Atlas Elektronik GmbH from Krupp GmbH to Bremer Vulkan AG (Official Journal of the 
European Communities L 185,28 July 1993, pp. 43-50).
The action brought on 1 July 1993 by Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG against the Commission was 
classified as Case C-63/95 (Official Journal o f the European Communities C 222, 18 August 1993, p. 
10). The action brought on 28 June 1993 by HIBEG against the Commission was classified as Case C- 
329/93 (Official Journal of the European Communities C 222, 18 August 1993, pp. 8-9). The action 
brought on 28 June 1993 by HIBEG against the Commission was classified as Case C-335/93 (Official 
Journal of the European Communities C 222, 18 August 1993, p. 9). These three cases were then 
classified as Joined Cases C-329/93, C-62/95 and C-63/95.
The Judgement of the Court of 24 October 1996 in Joined Cases C-329/93, C-62/95 and C-63/95 
was published in Official Journal of the European Communities C 9,11 January 1997, p. 2 and 
European Court Reports [1996] 1-5151.
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(now in liquidation) towards the purchase of KAE was incompatible with the 
Common M a r k e t / T h e  Commission accordingly ordered the recovery of the aid.
The EU was taken to task by the Federal Government, HIBEG and Bremer 
Vulkan. The governor was now being checked in its actions. The German actors 
emerged victorious in this dispute with the Commission as far as their complaint to 
the ECJ was concerned. This was, however, merely a victory on a question of 
procedure, rather than on the substance of the Commission’s prohibition of the 
Bremer Vulkan state aid. The next chapter shows that this did not lead to a sense of 
complacency on the part of the German government and Bremer Vulkan. This episode 
played an important part in instilling in both the German government and Bremer 
Vulkan an increased sense of awareness of the powers of the European Commission 
to govern the German shipbuilding industry.
5.3 DID THE EC MATTER TO BREMER VULKAN DURING THE
1980S?
This chapter has described eleven major cases of state aid provision to Bremer 
Vulkan during the period 1980 to 1989. Special attention was paid to the participation 
of the Land and Federal Governments in the provision of aid, or lack thereof, when 
requested by Bremer Vulkan. The analysis of these eleven state aid cases also reveals 
that the EC only intervened on three occasions. During the 1980s, the potential to 
intervene in cases of provision of shipbuilding aid was not fully exploited by the EC. 
The EC was not using its competences aggressively in this policy field. The potential 
for Europeanisation of the relevant German policy actors was not fully realised as 
seen by the limited EC prohibition of German shipbuilding aid.
One should, however, also ‘zoom out’ and move away from a myopic and 
close-range viewing of these state aid cases. Where the EC did not intervene is as 
important as where it did. Firstly, the fact that the EC did not intervene in a given 
state aid case either in terms of investigation or prohibition sent signals to the German 
authorities and Bremer Vulkan that such aid was not frowned upon by the EC. While
Commission Decision 31998D0665 of 25 February 1998 concerning aid awarded by Germany to 
HIBEG and by HIBEG via Krupp GmbH to Bremer Vulkan AG, facilitating the sale of Krupp Atlas 
Elektronik from Krupp GmbH to Bremer Vulkan AG (Official Journal of the European Communities L 
316,25 November 1998, pp. 25-32).
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this might or might not have induced the Federal and Lander governments to grant 
more such aid in the future, it did indicate what type of aid was at least tolerated, and 
the type of ‘mitigating circumstances’ that were acknowledged by the EC.
However, whilst there was relatively limited direct involvement of the EC in 
investigation and prohibition of state aid awarded to Bremer Vulkan during the 1980s, 
the Europeanisation effect occurred in a variety of ways. The Federal Government 
had become increasingly less involved in the German shipbuilding aid arena. The 
tangible evidence of this hesitant Federal Government attitude is the decline of 
Federal shipbuilding aid programmes, as discussed in Chapter 3, not only in terms of 
volume of state aid granted, but also in the increasingly strict conditions imposed on 
the recipient shipbuilding firms of these programmes.
Apart fi*om this quantifiable indicator, a further manifestation of the 
Europeanisation of the public shipbuilding policy actors was the increasing reluctance 
of the Federal Government to support the German shipbuilding industry in its 
rhetoric, and in its responses to Land requests for assistance for Bremer Vulkan 
during the years 1980 to 1989. The Federal Government refused to provide financial 
support for the proposed merger of AG Weser and Bremer Vulkan in 1982, and for 
Bremer Vulkan’s acquisition of other shipbuilding firms fi*om 1983 to 1986. The 
Federal Government also acknowledged the need to notify the European Commission 
of the state aid for the acquisition of Bremer Vulkan investments by the Bremen 
Senate in 1987 and 1988. This realisation and acceptance of the need to notify 
shipbuilding aid is evidence of the impact of EU shipbuilding policy on the Federal 
Government. Furthermore, the Federal Government began to increasingly propound 
EC shipbuilding policy goals in its discussions with both the Land Government of 
Bremen and with the Bremen shipbuilding firms. For instance, when approached for 
financial support for Bremer Vulkan in 1983 by the Bremen Senate, the Federal 
Government insisted on reduction of new shipbuilding capacity in Bremen. 
Downsizing the European shipbuilding industry to a competitive core and limiting 
new shipbuilding capacity was an important feature of EC shipbuilding policy in the 
1970s and early 1980s.
The manifestations of the Europeanisation of the Bremen Land Government, 
on the other hand, came somewhat later. The Land Bremen, admittedly, did 
eventually emulate the Federal Government stance of less generous state aid provision 
in its insistence on conditions being met by Bremer Vulkan. These conditions have
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included capacity reduction and increases in productivity. These trends, as discussed 
earlier, were consistent with the thrust of EC shipbuilding policy at that time. 
However, tangible evidence of this adoption and pursuit of EC shipbuilding policy 
goals by the Bremen Senate is to be found only in 1987 and 1988 during its 
discussions with Bremen Vulkan on the firm’s structural concept and associated 
requests for aid. Unlike the Federal Government, however, the Bremen Senate did not 
accept the need to notify the European Commission of the state aid that it provided to 
Bremer Vulkan in the 1980s.^^^
The impact of EC shipbuilding policy at the level of the firm can be seen in 
Bremer Vulkan’s inclusion of reduction of capacity to a core portfolio as a 
fundamental goal of its structural concept of 1987. Bremer Vulkan also appeared to 
take the cue fi*om the EC policy to link the shipbuilding and shipping industries when 
it acquired the shipping company. Senator Linie GmbH, and then went on to merge it 
with another shipping firm, Deutscher Seereederei. Bremer Vulkan’s sense that such a 
move would not be prohibited by the Commission, and even furthered by the Bremen 
Land Government, proved to be correct.
This chapter has analysed the roles that the various actors played in Bremer 
Vulkan’s state aid cases in the 1980s. The Europeanisation of the German 
shipbuilding actors has been analysed by studying the participation of the Land 
Government of Bremen, the Federal Government and the EU in the provision, 
notification, investigation and approval of state aid and the decisions taken by these 
public policy actors, as well as the responses of Bremer Vulkan. The following 
chapter looks at how these trends developed over the early 1990s.
This increasing reluctance of the Federal Government to grant state aid to Bremer Vulkan can also 
be seen as the result of domestic policy preferences regarding the shipbuilding industry. This thesis 
does not discount the relevance and in^ortance of domestic phenomena, including limited resources 
and the opinions of the political élite, in explaining change in German shipbuilding policy.
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Chapter Six
BREMER VULKAN VERBUND AG IN THE 1990s: 
RELATIONS WITH THE EU ARE INTENSIFIED
The impact of EU activity in the shipbuilding policy field on the Federal 
Government, the Land Government of Bremen and Bremer Vulkan fi*om 1990 until 
the collapse of Bremer Vulkan in 1996 is analysed in this chapter by examining cases 
of state aid provision to Bremer Vulkan during this time period. The domestic 
political and economic unification of a divided Germany brought with it, as this 
chapter shows, an increased role of the EU in the governance of the unified German 
shipbuilding industry. The objectives of this chapter are similar to those of the 
previous chapter which examined the relations among the Federal Government, the 
Land Government of Bremen, Bremer Vulkan and the EU during the 1980s. The last 
four of the fifteen state aid cases selected are analysed and special attention is given to 
interaction patterns among these policy actors. The Europeanisation of the public 
policy actors is studied, firstly, in terms of their participation in the provision of state 
aid to Bremer Vulkan. Secondly, the Europeanisation of the firm, Bremer Vulkan, is 
studied in terms of its awareness of and reference to the EU in cases in which it 
received state aid.
6.1 GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND BREMER VULKAN -  CASE 12: 
ACQUISITION OF EAST GERMAN SHIPYARDS BY BREMER 
VULKAN
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) had a sizable shipbuilding industry 
at the time of German unification. The East German capacities were about 80 per cent 
of the West German level, and East German shipbuilding production in the late 1980s 
has been estimated to have been approximately equal to that of the West German 
coastal Lander (Heseler and Loser 1992: 12). The Kombinat Schiffbau Rostock that 
was founded in 1979 was composed of twenty-one firms and had more than 55,000
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employees in 1989 (VSM 1990: 47). The Commission estimated that on 1 July 1990 
the total shipbuilding capacity of the former German Democratic Republic was
545,000 compensated gross tonnes, which put it among the largest producers in the 
EU (European Commission Press Release IP/92/401).
The Kombinat Schiffbau Rostock was transformed with effect from 1 June 
1990 into the Deutsche Maschinen- und Schiffbau AG (DMS), with a total of twenty- 
four subsidiary firms and 55,000 employees (VSM 1990: 47). The following 
shipbuilding firms emerged from this transformation: Wamow Werft GmbH, 
Volkswerfr GmbH Stralsund (VWS), Mathias-TheeBen-Werft which was later 
renamed Meeres Technik Werft GmbH Wismar (MTW), Schiffswerft Neptun GmbH, 
Peene Werft GmbH, Elbe Werft Boizenburg GmbH, and RoBlauer Schiffswerft 
GmbH. Alongside these seven shipyards, a number of mechanical engineering firms 
were also established, including Dieselmotorenwerke Rostock GmbH.
The efforts of Bremer Vulkan to take over parts of the shipbuilding industry of 
the ex-GDR had its origins even before official German reunification. In late summer 
1990, Bremer Vulkan concluded an agreement with Deutsche Maschinen- und 
Schiffbau AG (DMS) called ‘Preparation of Co-operation and Concentration of 
Firms’ {Hamburger Abendsblatt, 27 September 1990). This agreement was terminated 
in February 1991 when the Treuhandanstalt decided to dissolve DMS, and privatise 
its individual shipyards in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.
The privatisation experiment of the Treuhandanstalt in the Eastern German 
Lander proved to be very difficult. The East German shipbuilding firms were 
technologically obsolete, and their competitive situation on the world shipbuilding 
market was determined by the cost leadership of the Far Eastern shipyards. The East 
German shipyards presented a tremendous need for restructuring combined with 
considerable losses. The consequence was that domestic and foreign firms had little 
interest in the takeover of excess shipbuilding capacity in Mecklenburg-Westem 
Pomerania, and they waited rather for a closure of these firms. While other West 
German shipyards (Blohm + Voss and Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG, for 
example) indicated their lack of interest in the acquisition of the former GDR 
shipyards, Bremer Vulkan showed interest in various East German shipbuilding firms. 
In August 1991, only Bremer Vulkan was interested in the takeover of the three main 
shipyards in Wismar, Rostock and Wamemünde.
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In the supervisory board meeting on 16 December 1992, the board of directors 
of Bremer Vulkan explained their aim of taking over the shipyards in Mecklenburg- 
Westem Pomerania as ‘halting the building of competition in one’s own Land’ 
{Protokoll der Bremer Vulkan Aufsichtsratssitzung vom 16. Dezember 1992, p. 13). 
Bremer Vulkan felt that it either had to get involved itself in East Germany or invite 
the competition in (Bremer Vulkan 1995: 33). Bremer Vulkan aimed to become as 
indispensable a firm in Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania as it was in Bremen. To put 
it plainly, Bremer Vulkan intended to become competitive with size (Bremische 
Bürgerschaft 1998: 267). Bremer Vulkan also had another motivation to become 
involved in the East German shipbuilding industry. The board of directors believed 
that by controlling the East German shipyards, their leverage in bargaining with the 
Federal and respective Lander governments would increase, and Bremer Vulkan 
could thereby count on a more favourable German shipbuilding policy and generous 
provision of state aid. As Dr. Anton Schneider, a former member of the board of 
directors of Bremer Vulkan, testified to the Bremen parliamentary inquiry committee, 
“Only when one is big enough, can the shipbuilding policy no longer be scrapped and 
will the Land government be compelled to pay subsidies” (Bremische Bürgerschaft 
1998: 267).
Dr. Hennemann’s conception of a joint East-West German shipbuilding 
solution largely suited the unification policy of the Federal Government. The Bremen 
Senate too reacted mainly positively to the engagement of Bremer Vulkan in 
Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania. The co-operation agreements with the East 
German shipyards were seen by the Bremen Economics Senate as an opportunity for 
Bremen to be involved in East Germany and to strengthen the production location 
{Standort) of Bremen at the same time (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 269). Bremen 
had had bitter experiences in the past of having Bremen businesses dependent on 
headquarters outside of Bremen. Thus, the Land authorities in Bremen were quite 
keen to facilitate the growth of Bremer Vulkan such that Bremen became the 
headquarters for a large industrial concern. The Bremen Senate aimed to secure a 
shipbuilding policy of the Federal Government that allowed a continuation of 
shipbuilding in Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania without jeopardising the remaining 
shipbuilding capacity in Bremen. Such a policy required the equal treatment of East 
and West German shipyards with regard to funding and availability of competition aid 
{Bremische Bürgerschaft, Landtag, 13. Wahlperiode, Drs. 13/36).
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The meagre number of applicants and the political pressure of the Federal 
Government on the Treuhandanstalt for speedy privatisation placed the 
Treuhandanstalt in a weaker negotiating position, and enabled Bremer Vulkan to 
conclude very agreeable contracts with it. Furthermore, the Treuhandanstalt was faced 
with the pressure to succeed in the privatisation of the East German enterprises. 
Moreover, workers of these East German shipyards were marching in front of the 
Treuhandanstalt’s doors practically on a weekly basis. The Treuhandanstalt initially 
negotiated a deal with Bremer Vulkan to purchase the three major shipbuilding firms 
of the DMS, namely Mathias Thesen Werft, the Wamow Werft and 
Dieselmotorenwerk Rostock (Anderson 1999: 135). However, both the Federal 
Government and the EC were apprehensive about such a transaction because of the 
risk of excessive amounts of state aid that would be demanded (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 
29 Febmary and 1 March 1992). The solution finally adopted was that Bremer Vulkan 
would take over most of the businesses sold from the former Deutsche Maschinen- 
Schiffbau GmbH in Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania while the Norwegian Kvaemer 
concem, the only other interested buyer, would take over Wamow Werft so as to 
better distribute the risk of privatisation.
After lengthy negotiations, the Treuhandanstalt signed with Bremer Vulkan 
the purchase and transfer agreement of Mathias-Thesen-Werft GmbH Wismar 
(MTW), which Bremer Vulkan later renamed Meeres Technik Werft, and 
Dieselmotorenwerke Rostock (DMR) on 11 August 1992. Bremer Vulkan acquired 95 
per cent and Schichau Seebeckwerft 5 per cent of the shares of Hanse Holding, the 
sole shareholder of MTW and DMR. Bremer Vulkan then renamed DMR 
Dieselmotorenwerk Vulkan (DMV). Bremer Vulkan and the Treuhandanstalt next 
signed the privatisation and transfer agreement of Neptun Industrie Rostock (NIR) by 
which Bremer Vulkan took over 80 per cent of the shipyard’s shares. On 18 
December 1993, the Treuhandanstalt signed with Bremer Vulkan the purchase and 
transfer agreement of Volkswerft GmbH Stralsund (VWS). Based on the ship 
deliveries of all the East German shipyards in 1989, Bremer Vulkan took over 57 per 
cent of the East German shipbuilding industry. Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG was 
thus the primary agreement partner of the Treuhandanstalt in the privatisation of the 
East German shipbuilding industry.
Calculation done by author based on statistics on shipyard deliveries for 1989 in VSM (1990: 46).
163
In the completion of the privatisation agreement of MTW, Bremer Vulkan 
insisted that the Treuhandanstalt should take over all of MTW’s losses until the 
completion of its restructuring. For the Treuhandanstalt, it would have been 
impossible to verify in individual cases whether a payment involved a loss in the east 
or it was a displacement of a loss position from the western enterprises of Bremer 
Vulkan Verbund. Hence, the Treuhandanstalt negotiated a cap solution with Bremer 
Vulkan regarding the compensation of losses in the privatisation agreements of MTW 
and VWS. Because the Treuhandanstalt thereby released itself of all further 
obligations, the Treuhandanstalt did not find it necessary to require a verification for 
individual loss amounts as the loss compensation was fixed as a lump sum (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1998: 299). With this cap solution, the Treuhandanstalt agreed to forego all 
rights of verification and control of the use of the funds by Bremer Vulkan. This was 
an enormous liquidity gain for Bremer Vulkan. This had been the aim of Bremer 
Vulkan in the negotiations, and the result was that Bremer Vulkan received liquid 
funds in the hand that were expected to last until the investments in the East German 
shipyards could be paid from the progress of production on-site. In return, Bremer 
Vulkan was obliged to pay the agreed purchase price, provide confirmation of jobs 
and investment and secure the preservation of the firm. The investment obligations of 
Bremer Vulkan from the Treuhandanstalt and its own funds, however, were only 
expected to be carried out two or more years later.
Although EU state aid law specified that financial aid could only be paid out 
after approval by the European Commission, Dr. Hennemann insisted that the funds 
be allowed to flow in advance. Dr. Hennemann was in this privileged position of 
being able to pressurise the Treuhandanstalt as there had been no other interested and 
credible buyers for these shipyards in Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania, as discussed 
earlier. The Treuhandanstalt realised that the successful preservation of these 
employment-intensive but liquidity-strapped East German shipyards required the 
provision of funds that their buyer, Bremer Vulkan, was demanding.
Bremer Vulkan had listening ears in the Federal Government who were 
receptive to its ideas about the takeover of the East German shipyards. An effective 
lobbyist for Dr. Hennemann during Bremer Vulkan’s eastern expansion was Günter 
Krause, Federal Transport Minister and party chairman of the CDU in Mecklenburg- 
Westem Pomerania (Philipp 1998: 98). The State Secretary in the Federal Defence 
Ministry, Professor Manfred Timmermann, eventually became manager of the
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department in charge of the eastern expansion of Bremer Vulkan and head of the 
Hanse Holding in Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania.
The German contract partners found a way round the EU law. The 
Treuhandanstalt transformed the subsidies with the help of a further agreement with 
Bremer Vulkan into a loan with fixed interest rates but without securities. The interest 
would only be payable in the case that the EU did not approve the subsidies. The 
Treuhandanstalt and Bremer Vulkan believed that this did not require the approval of 
the European Commission (Deutscher Bundestag 1998: 300)
A system of central cash management was adopted by Bremer Vulkan 
Verbund in September 1993. This system facilitated a steady interacting liquidity 
equalisation between the participating firms. A practice that is common in large 
undertakings, it allowed greater flexibility of operating resource credits and the 
possibility to represent project financing out of the liquidity of the c o n c e m . T h e  
contract on concem-intemal financing and investment of capital obligated Bremer 
Vulkan to make available its financial surplus of the cash concentration account to 
cover its financial demand elsewhere in the cash concentration.
MTW and VWS joined the Bremer Vulkan cash management system at the 
end of 1994. The surplus liquidity and the resulting interest gains were applied from 
these East German firms of the concem to the automatic central cash management. 
There were no mles in the privatisation contracts on the use of the capital of the 
Treuhandanstalt in Bremer Vulkan’s cash management. In fact, the Treuhandanstalt 
indicated that it would not raise objections to a cash management when the money 
was available immediately upon request, the favoured West German firms lay bank 
guarantees and a comprehensive advance instmction about cash transfers followed 
(Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 278). The Treuhandanstalt disbursed large amounts of 
aid prematurely before EU approval on the basis of these special agreements with 
Bremer Vulkan.
The provision of aid to the East German shipyards was circumscribed by the 
conditions imposed by EU legislation, as discussed in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2. The 
1992 Directive contained a derogation in favour of shipyards located in the former 
GDR which allowed operating aid paid before the end of 1993 which exceeded the
Bremer Vulkan’s central cash management of cash concentration accounts was realised on the basis 
of the automatic cash management system of its house bank, Commerzbank.
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general operating aid ceiling defined in Article 4 of the 1990 Directive. The 
German Government was also supposed to carry out, according to a timetable 
approved by the Commission by 31 December 1995, a genuine and irreversible 
reduction of capacity of 40 per cent of the capacity of 545,000 compensated gross 
tonnes (cgt) existing on 1 July 1990. The Commission also announced its decision to 
“use its monitoring and investigative powers to ensure that the shipyards in the new 
Lander received only the minimum aid necessary to allow them to restructure”. The 
Commission bad set a 100,000 cgt capacity limit for MTW and an 85,000 cgt capacity 
limit for VWS.^^^ The Commission also insisted that it would approve restructuring 
aid in tranches provided that it received reports from Bremer Vulkan that 
‘demonstrated sufficiently’ that any risk of spill-over of aid to other shipyards was 
eliminated (European Commission Press Release IP/92/1090).^^®
The European Commission assessed that the money paid by the 
Treuhandanstalt to Bremer Vulkan for the East German shipyards constituted state aid 
in the sense of Articles 87 and 88 of the EU Treaty and required the approval of the 
EU. To obtain EU approval, the European Commission required information showing 
that:
- the use of the aid was proven;
- the privatised firms during the total reporting period would be led as an 
independent profit centre;
- all transactions between the privatised shipyards and their owners with allied 
firms followed market conditions, and
- the financing of investments by state aid funds and by the own funds of the 
enterprises were done in lockstep.
After examination of the privatisation contract and on the basis of the first 
report of the consultants concerning the initial investment plan, the Commission 
decided on 23 December 1992 to release a first tranche of aid for MTW. However, the
Article 10(a) of the Seventh Directive allowed operating aid for the shipbuilding and ship- 
conversion activities of the East German shipyards until 31 December 1993, provided that tiie aid did 
not exceed a maximum ceiling of 36 per cent of a reference annual turnover.
Council Directive 92/68/EEC of 20 July 1992 amending Directive 90/684/EEC (Official Journal of 
the European Communities L 219,4 August 1992, pp. 54-55),
According to a former director of Bremer Vulkan, conplying with these EU-inçosed capacity 
limitations was difficult for the firm. Ships, unlike cars, are not produced in exact quantities that can be 
accurately determined in advance of actual production. Because of wastage and other unforeseen 
technical problems, actual tonnage of production can very often exceed production levels in planned 
building programmes (interview 5),
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European Commission found that the investment grants of DM 242 million for MTW 
were not paid in conformity with the contracts. The EU stipulated that the grants 
would only be released when the payments were proven to have flown to the sub­
contractors. While the Commission understood that decisions were urgently needed in 
order to allow the restructuring of the former East German shipyards to proceed, it 
insisted that Bremer Vulkan provide “full information regarding the proposed aid, the 
investment plan, the control of spill-over to other yards and the restriction of 
capacity” before it would approve the release of aid to the East German shipyards 
(European Commission Press Release IP/92/1090). The second tranche of aid, which 
consisted of DM 406 million operating aid, was paid out to MTW only on 11 May 
1994, much later than expected by Bremer Vulkan and MTW. Both the 
Treuhandanstalt and Bremer Vulkan were convinced that the release o f the blocked 
funds would follow with the tendering of the contract of the MTW investments 
(Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 447). Furthermore, the Commission only allowed a 
second tranche of aid instead of all the outstanding aid. At the time of approving the 
aid, the Commission made it clear that “release of future tranches of investment aid 
was conditional on the German Government demonstrating to the Commission’s 
satisfaction that the aid will continue to respect the Community’s rules” (European 
Commission Press Release IP/94/390).
Similarly, the Commission released a first tranche of investment aid of DM 
18.6 million aid on 21 June 1995 and a further tranche of investment aid of DM 156.1 
million on 15 November 1995 for Volkswerft Stralsund (European Commission Press 
Releases IP/95/622 and IP/95/1253). The Commission, at that time, refused to 
approve the remaining amount of the generally authorised investment aid of DM 89.1 
million as it felt that it “had to monitor whether the capacity limit of 85,000 cgt set for 
Volkswerft was respected and whether any risk of spill-over of aid to other companies 
was eliminated” (European Commission Press Release IP/95/1253).
There was, however, no contractual control by the Treuhandanstalt over 
Bremer Vulkan on the avoidance of a so-called spill-over effect. The Treuhandanstalt 
sent a confidential letter to Dr. Hennemann requesting Bremer Vulkan to set up a 
blocked account for the MTW funds. This letter informed Bremer Vulkan that the 
Treuhandanstalt was in ‘great trouble’ because of the execution of privatisation 
contracts with Bremer Vulkan and that ‘there were also in Brussels delays which 
made necessary quick and decisive steps’. The Treuhandanstalt informed Bremer
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Vulkan that it had no certainty about how the money had been used, and requested Dr. 
Hennemann for clarification as soon as possible such that the relevant multilateral 
working group would have the information needed for a positive European 
Commission Decision (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 311).
At the insistence of the European Commission, and consequently of the 
Federal Government, which wanted to prevent the West German shipyards fi*om 
taking advantage of the state aid payments, Bremer Vulkan supplemented the 
contracts with the spill-over clause. For the purpose of control, Bremer Vulkan agreed 
to publish quarterly reports about the type and scope of the realised investments and 
the available jobs. These reports were to be examined by an auditor. The spill-over 
reports described the exchange of funds between the East German shipyards and other 
firms of Bremer Vulkan Verbund and addressed the question of whether this 
exchange was transacted by normal market conditions (Deutscher Bundestag 1998: 
301). While special control rights were not asserted by the Treuhandanstalt and later 
the Bundesanstalt fu r  vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben (BvS), pressure fi'om the 
European Commission resulted in the adoption of measures that linked the release of 
money to Bremer Vulkan Verbund with the progress of investment. The spill-over 
reports proved to be significant as the Treuhandanstalt first leamt fi-om the 
presentation of the spill-over report of MTW for the first half of 1993 that Bremer 
Vulkan had made use of the liquid funds of the East German shipyards elsewhere in 
the concem. The Treuhandanstalt was, however, “reluctant to publicly criticise 
Bremer Vulkan’s activities in Eastern Germany lest questions were raised about the 
Treuhand’s privatisation methods and the use of subsidies”, according to an article in 
the Financial Times on 22 February 1996.
This was, however, not the extent of EU involvement in the East German 
shipyards of the Bremer Vulkan group. On 28 Febmary 1996, the Commission 
initiated proceedings concerning the suspected misuse by the Bremer Vulkan group of 
up to DM 588 million of aid intended for the restmcturing of the East German 
shipyards, MTW and VWS. The Commission leamt in the course of the proceedings 
that the notifications of the aid given in the context of the privatisations had been 
incomplete. By November 1996, the total amount diverted was estimated to be DM
The main recipients of the Treuhandanstalt funds turned out to be Dôrries Scharmann, DSR-Senator 
Lines, Dieselmotorenwerk Vulkan and the Schichau and Lloyd shipyards in Bremerhaven (European 
Commission Press Release IP/96/992).
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788 million, DM 200 million higher than assumed at the start of the proceedings 
(European Commission Press Release IP/96/992). The resources, together with the 
other monies from the shipyards, had been placed in the group’s central cash 
concentration system and were largely used to cover losses in other parts of the group. 
In the Commission’s view, this practice infringed the “spillover ban” regarding such 
aid, which had been explicitly laid down in the derogations concerning the 
restructuring of the shipbuilding industry in the former GDR in Council Directive 
92/68/EEC. This exception was subject to the condition that the aid benefited only 
shipyards in the former GDR. Neither the notification of the shipyards’ privatisation 
or Germany’s later requests for Commission approval of partial amounts of aid 
contained any reference to payments already made. Germany thereby repeatedly 
infiinged Article 11 of the Seventh Directive on aid to shipbuilding, which prohibits 
any aid grants to shipyards without prior approval by the Commission. On 22 July 
1998, the Commission concluded that DM 788.7 million of aid had been illegally 
used by firms of the Bremer Vulkan Verbund other than the two East German 
shipyards to which the aid was originally granted. The Commission thus decided that 
Germany should recover the amount from Bremer Vulkan Verbund (European 
Commission Press Release IP/98/687). The Commission was here ordering the 
recovery of aid that it had previously approved because of misuse of the aid by the 
recipient.
The enforcement of its powers of state aid control by the European 
Commission on these East German shipyards has had an impact on the operating 
context of the shipbuilding industry in Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania. In August 
1997, the Bundesanstalt fiir vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben (BvS) explicitly 
forbade shipyards in Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania from taking on any contracts 
with known losses. The European Commission’s investigation of the use of 
Treuhandanstalt fimds meant for East German shipyards by West German shipyards 
in the Bremer Vulkan group of companies has even influenced German legislation on 
business entities. The law for the control and transparency in enterprises (Gesetz zur 
Kontrolle und Traansparenz im Untemehmen) came into force in Germany in 1998.
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6.2 CASE 13: ACQUISITION OF KLÔCKNER STAHL GMBH BY
BREMER VULKAN
At the end of 1992, the Klockner concem informed the Bremen Senate that it 
wanted to separate from its steel works in Bremen, Klockner Stahl GmbH. To avoid a 
closure of the steel works, the Bremen Senate looked for a way that could save the 
5,000 jobs in this firm. It would have been inadmissible by EU state aid law that the 
takeover of Klockner Stahl shares be realised essentially by the state and without the 
participation of private third parties. The so-called ‘interested-party model’ was thus 
developed by the Bremen Senate as the solution for this Klockner crisis. In the 
interested-party model, four Bremen firms -  the so-called interested parties -  supplied 
Klockner Stahl GmbH with a total sum of DM 250 million. These four firms were 
Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG, Stadtwerke Bremen AG, Detlev Hegemann GmbH and 
HIBEG.
The tables had been turned. The Bremen Senate needed the help of Bremer 
Vulkan, rather than vice versa. Bremer Vulkan revelled in this new sense of power 
vis-à-vis the Bremen Senate. A letter from Dr. Hennemann to members of the 
supervisory board of Bremer Vulkan on 6 December 1993 read, “I have been asked 
by the Bremen Senate to take part actively in the talks with the aim o f gaining a 
participation in the company as an interested party. The participation of a third party 
in a Bremen solution is, most of all for EU reasons, for the Land Government 
indispensable” (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 316). The participation of Bremer 
Vulkan in the solution of the Klockner crisis improved its negotiating position in 
matters of state aid for the Bremerhaven shipyards.
In the course of talks between the Land government and Bremer Vulkan, 
Bremer Vulkan demanded in return for Bremer Vulkan’s participation in the rescue of 
Klockner Stahl a purchase of ship shares of DM 50 million by the Bremen Senate 
(Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 318). The Klockner board of directors and HIBEG 
signed the purchase contract of the Bremer Klockner Stahlhütte on 19 November 
1993. The Bremer Vulkan demands were met at the economics cabinet meeting on 14 
December 1993, to which Dr. Hennemann was invited as a guest. A report was, 
however, not presented to the Bremen Senate. The required passing of a resolution by 
the entire Bremen Senate and the guarantee committee did not take place. This 
provision of state aid was rapidly decided and executed.
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Although the EU had consistently represented the standpoint that each 
purchase of ship shares had to be examined by the European Commission as state aid, 
Germany did not notify this measure to the Commission. The Commission had to 
instruct the German Government to notify it of this transaction in December 1993. At 
that time, the Commission found Bremer Vulkan Verbund’s status to be “unclear 
because some of the information available indicates a strong public sector influence in 
this group” (European Commission Press Release IP/94/51). The Commission 
initiated proceedings on 26 January 1994. On 27 July 1994, the Commission closed 
proceedings against Klockner Stahl, deciding that the injection of public capital into 
Klockner Stahl GmbH did not include any elements of state aid (European 
Commission Press Release IP/94/733).
This state aid case is important in that it reveals a change in the relationship 
between Bremer Vulkan and the Land Government of Bremen. Whilst Bremer Vulkan 
was granted the aid that it requested, this aid was decided and granted by the 
economics cabinet of the Bremen Land Government independently and without the 
knowledge of the rest of the Bremen Senate. Financial pressures on the Land’s coffers 
and realisation that the provision of such shipbuilding aid would not be welcomed or 
approved by the other departments in Bremen Land Government, by the Federal 
Government and by the EU jointly prompted the Bremen economics cabinet to decide 
on and grant this aid to Bremer Vulkan without notifying the other relevant bodies.
6.3 SYMPTOMS OF WITHDRAWAL FROM BREMER VULKAN IN THE 
BREMEN SENATE
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of this chapter have described two situations in which 
Bremer Vulkan received state aid. However, in the case of the privatisation of the East 
German shipyards, it was not Bremer Vulkan, but rather MTW and VWS, that were 
meant to be the actual recipients of the aid from the Treuhandanstalt. In fact, Bremen 
shipbuilding policy began to extricate itself from Bremer Vulkan in 1991. This had 
much to do with the fact that Bremer Vulkan itself had grown in another dimension 
with its diversification measures and with its expansion to East Germany. Bremer 
Vulkan had developed new financing sources against which the Bremen public budget 
appeared less crucial than it once did. Bremer Vulkan itself acted more independently
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from the state in 1991 than it had previously. Bremer Vulkan became, to an extent, 
independent from the Land, in that it widened its field of action beyond the borders of 
Land Bremen. Through the fimds from the capital increases and the Treuhandanstalt 
fimds for the East German shipyards, it did not have to appear as a supplicant to the 
Bremen Senate in survival crises. Bremer Vulkan emerged increasingly as the actor 
that also determined the line of co-operation with the Bremen Senate. This was in 
contrast to the situation in the 1980s.
There was an attempt by the Bremen Senate to disengage itself from Bremer 
Vulkan in the early 1990s. In the Bremen Senate of the 1991 "Ampel’ coalition of the 
SPD, Biindnis 90/Die Griinen and the FDP, Bremer Vulkan was looked on at a 
distance by the majority -  partly because of general political considerations, partly 
because of skepticism of the profitability of the concem. This was true of the Bremen 
Senate economics and finance departments as well as of the Bremen Senate 
Chancellery. The attempts of the Bremen Land Government to extricate itself from 
financially supporting Bremer Vulkan was also due to growing pressures on the 
Land’s budget and its dwindling coffers.
In mid 1993, the Bremen Senate held through HIBEG about 2.6 million shares 
of Bremer Vulkan or about 20 per cent of the firm’s shares. In December 1993, after 
discussions in the Bremen Senate, Bremen Finance Senator Volker Kroning instmcted 
HIBEG to sell its Bremer Vulkan shares (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 325). Dr. 
Hennemann had tried to prevent the sale of these HIBEG-held Bremer Vulkan shares 
and had unsuccessfully appealed to the President of the Bremen Senate. In January 
and Febmary 1994, the Land government withdrew its financial engagement in 
Bremer Vulkan by continuing its sale of Bremer Vulkan shares. Bremen Economics 
Senator Jager named the EU as the reason for the sale of the shares in his testimony to 
the parliamentary inquiry committee: “We did it so that we could say in 
correspondence with Bmssels that we were no longer involved” (Bremische 
Bürgerschaft 1998: 323).
6.3.1 Case 14: Unterweser Concept of Bremer Vulkan
The Bremen Land Government started displaying signs of increased 
withdrawal from Bremer Vulkan in 1994 in its increasing reluctance to grant state aid
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to this shipbuilding concem. It declared that the award of aid would be contingent on 
such aid being compliant with EU state aid and shipbuilding legislation. The 
acquisition itself of the two East German shipyards MTW and VWS by Bremer 
Vulkan was taken as a positive development by the Bremen Senate. However, there 
were also fears that Bremer Vulkan would neglect the western shipyards in favour of 
the eastern ones, especially in terms of jobs and investment.
After a reminder from Bremen Economics Senator Jager, Bremer Vulkan 
presented a draft concept for the shipyards in Bremerhaven in April 1994. This 
concept was, however, not seen as a conclusive or consistent restmcturing concept by 
the Bremen Senate. Whilst there was basic agreement between the Bremen Senate and 
Bremer Vulkan on the need for state aid, the Bremen Senate seemed to make it 
increasingly difficult for Bremer Vulkan to actually receive this aid. On 15 April 
1994, in an interview with Bremen Economics Senator Claus Jager that was published 
in the German regional newspaper, Nordsee Zeitung, when asked if  the Land 
government would participate financially in the Bremerhaven shipyards. Senator 
Jager spoke of the strict controls by the European Commission. On 21 April 1994, the 
board of directors of Bremer Vulkan reported to its supervisory board that the 
compliance of a Bremerhaven concept with EU state aid law had to be guaranteed 
{Protokoll der Bremer Vulkan Aufsichtsratssitzung vom 21. April 1994). Furthermore, 
Mayor Wedemeier and Bremen Economics Senator Jager replied to a letter from the 
SPD Bremen parliament fraction that while the Bremen Senate was concerned with 
preserving shipbuilding jobs in Bremen and Bremerhaven, a solution did not 
necessarily require the same kind of engagement as in Klôckner. They also mentioned 
that the gaze of the European Commission was directed at German and Bremen 
shipbuilding and that they could only use EU-conforming support measures 
(Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 337).
A growing trend in the response of the Bremen Senate to Bremer Vulkan’s 
requests for state aid was thus increasing reference to the need for EU conformity of 
any state aid measures that were to be considered. This was particularly the case in 
discussions of the Unterweser concept from 1993 to 1995. On 26 October 1995, in a 
discussion between Prof. Dr. Haller of the Bremen Senate and Dr. Gerhard Ollig of 
the Federal Economics Ministry, Dr. Ollig emphasised that the Bremen Senate’s 
support of the Unterweser concept measures had to lie within the EU guidelines on 
shipbuilding (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 503). The representatives of the Federal
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Government consistently asserted that shipbuilding was a sensitive industry and 
measures had to be notified to the EU. They also noted that the Federal Ministry of 
Finance required confirmation from the Federal Economics Ministry that the support 
measures were consistent with the economic and industrial interests of the Federal 
Government (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 527). The meeting between
representatives of Bremer Vulkan, the Federal Economics Ministry, the Federal 
Ministry of Finance and the BvS was held in the Deutsche Parlamentarische 
Gesellschaft in Bonn and not in the Federal Economics Ministry because according to 
Dr. Ollig, ‘the Federal Economics Ministry wanted to maintain a certain distance from 
Bremer Vulkan and the Bremen Land Government in this matter’ (Bremische 
Bürgerschaft 1998: 617). This is emblematic of the uncooperative stance of the 
Federal Government on the issue of providing state aid to Bremer Vulkan in the 
1990s.
On 4 May 1994, Bremer Vulkan representatives presented the Bremen Senate 
administration with evidence of the efforts of Bremer Vulkan to obtain a contract for 
the building of a cruise ship for the Italian shipping company, Costa Crochiere. 
Doubts were expressed by Lubiewski, the official responsible for the shipbuilding 
sector in the Bremen economics department, in a memo to Privy Council Prof. Dr. 
Haller that the guarantee for delivery time at DM 300 million per ship would place the 
Land Bremen in a position of extraordinary dependence on Bremer Vulkan. He 
suggested a limit of DM 200 milhon per ship and that such a signal should be given in 
advance to Bremer Vulkan. On 18 May 1994, in a discussion between the Bremen 
Senate administration and representatives of Schichau Seebeckwerft AG, Lloyd Werft 
and Bremer Vulkan, it was decided that Bremer Vulkan should commission the public 
audit firm, C & L, with a report on the productive capacity of its Bremerhaven 
concept for the future safeguarding of Schichau Seebeckwerft and Lloyd Werft in 
Bremerhaven (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 338). On 19 May 1994, Fritz 
Logemann, head of department in the Economics Senate, sent a letter to Bremer 
Vulkan that there would be a connection made between the handling of the Costa I 
guarantee application and the Unterweser concept (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 
340).
On 28 September 1994, Senator Jager issued a press release that he could only 
support a structural concept that spanned at least five years and whose productive 
capacity was confirmed by external parties. Eventually necessary state aid also had to
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be EU-compatible. Jager insisted that Bremer Vulkan had not presented such a 
concept yet. In the opinion of Senator Jager, ‘the management of Bremer Vulkan had 
a special regional political obligation, after the intensive support of the Land for 
years, to secure and achieve future jobs for Bremen and Bremerhaven such that the 
firms of the Bremer Vulkan Verbund in the Unterweser area retained a secure and 
permanent position’ (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 363). The Bremen economics 
cabinet decided in October 1994 to request supplementary documents and information 
from Bremer Vulkan. An active discussion emerged between both sides about the 
contents and schedule of further procedures. The members of the Bremen economics 
cabinet decided that the planning time frame should be extended until 1999 and that 
job guarantees should be considered. It was also decided that a supplementary 
diversification concept for Bremerhaven should be formulated. The Bremen Senate 
administration instructed Bremer Vulkan that the location Vegesack should also be 
included in ongoing examinations. It was apparent that the Land Government of 
Bremen was becoming increasingly unwilling to support Bremer Vulkan financially.
There was also emerging a tense relationship between Bremen Economics 
Senator Jager and Dr. Hennemann over the issue of the release of the C & L report to 
Bremer Vulkan. On 4 November 1994, an article appeared in the regional newspaper, 
Weser Kurier, with the title ‘Shipyard Concept Not Sustainable? Accountants 
Uncover High Risks in Bremer Vulkan’ in which the opinion of C & L from 
September 1994 was published, and there were word for word quotes from the 
administration’s draft of 10 October 1994. In retaliation, Bremer Vulkan issued a 
press release on the same day denying that the accountants had discovered any risks at 
Bremer Vulkan. It asserted that Bremer Vulkan was independent and did not need 
help but it acknowledged that the shipbuilding firms Schichau Seebeckwerft and 
Lloyd Werft Bremerhaven, like other West German shipyards, did have problems. 
Bremer Vulkan was using two negotiating tactics to get its point across. Firstly, the 
board of directors was alluding, ‘We want also to modernise in Bremen and 
Bremerhaven but we can only do that when the Land Bremen finances such 
investments with state aid -  which is what is happening in Mecklenburg-Westem 
Pomerania’. Secondly, Bremer Vulkan brought the case of Schichau Seebeckwerft 
into the talks to highlight that without investments which Bremer Vulkan could not 
and would not pay for alone, the shipyard could not be maintained in the long run.
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On 16 August 1995, Dr. Henning Scherf, President of the Bremen Senate, 
invited in writing members of the board of directors and the supervisory board of 
Bremer Vulkan to talks on the state of the Unterweser concept on 25 August 1995. 
This invitation was, however, cancelled on 23 August 1995 (Bremische Bürgerschaft 
1998: 497). When the Bremen Senate did consider Bremer Vulkan’s application for 
state aid that was submitted in September 1995, the Bremen Senate insisted on further 
documents being submitted about the necessity for and effectiveness of the proposed 
investment measures (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 499). The Senators formulated 
more clearly than before their expectation that Bremer Vulkan found new alternative 
jobs and gave guarantees for the remaining jobs in Bremerhaven in its capacity 
reduction measures.
Despite the lengthy and numerous exchanges of letters and discussions, 
throughout the three years from 1993 to 1995, there emerged no agreement between 
the Bremen Senate and Bremer Vulkan on a modernisation concept for the 
Unterweser shipyards. The Bremen Senate accused Bremer Vulkan of not being co­
operative by providing only abstract concepts and no actual formalisations. Relations 
between the Bremen Senate and Bremer Vulkan were on a downward spiral. The 
tendency of the Bremen Senate administration to state more precisely the 
requirements and to extend the time horizon of the calculations and plans kept 
growing. This was interpreted by Bremer Vulkan as the Bremen Senate being 
uncooperative. This was a signal of the new more reticent attitude of the Land 
authorities towards providing state aid to Bremer Vulkan.
The deterioration of relations between Bremer Vulkan and the Land 
Government of Bremen was also partly due to particular departments of the Bremen 
Senate realising the financial pressures on the Senate’s budget and the Land’s limited 
financial capacity to continue to prop up Bremer Vulkan. Differences soon emerged 
within the Bremen Senate. The Bremen Economics and Finance Senators, and above 
all their administrations, acted increasingly lukewarmly and were intent on keeping a 
distance from Bremer Vulkan. Against the attempt of the finance and economics 
departments to pursue a strict course of rigorous conditioning, the President of the 
Bremen Senate tended to softer and more negotiable formulations.
From the beginning of the talks. Dr. Hennemann looked for and found the 
direct way to the President of the Bremen Senate, Wedemeier, alongside and later also 
clearly against the responsible economics and finance departments. The Economics
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and Finance Senators were fully cognisant of the state of Bremen’s finances. Bremen 
could ill afford to dish out scarce funds to an industry that they perceived to be a 
‘bottomless pit’. The Mayor, on the other hand, was being led more by his concerns 
about re-election and public opinion. Nearly four weeks before the Bremen 
parliamentary election. Mayor Wedemeier sent the board of directors of Bremer 
Vulkan a letter in which he clarified the basic willingness of the Bremen Senate to 
pay state aid of DM 200 million for the Unterweser concept under the known 
conditions. The letter aroused a fierce backlash from Bremen Economics Senator 
Jager. This action was used as praise for Wedemeier by the SPD, as criticism by the 
FDP. Ultimately, Mayor Wedemeier’s action was all just part of election 
campaigning.
6.3.2 Case 15: Ultimate Crisis of Bremer Vulkan
There had been critical voices of the financial state of Bremer Vulkan in the 
press for some time (Handelsblatt, 17 January 1994; Wirtschaftswoche, 18 February 
1994). However, it was only in the first half of August 1994, when the banks pressed 
for a clarification of the overall state of Bremer Vulkan that Bremer Vulkan had to 
take its own dire financial situation seriously. Initially, the board of directors of 
Bremer Vulkan had manifestly wanted to keep the Bremen Senate out of the search 
for the required liquidity of DM 300 million. This was not only because of worries 
about publicity but also because of general scepticism and reservation from the new 
Economics and Finance Senators in the SPD-CDU coalition since July 1995. 
However, the banks made their co-operation in providing liquidity to Bremer Vulkan 
dependent on the participation of the Bremen Senate. Germany’s universal banking 
system allows the banks to work closely with industrial enterprises by permitting 
them to hold shares in companies and to appoint bank officials to firms’ supervisory 
boards. This close relationship between the banks and the firm, Bremer Vulkan in this 
case, provided the house banks with the privileged information that revealed the 
severity of the financial crisis confronting Bremer Vulkan.
Under immense time pressure and the knowledge of an imminent bankruptcy, 
a credit of DM 300 million was negotiated between the Bremen Senate, the banks and 
Bremer Vulkan by which ship shares of Bremer Vulkan were to be sold to a new firm.
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whose shareholders were to be the banks and HIBEG. The Bremen Senate took over 
in total one-third of the credit volume. The participation of the Bremen Senate in the 
DM 300 million credit package was decided and executed by the economics cabinet 
without the involvement of the entire Bremen Senate and without the legally required 
resolution of the Bremen parliamentary bodies (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 807).
The Bremen Senate also tried to pass the responsibility of financially 
supporting Bremer Vulkan onto the Federal Government. Dr. Scherf asked Senator 
Nolle, in view of an upcoming meeting of the Bremer Vulkan management with 
representatives of the Federal Economics Ministry and the Bundesanstalt fiir 
vereinigte Sonderaufgaben (BvS) in Bonn to make contact with the Federal 
Chancellor’s office and to make clear the Bremen Senate’s demands. Nolle said that 
the guarantee committee would meet two days later only if an acceptable arrangement 
had been reached in the Bonn talks, as Bremen would not cover the liquidity need of 
Bremer Vulkan alone (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 612).
The Bremen Senate approached the Federal Government for assistance in this 
aid package. However, Dr. Gerhard Ollig of the Federal Economics Ministry found 
that the bridging of short and medium-term gaps of liquidity of Bremer Vulkan as a 
guarantee of operating aid would have no chance of approval in notification to the 
European Commission. Bremen Senate Director Keller informed the Federal 
Government of the latest developments and suggested that the Kreditanstalt fiir 
Wiederaufbau (KfW) should participate significantly in the administering of 
necessary investment credits. Dr. Ollig responded that the KfW would be faced with 
the same problem. He knew firom experience the problematic situation in which the 
KfW found itself in a comparable financing of EKO Stahl. The reply of the KfW itself 
in November was negative (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 808). The Federal 
Economics Minister, Günter Rexrodt, declared, “Anyone who thinks he can restore 
the company to health with fi-esh money fi*om Bonn is mistaken” (quoted in Isaacsson 
and Tirsen 1996).
The Bremen Senate had obviously underestimated the political explosiveness 
of the use of the East German shipyard money by Bremer Vulkan firms in the west. 
Past experiences with the EU, including the European Commission Decisions on 
Bremer Vulkan’s acquisition of Krupp Atlas Elektronik, on the use of Treuhandanstalt 
aid and on the Unterweser concept, were apparently casting a long shadow over the 
behaviour of the Federal Government and its authorities in the state aid realm.
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In 1995, the Bremen Senate was also trying to pass the ‘responsibility’ of 
supporting Bremer Vulkan to the other Lander. Prof. Dr. Haller’s view was that the 
other Lander that were affected by an insolvency of Bremer Vulkan should also 
participate in the acceptance of the discussed guarantees for project financing. He 
suggested that co-operation with the other affected Lander governments be made a 
condition for the participation of the Bremen Senate in the bridging of the liquidity 
need of Bremer Vulkan. Senator Nolle agreed with these suggestions of Dr. Haller as 
the Bremen Senate could not afford a financing of the liquidity deficit of Bremer 
Vulkan on a continuing basis. The economics cabinet of the Bremen Senate thus made 
as a condition of new Bremen aid the participation of other Lander governments with 
sites of Bremer Vulkan firms (Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 550). The Bremen 
Senate informed the other Lander governments -  Lower Saxony, North Rhine- 
Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg and Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania -  
about the liquidity need of Bremer Vulkan and asked them for a partial provision of 
aid. The other Lander governments reacted predominantly reticently with objections 
and counterclaims to the Bremen Senate Chancellery. In the end, the Bremen Senate 
had to accept that the other Lander governments would not participate in the aid 
package and that they would only be active in so far as the firms received aid 
(Bremische Bürgerschaft 1998: 810).
A stmggle emerged between the Bremen Senate and the banks that demanded 
a clear clarification fi*om the European Commission about the permissibility of the 
guarantee because otherwise, they feared invalidity of the guarantee and therewith, 
the loss of their money. The banks followed here its line of total security and waited 
until the approval of the measure by the European Commission (Bremische 
Bürgerschaft 1998: 813). The motives behind the decisions on the provision of state 
aid by the Bremen Senate were political: the Bremen Senate did not want to appear to 
be the ones that caused the collapse of Bremer Vulkan. Everything was now about 
winning time and the next step in passing the buck. The disputes between the Bremen 
Senate and the head of Commerzbank were brought into the press by the Bremen 
Senate with the aim of placing the responsibility of the fate of Bremer Vulkan with 
the banks.
The situation worsened fiirther in 1996. An arrangement of the financing of 
the container ships to be built was not to be anticipated. Neither was the guarantee by 
the Land government as the EU judged new guarantees very critically so long as the
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repayment of the East German state aid was not clarified. On 17 January 1996, in a 
meeting in Bonn between representatives of Bremer Vulkan, the Federal Economics 
Ministry and BvS, co-operation of the Federal Government in the solution of Bremer 
Vulkan’s short-term liquidity problems was not forthcoming on the basis of lacking 
EU conformity. In early February 1996, the Bremen economics department 
considered the possibility of whether the instrument could be registered as a rescue 
aid. As a rescue aid was only possible with a simultaneous reduction of capacity, the 
Bremen Senate did not register the aid as a rescue aid with the EU because it did not 
want to be seen as financing a reduction of jobs.
The final outcome of all these deliberations and negotiations was that neither 
the Federal Government nor the Land Government of Bremen provided aid to Bremer 
Vulkan. Bremer Vulkan was finally declared insolvent at the end of May 1996 and 
ceased shipbuilding operations the following year.
6.4 PATTERNS OF EUROPEANISATION OF THE BREMEN
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY OVER TIME
The case study of Bremer Vulkan provides actual firm-specific evidence of the 
increasing Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry. Bremer Vulkan 
became increasingly a subject of EU monitoring and control over time. This was true 
not only in the field of state aid provision but also in the areas of business practices 
(cash concentrations, for example) and production levels (capacity limitations at the 
East German shipyards). This increased involvement of the EU influenced the 
propensity and attitude of the German public actors to provide state aid to Bremer 
Vulkan.
The Federal Government proved to be a willing and enthusiastic provider of 
state aid to Bremer Vulkan in the early 1980s. For instance, it was involved in the 
financing of the fiigate programmes of 1981 that ensured the survival of Bremer 
Vulkan by covering its losses in that year. Chapters 5 and 6 have shown that this 
enthusiasm has waned consistently since the early 1980s. Each and every time that 
either the Bremer Vulkan has approached the Federal Government directly or the 
Bremen Senate has turned to the Federal Government for its participation in state 
support measures, the Federal Government has always emphasised repeatedly the
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need for EU conformity of any such measures. The Federal Government has been 
constantly aware of the fact that as shipbuilding is a sensitive sector, shipbuilding aid 
had to be notified to the EU in a timely manner. Representatives of the Federal 
Economics Ministry frequently expressed the view that the participation of the 
Federal Ministry of Finance in this matter required that the Federal Economics 
Ministry confirmed that the economic and industrial interests of Germany were met in 
these shipbuilding support measures.
The description of the state support measures of the Bremen Senate in favour 
of Bremer Vulkan that has been provided in these two chapters shows that the Land 
Government of Bremen has been highly concerned with and involved in the 
preservation of this shipyard complex. Since 1982, the Bremen Senate, via HIBEG, 
has been owner of 20 to 30 per cent of Bremer Vulkan shares and its Senators and 
highest officials have been members of the firm’s supervisory board. The Land 
government of Bremen was also co-owner of Bremer Vulkan via the state aid and 
guarantees that supported its shipyards. In all the capital increases of Bremer Vulkan, 
the Bremen Senate exercised influence and guaranteed the execution of the capital 
increases as the banks were not willing to do so at such high risk. Without the 
guarantees of the Bremen Senate, the mobilisation of fi'esh money on the share market 
for Bremer Vulkan would not have been possible.
The Federal Government, as are all governments of EU member states, is the 
dialogue partner for the European Commission. The responsibility of notification of 
state aid measures to the European Commission lies with the Federal Government. 
The Federal Government turns to the Land Government and not to the firm for 
information that it requires for its communications to the EU. On occasions of state 
aid provision by the Land government, it is naturally the duty of the Land 
Government to provide the Federal Government with all the facts of the case such that 
the Federal Government, as the competent authority, is able to make an informed 
decision on notification of the state aid to the European Commission. In that sense,
£xanq)les include Bremen Economics Senator Uwe Beckmeyer, Man&ed Emcke, an advisor to the 
Bremen Senate on questions of industrial policy, Dr. Andreas Fuchs, Bremen Finance Senator and 
Head of the Senate Chancellery, Finance Senator Claus Grobecker, Bremen Senate President Hans 
Koschnik and Economics Senator Wemer Lenz. Horst-Jiirgen Lahmann, who was an official of the 
Bremen civil service, also had an advisor contract with Bremer Vulkan, Dr. Friedrich Hennemann, of 
course, was the epitome of the close relationship between the Bremen Land Government and Bremer 
Vulkan, being simultaneously Bremen Economics Senator and a member of Bremer Vulkan’s 
supervisory board from 1982 to 1987 when he moved to Bremer Vulkan to become the chairman of its 
board of directors.
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the Bremen Senate had often not facilitated the Federal Government’s efforts to 
inform the European Commission accurately and truthfully about the development of 
Bremer Vulkan and the state aid of the Bremen Senate voluntarily, in good time and 
comprehensively. The European Commission often learnt about the Bremen Senate 
measures from the press and regularly had to press the Federal Government for 
information thereafter. By the end of 1995, when the spill-over of Treuhandanstalt aid 
to West German shipyards was made known, the inquiries and reactions of the 
European Commission became more intransigent. The European Commission made it 
quite clear in its communications to Germany that each new guarantee provision in 
1996 had to be notified to and approved by the European Commission.
Commissioner Van Miert commented that there had been little contact 
between the Land Government of Bremen and the European Commission in general. 
In contrast, the Land governments of the new Lander looked for constant and direct 
contact with the European Commission (Minutes of interview between the Bremen 
parliamentary inquiry committee and Competition Commissioner Karel van Miert on 
4 July 1997, p. 4). This was confirmed by the Bremen Senate. Bremen Economics 
Senator Perschau testified to the Bremen parliamentary inquiry committee, ‘we are, 
when we go to Brussels, always only an accompanist to the Federal Economics 
Ministry.’ He did lament, however, that ‘when Dr. Ludewig goes and our people 
accompany, then we as Bremen people, always have the need that we were equally 
seen as a Bundesland in our claims. It was always clear that the Federal Government 
and also the EU had greater sympathy for the funding of Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania than for the Bremen sites’ (Bremische Biirgerschaft 1998: 641).
Even in the good old days of the 1980s of EC leniency in state aid cases, the 
Bremen Senate was aware of EC state aid rules and made some effort to work round 
them. The Bremen Senate used as a rule the Land-owned HIBEG for the 
implementation of its shipbuilding policy. This was partly to be able to deal flexibly 
and independently in the day-to-day trading and not to have to involve the 
parliamentary bodies in each sale of assets. In discussions with the EU, Bremen had 
always presented the viewpoint that HIBEG acted as a private company and thus, it 
was not obligated to notify or consult the EU.^^  ^Generally, the Bremen Senate chose
The Bremen Finance Senator had been of the opinion that “With regard to the aspect of consultation 
with the European Commission, it was advisable to provide the loan through the shareholder HIBEG
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the detour of the shareholder HIBEG so that the Bremen Senate, in its talks with the 
European Commission, could represent the position that a notification was not 
necessary as the matter was treated by a legal private company. Geertz, department 
head in the Bremen Economics Senate and head of HIBEG, admitted to the Bremen 
parliamentary inquiry committee that the legal position was unclear and that they had 
basically wanted to circumvent discussions with the EU. However, he admitted that it 
was not feasible in the long run. “Then the Competition DG had less than twenty 
people, now it has 160”, he said (Bremische Biirgerschaft 1998: 5). In actual fact, 
HIBEG never acted on its own initiative, but rather always on the instruction of the 
Land government. The managing director of HIBEG has been reported to have said 
that the recoverability of some of the engagements in Bremer Vulkan and other 
shipyards appeared in HIBEG reports for the European Commission only to avoid 
disputes with the EU over excessive subsidies (Kiesel 1997: 120).
The parliamentary inquiry committee itself found that ‘the Bremen Senate had 
imaginatively bypassed the EU state aid policy many times for regional political 
reasons’ (Bremische Biirgerschaft 1998: 810). The Europeanisation of the Bremen 
Land government seen here is probably not one anticipated or welcomed by the EU 
itself. This process of adaptation was one of duplicity and misleading based on 
growing knowledge and understanding of EU law. The initial stages of the 
Europeanisation of the Land Government of Bremen were characterised by these 
exercises of subterfuge. Initial declarations of ignorance and then of non-relevance of 
EU law to their transactions with Bremer Vulkan soon evolved into conscious and 
deliberate attempts to by-pass EU law by taking appropriate steps in business practice 
and accounting, for instance.
There was a sense of antagonism against the EU in the Bremen Senate -  an 
even stronger sense than in perhaps the Federal Government. As Prof. Dr. Haller, 
Privy Council in the Bremen Economics Senate, testified, ‘Talks lasted for months; 
one couldn’t ask the EU what pleased them and what didn’t. The firm would by then 
become bankrupt. I didn’t think that every acquisition firom Bremer Vulkan or a 
pickle firm had to be notified to the EU. We are not here a notification station for the 
EU. We don’t have our own competence for that anyway’ (Bremische Biirgerschaft 
1998: 319). There was also a belief held by some members of the Bremen Senate that
{Senator fiir Finanzen, Unterlagen Sitzungen Bürgschaftsanschüsse, Band I, Sitzung vom 16. Januar 
1984,p. 15).
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Germany could be unfairly treated by the EU. According to Prof. Dr. Haller, ‘The 
Germans are the ones, who take the guidelines, halfway seriously and all the other 
countries do not. I see how the other countries bypass the rules -  Credit Lyonnais and 
Air France, for example -  DM 40 billion -  no small amounts as here. One must see 
that the guidelines are not 100 per cent clear. We are the Obermusterknaben. If not, 
no one would be interested. To become a servant of the EU -  not my belief!’ 
(Bremische Biirgerschaft 1998: 645). Buhner and Paterson described in 1987 the type 
of outlook that Prof. Dr. Haller displayed. “German civil servants pride themselves on 
being much less guilty of chicanery than the bureaucracies of some other member 
states and make distinctions between *die Germanen’ (principally the Federal 
Republic of Germany) who play it straight on detailed implementation and ^die 
Romanen ’ (principally Greece, Italy and France) whose bureaucracies often finstrate 
the goals of Community policy at the stage of detailed implementation” (Buhner and 
Paterson 1987: 183).
The Bremen Senate had, in these years, with the exception of the structural 
concept, never voluntarily informed the European Commission about its aid actions 
with the justification that they did not involve state aid. It instead adopted an approach 
of wait and see if  the European Commission would learn about it fi'om the media and 
protest. The Bremen Senate’s representation to the European Commission was often 
not quite correct and was naturally always in the interests of the Land.
Five years after the event on 30 March 1995, Mrs Kolbeck-Rothkopf, a 
division head in the Bremen Finance Senate, commented in a memo to the Bremen 
Finance Senator that “the decision on the acquisition of assets of Bremer Vulkan and 
Seebeckwerft by HIBEG in 1988 then was made with much goodwill. The European 
Commission will not make such a favourable judgement any more, especially after 
the business of the acquisition of Krupp Atlas Elektronik by Bremer Vulkan and 
HIBEG” (Bremische Biirgerschaft 1998: 176). In his testimony to the parliamentary 
inquiry committee, Geertz himself conceded that the acquisition of ship shares had 
been a state aid as the ship shares could not have been sold on the open market. Only 
the Bremen Senate, in whose instruction HIBEG had acted, was ready to take on the 
acquisition. When asked why he had contested the state aid character of the share 
acquisition with the European Commission, Geertz answered, ‘I had to protect the 
interests of the Land and not those of the EU’ (Bremische Biirgerschaft 1998: 176).
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The Bremen Senate perceived the harder stance of the EU in the 1990s and 
responded accordingly. On 12 February 1996, Commissioner van Miert met with 
Federal State Secretary Dr. Ludewig in Brussels. Van Miert referred to the objections 
of the European Commission with reference to the case law of the ECJ in the case of 
Textilfabrik Deggendorf, a German textile firm, and insisted that the granting of new 
state aid was dependent on the repayment of previous illegal state aid. According to 
the position of the European Commission, this illegal aid had to be paid back to the 
proper addressee before new state aid could be granted. Van Miert underlined 
emphatically the necessity to transfer back the amount of the so called spill-over, 
which according to the calculations of the European Conunission exceeded DM 600 
million, as quickly as possible to the East German shipyards. According to Lehmkuhl, 
a division head in the Bremen Economics Senate, the European Commission adopted 
a clearly more sceptical attitude than in the past towards such guarantees firom 
February 1996 onwards. The European Commission represented the new position that 
financing guarantees, contrary to its decision of 11 December 1995, were to be 
classified not as guarantees to ship-owners but rather as guarantees to shipyards. 
Lehmkuhl lamented to the parliamentary inquiry committee that this opinion had 
made the support of Bremer Vulkan via financing guarantees ever more difficult, if 
not impossible (Bremische Biirgerschaft 1998: 627). Van Miert had also threatened 
that if newspaper reports revealed new guarantees of the Bremen Senate for Bremer 
Vulkan, therein lay illegal conduct against which the European Commission would 
legally proceed.
The Bremen Parliamentary Inquiry Report of 1996 on Bremer Vulkan has 
provided the author with a comprehensive and authoritative account of the process 
and content of provision of state aid to Bremer Vulkan. Appendix K provides a 
detailed presentation of the participation of the EU, the Federal Government and the 
Land Government of Bremen in the fifteen state aid cases of Bremer Vulkan. These 
various participations have been coded into four categories:
■ + for favourable participation which was to the benefit of the firm
(including working groups being formed and discussions being held with the aim of 
granting state aid to Bremer Vulkan);
■ ++ for actual provision of state aid to Bremer Vulkan;
■ - for actions that had detrimental impact on Bremer Vulkan (for 
example, the imposing of conditions on the award of aid), and
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■ - - for cases of denial of state aid.
These various instances of participation have then been quantified and 
presented in Graphs 6.1 and 6.2.
Graph 6.1 : Participation of the Federal Government in 
Bremen Vulkan State Aid Cases
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B r e m e r  V u lk a n  S t a t e  A id  C a s e  N u m b e r
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of Bremer Vulkan Verbund
AG, 1980-2002.
Graph 6.2: Participation of the Bremen Land Government in 
Bremer Vulkan State Aid Cases
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Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of Bremer Vulkan Verbund
AG, 1980-2002.
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Table 6.1 presents in tabular form the participation of the EU in these fifteen 
state aid cases.
Table 6.1. Participation of the European Union in Bremer Vulkan Verbund state aid 
cases, 1980-1996
STATE AID CASE ACTION TAKEN BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
1 Covering of losses of Bremer Vulkan in 1981 None
2 Proposed merger Bremer Vulkan and AG 
Weser 1982-1983
None
3 Merger of Bremer Vulkan and Schichau 
Unterweser AG (SUAG)
None
4 Merger of Bremer Vulkan and Seebeckwerft 
AG
- Opened procedure
- Positive decision
5 Merger of Bremer Vulkan and Hapag-Lloyd 
Werft ■> Bremer Vulkan-Lloyd Werft 
Verbund
None
6 Aid for Bremer Vulkan’s liquidity problems in 
1985
None
7 Bremer Vulkan’s American President Lines 
(APL) contracts
None
8 Sale of Bremer Vulkan’s ship shares in 1987 - Opened procedure
- Positive decision
9 Bremer Vulkan’s structural concept None
10 Bremer Vulkan’s acquisition of Senator Linie 
GmbH and merger of Senator Linie with DSR
None
11 Bremer Vulkan’s acquisition of Krupp Atlas 
Elektronik (KAE)
- Opened procedure
- Negative decision
- European Court of Justice 
case
- Second negative Commission 
Decision
12 Acquisition of East German shipyards - Imposed conditions on 
Treuhandanstalt aid
- Capacity limitations
- Opened procedure
- Negative decision
13 Bremer Vulkan’s acquisition of Klockner Stahl 
GmbH
- Opened procedure
- Positive decision
14 Unterweser concept - Opened procedure
- Positive decision
15 Ultimate crisis of Bremer Vulkan Talks between Bremen Vulkan 
management and EU
It can be seen that the EU has become increasingly involved over time in cases 
of state aid provision to Bremer Vulkan. The Federal Government was initially highly
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involved in Bremer Vulkan matters in 1981 and 1982, but it has remained either not 
involved or has been a constraining factor in the provision of state aid since then. The 
favourable participation of the Land Government does not appear to have declined 
over time as one might expect if one adopts a simplistic interpretation of the impact of 
EU state aid policy on a regional government. However, this thesis argues that 
effective Europeanisation does not necessarily mean a decline in the number of state 
aid cases, particularly when the scope and nature of EU shipbuilding policy is itself 
constantly evolving. As shown in Chapter 2, whilst the number of state aid cases in 
the shipbuilding industry in Germany has remained relatively high, one must note that 
Germany has been attempting to grant a type of state aid that better meets with the 
requirements of EU state aid law and EU shipbuilding policy. In fact, some of the 
state aid has been provided on the basis that such aid has been increasingly condoned 
by the EU shipbuilding policy. The increased participation of the EU in the 
monitoring and control of governmental and firm activity over the time period 
observed has increasingly influenced the stance of the Federal and Land Governments 
on providing state aid to Bremer Vulkan over time.
The numerous experiences it had of having the aid it had provided to Bremer 
Vulkan be investigated, prohibited and even ordered to be recovered despite earlier 
approval by the European Commission left its legacy on the Land Government of 
Bremen. The last sentence of the report of Bremen parliamentary inquiry committee 
reads that “conformity with the treaties and rules of the EU must be separately 
accounted for in all decisions on guarantees and aid measures in the future” 
(Bremische Biirgerschaft 1998: 819). The experience of the Treuhandanstalt with the 
European Commission in the matter of the aid given to the East German shipyards left 
an indelible mark on the practices of its successor, the Bundesanstalt fiir 
vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben (BvS). In August 1997, the BvS informed the 
shipbuilding firms in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania that they were not to accept 
contracts with known losses if they wished to receive financial support from the BvS.
This leads us to another indicator of the Europeanisation of the Bremen 
shipbuilding industry. Awareness of and credence to the EU, its powers and policies 
is an aspect of the impact of EU public policy on EU member states. Appendix L 
provides us with a summary of the correspondence, discussions and meetings among 
Bremer Vulkan, the Bremen Senate and the Federal Government documented in the 
report of the Bremen parliamentary inquiry committee regarding these fifteen state aid
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cases that included reference to the EU. These have been collated and presented in 
Graph 6.3. One observes increasing reference to the EU by all three actors -  Bremer 
Vulkan, the Bremen Senate and the Federal Government -  over time.
Graph 6.3: References to the EU in 
Bremer Vulkan State Aid Cases
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■ by Bremen Senate
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Bremer Vulkan State Aid Case
Source: Author’s compilation from Bremische Biirgerschaft (1998).
The Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry at the firm level can 
also be studied in terms of the reference made by the shipbuilding firm to the EU in 
its official publications over time. Company reports are published annually and 
provide a good basis to observe the preoccupations and orientations of the firm. Graph
6.4 shows that there have been increasing references to the EU over time in the 
Bremer Vulkan annual company reports.
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G ra p h  6 .4 : P ra is e  a n d  C ritic ism  fo r G e rm a n  a n d
EU S h ip b u ild in g  P o lic ie s , 1980-2002
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Year
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of Bremer Vulkan Verbund
AG, 1980-2002.
On the other hand, positive references to the Federal Government and the 
Bremen Senate have fallen over the time period 1980-1995, as shown in Table 6.2.
190
Table 6.2: References in annual reports of Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG, 1980-1995
YEAR PROVISION 
OF STATE 
AID
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
LAND
GOVERNMENT
EUROPEAN
UNION
VSM THA OECD DEMANDS
FOR
MORE
AID
+ - = + - = + - = + - =
1980 5 0 0 3 2 0 4 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 1 6
1981 4 0 1 3 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
1982 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
1983 1 2 0 2 4 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1984 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1985 0 0 3 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
1986 0 0 3 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1987 3 2 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
1988 1 0 3 0 0 3 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 2
1989 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0
1990 3 1 3 1 1 2 2 0 0 5 1 2 2 0 0 2
1991 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 0 0 10 2 1 0 3 0 0
1992 1 3 3 1 0 2 2 0 0 11 2 3 0 0 1 2
1993 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 0 0 10 4 0 0 1 1 5
1994 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 10 4 0 4 2 2
1995 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
Note: + refers to positive references, - to critical references and = to neutral references.
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG from 1980 to 1995.
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There are two dimensions to Bremer Vulkan’s increasing reference to the EU. 
Firstly, Bremer Vulkan became increasingly dissatisfied with German shipbuilding 
policy fi*om the late 1980s onwards. In 1988, it felt that while the EC only 
recommended a reduction of shipbuilding aid by 7.6 per cent, Germany had planned a 
reduction of 20 per cent. Bremer Vulkan lamented that “the German shipbuilding 
industry was thereby again more clearly disadvantaged” (Bremer Vulkan 1989: 5). 
Complaints about higher shipbuilding aid rates in other European countries coupled 
with criticism of German shipbuilding policy abound in Bremer Vulkan annual 
reports (Bremer Vulkan 1989: 5,1990: 5,1991: 21,1992: 24,1993: 25,1994: 24).
Secondly, Bremer Vulkan was becoming increasingly aware of the extent of 
EU powers in shaping the German shipbuilding industry. The firm believed that the 
amount of shipbuilding orders that it received was limited by the approval of state aid 
by the European Commission (Bremer Vulkan 1988: 5). By 1992, Bremer Vulkan 
was convinced that “important fi'amework conditions for its business activity ... were 
increasingly determined in Brussels” (Bremer Vulkan 1993: 20). The EU was the 
decisive public authority, according to Bremer Vulkan, as it “defined the market 
conditions of shipbuilding throughout Europe”, and the EU represented the German 
shipbuilding industry at OECD negotiations on shipbuilding agreements.
This growing appreciation of the role played by the EU in the German 
shipbuilding industry culminated in Bremer Vulkan’s attempts to “organise a 
strengthened representation and perception of maritime interests in Europe” (Bremer 
Vulkan 1991: 17). This shipbuilding firm was convinced that “the institutionalisation 
of a contact point in Europe” was important and even expected that the Commission 
would ultimately recommend to the member states “the institutionalisation of 
necessary support for previous national industrial efforts” (Bremer Vulkan 1992: 19). 
In fact, Bremer Vulkan became so finstrated with German shipbuilding policy and 
simultaneously attracted by the potential of the EU to revive the European 
shipbuilding industry that it transferred its interest representation efforts to the EU 
stage. Bremer Vulkan thus attempted to shape the environment in which EU 
shipbuilding policy was formulated. Bremer Vulkan, in the person of the chairman of 
its board of directors. Dr. Friedrich Hennemann, decided that it was more 
advantageous for the firm to adopt a more pro-active stance and engage in interest 
representation activity on a European level than to accept EU shipbuilding policy as a 
given and merely sit around hoping that whatever state aid, which was rapidly
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decreasing, that it received would be approved by the European Commission. The 
Europeanisation of Bremer Vulkan manifested itself in its efforts to establish an EU- 
level association of maritime interests which came to be known as the Maritime 
Industries Forum.
A simplistic application of the compliance indicator which looks at breach of 
EU state aid law by a domestic actor yields an inaccurate assessment of the 
Europeanisation of Bremer Vulkan. Bremer Vulkan has shown signs of adapting to 
EU shipbuilding policy goals even as it continued to be a subject of state aid cases 
under investigation by the European Commission. Firstly, in 1987, Bremer Vulkan 
incorporated the principle of capacity limitations and downsizing its shipbuilding 
production to a core portfolio of high-technology, highly-competitive shipbuilding in 
the structural concept of the consortium. This goal, as discussed in Chapter 2, is an 
important feature of EU shipbuilding policy.
Secondly, the impact of EU shipbuilding policy on Bremer Vulkan can be 
seen in the significant interest in R & D activity by the firm and the proliferation of R 
& D projects that were encouraged in the Council Directives and Regulations on 
shipbuilding aid. In 1989, Bremer Vulkan had two research projects worth a total DM 
1.206 million (Bremer Vulkan 1990: 60). By 1992, this had grown to twelve research 
projects worth DM 5.379 million (Bremer Vulkan 1993: 77). In fact, R & D projects 
were mentioned for the first time in the Bremer Vulkan annual report of 1989. From 
1989 to 1995, there was consistent and heavy emphasis on research, development and 
innovation efforts in shipbuilding technology in the annual reports of Bremer Vulkan 
(Bremer Vulkan 1991: 24, 1992: 27, 1993: 35, 1994: 35, 1995: 45). Bremer Vulkan 
even credited the European Commission for fimding most of these shipbuilding 
projects (Bremer Vulkan 1994: 51). In fact, Bremer Vulkan set up a separate company 
within its consortium in 1992 called EMIT Entwicklungszentrum fiir maritimen und 
industrieller Technik GmbH io coordinate R & D activities and to process projects of 
the EU fi-amework programmes (Bremer Vulkan 1993: 27).
Thirdly, Bremer Vulkan displayed much interest and success in implementing 
the recommendations of the EU to pursue greater cross-border co-operation in 
shipbuilding projects within the EU. For instance, Bremer Vulkan participated in the 
3E (European Ecological Economic) Tanker project with Howaldtswerke Deutsche
Refer to Section 4.2,4 of Chapter 4 for a discussion of the role played by Dr, Hennemann of Bremer 
Vulkan in the creation of the Maritime Industries Forum.
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Werft (HDW) of Germany, Chantiers de r  Atlantique of France, Fincantieri of Italy 
and Astilleros Esparioles of Spain (Bremer Vulkan 1991: 21). In April 1992, Bremer 
Vulkan signed contracts with the French shipbuilding firm. Chantiers de F Atlantique, 
for the formation of the EUROCORVETTE Economic Interest Grouping, The goal of 
this interest grouping was the joint world-wide marketing of the BRECA military and 
security ship family (Bremer Vulkan 1993: 30). In the same year, Bremer Vulkan and 
four other European shipbuilding firms formed the Euroyards shipbuilding group. By 
this time, Bremer Vulkan asserted that “the hallmark of its research activity was 
European co-operation” (Bremer Vulkan 1993: 16).
Lastly, Bremer Vulkan recognised the EU approach of linking together the 
shipbuilding and shipping industries and applied it to its business decisions. As 
discussed in Section 5.2.6 of Chapter 5, Bremer Vulkan acquired the shipping firm 
Senator Linie GmbH and merged it with Deutscher Seereederei in 1994. Its 
diversification into the shipping industry was undeniably based on calculations of 
profitability. However, Bremer Vulkan also realised that it could receive state aid to 
facilitate such a foray into the shipping industry that would ultimately be approved by 
the EU.
6.5 BREMER VULKAN’S SIDE OF THE EUROPEANISATION STORY:
THE EU AS NEMESIS AND PARTNER
Adopting a compliance approach to assess the success of implementation of 
EU shipbuilding policy in the German shipbuilding industry reveals only part of the 
picture of Europeanisation. The underlying assumption of the compliance approach is 
that compliance by member states with EU policy and EU law leads to EU-desired 
outcomes. The empirical data provided in Chapter 2 shows that Germany has 
consistently been at the top of the league of non-compliant member states with EU 
state aid law, and it has also consistently been the member state with the highest 
number of shipbuilding aid cases over the past forty years. The study of Bremer
During the month o f August 1997 alone, for instance, the month when the last ship left the pier of 
Bremer Vulkan, Blohm + Voss in Hamburg received a DM 136 million guarantee for a Greek contract 
for two cruise ships, the Land Government of Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania and the BvS granted 
state aid of DM 3 million to Elbe Werft Boizenburg (after occupation of the shipyard by its workers) 
and the Land of Lower Saxony confirmed that it would provide guarantees for die financing of new 
shipbuilding to Meyer Werft in Papenburg.
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Vulkan reveals similar findings on an individual firm level. The level of state aid 
provision to Bremer Vulkan remained quite high over the sixteen-year period studied. 
If one leaves the scene adopting only a compliance approach, one would leave with an 
assessment that there has not been much success in the implementation of EU 
shipbuilding policy and consequently, that there has been little Europeanisation of the 
German shipbuilding industry.
The Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry can only be fully 
assessed if one studies other dimensions of Europeanisation. Successful 
implementation of EU legislation in the German shipbuilding policy field should also 
be evaluated by considering whether evolving policy priorities at the EU level are 
pursued by relevant actors on the domestic stage. In this sense, there has indeed been 
successful Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry in the way that the 
Federal Government had modified its national shipbuilding policy in line with EU 
reform impulses over time. The Land Government of Bremen also pursued EU-led 
initiatives of capacity reductions and diversification into shipbuilding-related 
industries in its relations with Bremer Vulkan. Bremer Vulkan itself, as the recipient 
of state aid, pursued these EU shipbuilding policy objectives in a strategic move to 
obtain more state aid at a time when the propensity of both the Federal and Land 
Governments to provide it with financial support was on the decline.
The enforcement of EU public policies creates a plethora of opportunities for 
both public and private policy actors to exploit. Firstly, governments can find it 
advantageous to be bound by EU commitments (Moravcsik 1994; Grande 1996). This 
thesis shows that the German government has, indeed, been quite enthusiastic in 
limiting state aid provision to its shipbuilding industry because of its own diminishing 
financial resources and the declining economic importance of the industry. The strict 
state aid regime of the EU has thus been welcomed by the German government as a 
support, if not a ballast, of its own attempts to curtail state aid. Domestic actors may 
welcome EU constraints as boosting their own efforts in their domestic struggle to 
accomplish reform. Dyson and Featherstone (1999) termed this strategy as one of 
trying exploit a 'vincolo estem o’ (external tie) when looking at Italy’s response to 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and its constraints. A similar process can be seen 
to be at work in the response of the German government to European shipbuilding 
policy. The Federal Government has successfully used EU policy to legitimise its own 
attempts to limit state aid to its domestic shipbuilding industry. In the case of
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provision of aid to Bremer Vulkan, we have seen this Europeanisation of the Federal 
Government and the Land Government of Bremen in their decreasing disposition to 
grant state aid to Bremer Vulkan over time. Table 6.3 shows that the amounts of 
Wettbewerbshilfe aid granted by the Land Government of Bremen to Bremer Vulkan 
declined from 1985 to 1987 and from 1989 to 1994.
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Table 6.3: Wettbewerbshilfe aid disbursed by the Land Government of Bremen to Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG, 1984-1996
PAYMENT IN AMOUNT RECIPIENT
Seebeckwerft AG Schichau 
Unterweser AG
Schichau 
Seebeckwerft AG
Bremer Vulkan Lloyd W erft
1984 2,950,000 2,000,000 950,000
1985 9,700,000 1,700,000 8,000,000
1986 3,467,000 3,467,000
1987 890,000 890,000
1988 17,356,000 10,063,000 2,384,000 133,000 4,776,000
1989 41,918,000 18,794,000 21,200,000 1,924,000
1990 35,566,000 21,822,000 13,744,000
1991 27,168,000 10,851,000 13,886,000 2,431,000
1992 26,021,000 13,155,000 10,361,000 2,505,000
1993 22,312,000 9,604,000 12,002,000 706,000
1994 15,892,000 6,812,000 6,456,000 2,624,000
1995 37,300,000 14,760,000 18,582,000 3,958,000
1996 2,703,189 0 2,703,189 0
TOTAL 243,243,189 14,420,000 6,084,000 95,798,000 107,067,189 19,874,000
Source: Bremische Biirgerschaft (1998: 786).
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This Europeanisation of the German public actors has also been important for 
the Europeanisation of the recipient of state aid -  the shipbuilding firm itself. Bremer 
Vulkan realised both the threats and opportunities posed by the EU shipbuilding 
policy field, and its response was to increase the attention it paid to the EU. In fact, 
these two chapters on Bremer Vulkan along with Section 4.2.4 of Chapter 4 show that 
not only did this private actor become increasingly aware of the EU over time, it also 
transferred its interest representation activity to the EU level. Bremer Vulkan realised 
by the early 1990s that the EU had the power to significantly affect its business 
activity and that the EU, and not the Federal Government, was the platform on which 
the public policies relevant to the German shipbuilding industry were formulated. The 
increasing content of European shipbuilding policy served to usurp the German 
shipbuilding firm’s perception of the traditionally important roles of the Federal and 
Land governments in the German shipbuilding industry.
This Europeanisation process of Bremer Vulkan is only partly explained by its 
own acknowledgement or realisation of the powers of the EU to affect its operating 
context. The response of Bremer Vulkan to EU shipbuilding policy was also driven by 
the reactions of the Federal Government and of the Land Government of Bremen to 
EU shipbuilding policy. The increasing tendency and willingness of these public 
actors to comply with EU legislation was important in two ways. Firstly, it impressed 
upon Bremer Vulkan the extensive powers of the EU to shape the German 
shipbuilding industry. Secondly, the behaviour of the German public actors revealed 
that it was no longer sufficient for Bremer Vulkan to limit its interest representation 
efforts to the domestic level as there was growing evidence that the domestic state-aid 
providers were not as sympathetic to the needs of the firm as they once had been.
Bremer Vulkan and its long and multi-faceted relationship with the EU have 
thus served as an illuminating illustration of the impact of EU shipbuilding policy on 
the German shipbuilding industry and have highlighted the ways in which both public 
and private German actors have responded to EU activity in the shipbuilding policy 
field.
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Chapter Seven
EUROPEANISATION AND THE 
GERMAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
The impact of an EU public policy on the domestic policy field can be 
analysed in a number of ways. Firstly, EU policy in a particular sector affects national 
policy in that sector. Such impact can be analysed in terms of policy content, policy 
objectives and policy instruments. The implementation of EU public policy invariably 
involves both public and private actors at the domestic level. Successful 
implementation of EU policy by a member state can be said to lie in effective 
enforcement by the national public actors and compliance with EU law by the 
relevant national public and/or private actors, as the case may be. Thus, the second 
dimension of impact of EU policy on a member state is in terms of the decisions and 
actions taken by domestic public and private actors in their response to EU law. 
Thirdly, as EU policy affects the rules of the game for domestic actors, the adaptation 
of these actors to EU policy can involve changes in the patterns of interaction: firstly, 
between domestic public and private actors and secondly, between the domestic actors 
and the EU institutions.
7.1 EUROPEANISATION OF GERMAN SHIPBUILDING POLICY
CONTENT
The first dimension of Europeanisation that was studied in this thesis was the 
impact of EU shipbuilding policy on German shipbuilding policy content. Chapters 2 
and 3 analysed EU and German shipbuilding policies, respectively, from the 1960s to 
2002. The longitudinal analysis of these policies over this period has revealed their 
key features, their similarities and their differences. Most importantly, these two 
chapters have revealed the Europeanisation of German shipbuilding policy content in 
terms of provisions on the granting of shipbuilding aid. The juxtaposition of these two 
trajectories of policy development reveals that German shipbuilding policy has
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mirrored EU shipbuilding policy well. German shipbuilding policy has remained true 
to the letter and the spirit of EU shipbuilding policy. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 
3, from the perspective of policy adaptation, Germany has been an exemplary model 
student or Musterknabe of the EU. In fact, it has quite often been the opinion in both 
German government and industrial circles that the German government has been an 
Obermusterknabe in this respect. If EU shipbuilding policy is understood as a 
supranational policy that calls on EU member states to reduce their provision of 
shipbuilding aid, then it is manifestly clear that there has been Europeanisation of 
German shipbuilding policy content in terms of significant and successful 
downloading of EU policy onto the domestic template. There has been a decline in the 
number of German shipbuilding aid programmes offered over the time period studied. 
Not only has there been a decline in the number of shipbuilding aid programmes in 
force, the funding rates of these programmes have also fallen over time. In fact, the 
comparison of EU and German shipbuilding aid rates from 1987 to 2002 provided in 
Chapter 3 indicates that Germany has consistently exceeded EU requirements in this 
regard. Furthermore, more conditions have been attached to the provision of 
shipbuilding aid. The increasing conditionality and stringency of German shipbuilding 
aid programmes over time is evidence of the downloading of EU policy of limited 
shipbuilding aid provision.
There has been increasing withdrawal of the Federal Government from the 
responsibility of providing financial support to the German shipbuilding industry over 
time. Chapter 3 also showed that the Federal Government has increasingly shifted this 
responsibility onto the Lander level in an attempt to exonerate itself of the burden of 
propping up a possible sunset industry. This has naturally made the provision of state 
aid to the shipbuilding industry in Germany more complex and subsequently, less 
likely because of the limited financial capacities of individual Land governments. The 
scope of viable funding sources within Germany has thus become limited over time. 
These have been the ways in which German public actors -  the Federal and Lander 
governments -  have responded to EU shipbuilding policy. The downloading of EU 
shipbuilding policy onto the domestic German level has thus altered the framework 
conditions or Rahmenbedingungen of the German shipbuilding industry.
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7.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF ‘EUROPEANISED’ SHIPBUILDING
POLICY IN THE GERMAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
The adaptation of domestic policy to EU policy, in terms of policy content, 
objectives and instruments, only describes one aspect of the Europeanisation of public 
actors. A further aspect that should be examined is the actual implementation of such 
‘Europeanised’ policy in the German shipbuilding industry. Chapter 2 showed that 
Germany heads the list of EU member states in terms of the number of shipbuilding 
aid cases and Commission Decisions. This thesis argues that a superficial treatment of 
the level of compliance of the German shipbuilding industry with EU shipbuilding aid 
legislation results in the hastily-drawn and wrong conclusion that there has been no 
Europeanisation process evident. This thesis advocates closer analysis of the type of 
shipbuilding aid provided by the German public actors to its shipbuilding industry. 
Chapter 3 provided empirical evidence that there have been increases in the type of 
shipbuilding aid that the EU promotes, namely R & D aid and aid linking the 
shipbuilding sector and maritime transport.
Furthermore, the increased cross-border co-operation between shipbuilding 
firms of EU member states in R & D has been a direct response to stimuli from the 
EU level for collaboration projects. The number of EU-wide shipbuilding projects, 
like EUROYARDS and Leadership 2015, has also increased thanks to the support of 
the EU. Such cross-border co-operation was unheard of in the 1970s and 1980s before 
the EU started promoting such collaboration of shipbuilding firms, both in its policies 
and via the shipbuilding association that it sponsored, the Maritime Industries Forum.
Chapters 5 and 6 took Bremer Vulkan Verbund as a case study to explore the 
changing roles and interactions of public and private actors in the German 
shipbuilding industry. Detailed analysis of the fifteen state aid cases identified from 
1980 to 1996 revealed the decreasing participation of the Federal Government in the 
state aid arena, and the increasing reluctance of both the Federal Government and the 
Land Government of Bremen to grant state aid to Bremer Vulkan. Chapters 5 and 6 
also showed firm-specific evidence of the way in which Bremer Vulkan pursued EU 
shipbuilding policy prescriptions of downsizing and capacity reduction as part of its 
business strategy and of its attempts to obtain more state aid from the Land 
Government of Bremen. The response of Bremer Vulkan to EU shipbuilding policy 
was also observed in the firm’s incorporation of EU shipbuilding policy goals of
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concentrating on high-technology shipbuilding and co-operating with other European 
shipbuilding firms. Further evidence of the Europeanisation of Bremer Vulkan was 
seen in its acquisition of shipping firms in its attempts at vertical integration of the 
maritime sector, which has been promoted by EU shipbuilding policy.
7.3 SHIFTS IN FOCUS OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION EFFORTS OF
THE GERMAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
This ability of the EU to influence and, in many ways, to set the operating 
conditions of the German shipbuilding industry has affected the behaviour of German 
shipbuilding firms. This thesis shows that since the 1990s, shipbuilding firms and the 
shipbuilding association in Germany have been looking increasingly to the EU as the 
channel through which to air their concerns and further their interests.
This thesis has explored the comparatively more effective interest 
representation activity of European shipbuilding associations, when compared to the 
German shipbuilding association. This, along with the important role played by 
German shipbuilders and the German shipbuilding association in European 
shipbuilding associations, like CESA and the Maritime Industries Forum, indicate the 
reorientation of the attention of German shipbuilding firms from the domestic to the 
EU level in interest representation activity. Chapter 4 documented the increasing 
praise for EU initiatives and the concomitant increasing criticism of German policy in 
the shipbuilding sector by the German shipbuilding association over time. These 
annual reports also indicate that the German shipbuilding industry has, over time, 
placed more emphasis on the need for EU action than for German action in response 
to the challenges confronting it. Chapter 4 also analysed how Bremer Vulkan 
transferred its representation activity from the domestic to the EU level in its efforts to 
set up the Maritime Industries Forum.
Such a response is shown to be based on the realisation by the German 
shipbuilding industry that the EU can do what national governments cannot. Firstly, 
the EU possesses the overall control of state aid via its state aid policy regime. 
Secondly, the EU can and does provide support to the European shipbuilding industry 
via its research and technology and transport policies and its interests in 
environmental protection. Thirdly, the important issue of Far Eastern competition can
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only be tackled effectively by the EU in international negotiations in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
This reorientation of the efforts and attention of German shipbuilding firms 
emerged from a change in their perception of the EU and its powers. In the 1970s and 
the 1980s, the German shipbuilding firms saw the supranational authority of the EC as 
serving to constrict the room to manoeuvre of both the German government and of 
themselves through the enforcement of EC state aid and shipbuilding policies. The 
EU’s role as a governance actor was further increased with the capacity limitations 
that it imposed on the privatised East German shipyards in 1991.
The realisation by German shipbuilders individually and collectively in the 
German shipbuilding association, the VSM, that the EU and not the German 
government was best placed and had the requisite political weight to tackle the 
distortion of competition on the world shipbuilding market caused by the unfair 
business and trade practices of South Korean shipbuilding firms has led to a change in 
the behaviour and patterns of interaction of German shipbuilding firms. They have 
begun to perceive the EU shipbuilding associations to be the more effective platform 
from which to voice their interests and achieve their goals. This has affected the 
patterns of interaction of the shipbuilding firms with the German and the EU 
authorities and shipbuilding associations. In essence, the Europeanisation of the 
private actors in the German shipbuilding industry has occurred through a change in 
their perception of the EU from nemesis to saviour.
7.4 INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACTORS’
RESPONSES TO EU SHIPBUILDING POLICY
The Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry has thus far been 
dichotomised into the impact of EU shipbuilding policy on German public actors and 
that on German private actors. The EU shipbuilding policy addresses the government 
of the Federal Republic of Germany directly in the legal requirement of the Federal 
Government to ensure that German shipbuilding policy conforms to EU shipbuilding 
policy. The German success in this respect has been studied in Chapters 2 and 3. On 
the other hand, Europeanisation of the private actors of the German shipbuilding
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industry was discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. This thesis emphasises the 
interdependence between the responses of private and those of public actors to EU 
shipbuilding policy.
The response of the Federal Government has been to adapt German 
shipbuilding law to EU law. In fact, Germany has been shown to have even exceeded 
EU requirements by adopting shipbuilding aid law that is even stricter than the EU’s. 
What this has done has been to frustrate the private actors in the German shipbuilding 
industry - the shipbuilding firms. They have felt that the uncompromising German 
shipbuilding aid provisions have placed the German shipbuilding industry in an 
unfavourable competitive position vis-à-vis its EU and non-EU competitors. This 
dissatisfaction with German shipbuilding policy has been one of the major spurs of 
the Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding firms. This disenchantment with the 
domestic level has fuelled the increased momentum of activity on the EU level. 
Successful Europeanisation on the public actor level has, in fact, stimulated 
Europeanisation on the private actor level.
This Europeanisation of the private actors in turn has influenced the Federal 
Government’s recent stance on the German shipbuilding industry. A maritime co­
ordinator was appointed by the Federal Government in 2001. German shipbuilding 
firms have welcomed this move. Several factors account for the creation of this new 
department in the Federal Economics Ministry. These include the improved 
performance of the German maritime industry and greater domestic regard for this 
industry in government circles. The reorientation of German shipbuilding firms to the 
EU and the steadily increasing initiatives of the EU in favour of the European 
maritime industry very nearly ‘ostracised’ the German authorities from the policy 
field. Increased R & D funding from the EU and the fact that the direction and pace of 
technological development in this sector was being set by the EU Research and 
Technological Development framework programmes meant that by the mid 1990s, the 
German government was essentially ‘out of the shipbuilding loop’. The Federal 
Government’s response to this was the appointment of the maritime co-ordinator. 
Efforts of the German shipbuilding firms in the European forums have apparently 
elicited a response from the Federal Government.
This institutional development, as discussed before, is admittedly attributable 
to a variety of factors but the role played by the creation of a European maritime 
network by German and other European shipbuilding firms cannot be discounted. The
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principal theme of the First National Maritime Conference that was organised by the 
Federal Government and held in June 2000 was the question of the creation of a 
similar network within the German maritime industry. This had never before been 
considered openly and positively by the Federal Government. This creation of a 
maritime network within Germany is very much along the lines pursued by the 
Maritime Industries Forum at the EU level. This institutional development of the 
creation of a maritime co-ordinating department within the Federal Economics 
Ministry and of a Maritime Partner Ring can be considered to be the spawn of the 
EU’s successful transformation of the perception of the European shipbuilding 
industry from being a sunset industry to being one of the growth industries of the 
future. Furthermore, the key feature of bringing together representatives, both from 
industry and from government, who are linked to the various maritime-related 
industrial sectors, is an innovation that Germany has adopted from the Maritime 
Industries Forum, the EU counterpart of the German Maritime Partner Ring.
Europeanisation of the private actors in the German shipbuilding industry has 
contributed to the Europeanisation of the German public actors. Europeanisation of 
the German shipbuilding industry has thus occurred through the reinforcement of the 
different logics of action that characterise the different actors.
7.5 MOTIVATING FORCES IN THE EUROPEANISATION PROCESSES
IN THE GERMAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
By distinguishing between the relevant public and private actors, this thesis 
has been able to explore the routes of Europeanisation taken by each set of actors. The 
public actors - the Federal Government and the relevant Lander governments - have 
contributed to the Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry by taking 
appropriate measures so as to be in line with the EU objective of limiting the 
provision of state aid to the shipbuilding industry. The private actors - the German 
shipbuilding firms and the German shipbuilding association - have Europeanised their 
industry by thinking and acting on an EU level. Increased appreciation for and use of 
the European shipbuilding associations to tackle the challenges that they face have 
been presented in this thesis as evidence of the Europeanisation of German 
shipbuilding firms. They have increasingly been thinking on an ‘EU wavelength’.
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Evidence of operating on an ‘BU wavelength’ has come in the proliferation of cross­
national co-operation in R & D and joint shipbuilding contracts with shipbuilding 
firms in other EU member states.
The responses of these public and private actors have illustrated the ‘how’s’ of 
the Europeanisation processes occurring in the German shipbuilding industry. Equally 
important to knowing how this Europeanisation has taken place is the understanding 
of why it has. Understanding the motivations of relevant actors will shed light on the 
facilitators and impediments to Europeanisation processes in general.
The Federal Government has proven to be quite compliant in incorporating 
EU shipbuilding policy content and objectives into its own domestic legal framework. 
This ready willingness can be explained by the Federal Government’s own inclination 
to reduce the amount of state aid it was expected to grant to its shipbuilding industry. 
Dyson and Featherstone (1999) have shown how the EMU project gained ground in 
Italy by analysing the way in which the Italian government portrayed the convergence 
criteria as a ‘vincolo estemo ' or external tie to its electorate. In a very similar fashion, 
the German government has been able to advance its own agenda vis-à-vis the state 
support of its shipbuilding industry by paying dutiful homage to the supremacy of EU 
law. The shipbuilding industry in Germany was declining, both in terms of 
employment and turnover levels, and the Federal and Lander governments were 
financially unable and/or unwilling to support the shipbuilding industry as they once 
did. The objectives pursued by the EU in the shipbuilding sector tied in very well with 
domestic currents in the German government and this yielded successful 
Europeanisation in terms of policy content.
As argued by Dyson (2003: 228), the impact of the EU public policies thus has 
not been in ‘preference shaping’ but rather in ‘context altering’. German shipbuilding 
firms seek shipbuilding aid or, at the very least, support to boost the shipbuilding 
industry. The German Government, on the other hand, seeks to reduce its financial 
commitments to the shipbuilding industry, partly because of financial pressures on its 
available resources. These preferences of the two sets of actors have not been changed 
by EU shipbuilding policy. Rather, EU governance of the shipbuilding industry has 
‘altered the context’ within which German shipbuilding firms can obtain support for 
the shipbuilding industry, and allows the German government to further and to 
validate its attempts at limiting the state aid it provides to the shipbuilding industry.
206
From the perspective of the German shipbuilding firms, this EU objective of 
progressively reducing the state aid allowed was not apparently in their immediate 
interests. However, their own government was also pursuing this policy objective and 
in fact, with greater vigour than the EU and other EU member states. Furthermore, the 
spurt in EU-level activity of German shipbuilding firms was linked to the threats 
posed by competitor shipbuilding nations like South Korea and Japan to the 
competitiveness and viability even of the German shipbuilding industry. It was the 
realisation by the German shipbuilding firms that such global issues could be 
addressed more effectively by the EU than by the German government in isolation 
that explains the Europeanisation of these German firms. Thus, it was the onslaught of 
challenges from outside the EU and the relatively lesser capacity to act of the German 
government that precipitated and facilitated the Europeanisation processes of the 
private actors in this sector.
Salient characteristics of the shipbuilding industry partly explain why 
Europeanisation has proceeded as far as it has in this sector. Firstly, the R & D that is 
needed to make technological advances in the shipbuilding industry is of a scale that 
most individual shipbuilding firms are unable, either because of financial and/or 
personnel reasons, to undertake on their own. Collaboration with competitor firms 
within Germany for R & D purposes rarely occurred because of the specialisation of 
firms in different market segments and because of the general aversion to co-operate 
with business competitors. Thus, the idea that was promoted by the EU via its 
research and technology policy and in its shipbuilding directives of co-operation of 
firms on an EU-wide basis was an important new opportunity for German 
shipbuilding firms which have traditionally shown a keen interest in R & D projects.
A second key characteristic of the shipbuilding industry is its link to the 
shipping sector. Increased demand for shipping logically means increased demand for 
shipbuilding. Whatever improves the market conditions for the shipping industry is 
therefore in the interests of the shipbuilding industry. Because of the geographical 
position of Germany within the European continent, measures undertaken by the 
German government to improve the market for maritime transport is limited to those 
in favour of inland waterway transport. Both because Germany is part of the European 
continent in geographical terms and because it is part of the economic union, the EU, 
any meaningful stimulus to the shipping sector has to come either from the EU and/or 
from other EU member states as well. Thus, the Europeanisation process played itself
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out rather well in the German shipbuilding industry because of the realised potential 
of the EU to stimulate maritime transport and to improve the requisite infrastructure 
via its maritime transport policy.
Thirdly, due to the global nature of the shipbuilding market, there is no actual 
domestic shipbuilding market. Even if limited ToyaT domestic markets are defined, it 
is not possible to protect these domestic markets from foreign imports of ships with 
customs duties or import quotas. Thus, it has been crucial for German shipbuilding 
firms and the German government to work in concert with the EU and other European 
shipbuilding firms to achieve their common goals on competition conditions on the 
world shipbuilding market via negotiations in international organisations like the 
OECD and the WTO.
These salient characteristics of the industry have defined the types of 
challenges that the industry faces and thus, the type of solutions that are needed to 
address them. The nature of the shipbuilding industry itself has therefore been crucial 
in facilitating its Europeanisation process.
7.6 FACTORING IN THE POLITICAL PARTY COMPOSITION OF
GOVERNMENTS
The impact of EU shipbuilding policy on German shipbuilding policy and on 
German public actors has been analysed in Chapters 2 and 3. The political party 
composition of the Federal and the Land governments of the coastal Lander has 
changed several times over the forty-year time frame of this analysis. Examining 
whether the impact of this supranational state aid policy on the corresponding German 
policy field has been affected by the economic orientations of the political parties in 
office is thus analytically important. Distilling a differentiated resonance of EU policy 
in the domestic policy field that is dependent on the political party constitution of the 
national and regional governments, if  any, is an important step in understanding the 
Europeanisation of the national policy field.
The role of political party ideology in the formulation of national pubhc policy 
has been studied and debated extensively in academic research. Advocates of the 
‘partisan politics matter’ thesis contend that ideological preferences of governing 
political parties are important in shaping economic policies, including the level and
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nature of government expenditure (Tufte 1978; Hibbs 1977, 1987, 1992). The 
conventional or popular wisdom associates left-leaning political parties, which favour 
redistribution, with deficit spending and the right, which prioritises the unadulterated 
fimctioning of the fi*ee market system, with fiscal prudence.
This argument that partisan politics are important in determining fiscal and 
industrial policies has, however, not gone challenged. Those who argue that the 
influence of partisan preferences is at best marginal emphasise that all governing 
political parties are confi-onted with the same logics of industrialisation, 
modernisation and globalisation, with the same economic, technological and 
demographic imperatives. For instance, increased financial integration has diminished 
the autonomy of national governments to pursue party-based policies (IMF 1991; 
Helleiner 1994). The ability of political parties to pursue their ideological preferences 
in terms of domestic economic policy is constrained by domestic and international 
macroeconomic conditions (Garrett and Lange 1991; Peters 1991; Scharpf 1991; 
Keohane and Milner 1996; Carlsen 1997; Iverson 1998). Partisan-based differences in 
economic policy fields have thus “become more muted over time” (Cusack 1999: 465, 
2001: 108).
Mirroring this theoretical divergence, empirical studies of the impact of 
political parties’ ideological preferences on economic policy have arrived at divergent 
conclusions. Roubini & Sachs (1989), Comiskey (1993) and De Haan & Sturm (1994) 
conclude that the impact of political preferences on economic policy is significant, 
while Von Beyme (1985), Blais et al. (1993) and Cusack & Garrett (1993) admit to a 
more modest impact. On the other hand. Rose (1984) argued that policy output is not 
dependent on the ideological preferences of the governing party(ies).^^^ In fact, some 
scholars have concluded fi-om their empirical research that the partisan impact on 
fiscal policy is exactly the opposite of what is predicted by conventional wisdom on 
this question (Cameron 1985; Persson and Svensson 1989). Similar divergent 
conclusions are to be found in studies of the relation between party 
platforms/manifestos and public policies. While some scholars have found that there 
is a strong link between party platforms and public policies pursued (Budge and 
Hofferbert 1990,1992; King et al. 1993; Klingemann et al. 1994), there are those who
For further enpirical studies on the impact of government partisanship on economic policies, see 
Cameron 1978; Castles and McKinlay 1979; Keman 1984,1997; Schmidt 1989,1996,1997; Wilhams 
1990; Hicks and Swank 1992; Castles 1994,1998; Blais, Blake, and Dion 1993,1996.
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argue that while party platforms tend to be polarized, policies end up being moderate 
or centrist (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Snyder 1996).
Hofferbert and Klingemann (1990) demonstrated that party programmes have 
an important impact on government policy in Germany, with the party influence 
working mainly through possession of cabinet ministries. They argue that the neo­
liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) has had a disproportionate influence on 
government spending policies and that “the most useful document a German voter 
should consult at election time in order to anticipate the shape of public spending 
under the next government is the programme of the FDP” (Hofferbert and 
Klingemann 1990: 300). Free market economics, especially through reductions in 
taxes, removal of regulatory barriers to trade and production and elimination of 
subsidies, is a dominant tenet of FDP programmes, irrespective of the party’s 
government coalition partner (Roberts 1993: 151).^^^
To the extent that the FDP is present as a coalition partner in coalition 
governments and is in possession of the Economics and/or Finance Ministries, its free 
market ideological preferences would indeed be important for German industrial 
policy in terms of the goals and methods pursued and limiting the level of government 
spending in this regard. Analysing ideological differences between German political 
parties on a single left-right continuum, however, proves to be an inadequate basis of
138inquiry.
Both the CDU/CSU and the SPD have signed up to the soziale 
Marktwirtschaft or social market economy ideology. It is important to note in this 
context that no explicit mention is made of the valid provision of state aid to industry 
in the founding texts of the Ordoliberal school. German post-war political history is 
replete with SPD political leaders (Chancellor Schmidt, for example) who favoured 
the free functioning of the market economy, and CDU leaders (Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl, for instance) who were responsible for high levels of government spending for 
social and economic cohesion purposes. The Federal Government published a report 
prepared by FDP Federal Economics Minister, Gunter Rexrodt, in September 1993 
entitled ''Zukunftssicherung des Standortes Deutschland' (Safeguarding Germany’s
Refer to Dittbemer (1987) for a survey of FDP programmes, including the Freiburg and Kiel theses. 
Gross and Sigelman (1984) argue that such a left-right examination only provides a “skyline view” 
as programmatic differences can exist in specific policy domains.
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Future as an Industrial Location) in which subsidies were argued to be défendable on 
economic grounds, are not ipso facto unjustified and should be critically examined.
Key features of the German political and economic system serve as checks and 
balances and limit partisan differences. Germany’s system of cooperative federalism 
and the important role played by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the 
Sachverstandigenrat in the formulation of economic policies dampen the degree of 
partisan duels (cf. Lehmbruch 1976, 1978; Smith 1976; Scharpf 1985; Katzenstein 
1987). As shown in Chapter 3, a survey of Subventionsberichte fi“om 1967 to the 
present time reveals that the approach taken with regard to the provision of 
shipbuilding aid has been consistent across time, with identical wording of many key 
statements, despite changes in the political party make-up of the Federal 
Governments.
A fiuther mitigating factor on the impact of partisan differences is the gap 
between political rhetoric and policy practice, between ex ante declarations of intent 
and actual observed behaviour in policy implementation. Concern about political 
survival and electoral success constrain the ability of rational political actors to pursue 
their parties’ ideological preferences in the form of actual public policy content.
Analysis of the timing of the initiation and termination of the various German 
shipbuilding aid programmes should reveal whether the political party constitution of 
the various Federal and Land governments over time has been an important 
determinant of the level of support for the German shipbuilding industry. Table 7.1 
lists the years in which the various German shipbuilding aid programmes were 
initiated and terminated, and cross references these decisions with the governing 
political parties at the Federal and at the Land level in the four coastal Lânder.
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Table 7.1 Political party composition of governments and shipbuilding aid programmes
Year Federal
Government
Land 
Government of 
Bremen
Land 
Government of 
Hamburg
Land 
Government of 
Lower Saxony
Land Government 
of Schleswig- 
Holstein
Shipbuilding Aid Programme
1961 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD-FDP SPD-FDP SPD-GB/BHE-
FDP
CDU-FDP Initiated Werfthilfeprogramm
1962 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD-FDP SPD-FDP SPD-GB/BHE-
FDP
CDU-FDP Initiated Reederhilfeprogramm
1967 CDU/CSU-
SPD
SPD-FDP SPD SPD-FDP CDU-FDP Initiated adjustment investment aid 
programme
1970 SPD-FDP SPD SPD-FDP SPD CDU-FDP Terminated adjustment investment 
aid programme
1979 SPD-FDP SPD SPD CDU CDU - Initiated Auftragshilfeprogramm
- Initiated ^Meeresforschung und 
Meerestechnik' research programme
1981 SPD-FDP SPD SPD CDU CDU - TermmstQd Auftragshilfeprogramm
- Terminated *Meeresforschung und 
Meerestechnik* research programme
1983 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD SPD CDU CDU Initiated Land shipbuilding grants
1985 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD SPD CDU CDU Terminated Land shipbuilding grants
1987 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD SPD-FDP CDU-FDP CDU - Initiated
Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm
- Terminated Reederhilfeprogramm
1994 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD-FDP-
Greens
SPD-STATT
Partei
SPD SPD Initiated ‘Marine Technology’ 
research programme
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Year Federal
Government
Land 
Government of 
Bremen
Land 
Government of 
Hamburg
Land 
Government of 
Lower Saxony
Land 
Government of 
Schleswig- 
Holstein
Shipbuilding Aid Programme
1998 SPD-Greens SPD-CDU SPD-CDU SPD SPD-Greens Terminated ‘Marine Technology’ 
research programme
2000 SPD-Greens SPD-CDU SPD-Greens SPD SPD-Greens Initiated ‘Shipping and Marine 
Technology for the 21®^ Century’ 
research programme
2001 SPD-Greens SPD-CDU SPD-Greens SPD SPD-Greens Appointment of Maritime Coordinator
2002 SPD-Greens SPD-CDU SPD-Greens SPD SPD-Greens - Terminated Werfthilfeprogramm
- Terminated
Wettbewerbshilfeprogramm
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The empirical reality reveals a mixed or even kaleidoscopic picture. Five 
shipbuilding aid programmes were initiated and two were terminated during 
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition Federal Governments, two programmes were initiated and 
three were terminated when the SPD ruled in coalition governments with the FDP, 
and the SPD-Green coalition Federal Government from 1998 to 2002 initiated only 
one shipbuilding aid programme whilst it terminated three. It appears to be relatively 
difficult to extract an unambiguous finding about the ideological stance of the various 
German political parties with regard to state support for the shipbuilding industry. A 
similar mixed picture emerges from analysis of the actual amounts of aid disbursed to 
the German shipbuilding industry and the relative importance of the shipbuilding 
industry as a recipient of state aid in Federal Government budgets over time, as 
presented in Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2 German shipbuilding aid disbursed and German governments
Year Federal
Government
Land Government of 
Bremen
Federal subsidies per person employed in 
shipbuilding (DM)
German shipbuilding aid 
(million DM)
1967 CDU/CSU-SPD SPD-FDP 13
1968 CDU/CSU-SPD SPD 53
1969 SPD-FDP SPD 571
1970 SPD-FDP SPD 366 28
1971 SPD-FDP SPD 400
1972 SPD-FDP SPD 514
1973 SPD-FDP SPD 901
1974 SPD-FDP SPD 1274
1975 SPD-FDP SPD 1351 100
1976 SPD-FDP SPD 1167
1977 SPD-FDP SPD 926
1978 SPD-FDP SPD 889
1979 SPD-FDP SPD 1881
1980 SPD-FDP SPD 4379 254
1981 SPD-FDP SPD 5190 301
1982 CDU/CSU-FDP SPD 4068 240
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Year Federal
Government
Land 
Government 
of Bremen
Federal 
subsidies per 
person 
employed in 
shipbuilding 
(DM)
German 
shipbuilding 
aid (million 
DM)
Werfthilfe
(million
DM)
Wettbewerbshilfe 
(million DM)
Ranking of 
shipbuilding 
aid in Federal 
Government 
budget drafts
Shipbuilding 
aid in Federal 
budget drafts 
(million DM)
1983 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD 5273 290 289.9
1984 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD 3553 167 167.6
1985 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD 3148 148 230.0
1986 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD 142 200.0 17 200
1987 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD 3487 136 135.7
1988 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD 7143 250 149.8 100.0 11 280
1989 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD 8083 291 169.8 121.3
1990 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD 10583 381 200.8 180.0 10 375
1991 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD 14222 597 246.3 350.5
1992 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD-FDP-
Greens
13029 607 289.2 317.6 9 707
1993 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD-FDP-
Greens
7147 536 299.5 236.8
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Year Federal
Government
Land 
Government 
of Bremen
Federal 
subsidies per 
person 
employed in 
shipbuilding 
(DM)
German 
shipbuilding 
aid (million 
DM)
Werfthilfe
(million
DM)
Wettbewerbshilfe 
(million DM)
Ranking of 
shipbuilding 
aid in Federal 
Government 
budget drafts
Shipbuilding 
aid in Federal 
budget drafts 
(million DM)
1994 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD-FDP-
Greens
6986 489 285.2 203.6 10 515
1995 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD-FDP-
Greens
7523 399 284.2 114.4
1996 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD-CDU 355 267.3 88.0 11 442
1997 CDU/CSU-
FDP
SPD-CDU 335 234.3 70.1
1998 SPD-Greens SPD-CDU 280 208.2 70.8 15 291
1999 SPD-Greens SPD-CDU 96.5 37.1
2000 SPD-Greens SPD-CDU 244 77.9 47.2 15 260
2001 SPD-Greens SPD-CDU 70.6 86.9
2002 SPD-Greens SPD-CDU 223 50.5 63.9
Source: Author’s compilation from Deutscher Bundestag (1985: 18-19,26,126); (1987: 14-15,26); (1989: 15,26,106); (1991: 20,25,
112); (1993: 6, 26,109-110); (1995: 6,17-18,104-105); (1997: 6,13,17,108-109); (1999: 16, 20,101) and (2001: 15, 63).
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In-depth analysis of the processes of negotiation and formulation of these aid 
programmes would in all likelihood reveal a more reticent attitude of FDP Economics 
and Finance Ministers and even members of the bureaucratic élite on the question of 
the granting of shipbuilding aid.'^^
The neo-liberal drive to reduce government spending has led the Federal 
Government to transfer part of the burden of state expenditure to the Lander level. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, a significant proportion of German state support for the 
shipbuilding industry is borne by the Lander governments. In particular, the regional 
concentration of the German shipbuilding industry in the coastal Lander of Bremen, 
Hamburg, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein has meant that these Land 
governments are important sources of financial support for German shipbuilding 
firms.
Because of the heavy involvement of Lander governments in shipbuilding aid 
programmes, the political party composition of these governments is also of interest. 
The SPD has been the governing party in Bremen throughout the post-war period. It 
has either ruled alone, as it did between 1968 and 1991, or in coalition with other 
parties. It is perfectly possible or even probable that the amount of shipbuilding aid 
provided to the Bremen shipbuilding industry might not have been as generous had 
the CDU or the FDP possessed a stronger foothold in Bremen. However, because of 
the important socio-economic role of the shipbuilding industry in Bremen over 
several decades, whatever party was in power would be confronted with the same 
vociferous demands for state support from the shipbuilding firms and their workers, 
and support for this sector would inevitably be an issue of the socio-economic welfare 
of a segment of the Land’s population.
The Land governments of Bremen, Hamburg and Lower Saxony could not 
depend on similar party affiliations of other Land governments to get its shipbuilding 
agenda through the German legislative system. In 1981, the Social Democratic 
Bremen Senate demanded an increase in shipbuilding aid from the Federal 
Government from 12.5 to 17.5 per cent of the cost of ships for ship-owners who 
ordered ships from German shipyards. The governments of the other three coastal 
Lander agreed to support the Bremen proposal in March 1984. However, the proposal 
was blocked in the Bundesrat. The opponents to this proposal included Social
Such observations of a cautious FDP Federal Economics Minister Lambsdorff were made in the 
detailed Bremer Vulkan state aid cases in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Democratic Hessen and Saarland which were keen to ensure that the welfare of their 
car and steel producers, respectively, was not jeopardised by what they saw as 
excessive support of the shipbuilding industry (Strâth 1987: 35). It must be noted, 
however, that during years in which the Land coalition government consists of a 
political party that is not present in the coalition government at the Federal level (as 
from 1961 to 1965 and from 1982 to 1997, in the case of Land Bremen), the ability of 
such a Land governing party to effectively voice and realise the interests of the 
shipbuilding industry would be diminished.
Rational political actors target the financial resources that they disburse in 
space and through time in their efforts to increase their chances of electoral success. 
John and Ward (2001: 309) demonstrated that there are ‘particularly strong incentives 
to target resources to marginal legislative constituencies’ as by ‘putting resources 
where they matter’, electoral manipulation can be performed inconspicuously without 
significantly altering macroeconomic indicators and without drawing the undesirable 
attention of non-targeted sectors. Scholars have also argued that governments are 
likely to grant financial support in the period before an election (when they are behind 
in the polls), so the electoral pay-offs are greater at the margin (Schultz 1995; Price 
1998). Such considerations are relevant for the study of when and why state aid is 
given. Furthermore, when such conditions coincide with other factors emanating from 
either the EU and/or the domestic arena, the impact of an EU policy on the provision 
of state aid in a particular sector can either be attenuated or enhanced, as the case may 
be.
7.7 LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE TALE OF EUROPEANISATION OF
THE GERMAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Distinguishing between the various dimensions of impact in terms of 
adaptation of policy content and patterns of interaction of public and private actors 
has provided an explanation of the processes of Europeanisation involved and of the 
way in which each of the processes feeds into the other.
A natural starting point for the study of the impact of EU shipbuilding policy 
on the German shipbuilding industry might have been a focus of the level of 
compliance by Germany with EU shipbuilding law over time. The underlying
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assumption of such a top-down perspective is that compliance by the member states 
with EU law is the measure or indicator of successful Europeanisation. The empirical 
analysis provided in Chapter 2 indicates that Germany has consistently been at the 
bottom of the league of compliant member states in terms of the number of cases and 
Commission Decisions addressed to Germany on matters of shipbuilding aid. This 
might suggest that there has not been successful Europeanisation in the German 
shipbuilding industry since Germany has not come more into line with relevant EU 
law in this sector. However, this thesis has shown that such a conclusion is superficial 
and hastily drawn. There have indeed been significant Europeanisation processes at 
work in the German shipbuilding industry. Even within the context of examining 
German shipbuilding aid cases over time, it is important to refine the analysis further 
and to pay attention to the types of state aid that have been granted by the German 
authorities. It is important to remember that numbers sometimes do not tell the full 
story.
Looking at the ratio of approved German shipbuilding aid cases over time is 
also not a good measure of the extent of Europeanisation as there might be a level of 
discretion in the EU’s approval of state aid cases in that the criteria might be 
interpreted and applied in a subjective manner. Therefore, it is important to look not 
just at the final outcome of these aid cases in terms of EU approval or prohibition, but 
also to look at the type of state aid that the German authorities granted in the first 
place. If the German government has been offering more state aid that is of the kind 
that is being promoted by the EU at the time, as indeed has been the case with R & D 
aid, there is evidence of Europeanisation even when the statistics superficially mask 
it. Thus, it is important that the use of the compliance criterion in the study of 
Europeanisation is treated with care. This does not mean to say that compliance with 
EU law is not a useful indicator of Europeanisation, but rather that within the context 
of compliance, attention must be paid to the various facets inherent therein, which 
will vary according to the subject of study.
Another major theme in the literature on Europeanisation is the notion that 
there must be some “misfit” (Borzel 1999; Duina 1999) or “mismatch” (Héritier, 
Knill and Mingers 1996; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 
2001) between the EU and national policies and institutions for national adaptation to 
occur. These studies argue that the lower the compatibility between the EU and 
domestic processes, policies and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure.
2 2 0
Chapters 2 and 3 have shown that both the EU and German shipbuilding policies have 
evolved over time. Thus, it is not possible to measure the mismatch between these two 
policies that are not fixed. Furthermore, it is difficult to define relevant misfit as 
whilst there is considerable compatibility between German and EU theoretical 
approaches towards the provision of state aid to industry as shown in Chapter 1, there 
is often considerable divergence between the theoretical policy content and the actual 
implementation of those policies. The execution of these policies is not an exact 
science, and much is often left to the subjective interpretation and discretionary 
decision-making of relevant authorities. The Europeanisation processes that have been 
analysed in this thesis are not explained by policy fit or misfit. The responses of both 
public and private actors in the German shipbuilding industry to EU policy have been 
driven by other factors. It is the understanding of these other driving forces that can 
add value to the study of processes of Europeanisation in domestic public policy 
fields.
The response of the German private actors to EU shipbuilding policy has been 
determined not only by EU shipbuilding policy itself, but it has also been contingent 
on what German public actors have done in their response to that same EU policy. A 
true understanding of Europeanisation processes thus cannot be limited merely to 
either the study of EU pressures or the similarities and differences between the EU 
and domestic level, whether in terms of policies or institutions. Refining the analysis 
further into the differential impact of EU public policy on various sets of actors, 
whether public and private as in the case of shipbuilding policy or employers and 
trade unions in social policy, at a domestic level and exploring the contingent and 
interdependent nature of these various responses is a very rewarding exercise in the 
study of Europeanisation. The Europeanisation processes that occur in a member state 
as a result of the implementation of an EU policy are not determined purely by that 
policy or by the status quo in the member state’s policy field before its 
implementation. The study of the Europeanisation processes should be one of 
dynamic changes over time as the impact of an EU policy on a member states cannot 
be determined a priori.
Goetz (2000) highlights the need to pay attention to the time (when a decision 
is made), timing (sequencing of decisions) and tempo (speed) of change on the 
domestic level in response to the EU level. Adopting such an approach proves to be 
very rewarding in understanding the Europeanisation processes at work in the German
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shipbuilding industry. Previous chapters have shown how certain events have proven 
to be key moments for the Europeanisation of the German shipbuilding industry. 
Firstly, German reunification in 1990 and the subsequent privatisation of East German 
shipyards marked a watershed in relations between the EU and the German 
shipbuilding industry. The capacity limitations imposed by the EU on the East 
German shipyards significantly affected the business activity of these shipyards and 
complicated the relations between the Federal Government and the European 
Commission. Secondly, a major spurt of activity of the European shipbuilding 
associations coincided and actually addressed the increasing threat posed by the 
dumping practices of South Korean shipbuilders. This shows that a significant aspect 
of the Europeanisation process of the German shipbuilding industry has to do not with 
developments caused independently by the EU, but rather by other factors, that 
sometimes emanated fi-om within Germany and sometimes not.
What emerges fiom this study is that the EU should be seen as part of a bigger 
world. A narrow focus on EU-led initiatives can only partly explain the 
Europeanisation process(es) in a particular industry or policy field. Credence must be 
paid to the role played by exogenous factors in order to obtain a full understanding of 
the dynamics of the forces of change on the domestic level. The exposure or even 
vulnerability of particular industries to global forces, whether to do with market 
demand and supply or with the business and trade practices of competitors, determine 
whether firms or even industries should tackle the challenges they face on a national 
or an EU level. It is analytically beneficial to engage in an exploration of the interplay 
of national, EU and global forces.
It is also important to consider the type of industry and its key characteristics. 
For instance, the fact that the R & D required in the shipbuilding sector is of such a 
large scale that no single shipbuilding firm, however large, can go it alone, facilitated 
the Europeanisation of the industry. In the automobile sector, on the other hand, 
where R & D is of such a scale that it can be carried out by individual firms and 
countries, the Europeanisation of this sector via this mechanism would be less likely. 
As discussed earlier, the fact that the shipbuilding sector is linked to maritime 
transport has also facilitated its Europeanisation. In the case of the automobile sector.
Dyson (2002b: 102) refers to the need to look beyond Europeanisation and even globalisation when 
he argues, “The search for a prime long-term cause of change in German economic policy is likely to 
extend beyond Europeanisation and globahsation to more fundamental drivers like new technologies 
and the effects of their adoption and use on social, economic and political attitudes”.
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roads constitute the associated transport infrastructure and national automobile 
producers are not dependent on the EU or on the joint efforts of other EU member 
states to make them competitive.
The consideration of exogenous factors and of the characteristics of the 
industry being studied is thus important for understanding the processes involved in 
the Europeanisation of any industry. This is because these factors will help determine 
whether it is the individual national government or the supranational EU that is the 
best placed to address the issues facing the industry. If the private actors in an 
industrial sector perceive that its national government is adequately equipped to tackle 
the relevant challenges it faces, Europeanisation processes will tend to be more 
protracted. On the other hand, if the industry believes that the EU has powers and 
abilities that individual national governments either generally do not possess or have 
relinquished to the EU, the road of Europeanisation will be that much smoother. The 
assessment by the private actors of ‘who can best do the job’ and thereafter, of ‘who 
is best doing the job’ is instrumental in determining how that industry is 
Europeanised. The industry’s assessment of the competencies of the national 
government and of the EU, respectively, determines the industry’s judgement of 
where the necessary competences lie. This will subsequently shape the processes of 
Europeanisation that that industry will be engaged in.
The German Maritime Co-ordinator and his department in the Federal 
Economics Ministry has displayed so much renewed national interest in the 
shipbuilding industry since 2001 that the German shipbuilding industry has begun to 
look on the Federal Government as an important policy actor and dialogue partner 
once again. The foreword of the annual report of the German shipbuilding association 
of 2001 was entitled ‘Berlin must act’. This was the first time since 1980 that the 
German shipbuilding association highlighted the need for national action over that for 
EU action in the shipbuilding sector. Whilst it is too early to call this a ‘re­
nationalisation’ or ‘de-Europeanisation’ of private actors in the German shipbuilding 
industry, it does emphasise the important nexus between the response of domestic 
public and that of private actors to EU shipbuilding policy.
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Appendix A
Table 1.2: SUBSIDIES PER CAPITA. 1960-2002 (Euro)
COUNTRY 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Austria 33.73 36.81 43.87 52.79 54.60 60.04 65.00 64.60 66.35 68.58 68.84
Belgium 25.31 27.16 29.62 34.28 36.41 49.98 58.94 58.13 72.08 79.94 75.13
Denmark 8.53 34.83 39.37 41.05 41.63 37.88 48.26 60.36 77.72 86.15 94.03
Finland 16.17 16.06 16.89 22.20 28.12 28.71 31.48 30.74 33.80 40.87 43.15
France 16.55 21.71 25.78 33.17 34.24 38.97 42.69 45.14 58.35 60.19 55.02
Germany 19.82 20.70 22.31 26.51 30.84 42.88 41.76 40.93 95.37 84.57 84.91
Greece 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.25 0.48 0.69 1.12 1.32 1.13 0.81 0.83
Ireland 6.96 9.83 9.20 9.36 11.04 12.61 13.98 17.18 8.97 22.68 25.65
Italy 4.28 3.38 4.61 4.34 5.93 6.56 7.16 8.55 10.91 12.45 11.94
Luxembourg 26.14 29.24 33.34 34.27 52.51 67.37 75.75 78.69 77.20 57.93 55.37
Netherlands 37.41 35.60 29.71 30.41 35.59 32.81 36.50 46.32 50.01 32.77 44.06
Portugal 0.35 0.53 0.54 0.46 0.43 0.80 0.83 0.96 1.33 1.18 1.79
Spain 1.13 1.20 1.79 1.46 1.15 1.42 1.35 1.71 1.96 1.81 2.45
Sweden 12.75 15.87 16.99 23.93 24.82 28.16 33.67 35.82 51.41 50.36 48.21
UK 14.51 17.29 17.57 16.34 14.72 16.19 15.75 22.45 24.98 23.39 19.54
EU15 11.94 13.55 14.90 17.35 18.92 22.69 24.04 25.66 39.84 38.07 37.52
German rank from 4 '% f6 ; 5 '% f6; 5"^  of 6; 5“ of 6; 5"^  of 6; 3""of6; 4"' of 6; 5"" of 6; U 'of6; U 'of6 ; U 'of6;
the highest 4* of 15 7* of 15 7'  ^of 15 7'  ^of 15 7* of 15 4^  ^of 15 6'^  of 15 7'  ^of 15 U' of 15 2"*^  of 15 2^  ^o f 15
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Table 1.2: SUBSIDIES PER CAPITA. 1960-2002 fEurol
COUNTRY 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Austria 79.44 82.53 95.59 133.91 197.45 216.78 242.72 276.73 281.19 313.80 334.17
Belgium 78.55 96.67 114.74 124.27 151.58 177.88 206.37 227.66 249.19 249.61 275.92
Denmark 131.89 168.92 96.03 129.51 99.08 121.14 103.28 120.23 131.90 158.45 175.11
Finland 46.30 52.25 54.16 92.23 130.44 144.73 159.08 164.37 204.23 221.48 252.39
France 47.51 50.50 61.68 76.35 94.88 111.41 128.85 138.85 162.78 173.94 211.45
Germany 93.80 123.39 133.44 138.75 153.81 161.38 171.50 208.72 223.28 224.80 234.10
Greece 1.31 1.58 2.92 4.81 5.51 7.38 8.98 10.01 10.18 12.63 23.01
Ireland 27.69 29.98 25.43 27.49 41.43 49.63 54.90 69.77 84.82 100.01 122.10
Italy 13.82 17.54 17.95 22.01 34.31 41.29 54.08 68.34 83.42 96.17 114.72
Luxembourg 58.34 74.11 96.43 131.58 185.25 251.88 313.67 330.48 354.90 369.84 493.82
Netherlands 40.55 52.44 69.42 77.32 86.12 127.71 146.21 164.82 181.26 186.47 180.56
Portugal 1.81 1.72 2.28 4.83 5.20 10.06 12.76 18.21 24.43 34.95 44.24
Spain 3.25 3.70 4.01 4.95 6.93 9.46 12.85 20.84 21.52 26.91 28.39
Sweden 57.61 65.04 71.93 100.96 153.14 221.43 252.28 284.95 323.84 373.48 457.96
UK 20.65 25.43 31.49 65.60 75.41 73.83 70.22 75.78 93.80 133.36 146.52
EU15 39.66 48.66 53.49 69.68 76.02 86.64 96.48 111.99 134.67 149.31 166.98
German rank U 'of6; U 'of6; U 'of9; U 'of9; 2^  ^of 9; 3"%f9; 3 '% f9 ; 3 '% f9; 3"^  o f 9; 3"%f9; 3"%flO;
from the highest 2"*^  of 15 2^  ^o f 15 U 'o fl5 U' of 15 3"** of 15 5* of 15 5* of 15 5^ of 15 5* of 15 5'^ of 15 6* of 15
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Table 1.2; SUBSIDIES PER CAPITA. 1960-2002 Œuro^
COUNTRY 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Austria 360.60 375.55 383.29 423.96 497.37 512.50 505.00 511.32 531.18 607.52 635.00
Belgium 260.21 303.19 335.09 298.99 298.74 272.92 305.61 270.25 271.98 289.01 283.92
Denmark 220.83 242.38 246.26 255.05 243.89 258.53 380.97 415.15 458.60 450.13 604.43
Finland 268.02 308.42 340.73 361.46 388.59 407.07 446.24 468.75 516.69 574.13 579.70
France 245.95 272.47 335.84 365.90 330.13 331.53 330.13 331.53 323.11 320.58 323.36
Germany 237.84 243.72 268.41 343.17 356.22 369.62 356.22 369.62 354.13 409.33 388.36
Greece 22.68 19.76 22.69 40.65 45.31 44.71 55.17 48.08 47.32 29.08 27.72
Ireland 137.28 152.14 152.46 158.84 153.59 206.35 253.34 60.51 117.36 120.93 131.75
Italy 145.61 159.12 187.06 190.84 233.28 217.76 217.60 240.10 228.78 246.71 250.75
Luxembourg 561.51 714.40 665.49 532.78 568.51 606.23 611.37 605.45 614.72 699.08 755.82
Netherlands 203.88 227.71 251.83 266.46 276.14 332.63 331.64 354.51 366.70 383.06 409.56
Portugal 42.92 49.74 66.17 71.80 88.91 82.79 89.30 91.86 88.87 96.99 129.39
Spain 41.30 48.40 58.90 61.61 56.73 58.32 73.80 78.92 85.83 87.80 90.89
Sweden 488.80 513.65 582.06 637.30 630.16 630.32 640.40 738.81 785.95 901.96 963.27
UK 126.91 126.18 149.28 147.53 103.24 98.32 97.20 84.97 89.35 89.88 102.98
EU15 179.33 191.97 220.95 229.71 239.16 244.20 246.78 253.20 253.38 278.73 284.09
German rank 
from the highest
4‘% fl0 ;  
7* of 15
4*^  of 10; 
7'^ of 15
4"^  of 10; 
7'  ^of 15
3 '% flO ;
6"'^ofl5
2"‘" of 
12; 5'  ^of 
15
2"^* of 
12;5* of 
15
3"% fl2;
6 '% fI5
3 '% fl2 ; 
6* of 15
4‘"’ of 12; 
7'  ^of 15
3”^" of 12; 
6 '% fl5
4'" of 12; 
7* of 15
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Table 1.2; SUBSIDIES PER CAPITA. 1960-2002 (Euro)
COUNTRY 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria 666.72 598.00 619.70 580.63 579.49 652.01 625.22 617.23 681.08 715.08
Belgium 294.01 286.44 299.14 318.32 297.82 326.63 338.04 363.04 389.81 378.60
Denmark 601.42 641.38 652.47 699.19 690.43 677.75 690.53 694.37 694.16 724.96
Finland 553.53 550.03 519.58 385.56 372.96 371.63 366.27 379.85 376.32 378.26
France 319.10 310.19 297.63 322.75 322.76 304.38 309.11 300.19 325.44 318.45
Germany 383.10 447.54 468.28 452.16 418.03 435.33 438.19 427.71 411.12 375.18
Greece 30,45 27.31 31.76 39.08 13.91 14.17 20.12 18.11 18.36 20.42
Ireland 162.43 141.65 141.72 157.79 181.26 174.16 194.72 206.48 278.17 245.74
Italy 279.95 257.22 238.97 256.75 220.27 252.80 239.69 243.11 252.37 217.41
Luxembourg 741.58 856.86 587.21 693.70 686.22 727.32 660.81 777.88 800.14 862.44
Netherlands 376.65 364.61 210.03 241.38 318.32 330.43 372.57 371.66 403.64 416.89
Portugal 168.93 130.90 110.26 130.18 116.58 148.50 182.11 123.66 163.54 180.64
Spain 112.96 113.57 119.01 121.34 112.64 152.05 169.13 179.85 177.42 184.45
Sweden 868.31 831.51 798.73 775.16 666.22 543.04 534.85 463.70 421.62 461.03
UK 97.68 110.00 104.65 123.79 127.40 109.16 81.34 123.52 144.59 126.99
EU15 286.89 294.77 286.88 293.52 278.95 286.63 285.98 288.12 297.03 283.18
German rank from 
the highest
3''“ of 12; 
6'^  of 15
3"% fl2; 
6^^ of 15
6'” of 15 5 '% fl5 5'" of 15 5"" of 15 5 '% f 15 5'" of 15 5'" of 15 8'" of 15
Note: 1960-1972: EC6; 1973-1980: EC9; 1981-1985: EClO; 1986-1994: EC12; 1995-2002: EU15
Source: Author’s calculations based on statistics from OECD Statistical Compendium 2003 (electronic version), Paris: OECD Electronic
Publications, 2003.
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Table 1.3: SUBSIDIES PER PERSON EMPLOYED. 1960-2002 (Euro^
COUNTRY 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Austria 74.41 81.00 97.47 118.72 123.76 116.94 128.76 131.19 137.16 142.36 142.90
Belgium 64.83 69.28 74.70 86.48 91.40 126.10 149.17 148.61 185.20 205.97 190.23
Denmark 18.39 74.28 83.28 87.36 87.62 79.15 102.66 130.61 169.05 183.17 199.28
Finland 34.32 33.93 35.73 47.46 59.70 61.10 67.16 67.34 75.79 90.60 94.01
France 38.46 50.95 61.61 79.96 82.46 94,54 103.64 110.28 143.29 146.83 133.89
Germany 42.18 43.91 47.71 57.13 57.06 93.75 92.40 93.83 219.25 193.27 193.48
Greece 0.12 0.35 0.36 0.64 1.22 1.78 2.94 3.56 3.07 2.23 2.30
Ireland 18.36 26.32 24.57 25.03 29.51 33.93 37.83 46.99 52.80 62.25 71.85
Italy 10.42 8.26 11.37 10.94 15.12 17.24 19.29 22.91 29.42 34.10 32.71
Luxembourg 62.35 70.61 80.89 84.51 130.29 168.68 189.25 204.09 198.31 148.55 139.27
Netherlands 100.12 95.35 79.15 81.09 94.43 87.56 97.93 125.98 136.27 84.99 114.36
Portugal 0.95 1.43 0.30 1.25 1.18 2.22 2.29 2.56 3.60 3.18 4.67
Spain 2.96 3.17 4.75 3.90 3.09 3.83 3.65 4.64 5.35 4.95 6.70
Sweden 26.49 32.84 35.12 49.75 51.96 58.90 70.42 76.27 108.84 106.10 100.62
UK 30.91 36.81 37.59 35.13 31.45 35.24 34.40 49.94 56.06 52.76 44.34
EU15 27.55 31.35 34.74 40.81 44.64 53.95 57.62 62.36 97.43 93.01 91.56
German rank 
jfrom the highest
4 '% f6 ; 
5^  ^of 15
5'  ^of 6; 
7'  ^of 
15
5"^  of 6; 
7* of 
15
5 '% f6; 
7^  ^of 15
5"" of 6; 
8'^  of 15
4"" of 6; 
5'  ^of 15
5"^  of 6; 
7'  ^of 15
5'" of 6; 
7'  ^of 15
U 'of6; 
U' of 15
2""^ of 6; 
2^  ^of 15
U 'of6; 
2""^  of 15
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Table 1.3: SUBSIDIES PER PERSON EMPLOYED. 1960-2002 (Euro)
COUNTRY 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Austria 163.71 169.84 194.51 270.43 399.45 435.32 483.18 549.00 555.87 618.82 659.81
Belgium 198.03 245.16 289.44 309.46 383.82 453.25 528.45 582.32 631.82 634.55 715.19
Denmark 278.68 358.20 201.89 273.61 215.89 259.95 220.52 254.83 276.91 334.62 374.62
Finland 101.06 114.98 117.29 19.492 277.93 301.35 339.11 356.21 431.77 456.24 516.37
France 116.04 123.41 149.91 186.17 232.99 272.55 313.74 337,96 396.97 425.86 523.12
Germany 215.19 283.32 304.35 320.07 362.69 380.10 402.31 484.24 508.58 505.53 526.93
Greece 3.69 4.43 8.20 13.46 15.47 20.87 25.64 30.04 29.36 36.29 63.41
Ireland 78.60 86.19 73.24 79.38 122.66 150.57 165.86 208.31 249.50 294.24 366.84
Italy 38.16 49.56 50.58 61.07 95.19 114.25 148.22 187.73 227.38 258.90 311.30
Luxembourg 145.45 182.12 236.19 318.81 447.29 608.17 761.10 805.70 861.59 896.52 1195.05
Netherlands 107.73 139.77 186.41 209.05 236.60 353.40 404.73 454.98 496.62 508.62 501.33
Portugal 4.62 4.42 5.90 11.99 12.93 24.93 31.80 45.98 61.58 87.13 110.50
Spain 8.91 10.24 11.02 13.58 19.42 26.93 37.29 62.15 65.64 84.88 92.47
Sweden 120.86 136.77 150,89 207.94 308.84 445.33 507.86 572.98 642.64 732.93 901.82
UK 47.66 58.47 71.16 147.89 170.99 168.48 160.01 171.26 209.21 300.82 341.58
EU15 97.40 120.11 131.15 155.05 187.96 214.66 238.79 274.42 331.19 367.26 415.91
German rank U 'of6 ; U 'of6 ; U 'of9; U 'of9; 3'"^of9; 3 '% f9; 4'" of 9; 3"^  o f 9; 3"" of 9; 4"" of 9; 3 '% flO ;
from the highest 2""^  of 15 2"*^  of 15 of 15 of 15 4^ ‘^ o fl5 5'  ^of 15 6^% fl5 5'  ^of 15 5'*^  of 15 6'^  of 15 5^'"ofl5
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Table 1.3: SUBSIDIES PER PERSON EMPLOYED. 1960-2002 (Euro)
COUNTRY 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Austria 721.37 759.81 776.44 857.76 1003.37 1035.67 1016.61 1021.63 1053.96 1201.47 1269.33
Belgium 683.71 804.65 889.07 789.34 784.24 712.71 788.62 690.37 690.58 736.03 729.44
Denmark 469.99 512.81 506.83 510.00 473.57 501.99 731.66 807.92 889.34 880.02 1191.12
Finland 546.65 629.34 692.19 730.14 789.46 831.69 911.79 932.96 1033.47 1220.75 1331.30
France 609.40 680.20 850.29 868,08 932.87 932.62 837.13 832.78 809.64 806.50 822.69
Germany 539.31 555.68 604.68 650.49 681.09 737.28 759.52 781.52 739.86 851.41 826.34
Greece 63.40 54.96 63.19 112.55 125.37 124.05 150.94 131.48 128.36 81.67 77.65
Ireland 416.14 474.41 487.33 506.06 492.03 656.71 805.81 191.17 353.91 367.76 401.36
Italy 397.77 435.57 512.17 522.58 637.43 597.69 595.07 658.34 610.97 654.44 672.91
Luxembourg 1360.81 1738.55 1613.78 1291.38 1369.69 1450,55 1457.46 1435.41 1459.77 1659.92 1816.26
Netherlands 580.68 659.83 759.03 764.77 777.87 927.91 910.19 960.93 971.12 996.89 1056.58
Portugal 107.85 119.85 160.55 175.01 216.36 195.62 205.08 205.57 193.72 205.06 270.25
Spain 136.48 161.54 202.77 215.11 195.05 191.77 234.12 242.23 255.40 261.71 276.52
Sweden 964.46 1013.01 1140.52 1254.21 1233.91 1226.53 1234.83 1412.94 1500.30 1768.40 1984.19
UK 301.58 301.15 311.13 342.98 240.29 223.51 212.34 181.78 191.06 198.81 232.79
EU15 450.96 485.03 545.68 577.88 597.70 603.57 600.22 608.49 601.03 660.95 684.95
German rank 
from the 
highest
5"" of 10; 
8* of 15
5'" of 10; 
8 '% fl5
5'" of 10; 
8* of 15
5"" of 10; 
8* of 15
5"" of 12; 
8'^  of 15
4"^  of 12; 
7^*'ofl5
6"" of 12; 
9 '^^of 15
5"" of 12; 
8'^  o f 15
5"" of 12; 
8'  ^of 15
4"^  of 12; 
7'^ of 15
4“^ of 12; 
7* of 15
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Table 1.3: SUBSIDIES PER PERSON EMPLOYED. 1960-2002 (Euro)
COUNTRY 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria 1354.41 1222.72 1269.54 1198.58 1192.01 1328.64 1258.64 1235.94 1358.57 1428.37
Belgium 763.74 749.23 780.21 827.62 769.25 830.77 850.78 899.10 953.08 952.16
Denmark 1216.58 1309.58 1312.59 1398.80 1365.03 1339.47 1357.03 1365.12 1366.92 1424.33
Finland 1360.61 1368.27 1269.81 932.60 886.71 865.19 828.22 846.09 828.66 831.84
France 825.68 802.44 765.59 830.91 828.59 770.54 769.63 732.28 785.70 774.12
Germany 832.33 976.84 1022.95 993.56 921.84 949.33 944.66 907.31 869.54 799.21
Greece 85.08 75.21 86.91 107.49 38.58 37.81 53.79 48.80 49.73 57.20
Ireland 489.34 415.67 398.39 429.80 480.94 424.37 451.36 462.03 613.19 544.25
Italy 778.18 729.24 683.08 731.32 626.27 712,37 667.61 666.04 679.49 578.23
Luxembourg 1812.56 2107.57 1453.05 1712.27 1695.84 1785.39 1603.20 1860.60 1877.52 2018.17
Netherlands 971.98 947.30 535.54 605.62 776.25 785.29 865.69 855.72 913.51 941.25
Portugal 360.40 279.58 236.99 278.84 245.93 307.79 371.44 248.44 324.97 357.57
Spain 359.23 364.38 373.08 371.33 334.25 434.47 460.05 467.22 448.02 464.91
Sweden 1909.99 1859.55 1768.00 1728.89 1503.04 1208.25 1164.86 989.77 884.82 963.74
UK 223.12 252.31 235.79 277.03 280.87 238.99 176.30 265.40 309.30 270.91
EU15 763.46 729.96 706.99 721.23 680.59 688.80 676.04 669.56 683.37 652.49
German rank 
from the highest
4 * o fl2 ; 
7* of 15
3* of 12; 
6'^  of 15
6 * o fl5 5'" of 15 5“' of 15 5 * o fl5 5 ^ o fl5 5 '% f 15 7 * o f l5 8'" of 15
Note: 1960-1972: EC6; 1973-1980: EC9; 1981-1985: EClO; 1986-1994: EC12; 1995-2002: EU15
Source: Author’s calculations based on statistics from OECD Statistical Compendium 2003 (electronic version), Paris: OECD Electronic
Publications, 2003.
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Table 1.4; SUBSIDIES AS A SHARE OF GDP. 1960-2002 (per cent)
COUNTRY 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Austria 1.92 1.90 2.14 2.41 2.29 2.32 2.34 2.22 2.14 2.03 1.82
Belgium 1.65 1.68 1.72 1.86 1.78 2.09 2.51 2.09 2.51 2.32 2.29
Denmark 0.64 2.36 2.39 2.36 2.10 1.71 1.98 2.28 2.65 2.60 2.58
Finland 2.55 2.25 2.22 2.71 3.06 2.84 2.91 2.61 2.51 2.66 2.50
France 1.65 2.00 2.17 2.46 2.32 2.47 2.52 2.49 2.98 2.72 2.24
Germany 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.71 0.82 1.05 0.97 0.94 2.04 1.63 1.46
Greece 0.13 0.31 0.31 0.48 0.81 1.01 1.48 1.65 1.29 0.81 0.74
Ireland 2.27 2.96 2.57 2.45 2.55 2.75 2.90 3.28 3.27 3.35 3.39
Italy 1.66 1.19 1.45 1.20 1.51 1.56 1.58 1.73 2.04 2.13 1.82
Luxembourg 1.11 1.25 1.37 1.34 1.82 2.25 2.42 2.50 2.25 1.46 1.20
Netherlands 2.03 1.85 1.46 1.39 1.41 1.18 1.22 1.42 1.40 0.82 1.00
Portugal 0.75 1.05 1.00 0.79 0.68 1.15 1.08 1.07 1.35 1.08 1.47
Spain 0.80 0.75 0.97 0.68 0.48 0.52 0.43 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.50
Sweden 0.73 0.84 0.84 1.09 1.03 1.07 1.18 1.17 1.59 1.45 1.29
UK 1.93 2.20 2.15 1.88 1.56 1.60 1.47 2.00 2.06 1.80 1.37
German rank from 
the highest
6*of6 ;
13*of
15
6*of6 ; 
14'*^  of 
15
6*of6 ;
14% fl5
6*of6 ;
13* of 
15
6*of6 ; 
12* of 
15
6 *^* of 6; 
13* of 
15
6'" of 6; 
14* of 
15
6*of6 ; 
14* of 
15
4"" of 6; 
10* of 
15
4'" of 6; 
9* of 15
4“ of 6; 
9* of 15
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Table 1.4: SUBSIDIES AS A SHARE OF GDP. 1960-2002 (per cent)
COUNTRY 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Austria 1.89 1.73 1.78 2.19 3.04 3.02 3.06 3.29 3.05 3.17 3.18
Belgium 2.19 2.42 2.53 2.34 2.59 2.68 2.88 2.96 3.03 2.79 2.94
Denmark 3.30 3.70 1.85 2.23 1.53 1.88 1.26 1.35 1.37 1.66 1.70
Finland 2.45 2.38 2.04 2.77 3.43 3.38 3.38 3.18 3.41 3.21 3.24
France 1.76 1.68 1.81 1.96 2.17 2.21 2.28 2.16 2.24 2.13 2.32
Germany 1.47 1.78 1.73 1.68 1.77 1.70 1.69 1.91 1.90 1.81 1.80
Greece 1.05 1.10 1.56 2.25 2.16 2.36 2.49 2.40 1.91 1.99 3.06
Ireland 3.23 2.94 2.10 2.09 2.52 2.50 2.29 2.48 2.62 2.64 2.69
Italy 1.95 2.28 1.95 1.90 2.61 2.52 2.72 2.94 2.94 2.70 2.69
Luxembourg 1.26 1.43 1.56 1.76 2.70 3.20 3.89 3.75 3.71 3.57 4.48
Netherlands 0.84 0.95 1.11 1.10 1.12 1.47 1.55 1.63 1.69 1.64 1.53
Portugal 1.32 1.08 1.18 2.13 2.16 3.40 3.27 3.74 4.02 4.60 4.91
Spain 0.60 0.59 0.53 0.54 0.66 0.75 0.81 1.09 0.97 1.06 1.00
Sweden 1.40 1.44 1.42 1.83 2.39 3.03 3.10 3.11 3.22 3.24 3.49
UK 1.31 1.44 1.55 2.86 2.61 2.16 1.76 1.65 1.73 1.80 1.80
German rank from 
the highest
4"" of 6; 
8'^  of 15
3'"^  of 6; 
6 ^ o f l5
6'" of 9; 
8* of 15
8'*^ of 9; 
13'’’ of 
15
7'*’ of 9; 
12* of 
15
8'" of 9; 
13* of 
15
7* of 9; 
12* of 
15
6"’ of 9; 
11* of 
15
6"’ of 9; 
11* of 
15
6"’ of 9; 
11* of 
15
7'*’ of 
10; 11* 
of 15
233
Table 1.4: SUBSIDIES AS A SHARE OF GDP. 1960-2002 foer cenO
COUNTRY 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Austria 3.20 3.13 3.04 3.19 3.57 3.54 3.34 3.17 3.07 3.31 3.31
Belgium 2.56 2.81 2.88 2.42 2.31 2.03 2.13 1.74 1.66 1.69 1.59
Denmark 1.94 1.92 1.78 1.66 1.46 1.46 2.08 2.18 2.25 2.14 2.75
Finland 3.08 3.20 3.17 3.11 3.13 3.03 2.94 2.78 2.92 3.43 3.56
France 2.37 2.39 2.72 2.59 2.60 2.47 2.08 1.96 1.81 1.74 1.71
Germany 1.76 1.72 1.79 1.87 1.89 2.01 1.99 1.96 1.76 2.18 1.94
Greece 2.41 1.77 1.65 2.43 2.27 1.99 2.02 1.49 1.22 0.61 0.51
Ireland 2,59 2.62 2.38 2.30 2.09 2.63 2.97 0.63 1.13 1.13 1.17
Italy 2.91 2.73 2.81 2.57 2.84 2.43 2.19 2.21 1.88 1.86 1.79
Luxembourg 4.54 5.26 4.42 3.35 3.27 3.37 3.08 2.69 2.57 2.68 2.79
Netherlands 1.67 1.80 1.91 1.93 1.96 2,36 2.27 2.30 2.25 2.25 2.33
Portugal 3.88 3.63 3.96 3.44 3.39 2.69 2.42 2.11 1.73 1,64 1.93
Spain 1.27 1.32 1.43 1.35 1.09 1.00 1.14 1.09 1.06 1.00 0.96
Sweden 3.71 3.87 3.73 3.76 3.65 3.54 3.28 3.37 3.48 3.76 4.10
UK 1.45 1.37 1.54 1.38 1.03 0.94 0.78 0.63 0.66 0.62 0.71
German rank from 
the highest
8'" of
10; 12'h
of 15
9 * o f 
10; 13'h 
of 15
7'" of 
10; ll'h  
of 15
7“  of 
10; 11* 
of 15
9“ of 
12; 12* 
of 15
8th of 
12; 11* 
of 15
10'" of 
12;13* 
of 15
7'" of 
12;10* 
of 15
6 "^ of 
12; 9* 
of 15
3 * 0 f 
12; 6* 
of 15
4^ " of 
12; 7* 
of 15
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Table 1.4: SUBSIDIES AS A SHARE OF GDP. 1960-2002 (per cent)
COUNTRY 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria 3.40 2.90 2.89 2.63 2.56 2.76 2.57 2.42 2.61 2.67
Belgium 1.60 1.48 1.50 1.57 1.40 1.48 1.47 0.68 1.57 1.52
Denmark 2.63 2.61 2.48 2.55 2.44 2.33 2.26 2.16 2.09 2.12
Finland 3.37 3.18 2.79 2.00 1.79 1.65 1.58 1.51 1.44 1.41
France 1.66 1.57 1.46 1.54 1.50 1.36 1.35 1.25 1.32 1.26
Germany 1.88 2.10 2.12 2.02 1.83 1.85 1.82 1.73 1.63 1.47
Greece 0.50 0.40 0.42 0.47 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.16
freland 1.34 1.09 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.83 0.81 0.76 0.93 0.75
Italy 1.96 1.71 1.47 1.49 1.22 1.34 1.23 1.19 1.19 0.99
Luxembourg 2.51 2.74 1.83 2.07 1.86 1.82 1.54 1.64 1.64 1.78
Netherlands 2.10 1.95 1.07 1.19 1.49 1.47 1.57 1.47 1.50 1.50
Portugal 2.40 1.72 1.34 1.49 1.24 1.47 1.68 1.07 1.34 1.40
Spain 1.16 1.10 1.07 1.03 0.90 1.14 1.19 1.18 1.10 1.09
Sweden 4.46 4.06 3.71 3.21 2.70 2.17 2.01 1.58 1.53 1.60
UK 0.69 0.73 0.70 0.77 0.63 0.50 0.35 0.46 0.53 0.45
German rank from the 
highest
6'*^ of 12; 
9 * o f l5
3"“ of 12; 
6 * o f l5
5"’ of 15 5'" of 15 5'" of 15 4"^  of 15 4 * o f l5 3^cdT5 4'^ of 15 7'" of 15
Source: Author’s percentage calculations based on statistics from OECD Statistical Compendium 2003 (electronic version), Paris: OECD
Electronic Publications, 2003.
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Appendix B
FIRMS IN BREMER VULKAN VERBUND IN SHIPBUILDING DIVISION
AT 31 DECEMBER 1993
Name of Firm Location
Beteiligungsgesellschafl Siems mbH Liibeck, Schleswig-Holstein
Bremer Vulkan Werft und Maschinenfabrik 
GmbH
Bremen
DBG Dockbetriebgesellschaft Rostock mbH Rostock, Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania
DBG Dockbetrieb Bremerhaven GmbH Bremerhaven
Flender Werft AG Liibeck, Schleswig-Holstein
Geeste Metallbau GmbH Bremerhaven
Gnmdstiickgesellschafl Siems mbH Liibeck, Schleswig-Holstein
Hanse Schiffs- nnd Maschinenbaugesellschaft Rostock, Mecklenburg-Western
mbH Pomerania
Ingenieurtechnik und Maschinenbau GmbH Rostock, Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania
Ladenbau Johann Weimann GmbH Liibeck, Schleswig-Holstein
Lloyd Werft Bremerhaven GmbH Bremerhaven
MTW Schiffswerft GmbH Wismar, Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania
Neptun Industrie Rostock GmbH Rostock, Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania
Neue Jadewerft GmbH Wilhelmshaven, Lower Saxony
OXYTECHNIK Gesellschaft fur Systemtechnik 
mbH
Bschbom in Hessen
Rickmers Lloyd Dockbetrieb GmbH Bremerhaven
Schichau Seebeckwerft AG Bremerhaven
Seebeck TechnoProduct GmbH Bremerhaven
Volkswerft GmbH Stralsund Stralsund, Mecklenburg-Westem 
Pomerania
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Name of Firm Location
Vulkan Engineering GmbH Bremen
Vulkan Werften Verbund GmbH Bremen
Zweite Copia
Vermogensverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH
Bremen
Source: Author’s compilation from Bremische Bürgerschaft (1998; 190-191).
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Appendix C
EUROPEAN UNION LEGISLATION ON SHIPBUILDING AID. 1969-2002
Number of 
Legislation
Type of Legislation Date of Legislation Official Journal 
Reference
Period of Validity Key Elements
31969L0262 Council Directive 28 July 1969 OJ L 206,15 August 
1969, pp. 25-26
28 July 1969 -  
31 December 1971
Aid of up to 10 per cent of 
the contractually-fixed 
price of the ship
31972L0273 Council Directive
(2 nd)
20 July 1972 OJ L 169,27 July 
1972, pp. 28-30
1 January 1972 -  
31 December 1974
- Export credits for ships
- Aid of up to 5 per cent of 
the contract price in 1972 
and 4 per cent in 1973
31974L0643 Council Directive 19 December 1974 O JL 349 ,28 
December 1974, p. 
62
1 January 1975 -  
30 June 1975
Extension of Council 
Directive 31972L0273 for 
six months until 30 June 
1975
31975L0432 Council Directive
(3 rd)
10 July 1975 O JL 192 ,24 July 
1975, pp. 27-29
1 July 1975 -  
31 December 1977
- Provision of credit 
facilities for exports and 
for all other sales of ships
- Rescue aid
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Number of
Legislation
Type of Legislation Date of Legislation Official Journal
Reference i\.cic cu c
O J L 9 8 ,11 April 
1978, p. 19
Period of Validity Key Elements
31978L0338 Council Directive
(A
4 April 1978 1 January 1978 -  
31 December 1980
- Provision of credit 
facilities for the sale and 
conversion of ships where 
it is a case of matching 
terms offered by a 
shipbuilder from a non­
member country
- Investment aid is only 
allowed if  it does not lead 
to increases in the capacity 
of the sector in the member 
state or to the creation of 
employment which is not 
of a stable nature
- Rescue aid
- Crisis aid
31981L0022 Council Directive 20 January 1981 O JL43, 14 
December 1981, p. 
14
1 January 1981 -  
31 March 1981
Extension of Council 
Directive 31978L0338 for 
three months until 31 
March 1981
239
Number of
Legislation
Type of Legislation Date of Legislation Official Journal
Reference
Period of Validity Key Elements
31981L0363 Council Directive 
(5 ^
28 April 1981 OJ L 137, 23 May 
1981, p. 39
1 April 1981 -  
31 December 1982
- Provision of credit 
facilities for sales or 
conversion of ships
- Investment aid is only 
allowed if it does not lead 
to increases in the capacity 
of the sector in the member 
state or to the creation of 
employment which is not 
of a stable nature
- Rescue aid
- Aid to deal with the 
social and regional 
consequences of 
restructuring
- Crisis aid
- Aid in the form of cost- 
escalation insurance
- Ship-owner aid_________
31982L0880 Council Directive 21 December 1982 O JL371,30 
December 1982, p. 
46
1 January 1983 -  
31 December 1984
Extension of Council 
Directive 31981L0363 for 
two years until 31 
December 1984
240
Number of
Legislation
Type of Legislation Date of Legislation Official Journal
Reference ivcicrcu c
OJ L 2, 3 January 
1985, p. 13
Period of Validity Key Elements
31985L0002 Council Directive 18 December 1984 1 January 1985 -  
31 December 1986
Extension of Council 
Directive 31982L0880 for 
two years until 31 
December 1986
31987L0167 Council Directive 
(6"')
26 January 1987 OJ L 69, 12 March 
1987,pp. 55-64
1 January 1987 -  
31 December 1990
- Aid to ship-owners
- Operating aid - contract- 
related production aid
- Credit facilities for the 
building or conversion of 
ships
- Rescue aid, loss 
compensation and other aid 
to facihtate the continued 
operation of shipbuilding 
and ship-conversion 
companies
- Restructuring investment 
aid so long as it does not 
lead to increases in the 
shipbuilding capacity
- Closure aid
241
Number of
Legislation
Type of Legislation Date of Legislation Official Journal
Reference
Period of Validity Key Elements
31990L0652 Council Directive 4 December 1990 O IL  353,17 
December 1990, p. 
45
3 October 1990 -  
31 December 1990
- Includes the new 
Bundeslander in Chapter 
IV of Council Directive 
87/167/EEC
- Operating aid in line with 
restructuring in new 
Bundeslander
31990L0684 Council Directive 
(7*)
21 December 1990 OJL380,31 
December 1990, pp. 
27-36
1 January 1991 -  
31 December 1993
- Credit facilities, 
guarantees and tax 
concessions granted to 
ship-owners
- Production aid
- Extension of delivery 
limit
- Aid for continued 
operation including rescue 
aid, loss compensation and 
all other types of operating 
aid
- Investment aid without 
increase of shipbuilding 
capacity
- Closure aid
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Number of 
Legislation
Type of Legislation Date of Legislation Official Journal 
Reference
Period of Validity Key Elements
31992L0068 Council Directive 20 July 1992 OJ L 219,4 August 
1992, pp. 54-55
1 July 1990- 
31 December 1993
- Includes the new 
Bundeslander in Chapter 
IV of Council Directive 
90/684/EEC
- Operating aid for new 
Bundeslander
31993L0115 Council Directive 16 December 1993 OJ L 326, 28 
December 1993, p. 
62
1 January 1994- 
31 December 1994
Extension of Council 
Directive 31990L0684 for 
one year until 31 
December 1994
31995R3094 Council Regulation 22 December 1995 OJ L 332, 30 
December 1995, pp. 
1-9
From 31 December 
1995
- Social assistance
- Ship-owner aid -  loans, 
guarantees
- Development assistance
- Other exceptional aid
31996R1904 Council Regulation 27 September 1996 OJ L 251, 3 October 
1996, p. 5
Directive 
31990L0684 
applies until OECD 
Agreement enters 
into force or 31 
December 1997 at 
the latest
Amendment of Council 
Regulation 31995R3094
31997R1013 Council Regulation 2 June 1997 OJ L 148, 6 June 
1997, pp. 1-3
7 June 1997 -  
31 December 1998
Additional operating aid 
for shipyards in new 
Bundeslander
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Number of 
Legislation
Type of Legislation Date of Legislation Official Journal 
Reference
Period of Validity Key Elements
31997R2600 Council Regulation 19 December 1997 O JL351,23 
December 1997, p. 
18
23 December 1997 
-  until the OECD 
Agreement enters 
into force or 31 
December 1998 at 
the latest
Amendment of Regulation 
(EC) No. 3094/95 
(Directive 31990L0684 
applies)
31998R1540 Council Regulation 29 June 1998 OJL202, 18 July 
1998,p p .1-10
1 January 1999 -  
31 December 2003
- Contract-related 
operating aid
- Closure aid
- Restructuring aid
- R & D and investment 
aid for innovation
- Regional investment aid 
-Aid for environmental 
protection
32002R1177 Council Regulation 27 June 2002 OJ L 172,2 July 
2002, pp. 1-3
3 July 2002- 
31 March 2004
- Direct aid for contracts 
for building container 
ships, product and 
chemical tankers, LNG 
carriers for up to 6 per cent 
of contract value before 
aid
Source: Author’s compilation based on respective Council Directives and Regulations.
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Appendix D
COMMISSION DECISIONS ON SHIPBUILDING AID ACROSS EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES. 1961-2002
DECISION DATE TITLE COUNTRY OFFICIAL
JOURNAL
REFERENCE
1 3196100408(01) 1961 Commission Decision on a modification of the system of aid 
applied in Italy in respect of shipbuilding
Italy OJ 25, 8 April 1961, 
p. 582
2 3197900496 2 May 1979 Commission Decision of 2 May 1979 on the United Kingdom 
scheme of assistance in the form of interest relief grants in favour 
of the offshore supplies industry (offshore supplies interest relief 
grant, OSIRG)
UK OJ L 127, 24 May 
1979, p. 50
3 3198200047 16
December
1981
Commission Decision of 16 December 1981 on a proposal of the 
United Kingdom Government to grant aid for the export of two 
ships to Panama
UK OJ L 20, 28 January 
1982, p. 43
4 3198800281 17
November
1987
Commission Decision of 17 November 1987 on aid for 
shipbuilding and ship-repair in Italy -  Article 10 of Law No. I l l  of 
22 March 1985
Italy O JL 119,7M ay 
1988, p. 33
5 3198800437 20 January 
1988
Commission Decision of 20 January 1988 concerning aids planned 
by the French Government in favour of a shipbuilding contract for 
which there is competition between yards in several member states
France O JL  211,4 August 
1988, p. 24
6 31990D0223 20 April 
1989
Commission Decision of 20 April 1989 concerning an aid 
project planned by the German Government in favour of a 
shipbuilding contract for which there is competition between 
yards in different member states
Germany OJ L 118,9 May 
1990, p. 39
7 3199000627 4 July 1990 Commission Decision of 4 July 1990 on loans granted by the 
Belgian authorities to two ship-owners for the purchase of a 34000 
m3 LPG ship and two refrigerator ships
Belgium OJ L 338, 5 
December 1990, p. 
21
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DECISION DATE TITLE COUNTRY OFFICIAL
JOURNAL
REFERENCE
8 31991D0306 12
December
1990
Commission Decision of 12 December 1990 concerning two aid 
projects of the German Government in favour of a shipyard in 
financial difficulties C 54/89 (ex NN 27/89, No. 140/89)
Germany OJ L 158,22 June 
1991, p. 71
9 31991D0375 13 March 
1991
Commission Decision of 13 March 1991 concerning credits granted 
by the Belgian authorities to various ship-owners for the building of 
nine vessels Aid No. C 32/90 (ex NN 61/90)
Belgium O J L 203, 26 July 
1991, p. 105
10 31992D0569 31 July 
1992
Commission Decision of 31 July 1992 concerning proposed aid by 
Germany to the Chinese shipping company Cosco for the 
construction of container vessels
Germany OJ L 367,16 
December 1992, p. 
29
11 31997D0364 5 December 
1997
Commission Decision of 5 February 1997 concerning the financing of 
shipbuilding in Denmark during 1987 to 1993
Denmark OJ L 154, 12 June 
1997, p. 35
12 31997D0616 21 May 
1997
Commission Decision of 21 May 1997 on the aid granted by 
Germany to Bremer Vulkan Werft GmbH
Germany OJ L 250,13 
September 1997, p. 
10
13 31998D0157 5 November 
1997
Commission Decision of 5 November 1997 concerning aid Spain 
proposes to grant to Astilleros Zamacona SA in respect of five 
tugboats
Spain OJ L 50, 20 February 
1998, p. 38
14 31999D0142 25
February
1998
Commission Decision of 25 February 1998 on development aid 
granted by Germany for the construction of a dredger sold to 
Indonesia
Germany OJ L 46,20  
February 1999, p. 
52
15 31999D0148 13 May 
1998
Commission Decision of 13 May 1998 on state aid granted by Italy by 
way of tax relief under Law No. 549/95 to firms in the motor vehicle, 
shipbuilding and synthetic fibres industries and to steel firms covered 
by the ECSC Treaty
Italy OJ L 47,23 February 
1999, p. 6
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JOURNAL
REFERENCE
16 31999D0274 22 July 
1998
Commission Decision of 22 July 1998 on the misuse of restructuring 
aid for MTW-Schiffswerft and Volkswerft Stralsund, two 
companies formerly belonging to Bremer Vulkan Verbund, and the 
unauthorized provision of an investment loan of DM 112.4 million to 
MTW-Schiffswerft
Germany OJ L 108,27 April 
1999, p. 34
17 31999D0374 28 October 
1998
Commission Decision of 28 October 1998 on aid granted by 
Germany to Neptun Industrie Rostock GmbH
Germany OJ L 144, 9 June 
1999, p. 21
18 31999D0379 11
November
1998
Commission Decision of 11 November 1998 on aid for the INMA SpA 
shipyard under Italian Law No. 564/93, converted by Law No. 132/94
Italy OJ L 145, 10 June 
1999, p. 27
19 31999D0657 3 March 
1999
Commission Decision of 3 March 1999 on the aid which Germany 
has granted by way of development assistance to Indonesia in 
connection with the construction of two dredgers by Volkswerft 
Stralsund and the sale of the dredgers to Pengerukan (Rukindo)
Germany OJ L 259, 6 
October 1999, p. 
19
20 31999D0675 8 July 1999 Commission Decision of 8 July 1999 on the state aid implemented by 
Germany in favour of Kvaerner Wamow Werft GmbH (amended 
by 32000D0416)
Germany OJ L 274,23 
October 1999, p. 
23
21 31999D0719 30 March 
1999
Commission Decision of 30 March 1999 on state aid which France is 
planning to grant as development aid in the sale of two cruise vessels to 
be built by Chantiers de T Atlantique and operated by Renaissance 
Financial in French Polynesia
France OJ L 292, 13 
November 1999, p. 
23
22 31999D0763 17 March 
1999
Commission Decision of 17 March 1999 on the measures, 
implemented and proposed, by the Federal State of Bremen, 
Germany, in favour of Liirssen Maritime Beteiligungen GmbH & 
Co. KG
Germany OJ L 301, 24 
November 1999, p. 
8
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JOURNAL
REFERENCE
23 32000D0131 26 October 
1999
Commission Decision of 26 October 1999 on the state aid 
implemented by Spain in favour of the publicly-owned shipyards
Spain OJ L 37,12 February
2000, p. 22
24 32000D0250 16
November
1999
Commission Decision of 16 November 1999 on the state aid which 
Italy plans to grant for the creation of new shipyards at Oristano 
(Sardinia) and Belvedere Marittimo
Italy OJ L 78,29 March 
2000, p. 23
25 32000D0262 20 July 1999 Commission Decision of 20 July 1999 on state aid granted by Italy to 
the INMA shipyard through the public holding company Itainvest 
(formerly GEPI)
Italy OJ L 83,4 April
2000, p. 21
26 32000D0336 15
February
2000
Commission Decision of 15 February 2000 on state aid 
implemented by Germany in favour of Kvaerner Warnow W erft 
GmbH
Germany O J L 120,20 May
2000, p. 12
27 32000D0416 29 March 
2000
Commission Decision of 29 March 2000 on state aid implemented 
by Germany in favour of Kvaerner Warnow W erft GmbH (1999) 
and amending Decision 1999/675/EC
Germany O J L 156,29 June 
2000, p. 39
28 32000D0668 12 July 2000 Commission Decision of 12 July 2000 on state aid granted by Italy to 
shipbuilders in the form of tax relief under Law No. 549/95
Italy O JL 2 7 9 ,1 
November 2000, p. 
46
29 32001D0522 7 February 
2001
Commission Decision of 7 February 2001 on the state aid which the 
Netherlands intends to grant to China in the form of development 
assistance for the construction of a high technology dredger
Netherlands O JL 1 8 9 ,11 July
2001, p. 21
30 32001D0882 25 July 2001 Commission Decision of 25 July 2001 on the state aid implemented 
by France in the form of development assistance for the cruise vessel 
‘Le Levant’, built by Alstom Leroux Naval for operation in Saint- 
Pierre-et-Miquelon
France O JL  327, 12 
December 2001, p. 37
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REFERENCE
31 32002D0132 25 April 
2001
Commission Decision of 25 April 2001 on state aid granted by France 
to the shipyard ACHCN
France O JL 47, 19 
February 2002, p. 37
32 32002D0284 19
September
2001
Commission Decision of 19 September 2001 on the state aid which the 
Netherlands is planning to implement in the form of development 
assistance for a high technology dredger for the Republic of Djibouti
Netherlands OJ L 105, 20 April
2002, p. 26
33 32002D0632 12 March 
2002
Commission Decision of 12 March 2002 on the state aid which 
Germany is planning to implement for Flender W erft AG, Liibeck
Germany O J L 203,1 August
2002, p. 60
34 32002D0868 17 July 
2002
Conunission decision of 17 July 2002 on the aid scheme implemented 
by Italy in order to reduce the number of single-hull tankers older than 
20 years in the Italian tanker fleet
Italy OJ L 307, 8 
November 2002, p. 
49
35 32003D0045 5 June 2002 Commission Decision of 5 June 2002 on the measures to restructure 
and privatise Koninklijke Schelde Groep implemented by the 
Netherlands
Netherlands OJ L 14, 21 January 
2003, p. 56
36 32003D0055 30 October 
2002
Commission Decision of 30 October 2002 on the State aid granted by 
Italy to Industrie Navali Meccaniche Affini SpA (INMA)
Italy OJ L 22, 25 January 
2003, p. 36
37 32003D0730 13
December
2000
Commission Decision of 13 December 2000 on state aid which the 
Netherlands is planning to implement in the form of development 
assistance for two general cargo vessels and two pulp and paper 
carriers to be built by Bodewes/Pattje for use in Indonesia
Netherlands O JL 264, 15 
October 2003, pp. 
25-27
Source: Author’s compilation from texts of Commission Decisions published in various issues of the Official Journal of the European
Communities (L Series).
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Appendix E
SHIPBUILDING STATE AID CASES IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES
CASE
NUMBER
COUNTRY TITLE OF AID REFERENCE
1961
1 Italy Modification of system of aid applied in respect of shipbuilding OJC 25, 8 April 1961, p. 
582
1968
2 France Shipbuilding aid OJ C 107, 18 October 
1968, p. 1
1971
3 Germany Exemption and fiscal reductions under German law of 28 December 1968 
on taxation of maritime transport
O J C 40,28 April 1971, 
p. 5
1973
4 Italy Direct aids for the construction and repair of ships and for investments in these 
sectors
CEC 1974
5 France Compensation equivalent to cost increases during the building of ships CEC 1974
1977
6 Netherlands Aid to facilitate implementation of the restructuring measures in the 
shipbuilding industry
CEC 1978
7 UK Fourteen notification cases of Intervention Fund up to November 1977 CEC 1978
8 France Aid to enable its shipbuilding industry to secure new orders CEC 1978
9 Denmark Favourable credit facilities to ship-owners purchasing ships fi-om Danish 
shipyards
CEC 1978
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CASE
NUMBER
COUNTRY TITLE OF AID REFERENCE
1978
10 France Assistance totalling FF 55 million to the ship-repairing industry in France OJ C 152, 28 June 1978,
p. 2
11 UK One-year £90 million Intervention Fund for the shipbuilding industry OJ C 152, 28 June 1978,
p. 2
12 Netherlands Assistance for the restructuring of the shipbuilding, ship-repairing and heavy 
engineering industries in the Netherlands
O JC 161, 7 July 1978,
p. 2
13 Denmark Credit facilities for ship-owners for ships purchased from Danish shipyards CEC 1979
14 Netherlands 30 per cent investment grant towards modernising equipment for a new ship- 
repair firm
CEC 1979
15 France Subsidies of 25 per cent of the contract price for the shipbuilding industry CEC 1979
16 Ireland Subsidy up to 30 per cent of the contract price for the sole Irish yard to 
withstand the current crisis
CEC 1979
17 Italy Production aid of up to 30 per cent of the vessel’s building costs for orders 
placed up to 30 September 1978
CEC 1979
1979
18 UK Scheme of assistance in the form of interest relief grants in favour of the 
offshore supplies industry
OJ L 127, 24 May 1979, 
p. 50
19 UK Nineteen cases of proposed application of aid under 1978/1979 Intervention 
Fund -  for one case
CEC 1980
20 UK £30 million aid fimd for the Northern Ireland shipyard of Harland and Wolff 
Ltd.
OJ C 97,18 April 1979, 
p. 4
21 Germany Proposed scheme of assistance to its shipbuilding industry CEC 1980
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CASE
NUMBER
COUNTRY TITLE OF AID REFERENCE
1980
22 Italy Proposals of the Italian government to provide aid under Law No. 231 of 25 May 
1978 to a shipyard in Palermo for the construction of two car ferries
OJC 141, 10 June 
1980, p. 2
23 Italy Proposal of the Italian government to grant aids for the construction of dry docks at 
Palermo, Messina and Trapani under Law No. 34 of 10 August 1978 of the Sicilian 
Regional Authority
OJ C 143,12 June 
1980, p. 5
24 Italy Proposals of the Italian government to grant aids under Law No, 231 of 25 May 
1978 for the construction by Italian yards of 51 ships
OJ C 264, 11 October 
1980,p .3
25 Belgium Belgian plan to grant aid to the ship-repair industry in Antwerp OJ C 278, 27 October 
1980, p. 2
26 France Production aid for the construction of four ships for a Polish owner CEC 1981
27 France Aid for the construction of four container vessels in a French yard CEC 1981
28 Italy Production aid of up to 15 per cent of the contract price of repair work or 
conversion work commenced in 1979 or 1980
CEC 1981
29 Italy Fifteen cases under the application of the aid scheme under Law No. 231 CEC 1981
30 Italy Shipbuilding aid case CEC 1981
31 Italy New shipbuilding aid scheme under Law No. 122 of 1980 CEC 1981
1981
32 UK Two UK aid schemes concerning export credits for ships OJ C 252, 2 October 
1981, p. 3
33 Italy Planned Italian rescue aid for the Alto Adriatico shipyard O JC 319, 8 
December 1981, p. 3
34 France Extension of its shipbuilding aid scheme to cover 1981 and 1982 CEC 1982
35 Denmark Extend the credit facility scheme offered to Danish ship-owners -  first for 1981 and 
then for 1982
CEC 1982
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NUMBER
COUNTRY TITLE OF AID REFERENCE
36 UK UK shipbuilding aid for first six months of 1981 CEC 1982
37 UK Shipbuilding aid up to 1 July 1982 CEC 1982
38 UK Aid for two vessels to an Indonesia ship-owner - destined for Panama OJ L 20, 28 January 
1982, p. 43
1982
39 Netherlands Netherlands aid plan to rescue the NSM shipyards in Amsterdam OJ C 36, 12 
February 1982, p. 2
40 Germany Proposed grant of assistance to shipbuilding by the Federal Republic of 
Germany in the form of compensatory payments calculated on the basis of 
fictitious loan transactions in conjunction with orders for vessels
O J C 107,28 AprU 
1982, p. 2
41 Germany Renewal of shipbuilding aid scheme (credit facilities on the purchase of vessels) CEC 1983
42 UK UK proposal to assist shipbuilding during the period from 16 July 1982 -  15 July 
1983 (Fifth Intervention Fund for Shipbuilding)
O JC  175, 13 July 
1982, p. 2
43 Italy Number of measures to assist shipbuilding and ship-repair to be taken under Act No. 
599/82 covering the period 1981-1983
CEC 1983
44 Belgium Aid for amalgamation of two major Belgian yards CEC 1983
45 Netherlands Planned aid totalling HFL 35 million to a repair yard CEC 1983
46 Italy Italian Government’s plans for the ship-repair industry under Act No. 599/82 CEC 1983
1983
47 France Extension of its 1981-1982 shipbuilding aid scheme to 1983-1984 CEC 1984
48 Netherlands Aid of between 3 and 8 per cent for shipbuilding until 31 December 1984 CEC 1984
49 Denmark Extension to 1983-1984 of the Danish scheme of credit facilities for Danish ship­
owners ordering ships in the EC
CEC 1984
50 Ireland Production aid of 30 per cent in 1983 and 1984 to avert closure of the city’s last 
remaining yard
CEC 1984
51 Netherlands Rescue a repair yard in Amsterdam CEC 1984
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NUMBER
COUNTRY TITLE OF AID REFERENCE
1984
52 Netherlands Aid for port-handling facilities under consideration by the Netherlands 
Government
OJ C 196,25 July 1984,
p. 2
53 UK UK proposal to assist shipbuilding during the period 1 July 1984 -  1 July 1986 OJ C 219, 21 August 
1984, p. 3
54 Italy Italian government’s proposed aid scheme for the shipbuilding and ship-repair 
industries covering the period 1 July 1984 -  31 December 1986
OJ C 290, 30 October 
1984, p. 2
55 Netherlands Dutch government’s plans for aid to its shipbuilding industry between 1 January 
and 31 December 1984
OJ C 319, 30 November 
1984, p. 4
56 Germany North German coastal Lander shipbuilding aid scheme CEC 1985
57 France Emergency measures -  a restructuring grant and a credit line for guaranteeing 
the solvency of a large shipbuilding group
CEC 1985
1985
58 Germany Shipbuilding aid in Bavaria CEC 1986
59 France Additional aid given to the French shipbuilding industry in 1984 OJ C 18,19 January 
1985, p .4
60 France French Decree No. 84282 of 9 April 1984 on the introduction of a parafiscal tax 
on inland waterway transport operations under the freight rota system
OJ C 37, 9 February 
1985, p. 2
61 France Proposal by the French government to award aid to the shipbuilding and ship- 
repair industries from 1 January 1985 -  31 December 1986
OJ C 252, 3 October 
1985, p. 4
62 Denmark Prolongation into 1985 of its aid scheme of credit facilities for Danish ship­
owners for the purchase of ships in the EC
CEC 1986
63 Greece Credit facilities for Greek shipbuilders CEC 1986
64 Netherlands Dutch aid scheme for rationalising port-handling services CEC 1986
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NUMBER
COUNTRY TITLE OF AID REFERENCE
1986
65 Germany Aid by Hamburg to Blohm + Voss shipyard CEC 1987
66 Germany Aid to Harmstorf shipyard CEC 1987
67 Italy Proposal by the Italian government to award grants to large shipbuilding and ship- 
repair yards towards the cost of stocks
O JC 317, 10 
December 1986, p. 
2
68 Netherlands Dutch programme of scrapping CEC 1987
69 France French programme of scrapping accompanied by improved pre-retirement schemes CEC 1987
70 Italy Aid scheme for ship-owners for ports OJ C 78, 25 March 
1987
71 UK Aid scheme for ship-owners OJ C 96, 9 April 
1987
72 Italy Supplementary aid in respect of contracts signed in 1985 and 1986 by the Fincantieri 
yard
CEC 1987
1987
73 NN 121/87 
C 18/89
Germany Provision of state aid by the German government in connection with 
reorganisation and restructuring of a number of shipyards in the Land of 
Bremen and Lower Saxony -  Bremer Werftenverbund (considered under Article 
5 of the Sixth Directive)
OJ C 127,23 May 
1990
74 Italy Aid which the Italian government has decided to grant to ports OJ C 78,25 March 
1987, p. 5
75 UK and 
France
Contract-related production aid proposed by the UK and French governments in 
support of a particular shipbuilding contract for which there is competition between 
yards in different member states
O JC 313, 25 
November 1987, p. 
2
76 Germany Aid scheme on export credits for ships CEC 1987
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NUMBER
COUNTRY TITLE OF AID REFERENCE
77 Germany Shipbuilding aid award -  Firma Lindenau GmbH SchifTswerft and Maschinenfabrik
78 UK Eight aid schemes operating and restructuring aid to the shipbuilding industry CEC 1988
79 UK Home credit scheme CEC 1988
80 UK Two R & D aid schemes CEC 1988
81 Denmark Six aid schemes for shipbuilding -  construction aid to ship-owners and tax concessions to 
third persons by investments in new ships
CEC 1988
82 Germany Ten aid schemes -  direct operating aid to yards, shipbuilding credits and tax 
concessions to ship-owners and third persons investing in ships, restructuring aid to 
yards in the coastal Lander
CEC 1988
83 Germany Two aid schemes which allowed for the possibility of granting aid exceeding the 
prevailing aid ceiling
CEC 1988
84 Italy Planned investment aid to three ship-repair sector in Sicily CEC 1988
85 Denmark Export credits to ship-owners in third countries CEC 1988
86 UK Loss compensation for British shipbuilders in 1986 CEC 1988
87 Germany Construction of 5 container ships at German yards CEC 1988
88 Italy Refinancing of the Italian aid scheme for direct aid to large yards during 1984-1986 CEC 1988
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NUMBER
COUNTRY TITLE OF AID REFERENCE
89 UK Aid granted to the ports of London and Liverpool CEC 1988
90 UK Aid for the British fleet -  grants for the training of seamen CEC 1988
1988
91 N 444/88 ^  C 
12/89
Italy • The Italian draft law ‘Provisions concerning the shipbuilding industry and 
measures to foster applied research in the sector’
• Aid which Italy has decided to grant in order to compensate the losses of the 
state-owned shipyard Fincantieri for 1987 and Law 234/89 providing for 
shipbuilding aid in Italy
OJ C 293, 22 
November 1989
92 UK Aid planned by the UK government under the Sixth Council Directive of 26 
January 1987 on shipbuilding aid
OJ C 10,15 January 
1988, p. 6
93 Germany Aid planned by the German government under the Sixth Council Directive of 
26 January 1987 on shipbuilding aid -  Pohl and Jozwiak shipyard in 
Hamburg
OJ C 69,15 March 
1988, p. 3
94 Germany Shipbuilding aid in the form of credit facilities granted to national ship­
owners for building and conversion of fishing vessels
OJ C 69,15 March 
1988, p. 2
95 Italy Extraordinary assistance to complete the building of dry docks at Trapani, 
Messina and Palermo -  Law No. 23/87 of the Sicilian Regional Authority
OJ C 77, 24 March 
1988, p. 4
96 Belgium Aid which the Belgian government is proposing to grant to certain boatmen under 
its plan to convert the Belgian inland waterway fleet
O JC  113,29 April 
1988, p. 2
97 Italy Aid which the Italian government plans to grant to small and medium-sized 
shipyards
O JC  124,11 May 
1988, p. 5
98 France Aid granted by the French government to ports OJ C 169,28 June 
1988, p. 3
99 Germany Contract-related production aid proposed by the German government O JC 311,6 
December 1988, p. 3
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100 Netherlands 
and Germany
Aid proposed by the Dutch and German governments in support of a 
particular shipbuilding contract for an Irish ship-owner
OJ C 336,31 
December 1988, p. 
2
101 Germany Aid to be granted to HDW and Bremer Vulkan for construction of 4 container 
vessels for the Israeli maritime company ZIM
IP/88/467
102 Germany Contract-related production aid proposed by the German government in 
support of a particular shipbuilding contract for which there is competition 
between yards in different member states -  aid for a contract concerning the 
construction of a 1700 cgt wine-tanker for the German ship-owner Paul Haese
OJ C 336,31 
December 1988, p. 
2
103 Germany Aid plans for shipbuilding -  Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft and Flender 
Werft
CEC 1989
104 Belgium Three aid schemes on shipbuilding aid to ship-owners and investment and R & D 
aid to yards
OJ C 324, 17 
December 1988
105 Belgium Capital contribution from the Belgian State to Boelwerf CEC 1989
106 Germany Capital contribution of DM 112.5 million granted by the Federal Government 
as a shareholding participant to HDW
CEC 1989
107 France Closure aid for the winding up of the commercial shipbuilding activities of the 
yards of Chantiers du Nord et de la Mediteranée
CEC 1989
108 France Capacity reducing restructuring measures in the shipbuilding and ship-repair sector CEC 1989
109 Portugal Aid schemes notified by Portugal in support of the shipbuilding activities of its 
yards other than Setenave
CEC 1989
110 Germany Aid to the Armenius Werft shipyard for the building of 6-8 coasters for the 
German ship-owner Peter Dohle
CEC 1989
111 Netherlands Measures designed to improve the competitiveness of the Dutch fleet CEC 1989
112 Netherlands Reduction in the direct tax burden for sailors working on Dutch flag vessels CEC 1989
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113 Italy Shipbuilding and ship-repair aid -  Article 10 of Law No. 111 of 22 March 1985 OIL 119, 7 May 1988, 
p. 24
114 UK Extension until 31 March 1990 of aid to British ports which it had authorised in 
1987
CEC 1989
1989
115 Germany Development aid to Israel proposed by the German government in support 
of a particular shipbuilding contract
OJ C 162, 29 June 
1989, p. 14
116 Germany Development aid to Mauritius for the building of a 4500 dwt transport ship 
at Husumer Schiffswerft
IP/89/441
117 Germany Development aid to Thailand for three dredgers to be built at Sürken Werft, 
Papenburg
IP/89/441
118 Germany DM 4 million investment aid to Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft in Kiel IP/89/101
119 Germany Investment aid to HDW Nobiskrug shipyard IP/89/59
120 Germany Capital injection of DM 37.65 million to Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft in 
Kiel
IP/89/182
121 Germany Investment aid to Neue Jadewerft in Wilhelmshaven IP/89/318
122 Germany Two 90 per cent guarantees granted by Land of Lower Saxony for Sürken 
Werft in Papenburg
IP/89/556
123 Germany Development aid in support for building 4 fishing vessels for a Chilean 
enterprise by Sietas Werft
IP/89/578
124 Germany Prolongation of aid scheme on export credits for ships which had already 
originally been approved by the Commission in December 1987
IP/89/911
125 Germany Shipbuilding aid to Oldenburg Brand Werft CEC 1990a
126 Germany Shipbuilding aid to Kotterwerft CEC 1990a
127 Germany Shipbuilding aid to Arminius Werft CEC 1990a
128 Germany Shipbuilding aid to Deutsche Industrie Werke CEC 1990a
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129 Germany Shipbuilding aid to HDW and Flensburger Schiflbau Gesellschaft CEC 1990a
130 Belgium Financial terms offered to ship-owners for an LPG vessel to be built by the 
Boelwerf yard
Official Journal L 338, 5 
December 1990, p. 21
131 Spain Viability plan for the Merchant Navy CEC 1990a
132 NN 2 1 /8 9 ^  
C 10/89
Greece Application of Greek law 1262/1982 and its amendments to shipbuilding in 
Greece
OJ C 311, 12 December 
1989, p. 3
133 C 26/89 Spain Shipbuilding aid in Spain provided under Royal Decrees 1239/1987 and 
1433/1987 and the sector’s restructuring programme for the period 1987-1990 
and an additional aid in the form of loss compensation for public yards
OJ C 127, 23 May 1990, 
p. 4
134 NN 27/89 Germany Aids which Germany has decided to grant in the form of two guarantees 
on loans for Schiffswerft Gemersheim (considered under Article 5 of the 
Sixth Directive)
O J C 52,3 M arch 1990,
pp. 10-11
135 NN 76/89 ^  
C 38/90
Netherlands Aid which the Netherlands has decided to grant to the shipyard van der Giessen 
de Noord
OJ C 3, 5 January 1991, 
pp. 3-4
136 NN 9 1 /8 9 ^  
C 1/90
Belgium Aids which Belgium had decided to grant for the building of 2 refrigerator 
ships at the Boelwerf shipyard
OJ C 67,17 March 1990,
pp. 11-12
137 N 131/89 Portugal Proposal of the Portuguese government to grant subsidies to Portuguese ship­
owners for the purchase of vessels
OJ C 302,1 December 
1989, pp. 5-6
138 N 142/89 Greece Shipbuilding aid OJ C 3, 7 January 1992, 
p. 9
1990
139 C 18/90 Greece Aid which Greece has decided to grant to Neorion Shipyards of Syrol SA OJ C 229,14 September 
1990, pp. 6-7
140 NN 54/90 ^  
C 10/91
Greece Aid which Greece has granted to shipbuilding in the period 1987-1990 O JC  123, 9 May 1991, 
pp. 16-17
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141 NN 56/90 -> C 
11/91
Greece Aid which Greece has granted to shipbuilding in the period 1987- 
1990
O JC 123, 9 May 1991,pp. 
16-17
142 NN 58/90 C 
12/91
Greece Aid which Greece has granted to shipbuilding in the period 1987- 
1990
O JC 123, 9 May 1991, pp. 
16-17
143 NN 61/90 ^  C 
32/90
Belgium Aid which the Belgian government has granted under the Law of 23 
August 1948 on shipping credit for the building of nine ships
OJ C 318,18 December 
1990, pp. 2-3
144 NN 77/90 ^  C 
37/90
Germany Aid which the German Federal Republic has decided to grant to 
Flensburger Schiflbau Gesellschaft and Co. KG
OJ C 326,28 December 
1990, pp. 14-15
145 NN 102/90 
C 14/91
Greece Aid which Greece has decided to grant to its ship-repair industry OJ C 145,4 June 1991, pp. 
2-3
146 N 506/90 ^  C
7/91
Italy Aid which Italy plans to grant to shipbuilding O JC 123, 9 May 1991,pp. 
14-15
147 N 536/90-» C  
1/91
Belgium and 
Netherlands
Aid which Belgium and the Netherlands has decided to grant for the 
benefit of the contract to build a 15000 dwt dredger for Jan de Nul
O JC 82, 27 March 1991, 
pp. 4-5
148 592/90 Italy Loss compensation for the state-owned Fincantieri for 1989 OJ C 249,24 September 
1991, p. 5
149 Germany Shipbuilding aid to Sürken Werft Papenburg CEC 1991a
150 Germany Shipbuilding aid to Elfslether Werft CEC 1991a
151 Germany Aid for the construction by Schlomes Werft of 3 fishing vessels 
for Guinea Bissau
CEC 1991a
152 Denmark Special tax concessions granted to shareholders in ship-owning 
partnerships under Tax Law No. 388 of 7 June 1989
CEC 1991a
153 Portugal Aid for the restructuring of Setenave yard CEC 1991a
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1991
154 NN 10/91 Netherlands Aid to ship-owners for shipbuilding and ship conversion OJC 178, 9 July 1991, 
p. 4
155 C 43/91 Germany Aid which Germany has decided to grant to ship-owners for the 
construction, conversion or purchase of cutter vessels
OJ C 260,5 October 
1991, p .6
156 N 43/91 Netherlands Aid to ship-owners for shipbuilding O JC 178, 9 July 1991, 
p. 5
157 N 64/91 Spain Draft Royal Decree providing for operating and restructuring aid 1991-1993 OJ C 249, 24 September 
1991, pp. 9-10
158 N 68/91 Germany Shipbuilding aid OJ C 3, 7 January 
1992, p. 6
159 NN 69/91 C 
50/91
Spain Aid which Spain has decided to grant to Morocco for the purchase of a 15,345 
cgt ferry by the company Lignes Maritimes de Detroit fi’om the Spanish 
shipyard Hijos de J. Barreras
OJ C 36,14 February 
1992, pp. 2-3
160 N 70/91 Germany Shipbuilding aid OJ C 3 ,7  January 
1992, pp. 7-8
161 N 106/91 Belgium Shipbuilding aid OJ C 3, 7 January 1992, 
p. 9
162 N 132/91 UK Sale of British and Irish Line pic to Irish Ferries O JC 147, 6 June 1991,
p. 11
163 NN 152/91 
C 48/91
Germany Aid which Germany has decided to grant for the Cosco project - China OJ C 22,29 January 
1992, pp. 4-6
164 N 218/91 Portugal Specific or applied aid schemes for shipbuilding in 1991 OJ C 249,24 September 
1991, pp. 5-6
165 222/91 Germany To encourage investment in the construction and modernisation of fishing 
vessels
OJ C 64,13 March 
1992
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166 N 241/91 Denmark Seventh Council Directive of 21 December 1990 on shipbuilding aid -  four aid 
schemes
OJ C 249, 24 
September 1991, p. 3
167 N 249/91 France Shipbuilding aid OJ C 129,21 May 
1992, p. 3
168 N 283/91 Germany Flensburger Schiflbau Gesellschaft mbH and Co. OJ C 249,24 
September 1991, p. 
6
169 N 305/91 -> 
C 41/91
Netherlands Aid plans of the Dutch government for its shipyards under its different shipbuilding 
aid schemes as regards the investment of the Statshavneadministrationen in Esbjerg 
for a trailing suction hopper dredger/grab dredger
OJ C 274,19 
October 1991, pp. 8- 
9
170 N 312/91 Italy Aid to small and medium-sized shipyards O JC 203, 11 August 
1992,p .3
171 N 351/91 UK Investment aid for the ship-repair yard Tyne Dock Limited OJ C 129, 21 May 
1992, p. 3
172 N 361/91 Germany Shipbuilding aid OJ C 3, 7 January 
1992, p. 6
173 N 381/91 Germany Shipbuilding investment development aid for Indonesia -  Jos L. Meyer Werft 
in Papenburg
OJ C 124,16 May 
1992, p. 8
174 N 403/91 Germany Shipbuilding aid OJ C 3 ,7  January 
1992, p. 7
175 N 537/91 Spain Shipbuilding aid 1991-1993 OJ C 3, 7 January 
1992,p. 10
176 650/91 Italy Compensation for losses in the Fincantieri shipyards in 1990 O JC 2 0 3 ,11 August 
1992, p. 2
177 N 686/91 Germany Aid for boat construction or modernisation or for the purchase of second hand 
boats
OJ C 157,24 June 
1992, p. 3
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178 N 692/B/91 Germany Aid to facilitate the continued operation of Mathias Thesen Werft -  first 
tranche (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania)
OJ C 66,9 March 1993,
p. 8
179 N 692/C/91 Germany Restructuring aid for Peene yard -  first tranche (Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania)
OJ C 209,3 August 
1993, p .11
180 N 692/D/91 Germany Restructuring aid for Warnow yard -  first tranche (Mecklenburg- 
Western Pomerania)
OJ C 209,3 August 
1993, p. 11
181 N 692/E/91 Germany Shipbuilding aid -  Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania OJC 111,21 April 
1994, p. 4
182 N 692/F/91 Germany Shipbuilding aid -  Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania OJC 111,21 April 
1994, p. 4
183 N 692/G/91 Germany Aid for the shipyard Warnow Werft CEC 1992a
184 N 692/H/91 Germany Shipbuilding aid -  Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania OJC 111, 21 April 
1994, p. 4
185 N 692/1/91 Germany Restructuring aid for Meerestechnik Werft (MTW) in Wismar, 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
OJ C 259,16 
September 1994, p. 4
186 N 692/J/91 Germany Shipbuilding aid -  Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania OJC 111,21 April 
1994, p. 4
187 N 726/91 -> C 
64/91
Germany Development aid which Germany has decided to grant for a project to 
build two 1066 teu container vessels for Indonesia -  Mathias Thesen 
Werft
OJ C 36,14 February 
1992, pp. 3-4
188 N 773/91 -> C 
14/92
Germany Sale to Bremer Vulkan by Krupp of Krupp Atlas Elektronik OJC 171, 7 July 1992
189 Greece Ministerial Decree providing for shipbuilding aid in the period 1991-1993 CEC 1992a
190 Greece Three shipbuilding aid schemes CEC 1992a
191 Germany Development aid credit for the purchase of two passenger vessels by the 
Indonesian Government from Meyer Werft
IP/91/683
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192 Germany Development aid credit for the purchase of a tugboat by the Tunisian 
government from Mutzenfeldt, Cuxhaven
IP/91/683
193 Netherlands Contract-related operating aid to Dutch yards CEC 1992a
194 Spain Loss compensation to the public Spanish yards in the context of 
restructuring of those yards 1987-1992
CEC 1992a
195 Ireland Irish Government’s intention to grant Swansea-Cork Ferries Ltd an 
interest-free loan
CEC 1992a
1992
196 N2/92 Spain Spanish shipbuilding aid for Mexico OJ C 66, 9 March 1993, 
p. 7
197 N 23/92 Belgium Shipbuilding aid OJ C 286,22 October 
1993, p. 4
198 NN 103/92 ^  C 
27/93
Italy Aids granted by Italy to port companies OJ C 281,19 October 
1993, p. 10
199 NN 116/92 UK Modernisation of the fishing fleet O JC 173, 7 June 1997,p. 
8
200 192/92 Germany To promote investment in the construction and modernisation of 
fishing vessels
OJ C 203,11 August 
1992, p. 8
201 N 261/92 Italy Eureka project No. 353 F ASP (Flexible Automation in Ship Préfabrication) OJ C 334,18 December 
1992, p. 5
202 N 290/92 Germany Development assistance to Indonesia by the German shipyard 
Volkswerft Stralsund
OJ C 201,23 July 1994, 
p. 7
203 N 354/92 Germany Development assistance to Cameroon by the German shipyards 
Bayerische Schiffbau and RoBlauer Schiffswerft
OJ C 201,23 July 1994, 
p. 7
204 N 688/92 Denmark Shipbuilding aid OJ C 66,9 March 1993,
p. 8
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205 N 703/92 Germany German shipbuilding aid OJ C 209,3 August 
1993, p. 11
206 N 712/92 Germany Shipbuilding aid for the new Lander OJ C 209,3 August 
1993, p. 11
207 N 714/92 Denmark Scheme for guarantees from the Danish Ship Credit Fund to the last ship at a 
shipyard under closure
OJ C 252, 16 September 
1993,p .4
208 UK State aid of ECU 115 million for workers made redundant in connection 
with the restructuring of ports
CEC 1993a
209 Greece Aid in the form of debt write-offs for financial restructuring linked to the 
sale of 4 publicly-owned shipyards
CEC 1993a
210 Denmark Five shipbuilding contracts signed in 1992 by Odense Stalskibsvaerfr A/S CEC 1993a
1993
211 NN 52/93 Belgium Flemish fimd for shipbuilding aid O JC 215,25 July 1996,
p. 8
212 NN 79/93 ^  C 
65/94
Italy Aid granted by Italy to Viamare SpA di Navigazione OJ C 261, 6 October 
1995, pp. 2-4
213 NN 102/93 Germany Loans from BvS and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania for the future 
restructuring and operation of MTW and Volkswerft
CEC 1994
214 NN 103/93 Germany Loans from BvS and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania for the future 
restructuring and operation of MTW and Volkswerft
CEC 1994
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215 NN 104/93 (ex 
NN 126/93) ^  
C 10/94
Greece • Aid which Greece has decided to grant to Hellenic Shipyards pic and 
Neorion Shipyards of Syros pic
• Aid which Greece has granted to Neorion shipyard of Syros
• Aid which Greece has decided to grant to Hellenic Shipyards pic
• Aid which the Greek government plans to grant to Hellenic Shipyard pic
O JC 138,20 May 1994, 
pp. 2-3
216 NN 111/93->C  
8/95
France Direct and indirect aid granted by the French government for the building of 
passenger sailing ships (ACH and SFCN) (French overseas department)
OJ C 279,25 October 
1995, pp. 3-6
217 NN 130/93 ^  C 
46/95
France Aid granted by France to the Compagnie Générale Maritime OJ C 58, 28 February 
1996, pp. 4-7
218 N 131/93 Germany Shipbuilding aid, pursuant to Article 4(7) of the Seventh Directive for 
Husumer Schiffswerft
O J C 158,10 June 
1993, p. 5
219 N 158/93 Denmark Danish aid scheme for shipbuilding OJ C 252,16 September 
1993, p. 4
220 N 159/93 Denmark Danish aid scheme for shipbuilding OJ C 252,16 September 
1993, p. 4
221 N 198/93 Germany Aid scheme to reduce operating costs of its ship operating companies IP/93/1202
222 N 222/93 Belgium Aid for the rescue and restructuring of the Boelwerf shipyard O JC 111, 21 April 
1994, p. 3
223 N 265/93 Italy Shipbuilding aid for 1991 -1993 OJ C 302, 9 November 
1993, p .6
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224 N 417/93 Spain Aid for the National Maritime Passenger Transport Company (Algeria) to 
finance the purchase of a ferry as part of development aid
OJ C 302, 9 November 
1993, p .6
225 N 527/93 Germany Aid in favour of Neptun Industrie Rostock GmbH OJ C 85,22 March 
1994, p. 11
226 N 561/93 Denmark Shipbuilding aid, interest aid scheme OJ C 87, 24 March 1994, 
p. 3
227 N 641/93 Germany Special depreciation scheme for new ships and tax deduction scheme for 
individuals investing in new ships
OJ C 266,13 October 
1995, p. 16
228 N 685/93 Greece Investment aid to Salamis Shipyard SA OJ C 293, 21 October 
1994, p. 12
229 N 727/93 Denmark Shipbuilding aid -  extension of delivery limit for 3 chemical tankers OJ C 175,28 June 1994,
p. 6
230 N 731/93 UK Shipbuilding aid to Swan Hunter shipyard CEC 1994
231 N 784/93 Germany Naval construction technique OJ C 58, 8 March 1995,
p. 6
232 Germany Changes to the Wettbewerbshilfe previously approved on 13 September 
1991
IP/93/47
233 Germany Werfthilfe programme (already approved for the West German yards in 
1991)
IP/93/81
234 Netherlands Interim state aid to stimulate shipping CEC 1994
235 Germany Aid to assist with the privatisation of Deutsche Seereederei Rostock CEC 1994
236 Spain Aid for a new shipping line CEC 1994
237 Italy Aid to support the restructuring of the Italian port sector CEC 1994
238 Spain Financial support granted by the Spanish authorities to the leisure ports of 
Catalonia
CEC 1994
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1994
239 N 18/94 Germany Development assistance to China by the German yard Brand Werft 
GmbH Oldenburg
OJ C 201,23 July 1994, 
p. 7
240 N 31/94 Germany Development aid to China by the German shipyard MTW OJ C 165,17 June 
1994, p. 7
241 N 32/94 Germany Development aid to China by the German shipyard Lindenau OJ C 165,17 June 
1994, p. 7
242 N 33/94 Germany Development aid to China by the German shipyard Bremer Vulkan OJ C 165,17 June 
1994, p. 7
243 N 34/94 Germany Development aid to China by the German shipyard OJ C 165,17 June 
1994, p. 7
244 N 35/94 Germany Development assistance to Indonesia by the Meyer Werft shipyard OJ C 165,17 June 
1994, p. 7
245 N 39/94 Germany Extension of aid scheme into 1994 -  grants for yards in West Germany on 
shipbuilding contracts
OJ C 175,28 June 
1994, p .6
246 N 41/94 Denmark Shipbuilding aid -  extension of three aid schemes OJ C 1 6 5 ,17 June 1994, 
p. 7
247 NN 49/94->C  
38/94
Italy Aids granted by Italy to Lloyd Triestino SpA di Navigazione and Italia SpA di 
Navigazione
OJ C 333, 29 November 
1994, pp. 6-8
248 N 90/94 Germany Extension of aid scheme into 1994 -  interest support grants for yards in 
West Germany for contracts acquired in 1994 and to be delivered before 
end 1997
OJ C 175,28 June 
1994, p. 6
249 NN 102/94 Germany Application of shipbuilding aid schemes in 1994 OJ C 390,31 December 
1994, p. 19
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250 N 146/94 Spain Draft Royal Decree on shipbuilding premiums and financing OJ C 259,16 September 1994, 
p. 5
251 N 233/94 Netherlands Subsidy regulation for the new building of sea-going ships OJ C 259,16 September 1994, 
pp. 4-5
252 N 302/94 Greece Restructuring and modernisation of the Elefsis Shipyards SA OJ C 265,12 October 1995, p. 
17
253 N 336/94 Italy Shipbuilding aid OJ C 390, 31 December 1994, p. 
18
254 N 429/94 ^  NN 
135/94
Portugal Shipbuilding aid in 1994 OJ C 395, 31 December 1994, p. 
12
255 N 529/94 NN 
136/94
France Shipbuilding aid OJ C 395, 31 December 1994, p. 
13
256 N 533/94 Germany Guarantee for a conversion contract of Miitzelfeldt shipyard, 
Lower Saxony
O J C 390,31 December 1994,
p. 20
257 N 540/94 Spain Aid for the acquisition of fishing vessels OJ C 339, 3 December 1994, p. 
3
258 N 546/94 Greece Shipbuilding aid OJ C 390, 31 December 1994, p. 
19
259 N 566/94 UK Shipbuilding aid scheme OJ C 395, 31 December 1994, p. 
13
260 N 573/94 Germany P t  Peini -  Indonesia -  acquisition of a passenger vessel O J C 395,31 December 1994,
p. 12
261 N 614/94->NN 
145/94
UK Renotification of shipbuilding aid schemes for 1994 OJ C 395, 31 December 1994, p. 
13
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1995
262 N l/95 Germany Restructuring aid in relation to the privatisation of the Warnow Werft 
yard, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
OJ C 265,12 October 
1995, p. 18
263 N2/95 Denmark Extension of three shipbuilding aid schemes for 1995 OJ C 265,12 October 
1995, p, 18
264 N9/95 Germany Restructuring aid in relation to the privatisation of the Peene Werft yard, 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
OJ C 265,12 October 
1995, pp. 18-19
265 N 15/95 Netherlands Development aid for Ghana -  financing for three tugs to be built for Ghana at 
Damen shipyard
OJ C 295, 10 November 
1995, p. 23
266 N 16/95 UK Investment aid for the A & P Appledore shipyard, Tyne OJ C 295, 10 November 
1995,p. 23
267 N 39/95 Spain Development aid for the building of fishing-boats for Cameroon OJ C 295,10 November 
1995, p. 23
268 N 50/95 Italy Shipbuilding aid OJ C 55, 24 February 
1996, p. 6
269 Spain Loss compensation to the public Spanish yards CEC 1996
270 N 81/B/95 Germany Restructuring aid in the form of a loan to Deutsche Binnenreederei 
Binnenschiffahrt Spedition Logistik GmbH (inland waterway transport)
OJ C 155,30 May 1996, 
p. 9
271 N 84/95 Germany Privatisation of Volkswerft (second tranche), Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania
OJ C 343,21 December 
1995, p. 14
272 N 96/95 Portugal Plan for restructuring and conversion of Lisnave ship-repair firm OJ C 55, 24 February 
1996, p. 6
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273 NN 103/95 Spain Assistance towards modernisation and conversion of fishing vessels OJ C 150,24 May 1996,
p. 12
274 NN 119/95 Spain Aid for the construction of fishing vessels OJ C 53,22 February 
1996, p. 5
275 N 128/95 Germany Restructuring aid in relation to the privatisation of the Elbewerft 
Boizenburg yard, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
O J C 266,13 October 
1995, p. 18
276 N 141/95 Denmark Support for passenger ferry services OJ C 207, 8 July 1997, p. 
9
277 N 142/95 UK UK shipbuilding aid schemes OJ C 392, 16 December 
1998, p. 5
278 NN 181/95 
23/96
Italy Aid from the Sardinian authorities to Sardinian ship-owners OJ C 368, 6 December 
1996, pp. 2-3
279 NN 189/95 Netherlands Investment aid to the Frisian shipyard Welgelegen BV OJ C 150,24 May 1996, 
p. 13
280 N 232/95 Portugal Shipbuilding aid OJ C 55, 24 February 
1996, p. 6
281 N 239/95 
58/96
Spain Application for extension of delivery limit under Article 4(3) of shipbuilding 
aid Directive in respect of five tugs built by Astilleros Zamacona SA
OJ C 58, 25 February 
1997, pp. 8-10
282 N 246/95 Spain Modernisation and conversion of the Canary Islands fishing fleet OJ C 272,18 October 
1995, p. 8
283 N 263/95 Netherlands Development assistance according to Article 4(7) of the Seventh Directive 
for Jamaica
OJ C 343,21 December 
1995, p. 14
284 N 365/95 France Shipbuilding aid OJ C 55, 24 February 
1996, p. 6
285 N 370/95 Sweden State guarantee for shipbuilding OJ C 53, 22 February 
1996, p. 4
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286 N 376/95 Germany Shipbuilding development aid for Indonesia OJ C 343,21 December 1995, 
p. 14
287 N 379/95 Spain Shipbuilding development aid for Tunisia OJ C 343,21 December 1995, 
p. 15
288 N 388/95 Netherlands Aid to Dutch inland waterways O JC 155, 3 0 May 1996,p. 7
289 N 391/95 Denmark Guarantee fund for shipbuilding OJ C 343, 21 December 1995, 
pp. 14-15
290 N 411/95 Germany Inland waterways OJ C 343,21 December 1995, 
p. 13
291 N 418/95 Greece Investment aid to Neorion Shipyard SA OJ C 150. 24 May 1996, p. 10
292 N 448/95 France Aid for the purchase of the Jegoquere ship-owning business by 
Pescanova
OJ C 88, 19 March 1997, p. 16
293 N 457/95 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid for Vietnam OJ C 343, 21 December 1995, 
p. 15
294 N 482/95 Spain Shipbuilding development aid to Morocco OJ C 227, 6 August 1996, p. 5
295 N 521/95 Spain Assistance towards modernisation and conversion of the fishing fleet O JC 168,12 June 1996,p. 9
296 N 536/95 Germany Subsidy schemes for the shipbuilding industry 1995 OJ C 53,22 February 1996, 
p. 7
297 N 546/95 Italy Management buy-out of Luigi Orlando shipyard in Livorno OJ C 53,22 February 1996, p. 
5
298 N 572/95 Germany Shipbuilding aid in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania: 
restructuring of MTW-Schiffswerft GmbH
OJ C 150,24 May 1996, p. 10
299 N 605/95 Belgium Operating aid to secure a contract for the construction of six small 
chemical tankers
OJ C 392,16 December 1998, 
p. 5
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300 N 637/95 Germany Shipbuilding aid in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania: restructuring of 
Warnow Werft
OJ C 150,24 May 
1996, p. 10
301 N 688/95 Germany Shipbuilding development aid for China OJ C 53,22 
February 1996, p. 5
302 N 700/95 Germany Shipbuilding aid in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania: restructuring of 
Elbewerft Boizenburg
OJ C 150,24 May 
1996, p. 10
303 N 721/95 UK Guarantee for the building of a vessel in the McTay marine shipyard OJ C 55, 24 February 
1996, p. 7
304 N 728/95 Greece Extension of the application of national aid scheme for the year 1995 O JC 150. 2 4 May 
1996, p. 10
305 N 723/95 Spain Prolongation of Royal Decree 442/1994 as modified on shipbuilding premiums and 
financing
OJ C 85, 22 March 
1996, p. 15
306 N 797/95 Germany Shipbuilding aid in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania: restructuring of 
Warnow Werft
OJ C 150,24 May 
1996, p. 10
307 N 801/95 Germany Shipbuilding aid in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, privatisation of 
Volkswerft, third tranche of investment aid
OJ C 53,22 
February 1996, p. 5
308 N 802/95 Germany Restructuring of the Peene Werft shipyard -  second tranche of closure aid OJC 197,27 June 
1997, p. 8
309 N 806/95 -> 
C7/96
Germany Spillover of restructuring aid for MTW-Schiffswerft and Volkswerft to other 
Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG undertakings, non-authorised payment of DM 
112.4 million investment loan to the MTW shipyard
OJ C 150,24 May 
1996, pp. 2-4
310 N 841/95 Netherlands Dutch maritime research O JC 102,4 April 
1996, p. 8
311 N 842/95 Germany Shipbuilding development aid for China OJ C 86,23 March 
1996, p. 4
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312 N 883/95 Germany Shipbuilding development aid for Indonesia OJ C 86,23 March 1996, 
p. 4
313 N 897/95 Netherlands Subsidy for crew, definitive withdrawal of vessels OJ C 55, 24 February 
1996, p. 7
314 N 930/95 Spain Shipbuilding development aid to the Philippines OJ C 168, 12 June 1996, p. 
10
315 N 936/95 Netherlands Subsidy regulation for the new building of sea-going ships OJ C 85, 22 March 1996, 
p. 15
316 N 941/95 C 
56/95
Spain Aid that Spain plans to grant its publicly-owned shipbuilding yards in the 
form of a tax credit facility 1995-1998
OJ C 75,15 March 1996, 
pp. 2-5
317 N 943/95 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid for Costa Rica OJ C 86,23 March 1996, 
p. 4
318 N 948/95 ^  C 
26/96
Spain Aid which the Spanish government plans to grant to the shipyard P. Freire 
SA
OJ C 291,4 October 1996, 
pp. 8-9
319 N 958/95 Belgium Closure aid for VSM shipyard OJ C 290, 3 October 1996, 
p. 14
320 N 959/95 Belgium Closure aid for Boelwerf shipyard OJ C 86,23 March 1996, 
p. 4
321 N 966/95 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid to Tunisia O JC 150. 2 4 May 1996,p. 
11
322 N 981/95 Netherlands Investment aid to the shipyard Bodewes Schhepswerf Volhardt Foxhol BV O JC 168,12 June 1996, p. 
11
323 N 1023/95 Germany Shipbuilding development aid to Indonesia OJ C 150,24 May 1996,
p. 11
275
CASE
NUMBER
COUNTRY TITLE OF AID REFERENCE
324 N 1034/95 Denmark Extension of three shipbuilding aid schemes for 1996 OJ C 168,12 June 
1996, p. 10
325 N 1048/95 Germany Investment aid for the modernisation of Flender Werft, Schleswig-Holstein OJ C 290,3 October 
1996, p. 14
1996
326 N 1/96 -> C 
11/96
Germany Aid for construction of two cruise vessels for the Malaysian company 
Genting International -  Star Cruise
OJ C 144,16 May 
1996, pp. 121-3
327 N8/96 Spain Shipbuilding development aid for the Philippines O JC 168,12 June 
1996, p. 10
328 NN 31/96 -> 
Cl/96
Germany Spillover of restructuring aid for MTW-Schiffswerft and Volkswerft to other 
Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG undertakings, non-authorised payment of DM 
112.4 million investment loan to the MTW shipyard
OJ C 150,24 May 
1996, pp. 2-4
329 NN 37/96 Portugal Modification of rates of aid for construction and acquisition of fishing vessels OJ C 391,28 
December 1996, p. 14
330 N 48/96-> 
NN 51/97
France A multi-annual programme (1995-1997) of state aid in favour of shipping 
companies with the objective of improving the competitive position of the fleet 
flying under the French flag
OJ C 207, 8 July 1997, 
p. 9
331 N 64/96 Netherlands Investment aid to Bijlsma shipyard OJ C 290, 3 October 
1996, p. 13
332 NN 64/96 -> 
C 35/96
Germany Contract-related aid in favour of Bremer Vulkan Werft for the construction 
of the cruise vessel Costa I
OJ C 290,3 October 
1996, pp. 10-12
333 NN 66/96 ^  
C 32/96
Denmark Ship financing in Denmark in the period 1987-1993 OJ C 232,10 August 
1996, pp. 6-7
334 NN 68/96 
C5/97
Germany Aid the German Government intends to grant to Neptun Industrie Rostock 
GmbH, Mecklenburg-W estem Pomerania
OJ C 119,17 April 
1997, pp. 4-7
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335 N 87/96 Germany Development aid to Friedrich Liirssen Werft for Indonesia OJ C 215,25 July 
1996, p. 7
336 NN 102/96 
C 60/96
Germany Loans from the BvS and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania for the 
continued restructuring and operation of MTW-Schiffswerft and 
Volkswerft
OJ C 120,18 April 
1997, pp. 2-4
337 NN 103/96 ^  
C 60/96
Germany Loans from the BvS and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania for the 
continued restructuring and operation of MTW-Schiffswerft and 
Volkswerft
OJ C 120,18 April 
1997, pp. 2-4
338 NN 105/96 -> 
C6/97
Germany Aid the German Government intends to grant to Dieselmotorenwerk 
Vulkan GmbH, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
O JC 119,17 April 
1997, pp. 8-10
339 N 107/96 Germany Guarantee scheme for shipbuilding OJ C 150,24 May 
1996, p. 11
340 N 108/96 Germany Subsidy schemes for the shipbuilding industry OJ C 168,12 June 
1996, p. 10
341 N 125/96 Finland Shipbuilding aid OJ C 227, 6 August 
1996, p. 5
342 Finland Aid scheme for ship-owners -  tax concessions when they acquire ice-breakers CEC 1997a
343 N 207/96 Germany Investment aid for the restructuring of MTW shipyard OJ C 215,25 July 
1996, p. 8
344 N 240/96 Spain Aid for the construction and modernisation of fishing vessels OJ C 225,2 August 
1996, p. 6
345 N 256/96 Germany Rescue aid to Dorries Scharmann IP/96/423
346 N 277/96 Italy Shipbuilding aid -  Fratelli d’Amico OJ C 290, 3 October 
1996, p. 14
347 N 281/96 Spain Prolongation of Royal Decree 442/1994, as amended, on shipbuilding 
premiums and financing
OJ C 227, 6 August 
1996, p. 5
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348 N 303/96 Netherlands Subsidy regulation for the new shipbuilding of sea-going ships OJ C 227, 6 August 1996, 
p. 5
349 N 317/96 France Financial support to carriers subject to the ‘French economic and social plan 
for transport by inland waterway’
O J C 213, 23 July 1996,p. 
2
350 N 318/96 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid to Benin OJ C 290, 3 October 
1996, p. 14
351 N 327/96 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid to Vietnam OJ C 300, 10 October 
1996, p. 5
352 N 335/96 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid to India OJ C 300,10 October 
1996, p. 5
353 N 372/96 Portugal Sipesca aid scheme for fleet construction and modernisation OJ C 39, 8 February 1997,
p. 16
354 N 380/96 Belgium Flemish plan for aid to transport by inland waterway O JC 139, 6 May 1997,p. 
5
355 N 406/96 Spain Shipbuilding development aid to Vietnam OJ C 1, 3 January 1997, p. 
7
356 N 426/96 Germany Contract-related aid in favour of Schichau Seebeckwerft for the 
construction of two ferryboats for Cotunav
OJ C 1,3 January 1997, 
p. 7
357 N 464/96 UK Shipbuilding aid schemes OJ C 300,10 October 
1996, p. 6
358 N 468/96 Germany Shipbuilding development aid to China OJ C l ,  3 January 1997, 
p. 7
359 N 544/A/96 Denmark Modernisation of fishing vessels OJ C 173, 7 June 1997, p. 
8
360 N 557/96 -> C 
38/96
Germany Contract-related production aid in favour of Bremer Vulkan Werft 
GmbH, in liquidation, for the construction of two container ships
OJ C 330,5 November 
1996, pp. 6-9
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361 N 602/96 UK Financial measures of the UK within the jframework of the privatisation of 
Devonport Royal Dockyard
O JC 111, 9 April 1998,p. 
20
362 N 663/96 Netherlands Shipbuilding purchase of five buoy tenders by the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia, represented by Seacom
O JC 141, 8 May 1997, p. 
9
363 N 679/96 Netherlands Investment aid to Niestem Sander BV shipyard O JC 141, 8 May 1997, p. 
9
364 N 691/96 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid to Jamaica O JC 141, 8 May 1997,p. 
8
365 N 723/96 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid to Costa Rica O JC 141, 8 May 1997,p. 
8
366 N 724/96 Spain Shipbuilding development aid to Tunisia O JC 141, 8 May 1997, p. 
9
367 N 738/96 Germany Loan guarantee for Flender Werft, Lübeck O J C 43,11 February 
1997, p. 4
368 N 739/96 Netherlands Purchase of two fishing vessels to the private shipping company PT 
Midasian (Indonesia)
O JC 141, 8 May 1997,p. 
9
369 N 789/96 Denmark Shipbuilding extension of three aid schemes for 1996 O JC 141, 8 May 1997,p. 
9
370 N 803/96 Denmark Aid for the construction of fishing vessels and for consultancy services in the 
fishing sector
OJ C 173, 7 June 1997, p. 
8
371 N 810/96 Finland Prolongation of two shipbuilding aid schemes for 1996 and 1997 OJ C 302, 3 October 1997, 
p. 3
372 N 849/96 France Shipbuilding aid OJ C 197, 27 June 1997, 
pp. 8-9
373 N 852/96 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid to Cape Verde OJ C 141, 8 May 1997, p. 
9
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374 N 858/96 UK Financial measures of the UK within the framework of the privatisation of Rosyth 
Royal Dockyard
OJ C 88, 19 March 
1997, p. 16
375 N 899/96 Germany Changes to the present programme of state aid to German inland navigation O J C 4, 8 January 
1997, p. 4
376 N 903/96 Netherlands Subsidy regulation for the new building of sea-going ships OJ C 197, 27 June 
1997, p. 8
377 Germany Guarantee scheme for the shipbuilding sector in Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania
IP/96/159
378 Germany Depreciation/tax deduction scheme for ships operated under the German flag IP/96/874
379 Germany Aid schemes for ship operating companies IP/96/991
380 France French law on the application of tax reduction measures to investments in 
overseas departments, where they apply to shipbuilding
CEC 1997a
381 France Aid for restructuring of yards CEC 1997a
382 UK Special tax measure for ship-owners extending the period allowed for reinvesting 
excess allowances in replacement vessels
CEC 1997a
383 UK Amending and extending the above-mentioned scheme CEC 1997a
384 Netherlands Measures aimed at reducing the costs involved in employing Dutch nationals on 
board Dutch vessels and at reducing the tax burden on shipping companies
CEC 1997a
385 France Tax proposals concerning maritime co-ownership aimed at encouraging the 
registration of vessels under the French flag
CEC 1997a
386 France Restructuring aid for COM CEC 1997a
387 Italy Aid scheme introduced by Italian Law No. 343 of 8 September 1995 for shipping 
companies so as to promote the employment, training and skills of sailors
CEC 1997a
388 Spain Three development aid cases CEC 1997a
389 Netherlands Development aid case CEC 1997a
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1997
390 NN 8/97 C 
22/97
Germany Purchase of three dredgers from the German yard Volkswerft Stralsund 
by an Indonesia public corporation, Fengerukan Rukindo
OJ C 192,24 June 
1997, pp. 9-10
391 NN 9/97 ^  C 
10/97
Portugal Measures taken by Portugal to assist Lisnave ship-repair firm OJ C 98, 26 March 
1997, pp. 20-21
392 NN 11/97 
76/2001
Italy Aid to the fisheries sector in Corsica -  1987-1999 -  aid for purchasing and 
converting vessels
OJ C 25, 29 January
2002, pp. 2-8
393 NN 35/A/97 ^  
C 27/97
Italy Tax reductions provided by Law 549/95 in Italy -  application to the motor 
vehicle, shipbuilding and synthetic fibres industries and to firms covered by 
the ECSC Treaty
OJ C 268, 4 September 
1997, pp. 4-8
394 N 70/97 ^  C 
25/97
Germany Aid in favour of Dorries Scharmann GmbH OJ C 230,29 July 
1997, pp. 6-14
395 N 31/97 Germany First tranche of aid for the restructuring of MTW Schiffswerft GmbH OJ C 344,14 
November 1997
396 NN 63/97 Sweden Operating aid for ship-operating companies O JC 231, 30 July 1997,
p. 10
397 NN 64/97 ^  C 
31/98
France • Aid in the shipping sector for the shipping company Brittany Ferries (BAI)
• Additional aid for the restructuring of BAI (Brittany Ferries)
OJ C 244,4 August 
1998, pp. 9-18
398 N 69/97 Greece Amendment and prolongation of shipbuilding aid legislation until 31 
December 1997
OJ C 197, 27 June 
1997, p. 8
399 N 85/97 Germany Prolongation of aid schemes applicable to shipbuilding 1996/1997 OJ C 51,18 February 
1998, p. 6
400 N 91/97 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid to El Salvador OJ C 302, 3 October 
1997, p. 4
2 8 1
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401 N 92/97 Germany Shipbuilding development aid to Vietnam OJ C 302,3 October 
1997, p. 4
402 NN 102/97 Germany Aid to Neptun Industrie Rostock GmbH OJ L 144,9 June 
1999, pp. 21-33
403 N 108/97 Italy Shipbuilding aid scheme to remain in force until 31 December 1997 OJ C 50, 17 February 
1998, p. 5
404 N 113/97 Germany State guarantee for a short term working capital loan -  Lloyd Werft 
Bremerhaven GmbH
OJ C 51,18 February 
1998, p. 6
405 NN 144/97 
C 71/97
Italy Aid to the shipping sector (loans/leases at concessionary conditions for the 
acquisition/conversion and repair of vessels): amendment of aid scheme under C 
23/96 (ex NN 181/95)
OJ C 386, 20 
December 1997, pp. 6- 
8
406 NN 146/97 -> 
C 73/97
France Recapitalisation of Stardust Marine (boat charter) O JC 111, 9 April 
1998, pp. 9-17
407 N 163/97 Spain Shipbuilding aid OJ C l  07, 7 April 
1998, p. 22
408 N 172/97 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid to Morocco OJ C 302, 3 October 
1997, p. 5
409 NN 176/97 -> 
C9/98
Germany Financial measures in connection with the takeover of Bremer Vulkan 
Marine Schiffbau GmbH by Liirssen Maritime Beteiligungen GmbH and 
Co. KG
OJ C 252,11 August 
1998, pp. 4-6
410 N 254/97 Spain Shipbuilding aid OJ C 107, 7 April 
1998, p. 22
411 N 322/97 C 
86/97
Ireland Aid to the shipping sector (refund to employers of social security contributions 
paid in respect of seafarers)
OJ C 103,4 April 
1998, p p .15-18
2 8 2
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412 N 353/97 ^  C 55/97 Italy Additional aid for the INMA shipyard in respect of two liner 
conversion contracts
OJ C 377,12 December 
1997, pp. 4-5
413 N 389/97 Netherlands Development assistance according to Article 4(7) of the 
Seventh Directive on shipbuilding aid for Yemen
OJ C 7 January 1998, p. 3
414 N 401/97 Greece Investment aid to Hellenic Shipyards OJ C 47,12 February 1998, 
p. 3
415 N 415/97 Germany State guarantee for the financing of the conversion of the 
passenger vessel Winward
OJ C 51,18 February 1998,
p. 6
416 N 421/97-^ C  81/98 Italy Measures under Law No. 30/98 in favour of the port sector OJ C 108,17 April 1999, pp. 
2-5
417 N 433/97 NN 9/98 Germany Aid for Kranbau Eberswalde GmbH (part of Bremer 
Vulkan Verbund)
OJ L 326,18 December 
1999, pp. 57-64
418 N 448/97 (modification of 
N 724/96)
Spain Development assistance for Tunisia OJ C 3, 7 January 1998, p. 3
419 N 450/97 Netherlands Development assistance for Cuba OJ C 3, 7 January 1998, p. 3
420 N 481/97 Spain Development assistance for Morocco OJ C 3, 7 January 1998, p. 3
421 N 490/97 France Economic and social plan for inland waterway 1997-1998 OJ C 336, 7 November 1997,
p. 12
422 N 497/97 Netherlands Development assistance for Indonesia OJ C 3, 7 January 1998, p. 3
423 N 500/97 UK UK shipbuilding aid schemes OJ C 47,12 February 1998, 
p. 3
424 N 525/97 Germany Amendments to the programmes of state aid N 411/95 and 
N 399/96 in favour of inland waterways
CEC 1998b
425 N 547/97 Germany Development assistance for China OJ C 3 ,7  January 1998, p. 
3
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426 N 571/97 Luxembourg Inland navigation OJ C 336, 7 November 
1997, p. 12
427 N 699/97 Netherlands Subsidy regulation for the new building of sea-going ships OJ C 47,12 February 
1998, p. 3
428 N 701/97 -> C 
59/98
Netherlands Aid to the Barge Control Centre in the Port of Rotterdam (inland waterway 
freight) (investment aid was approved)
OJ C 372,2 December 
1998, pp. 6-9
429 N 783/97 ^  C 
35/98
Italy Italian notification of regional investment aid under the Italian Law No. 
488/92 for the creation of two new shipyards
OJ C 307, 7 October 
1998, pp. 8-9
430 N 784/97 Italy Regional investment aid for the Nuovi Cantiere Apuiana shipyard OJ C 409, 30 December 
1998, p. 6
431 N 786/97 Italy Regional investment aid for Vittoria Spa shipyard OJ C 409, 30 December 
1998, p. 6
432 N 802/97 Germany Restructuring and privatisation of MTW Schiffswerft -  second tranche 
of aid
OJ C 24,29 January 
1999, p. 20
433 N 803/97 Germany Restructuring and privatisation of Volkswerft GmbH Stralsund -  
second tranche of aid
OJ C 24,29 January 
1999, p. 20
434 Germany Aid granted for the rescue and reprivatization of Ingénieur und 
Maschinenbau GmbH (IMG), Rostock -  part of Bremer Vulkan
IP/98/807
435 France Extension until 31 December 1997 of the shipbuilding aid scheme in force in 
France since 1991
CEC 1998b
436 UK Privatisation of Devenport Royal Dockyard CEC 1998b
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1998
437 N 618/98->C
31/98
France • Aid in the shipping sector for the shipping company Brittany Ferries 
(BAI)
• Additional aid for the restructuring of BAI (Brittany Ferries)
OJ C 244,4 August 1998, 
pp. 9-18
438 NN 12/98 ^  C 
10/98
Spain Aid to the shipping sector (new maritime public service contract) OJ C 147,13 May 1998, pp. 
10-15
439 NN 21/98-^ C
79/98
France Aid to the shipping company Corsica Marittima (subsidiary of Société 
Nationale Maritime Corse Méditerranée -  SNCM)
OJ C 62, 4 March 1999, pp. 
9-13
440 N 45/98 Denmark Shipbuilding aid OJ C 409, 30 December 
1998, p. 6
441 N 73/98 Denmark Aid for the construction of fishing vessels O JC 111, 9 April 1998,p. 
20
442 N 103/98 Italy Shipbuilding aid scheme for 1998 and special guarantee fund for 
shipping credit
OJ C 32, 6 February 1999, 
p. 3
443 N 107/98 Netherlands Development aid to Indonesia OJ C 69,12 March 1999, p. 
13
444 NN 113/98 ^  C 
66/98
Germany Breach of capacity restrictions by Kvaerner Warnow W erft GmbH O J C 41,16 February 
1999, pp. 23-26
445 N 124/98 ^  C 
37/98
France French notification of development aid to the French Polynesia -  two 
cruise vessels by Chantiers de F Atlantique
OJ C 307, 7 October 1998,
pp. 6-8
446 NN 128/98 C 
77/98
Italy Loss compensation granted to the INMA shipyard by the public holding 
company Itainvest (formerly GEPI)
OJ C 63, 5 March 1999, pp. 
2-4
447 NN 134/98 C 
2/99
France Shipbuilding aid -  ACHCN O JC 113, 24 April 1999, 
pp. 7-8
448 NN 145/98 ^  C 
3/99
Spain Excess of aid to publicly-owned yards -  shipbuilding group AESA O JC 113,24 April 1999, 
pp. 14-16
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449 N 152/98 Germany Investment aid to Flensburger Schiffbau Gesellschaft (Schleswig- 
Holstein)
OJ C 409,30 December 
1998, p. 6
450 NN 152/98 Germany Rescue, privatisation and restructuring of Wismarer Propeller und 
Maschinenfabrik GmbH
OJ C 88,25 March 2000, 
p. 3
451 N 157/98 Italy Regional investment aid for the Visentini shipyard OJ C 409, 30 December 
1998, p. 7
452 N 158/98 Italy Regional investment aid for the Orlando shipyard OJ C 409, 30 December 
1998, p. 7
453 N 159/98 Italy Regional investment aid for the CRN shipyard OJ C 409, 30 December 
1998, p. 7
454 N 160/98 ^  C 
35/98
Italy Italian notification of regional investment aid under the Italian Law No. 
488/92 for the creation of two new shipyards
OJ C 307, 7 October 1998, 
pp. 8-9
455 N 161/98 Italy Regional investment aid for the De Poli shipyard OJ C 409, 30 December 
1998, p. 7
456 N 208/98 Germany Extension of shipbuilding aid schemes for 1998 OJ C 24, 29 January 
1999, p. 19
457 N 212/98 Greece Prolongation of shipbuilding aid legislation until 31 December 1998 OJ C 392,16 December 
1998, p. 6
458 N 303/98 Germany Development assistance to China OJ C 409,30 December 
1998, p. 6
459 N 344/98 Greece Investment aid to the shipyard Elefsis Shipbuilding and Industrial 
Enterprises SA
OJ C 11,15 January 1999, 
p. 3
460 N 351/98 
42/99
France Measures in favour of the port sector OJC 233,14 August 1999, 
pp. 25-28
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461 N 383/98 Germany Development assistance to Cape Verde OJ C 409,30 
December 1998, p. 6
462 N 396/98 Germany Law amending the law on maritime transport -  introduction of a tonnage 
tax and non-payment of 40 per cent of seamen’s income tax by the shipping 
lines (employers)
OJ C 29,4 February 
1999, p. 13
463 N 415/98 Netherlands Prolongation of shipbuilding aid legislation until 31 December 1998 OJ C 11, 15 January 
1999, p. 2
464 N 436/98 France Inland navigation -  economic and social plan for inland waterway transport OJ C 337, 5 November 
1998, p. 5
465 N 511/98 France Aid scheme for the early cessation of activity of seafarers of the commercial fleet OJC 392,16 
December 1998, p. 4
466 N 535/98 Spain Development aid to Algeria OJ C 69, 12 March 
1999, p. 14
467 N 553/98 Ireland Seafarer income tax concession -  aid to the maritime transport sector OJ C 72, 16 March 
1999, p. 4
468 N 582/98 Finland Tax concession for vessels with ice-breaking facilities OJ C 340, 27 
November 1999, p. 5
469 N 602/98 Finland Prolongation of the contract-related shipbuilding aid scheme for 1998 OJ C 69,12 March 
1999, p. 13
470 N 610/98 Spain Shipbuilding aid scheme 1998 OJ C 88, 25 March 
2000, p. 3
471 N 617/98 Netherlands Subsidy for Container Terminal Lage Weide Utrecht (inland waterway transport) OJC 71,11 March 
2000, p. 7
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472 N 618/98 
31/98
France • Aid in the shipping sector for the shipping company Brittany Ferries 
(BAI)
• Additional aid for the restructuring of BAI (Brittany Ferries)
OJ C 244,4 August 1998, 
pp. 9-18
473 N 664/98 Spain Shipbuilding aid scheme 1999-2003 O JC 151,29May 1999,p. 5
474 N 694/98 Germany Restructuring of Volkswerft Stralsund (third tranche of aid) O J C 27,29 January 2000, 
p. 17
475 Germany Reprivatisation of Volkswerft and second instalment of aid CEC 1999a
476 Germany Reprivatisation of MTW-Schiffswerft CEC 1999a
477 Spain EUR 110.9 million paid in 1998 to the publicly-owned yards OJ L 37, 12 February 2000,
p. 22
1999
478 N3/99 Denmark Contract-related shipbuilding operating aid OJ C 72, 16 March 1999, pp. 
4-5
479 NN 35/99 Belgium Granting of exemptions to merchant shipping and dredging companies 
from certain social security contributions
OJ C 225, 7 August 1999, p. 
3
480 NN 46/99 Germany Restructuring and privatisation of Mecklenburger MetallguB 
GmbH
O J C 375,24 December 
1999, p. 5
481 N 50/99 Finland Contract-related shipbuilding operating aid O JC  313, 30 October 1999,
p. 2
482 NN 59/99 C 
46/99
Germany Kvaerner Warnow W erft -  exceeding of capacity limitation in 1997 O J C 245,28 August 1999, 
pp. 24-27
483 NN 68/99 -> C 
64/99
Italy State aid to the Gruppo Tirrenia di Navigazione Companies -  shipping OJ C 306, 23 October 1999,
pp. 2-10
484 NN 65/99 C 
74/99
France Shipbuilding development aid to Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon O JC 33, 5 February2000,
pp. 6-8
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485 NN 93/99 C 
6/2000
Germany Excess payment of restructuring aid to Kvaerner Warnow Werft OJ C 134,13 May 2000, 
pp. 5-9
486 N 121/99 Austria Programm fur die Forderung des kombinierten Güterverkehrs Strafie- 
Schiene-Schiff, 1 January 1999 -  31 December 2002
OJ C 245,28 August 1999, 
pp. 2-3
487 NN 124/99 Germany Shipping -  to improve seafarers’ know-how OJ C 110,15 April 2000, 
p. 45
488 N 133/99 Spain Shipbuilding - Fiscal investment aid for ship-owners O JC 151,29 May 1999, p. 
5
489 N 147/99 Denmark Decree on the grant of subsidies for the construction of fishing vessels OJ C 259, 11 September 
1999, p. 5
490 N 178/99 Italy Regional aid for investments at the De Poli shipyard OJ C 340,27 November 
1999, p. 5
491 N 180/99 Italy Shipbuilding aid scheme 1999-2003 OJ C 288, 9 October 1999,
p. 22
492 N 231/99 Ireland Reimbursement of social security contributions paid by employers in 
respect of seafarers
OJ C 203,17 July 1999, p. 
8
493 N 233/99 -> C 
3/2000
Netherlands Development aid for Indonesia OJ L 264,15 October 
2003, pp. 25-27
494 N 234/99->C  
3/2000
Netherlands Development aid for Indonesia OJ L 264,15 October 
2003, pp. 25-27
495 N 272/99 Germany Continued application of shipbuilding aid programmes for 1999 OJ C 62,4 March 2000,
p. 18
496 N 283/99 Germany Development aid to Indonesia for the construction of two passenger 
ferries -  Meyer Werft
OJ C 142,20 May 2000,
p. 2
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497 N 290/99 UK Tonnage tax - UK maritime transport sector OJ C 258, 9 September 2000, 
p. 3
498 N 315/99 France Shipbuilding aid scheme OJ C 88,25 March 2000, p. 5
499 N 325/99 Germany Transfer of the shipbuilding capacity of the former Elbewerft OJ C 88,25 March 2000, 
pp. 3-4
500 N 412/99 Netherlands Shipbuilding aid scheme for 1999 OJ C 332, 20 November 
1999, p. 8
501 N 422/99 UK Shipbuilding aid schemes for 1999 OJ C 359, 11 December 
1999, p ,6
502 N 532/99 ^  C 
12/2000
Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid for China OJ C 148, 27 May 2000, pp. 
14-16
503 N 557/99 Italy Regional investment aid for the Rodriguez C. N. shipyard OJ C 354, 9 December 2000, 
p. 14
504 N 567/99 Belgium Second Walloon aid scheme for inland waterway transport OJ C 284, 7 October 2000, p. 
3
505 N 568/99 France French aid plan for inland waterway carriers OJ C 365,18 December 
1999, p. 8
506 N 569/99 Germany Aid for training ships’ boys (inland waterways) OJ C 12,15 January 2000, 
p. 7
507 N 573/99 Finland Interest subsidy for loans taken for vessel acquisition OJ C 162,10 June 2000, p. 
24
508 N 631/99 Germany Shipbuilding development aid for the Philippines -  construction 
of 2 lifeboats
OJ C 232,12 August 2000,
p. 8
509 N 700/99 Germany Rescheduling of debt -  ship-repair -  Bremerhavener 
Dockbetriebs GmbH (Bredo)
OJ C 232,12 August 2000, 
pp. 8-9
510 N 716/99 Italy Regional aid for investment by Palumbo SpA, a mechanical 
engineering and shipbuilding firm
OJ C 232,12 August 2000, p. 
9
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511 N 731/99 Spain Ship financing aid scheme 2000 OJ C 94, 1 April 2000, p. 
8
512 N 734/99 Finland Prolongation of the interest equalisation system of officially supported 
ship credits
O JC 1 8 4 ,l July 2000, p. 
22
513 N 819/99 Sweden Aid to Swedish shipping companies OJC 88, 25 M arch2000, 
p. 4
514 France Aid scheme concerning the acquisition of additional new equipment by 
handling firms operating in the ports of Dunkirk and Le Havre
CEC 2000a
2000
515 NN 4/2000 Germany Aid to Schiffsanlagenbau Barth GmbH OJ C 94, 24 March 2001,
p. 2
516 NN 61/2000 -> C 
40/2000
Spain Further restructuring of publicly-owned Spanish shipyards OJ C 328,18 November
2000, pp. 16-18
517 NN 97/2000 Germany Financial contributions for 2000 to impose seafarers’ skills OJ C 106,9 June 2001, p. 
28
518 N 110/2000 Germany Shipbuilding aid in Germany for year 2000 OJ C 272,23 September 
2000, p. 47
519 NN 130/2000 (ex N 
758/2000)
UK Shipbuilding -  partial closure aid to Harland and Wolff OJC 117,21 April 2001, 
p. 15
520 N 151/2000 Netherlands Shipbuilding aid schemes 2000 O JC 1 8 4 ,l July 2000, p. 
22
521 N 156/2000 Germany Navigation and maritime technology for the 2U^  century OJ C 37,3 February 
2001, p .50
522 N 180/2000 Germany Aid for boys’ training ships (inland waterways) OJ C 184,1 July 2000, p. 
23
523 N 194/2000 ^  C 
6/2001
Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid for the Republic of Djibouti O JC 172,16 June 2001, 
pp. 12-14
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524 N 230/2000 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid for Syria OJ C 149,19 May 2001, pp. 9-10
525 N 232/2000 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid for Bangladesh OJ C 149,19 May 2001, pp. 9-10
526 N 244/2000 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid for Sri Lanka OJ C 149,19 May 2001, pp. 9-10
527 N 441/2000 Denmark Maritime training aid OJ C 380, 30 December 2000, p. 11
528 N 502/2000 Italy Measures to promote shipbuilding investment in 2000 O JC 117, 21 A pril2001,p. 14
529 N 531/2000 Finland Contract-related shipbuilding operating aid OJ C 44, 10 February 2001, p. 6
530 N 542/2000 Germany Shipbuilding development aid to Vietnam O J C 102,31 M arch 2001, p. 8
531 N 564/2000 France French aid plan for inland waterway carriers for 2000 OJ C 380, 30 December 2000, p. 10
532 N 597/2000 Netherlands Subsidy scheme for private links with inland waterways O JC 102, 31 2001,p. 8
533 N 664/2000 Spain Shipbuilding development aid to Algeria O JC 149, 19M ay2001,p. 8
534 N 666/2000 Spain Shipbuilding development aid to Algeria O JC 149, 19M ay2001,p. 8
535 N 679/2000 ^  C 65/2000 France Start up aid for short sea shipping services OJ C 37, 3 February 2001, pp. 16-21
536 N 702/2000 -> C 23/2001 Germany Investment aid to Flender Werft AG O J C 191, 7 July 2001, pp. 15-17
537 N 757/2000 Spain Shipbuilding modification of aid regime O JC 172, 16 June 2001, p. 16
538 N 763/2000 Spain Aid for building and modernising fishing vessels OJ C 234, 18 August 2001, p. 13
539 N 785/2000 Sweden Maritime training aid OJ C 107, 7 April 2001, p. 2
540 N 788/2000 Greece Shipbuilding aid scheme 1999-2000 O JC 172,16 June 2001, p. 16
541 N 809/2000 ^  C 18/2002 Italy Investment aid for various shipyards OJ C 141,14 June 2002, pp. 15-21
542 Spain Acquisition of Juliana and Cadiz yards CEC 2001a
543 Luxembourg Aid for a firm for acquisition of 2 cranes for the 
handling of containers for inland water transport
CEC 2001a
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2001
544 NN 16/2001 -> C 
14/2001
France Aid to Société National Corse Méditerranée -  maritime services OJ C l  17, 21 April 2001, 
pp. 9-13
545 NN 43/2001 ->C  
56/2001
Netherlands Application of maritime transport state aid to Dutch tugboat operations 
in EU inland waterways and ports
OJ C 298, 24 October 
2001, pp. 5-9
546 NN 48/2001 Spain Measures to assist the Trasmediterranea shipping company OJ C 96, 20 April 2002, p. 
4
547 NN 57/2001 -> C 
64/2001
Netherlands Privatisation and restructuring of Koninklijke Schelde Group 
(shipbuilding and ship-repair)
OJ C 254, 13 September 
2001, pp. 6-14
548 NN 89/2001 Germany Maritime shipping -  seafarers’ skills OJ C 146,19 June 2002,
p. 11
549 N 93/2001 ^  C 
97/2001
Italy Scrapping and renewal of the Italian oil tanker fleet OJ C 50, 23 February 
2002, pp. 7-15
550 NN 174/2001 Germany Shipbuilding aid 2001 OJ C 164,10 July 2002, 
p. 5
551 NN 174/A/2001 Germany Shipbuilding aid 2001 OJ C 164,10 July 2002, 
p. 5
552 N 176/2001 Germany R & D project ‘Integrating bus technologies into shipbuilding’ by 
Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft GmbH and Co. KG
OJ C 24,26 January
2002, p. 2
553 N 299/2001 France Aid for French inland waterway carriers OJ C 342, 5 December 
2001, p. 7
554 N 314/2001 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid for Yemen OJ C 333, 28 November
2001, p. 6
555 N 315/2001 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid for Vietnam OJ C 333, 28 November
2001, p. 6
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556 N 371/2001 
28/2003
Italy Guarantees for ship financing OJ C 145, 21 June 
2003, pp. 48-53
557 N 499/2001 UK UK support for maritime training scheme OJ C 347, 8 December
2001, p. 2
558 N 513/2001 
40/2002
Greece Aid to Hellenic Shipyards OJ C 186, 6 August 
2002, pp. 5-12
559 N 542/2001 Sweden Fiscal measures for maritime transport OJ C 347, 8 December
2001, p. 2
560 N 550/2001 Belgium Public-private partnership for loading and unloading facilities (inland 
waterways)
OJ C 24, 26 January
2002, p. 2
561 N 563/2001 Denmark Act on taxation of shipping (tonnage tax) OJ C 146, 19 June 
2002, p. 9
562 N 612/2001 Germany Development aid to Indonesia -  construction of a passenger vessel OJ C 62,9 March 
2002, p. 41
563 N 649/2001 UK Port of Rosyth project and extension of the UK scheme Freight Facilities 
Grant
CEC 2002a
564 N 725/2001 Germany R & D project ^Optimisation of the development and production of small 
and medium sized ships in order to reduce costs by 30 per cent’ by Peene 
Werft GmbH
OJ C 98,23 April 
2002, pp. 34-35
565 N 731/2001 ->C  
33/2002
Spain Prolongation of the three-year delivery limit for LNG tankers OJ C 238, 3 October
2002, pp. 2-6
566 N 801/2001 Finland Subsidy to passenger vessels OJ C 98, 23 April 
2002, p. 35
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567 N 836/2001 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid to Colombia OJ C 71,25 March 2003, p. 
3
568 N 840/2001 -> C 
51/2001
Netherlands Aid for Alkmaar container terminal OJ C 212, 6 September
2002, pp. 2-8
569 N 843/2001 Germany Meyer Werft Papenburg -  extension of the 3-year delivery limit for 
a vessel
OJ C 238,3 October 2002, 
p. 14
570 France Extend beyond 2001 the scheme for the reimbursement of employers’ 
social security contributions paid by shipping companies
CEC 2002b
571 France Further aid measure in support of the employment of Community 
seafarers
CEC 2002b
572 Finland Repay to ship-owners the employers’ contributions paid towards 
seafarers
CEC 2002b
573 Spain Aid compensating the company for public service obligations between 
Canary Islands
CEC 2002b
2002
574 N 3/2002 Spain Shipbuilding development aid to Namibia OJ C 262, 29 October 2002, 
p. 3
575 XS 34/2002 Italy Legge 1329/65 ‘Sabatini’ CEC 2002a
576 N 48/2002 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid for Jamaica -  construction of a tugboat O JC 127, 2 9 M ay2002,p. 
7
577 NN 49/2002 Germany Reduction of non-wage labour costs in the maritime transport 
sector
OJ C 164,10 July 2002, p. 
5
578 NN 53/2002 ^  C 
55/2002
France Aid to Soreni Ship-Repair Company OJ C 222, 18 September 
2002, pp. 21-24
579 XS 55/2002 Germany Investment aid for Neue Jade Werft, Lower Saxony OJ C 182,1 August 2003, 
P-20
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580 N 59/2002 Germany R & D project ‘Virtual engine room -  passenger ship’ by Aker MTW Werft 
GmbH
OJ C 277,14 
November 2002, p. 3
581 N 61/2002 Germany R & D project ‘Virtual engine room -  cargo ship’ by Kvaerner Warnow 
Werft GmbH
OJ C 277,14 
November 2002, p. 3
582 N 71/2002 Ireland Tonnage remeasurement programme OJ C 232, 28 
September 2002, p. 3
583 NN 94/2002 Germany Directive for the promotion of German maritime shipping (financial 
contributions for 2002)
CEC 2002a
584 N 99/2002 Denmark Prolongation of delivery limits for 2 ships built at Odense shipyard OJ C 262, 29 October 
2002, pp. 4-5
585 N 113/2002-> 
C 23/2003
France Misuse of shipbuilding development aid for ships R3 and R4 OJ C 105, 1 May 
2003, pp. 30-32
586 N 118/2002 ^  
C 58/2002
France Aid for restructuring SNCM OJC 308, 11 
December 2002, pp. 
29-34
587 N 146/2002 Germany R &  D project entitled ‘Analysis of requirements and specification of the 
NET-S model with special regards to the PDM aspects’ by Fr. Liirssen 
Werft GmbH
OJ C 277,14 
November 2002, p. 2
588 N 147/2002 Germany R & D project entitled ‘Analysis of the current position and specification of 
the NET-S model with special regard to the financial connections between 
cooperating partners’ by Thyssen Nordseewerke GmbH
OJ C 277,14 
November 2002, p. 2
589 N 221/2002-> 
C 62/2002
UK Ad hoc aid to Clyde Boyd under the freight facilities grant scheme OJ C 269, 5 
November 2002, pp. 
3-8
590 N 306/2002 Germany Investment aid for Flensburger Schiffbaugesellschaft mbH and Co. KG OJ C 277,14 
November 2002, p. 2
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591 N 383/2002 Greece Investment aid to Neorion shipyards OJ C 6,10 January 2004,
p. 21
592 N 406/2002 Germany Support of transhipment facilities in combined transport (inland 
waterway)
O J C 292,27 November 
2002, p. 5
593 N 433/2002 
20/2003
Belgium Fiscal measures for maritime transport OJ C 145, 21 June 2003, 
pp. 4-47
594 N 455/2002 Netherlands Shipbuilding development aid to El Salvador OJ C 71, 25 March 2003, 
p. 4
595 N 468/2002 Finland Kvaerner Masa Yard - extension of 3-year delivery limit for a ship OJ C 15, 22 January 2003, 
p. 5
596 N 484/2002 Germany R &  D project ‘Sinsee, ship safety’ by Flensburger Schiffbau 
Gesellschaft mbH and Co. KG
O J C 292, 27 November
2002, p. 6
597 N 504/2002 Ireland Tonnage tax 2002 OJ C 15, 22 January 2003, 
p. 5
598 N 519/2002 Italy Extension of a scheme to reduce social charges in the maritime 
cabotage sector
OJ C 262, 29 October 
2002, p. 4
599 N 556/2002 Germany R & D project SITZ, Safe Double Hill Tankers’ by Lindenau 
GmbH Schiffswerft und Maschinenfabrik
O J C 327,28 December 
2002, p. 9
600 N 572/2002 Spain Introduction of a tonnage tax in Biscay OJ C 58,13 March 2003, 
p. 9
601 N 585/2002 Maritime transport and fisheries OJ C 1,4 January 2003, 
pp. 9-12
602 N 591/2002 Finland CIRR ship financing scheme OJ C 221,17 September 
2003, p. 10
603 N 598/2002 Netherlands Development aid for Sri Lanka - shipbuilding OJ C 87, 10 April 2003, p. 
34
297
CASE NUMBER COUNTRY TITLE OF AID REFERENCE
604 N 662/2002 France Amendment of the scheme for refimding the maritime part of the trading 
income tax (N 593/2000)
OJ C 15, 22 January 2003
605 N 728/2002 ^  C 
34/2003
France Aid for CMR, ship-repair yard, Marseille OJ C 188, 8 August 2003, 
pp. 2-7
606 N 744/2002 Germany Temporary defensive mechanism for shipbuilding O JC  108, 7 M ay2003,p. 
5
607 N 751/2002 Italy Extension of the three-year delivery limit for a cruise vessel OJ C l  08, 7 May 2003, p. 
5
608 N 780/2002 Netherlands Temporary defensive measures for shipbuilding OJ C 221, 17 September 
2003, p. 10
609 N 796/2002 Germany R & D project ^Simba’ simulation toolkit for maritime equipment by 
Flensburger Schiffbau Gesellschaft mbH and Co. KG
OJC 114, 14 May 2003,
p. 2
610 N811/A/2002 Spain Spanish CIRR ship-financing scheme CEC 2002a
611 N 812/2002 Spain Temporary defensive measures for shipbuilding OJ C 6, 10 January 2004,
p. 22
Source: Author’s compilation from Official Journal of the European Communities (C and L series), European Commission Competition
Policy Reports and the EU State Aid Register.
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Appendix F
SHIPBUILDING PRODUCTION IN PRINCIPAL SHIPBUILDING COUNTRIES. 1956-1988 (tonnes gross)
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Federal Republic of Germany 1,083,963 1,230,574 1,355,121 1,241,366 1,123,500 1,038,281 967,213 1,051,284 826,779
Japan 1,538,247 2,309,275 2,234,086 1,727,533 1,838,666 1,719,419 2,072,569 2,269,373 3,763,932
Western Europe total 4,313,242 5,026,511 5,594,272 5,478,180 5,311,696 5,103,702 4,700,356 5,159,473 4,642,650
World total 6,291,021 8,117,091 9,059,267 8,696,601 8,382,342 8,057,542 8,182,306 9,028,210 9,723,825
Federal Republic of Germany’s 
share of Western Europe total (per 
cent)
25.13 24.48 24.22 22.66 21.15 20.34 20.58 20.38 17.81
Federal Republic of Germany’s 
share of world total (per cent)
17.23 15.16 14.96 14.27 13.40 12.89 11.82 11.64 8.50
Japan’s share of world total (per 
cent)
24.45 28.45 24.66 19.86 21.93 21.34 25.33 25.14 38.71
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SHIPBUILDING PRODUCTION IN PRINCIPAL SHIPBUILDING COUNTRIES. 1956-1988 (tonnes gross)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Federal Republic of 
Germany
1,035,099 1,157,772 1,041,466 1,211,433 1,786,842 1,317,120 1,967,512 1,388,670 1,925,956
German Democratic 
Republic
254,506 271,768 294,806 309,809 326,764 294,766 325,064 308,267
Japan 4,885,605 6,494,613 7,217,375 8,349,212 9,167,930 7,099,965 11,132,359 12,857,119 14,750,831
South Korea 9,920 6,313 2,566 6,806 1,899 16,161 14,708 14,358
Western Europe total 5,329,184 5,944,297 6,150,326 6,293,762 7,263,361 8,105,400 9,798,901 10,088,527 11,189,393
World total 11,763,251 14,105,450 15,156,857 16,844,962 18,738,741 20,979,977 24,387,691 26,748,822 30,408,930
Federal Republic of 
Germany’s share of 
Western Europe total 
(per cent)
19.42 19.48 16.93 19.25 24.60 16.25 20.08 13.76 17.21
Federal Republic of 
Germany’s share of 
world total (per cent)
8.80 8.21 6.87 7.19 9.54 6.28 8.07 5.19 6.33
German Democratic 
Republic’s share of 
world total (per cent)
1.80 1.79 1.75 1.65 1.56 1.21 1.22 1.01
German Democratic 
Republic’s share of 
Western Europe total 
(per cent)
4.28 4.42 4.68 4.27 4.03 3.01 3.22 2.75
Japan’s share of world 
total (per cent)
41.53 46.04 47.62 49.57 48.93 33.84 45.65 48.07 48.51
South Korea as share of 
world total (per cent)
0.07 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.05
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SHTPBITIT.niNn PRODUCTION IN PRINCIPAT, SHIPBIJTLDING COUNTRIES. 1956-1988 (tonnes grossi
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Federal Republic of 
Germany
2,141,823 2,498,569 1,873,658 1,595,214 844,530 437,286 376,192 702,523 615,407
German Democratic 
Republic
331,982 350,636 354,998 378,276 409,727 381,320 346,084 358,347 343,126
Japan 16,894,017 16,991,230 15,867,828 11,707,635 6,307,155 4,696,996 6,094,142 8,399,831 8,162,915
South Korea 312,947 409,655 813,583 562,019 604,286 495,219 522,245 929,180 140,0525
Western Europe total 11,880,458 12,205,331 12,080,675 13,691,316 6,678,744 4,530,538 3,090,801 4,176,162 3,761,018
World total 33,541,289 34,202,514 33,922,193 27,531,824 18,194,120 14,289,369 13,101,104 16,931,719 16,820,101
Federal Republic of 
Germany’s share of 
Western Europe total 
(per cent)
18.03 20.47 15.51 11.65 12.65 10.34 12.17 16.82 16.36
Federal Republic of 
Germany’s share of 
world total (per cent)
6.39 7.31 5.52 5.79 4.64 3.06 2.87 4.15 3.66
German Democratic 
Republic’s share of 
world total (per cent)
0.99 1.03 1.05 1.37 2.25 2.67 2.64 2.12 2.04
German Democratic 
Republic’s share of 
Western Europe total 
(per cent)
2.79 2.87 2.94 2.76 6.13 8.42 11.20 8.58 9.12
Japan’s share of world 
total (per cent)
50.37 49.68 46.78 42.52 34.67 32.87 46.52 49.61 48.53
South Korea’s share of 
world total (per cent)
0.93 1.20 2.40 2.04 3.32 3.47 3.98 5.49 8.33
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SHIPBUILDING PRODUCTION IN PRINCIPAL SHIPBUILDING COUNTRIES. 1956-1988 (tonnes gross)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
German Democratic Republic 336,929 366,841 358,002 361,669 292,241 292,221
Federal Republic of Germany 798,461 516,590 562,378 515,394 341,319 521,156
Japan 6,670,317 9,711,381 9,502,831 8,177,953 5,707,898 4,040,199
South Korea 1,538,592 1,472,897 2,620,472 3,642,495 2,090,966 3,174,494
Western Europe total 4,259,664 3,707,813 3,115,330 2,169,981 2,117,121 1,879,375
World total 15,911,143 18,334,061 18,156,526 16,844,909 11,259,419 10,909,340
Federal Republic of Germany’s share of Western Europe total 
(per cent)
18.74 13.93 18.05 23.75 16.12 27.73
Federal Republic of Germany’s share of world total (per cent) 5.02 2.82 3.10 3.06 2.78 4.78
German Democratic Republic’s share of world total (per cent) 2.12 2.00 1.97 2.15 2.38 2.68
German Democratic Republic’s share of Western Europe total 
(per cent)
7.91 9.89 11.49 16.67 13.80 15.55
Japan’s share of world total (per cent) 41.92 52.97 52.34 48.55 46.56 37.03
South Korea’s share of world total (per cent) 9.67 8.03 14.43 21.62 17.06 29.10
Source: Author’s percentage calculations based on figures firom Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (1973: 68-69), (1989: 36-37).
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Appendix G
FINANCIAL AID OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR INDUSTRY 
AND FOR SHIPBUILDING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.
1970-2002
Year Financial Aid to 
Shipbuilding 
(million DM)
Financial 
Aid to 
Industry 
(million DM)
Shipbuilding Aid 
as Share of Total 
State Aid 
(per cent)
Shipbuilding Aid 
as Share of State 
Aid to Industry 
(per cent)
1970 28 3,702 0.2 0.8
1975 100 5,564 0.5 1.8
1980 254 9,163 1.0 2.8
1981 301 9,116 1.2 3.3
1982 240 8,884 1.0 2.2
1983 290 9,595 1.1 3.0
1984 167 11,384 0.6 1.5
1985 148 11,078 0.5 1.3
1986 142 11,042 0.5 1.3
1987 136 12,019 0.5 1.1
1988 250 13,466 0.9 1.9
1989 291 14,255 1.0 2.0
1990 381 14,534 1.3 2.6
1991 597 17,821 1.6 3.4
1992 607 17,629 1.6 3.4
1993 536 17,708 1.5 3.0
1994 489 14,977 1.4 3.3
1995 399 16,354 1.1 2.4
1996 355 22,768 0.8 1.6
1997 335 20,674 0.8 1.6
1998 280 19,584 1.3 1.4
2000 244 22,555 1.1 1.1
2002 223 19,421 1.0 1.2
Sources: Author’s percentage calculations based on figures fi-om Deutscher
Bundestag (1987: 14-15), (1989: 15), (1991: 25), (1993: 6), (1995: 6), 
(1997: 6 and 13), (2001: 15).
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Appendix H
SHIPBUILDING ORDERS PLACED IN PRINCIPAL SHIPBUILDING COUNTRIES. 1970-1993 (per cent^
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Belgium 0.8 0.7 2.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7
Denmark 4.2 2.7 1.0 0.9 3.6 2.8 1.3 1,3 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.5 1.3 2.4 2.9
Finland 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.7 0.8 0.9 0.2 1.5. 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.0 0.4 2.1 1.3
France 3.6 4.3 1.9 2.4 8.4 2.3 0.2 0.1 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 2.0
Germany 5.7 4.0 2.5 7.1 8.9 5.2 2.4 3.3 3.6 4.4 2.2 4.4 4.4 2.4 3.2 5.5
GDR 0.3 0.6 1.9 2.1 2.6 3.5 0.9 1.2 1.9 4.0 2.4 1.0
Italy 2.8 1.8 1.8 3.3 1,7 1.3 1.9 0.6 2.7 1.0 1.6 0.5 2.6 0.2 0.3 2.8
Netherlands 5.4 1.6 0.6 1.8 1.7 0.5 1.1 2.7 2.0 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.6 1.0 1.0
Spain 6.8 4.8 2.7 5.6 2.5 3.3 6.3 2.1 2.4 4.4 5.2 5.3 1.6 1.1 0.3 0.9
Sweden 6.7 3.6 10.8 7.5 4.4 0.6 2.5 4.7 5.2 1.7 1.5 2.1 1.8
UK 4.9 4.0 2.3 5.9 1.6 0.6 3.2 3.9 1.9 1.4 2.7 2.9 2.5 0.6 1.0 1.4
EC 26.99 13.44 10.56 13.11 14.89 14.02 12.11 14.04 13.47 7.40 9.95 14.21
Western Europe 39.46 2.47 23.69 27.16 25.95 27.43 24.39 25.33 21.24 11.60
Japan 44.2 54.1 63.0 48.6 38.4 49.2 56.0 52.1 43.3 49.5 52.7 48.0 49.7 56.6 56.7 49.8
South Korea 0 0 0 1.3 2.8 3.7 2.5 5.7 3.7 6.2 9.0 8.1 9.6 19.2 14.7 10.8
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SHIPBUILDING ORDERS PLACED IN PRINCIPAL SHIPBUILDING COUNTRIES. 1970-1993 (per cent)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Japan 43.37 34.58 37.58 49.80 46.28 40.5 40.68 33.18
South Korea 24.04 30.15 24.00 16.62 23.83 25.62 17.29 36.85
EC 11.42 14.63 16.96 14.27 16,19 14.49 16.42 14.44
Rest of the world 21.17 20.64 21.46 19,31 13.70 19.39 25.61 15.53
Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (1984: 7), (1993: 37),
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Appendix I
LABOUR FORCE OF GERMAN SHIPBUILDING FIRMS
IN CESA AND AWES, 2003
Name of Firm Number of Persons 
Employed
Schiffswerfl von Colin GmbH & Co. 8
Schiffswerft Wilhelm Fleischhauer 10
Binger Schiffswerft Ing. Dieter Schaefer 14
Heinrich Buschmann & Sohne GmbH Schiffswerft 14
Julius Grube KG GmbH & Co. 15
SSB Spezialschiffbau Oortkaten GmbH 18
Weserwerft Minden GmbH 18
M. A. Flint GmbH & Co. 20
Neue Oderwerft GmbH 20
Arminius Werke GmbH 25
Deutsche Industriewerke GmbH 25
Kotter Werft GmbH 25
Schiffswerft Bolle GmbH Derben 26
Schiffswerft Diedrich GmbH & Co. KG 26
Husumer Dock- und Reparatur GmbH & Co. KG 30
Schiffswerft Hermann Barthel GmbH 30
Erlenbacher Schiffswerft Maschinen- und Stahlbau 
GmbH
33
Hitzler Werft GmbH 40
Kolner Schiffswerft Deutz GmbH & Co. KG 45
Theodor Buschmann GmbH & Co. Schiffswerft 50
Gebr. Friedrich KG Schiffswerft 75
Meidericher Schiffswerft GmbH & Co. KG 75
Neue Jadewerft GmbH 76
Elsflether Werft GmbH & Co. KG 80
Bodan-Werft Metallbau GmbH & Co. KG 90
Miitzelfeldtwerft GmbH 100
Schiffbau- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft 
Tangermünde
100
Turbo-Technik Reparatur-Werft GmbH & Co. 100
Neptun Reparaturwerft GmbH 150
Peters Schiffbau AG 150
Schiffswerft und Maschinenfabrik Cassens GmbH 150
Detlef Hegemann Rolandwerft GmbH & Co. KG 200
MWB Motorenwerke Bremerhaven AG 235
Fr. Fassmer GmbH 240
Kroger Werft GmbH & Co. KG 250
Lindenau GmbH 280
Blohm + Voss Repair GmbH 400
HDW-Nobiskrug 400
Abeking & Rasmussen GmbH & Co. 450
Lloyd Werft Bremerhaven GmbH 510
306
Name of Firm Number of Persons 
Employed
Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft & Co. 650
SSW Fahr- und Specialschiffbau GmbH 650
Fr. Lürssen Werft GmbH & Co. 700
Peene-Werfr GmbH 750
Flender Werft AG 800
Blohm + Voss GmbH 1,000
J. J. Sietas KG Schiffswerft GmbH & Co. 1,200
Volkswerft Stralsund GmbH 1,200
Aker MTW Werft GmbH 1,370
Thyssen Nordseewerke GmbH 1,400
Jos L. Meyer GmbH 2,400
Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG 3,400
Source: Author’s compilation from the websites of CESA, AWES and the
respective shipbuilding firms.
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Appendix J
SHIPBUILDING PRODUCTION IN GERMANY BY LAND. 
1961-1972 AND 1980-1995 (thousand DM)
Land 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Bremen 532,799 478,287 375,259 524,107 427,009 605,507 509,339 698,963 872,092 869,678
Hamburg 645,782 597,394 500,216 642,481 580,425 540,649 599,312 552,830 783,723 845,900
Lower
Saxony
232,554 189,121 250,469 219,813 260,734 293,360 376,648 379,010 410,286 416,781
Schleswig-
Holstein
646,570 454,098 614,933 427,698 552,623 682,491 613,675 820,765 828,703 785,993
Federal 
Republic of 
Germany
2,192,305 1,849,116 1,885,193 1,976,502 1,954,506 2,270,761 2,246,802 2,586,358 3,063,288 3,116,128
Land 1971 1972 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Bremen 1,136,512 1,224,485 908,698 888,500 804,200 1350,300 668,800 810,700 683,600 687,500
Hamburg 783,639 798,279 868,629 454,900 592,800 549,300 408,700 321,800 240,200 175,100
Lower
Saxony
606,938 639,748 759,608 297,400 675,100 761,200 683,400 619,000 701,900 631,100
Schleswig-
Holstein
980,603 1,022,504 832,390 1,197,700 1,316,400 1405,500 1,054,600 1,086,600 964,200 507,100
Federal 
Republic of 
Germany
3,759,240 3,939,950 3,673,616 2,856,800 3,406,800 4,128,500 2,815,500 2,838,100 2,589,900 2,000,800
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SHIPBUILDING PRODUCTION IN GERMANY BY LAND. 
1961-1972 AND 1980-1995 (thousand DMI
Land 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Bremen 718,200 778,900 792,500 718,900 915,300 859,600 1,024,400 619,100
Hamburg 240,700 279,800 512,400 346,500 344,300 394,900 433,500 461,800
Lower Saxony 460,800 408,300 1,030,300 801,300 906,100 1,412,400 606,500 1,771,200
Schleswig-Holstein 581,800 683,400 866,700 1,123,400 981,500 830,800 921,200 1,106,400
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 2,001,500 2,150,400 1,650,300 1,235,100 965,300 1,365,600 1,700,000 1,323,300
Federal Republic of Germany 4,003,000 4,300,800 4,852,200 4,225,200 4,178,400 4,863,300 4,685,600 5,281,800
Source: VDS (1962), (1973) and various issues of annual reports of the Verband fu r  Schiffbau und Meerestechnik.
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Appendix K
PARTICIPATION OF THE BREMEN LAND GOVERNMENT. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
IN CASES OF STATE AID PROVISION TO BREMER VULKAN VERBUND AG. 1980-1996
STATE AID 
CASE
PARTICIPATION OF 
BREMEN LAND GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION OF 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION 
OF EUROPEAN 
UNION
Covering of 
losses of 
Bremer Vulkan 
in 1981
HIBEG acquired 25.1 per cent of 
Bremer Vulkan shares and the 
Bremen Senate thereby became a 
minority shareholder of Bremer 
Vulkan
Federal Government contributed DM 190 million 
for the frigate programme
None
Proposed 
merger of 
Bremer Vulkan 
and AG Weser 
1982-1983
January 1982: HIBEG, Krupp and 
Thyssen commissioned a group of 
experts with a report 
Mayor Koschnik first enunciated 
the Bremen Senate’s plans for the 
merger of Bremer Vulkan and AG 
Weser in the Bremen Parliament on 
9 December 1981 
January 1982: Bremen Senate 
instructed the board of directors of 
Bremer Vulkan and AG Weser to 
develop a common concept
Federal Government insisted on concrete plans of 
reduction of capacity in new shipbuilding and 
conditions of reviewability 
Federal Chancellor Dr. Kohl invited the works 
councils of AG Weser and Bremer Vulkan to 
discuss the situation with him directly 
20 July 1983: Committee on Bremen ideas for a 
reorganisation of the yards -  generally 
understanding of the Bremen Senate’s position but 
demanded more concrete documentation from the 
Bremen Senate and argued that small and medium­
sized shipyards would suffer 
22 July 1983: Telex from von Wiirzen to Bremen 
Economics Senator -  generally sympathetic but 
imposed conditions__________________________
None
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STATE AID
CASE
PARTICIPATION OF
BREMEN LAND GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION OF
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION
OF EUROPEAN
UNION
Proposed 
merger of 
Bremer Vulkan 
and AG Weser 
1982-1983
17 and 18 February 1983: Mayor Koschnik spoke 
with Federal Economics Minister Graf Lambsdorff 
and Federal Finance Minister Dr. Stoltenberg about 
the recommendations by Bremer Vulkan and AG 
Weser and asked the Federal Government to 
participate in the financing of the shipyards 
April 1983: Conference of economics ministers of 
north German coastal Lander -  ministers agreed that 
future provision of shipbuilding aid must be linked 
to the reduction of new shipbuilding capacity 
Expert forum composed of board of directors of the 
two yards and Bremen Senate representatives 
prepared draft merger agreement 
5 July 1983: Bremen Senate meeting -  Senate 
agreed to take on DM 50 million of the anticipated 
DM 115 million state aid 
11 July 1983: Bremen Economics Senator, Karl 
Willms, informed the State Secretary in the Federal 
Economics Ministry, von Wiirzen, of these plans
November 1983: Federal 
Government rejected application 
of Bremer Vulkan, AG Weser 
and Hapag-Lloyd Werft for 
cross-firm structural measures
None
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STATE AID
CASE
PARTICIPATION OF
BREMEN LAND GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION OF
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION OF
EUROPEAN UNION
Merger of Bremer 
Vulkan and 
Schichau 
Unterweser AG 
(SUAG)
28 July 1983: Bremen Senate applied for 
Bund-Land financing instrument of the 
Gemeinschaftsaufgabe (which was preferred 
by the Federal Government)
Bremen Senate refused to increase its share of 
state aid even when Thyssen withdrew from 
German shipbuilding -  Senate told Krupp and 
Hapag-Lloyd Werft not to take over 
Thyssen’s share -> closure of AG Weser on 
31 December 1983
Bremen Senate exerted pressure in linking 
guarantees for Schichau with its merger with 
Bremer Vulkan
Bremer Gesellschaft fur Wirtschaft und Arbeit 
acquired 38 per cent of the share capital of 
SUAG
None None
Merger of Bremer 
Vulkan and 
Seebeckwerft AG
Guarantee for a capital increase of DM 7.95 
million
Repayable loan of DM 25 million 
29 November 1985: Talks between the 
Bremen Economics Senator and chairman of 
Friedrich Krupp GmbH, Dr. Wilhelm 
Scheider
Federal Government did not 
notify the European 
Commission as it felt that the 
measure was covered in an 
earlier communication
• EU learnt about the 
acquisition of 
Seebeckwerft investments 
by Bremer Vulkan from 
the press
• Measure became part of 
EU proceedings initiated 
on 10 July 1989________
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STATE AID
CASE
PARTICIPATION OF
BREMEN LAND GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION
OF
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION OF EUROPEAN
UNION
Merger of Bremer 
Vulkan and 
Seebeckwerft AG
Talks between representatives of the Bremen 
Senate and Krupp on the model of integration of 
Seebeckwerft into Bremer Vulkan 
30 June 1986: Working group composed of 
Bremen Senate and Krupp representatives on 
development of procedural suggestions for 
Seebeckwerft to be modelled after Bremer 
Vulkan
2 July 1986: Agreement between the Bremen 
Senate and Friedrich Krupp GmbH with which 
takeover of Seebeckwerft stocks and VFW 
shares became contractual 
23 July 1986: Bremen Senate takeover of shares 
o f Seebeckwerft and VFW fi’om Krupp via 
HIBEG
29 August 1986: Agreement between Krupp, 
HIBEG and Bremer Vulkan on new structuring 
of the Bremen shipbuilding industry 
21 October 1986: DM 6 million to 
Seebeckwerft to facilitate the acquisition of a 
conversion contract (Lorentzen conversion of 
Bremer Vulkan)___________________________
16 October 1990: EU closed procedure 
-  approved aid because it lay below the 
annual ceiling allowed by the EU 
guidelines
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STATE AID CASE PARTICIPATION OF
BREMEN LAND GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION
OF
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION OF
EUROPEAN UNION
Merger of Bremer 
Vulkan and Hapag- 
Lloyd Werft 
Bremer Vulkan- 
Lloyd Werft 
Verbund
10 January 1984: Bremen Senate passes a resolution 
12 February 1985: Acceptance of a 75 per cent loss guarantee 
for a consolidation loan to Bremer Vulkan AG in the amount 
of DM 70 million with a maturity of 15 years for financing of 
long-term installation assets
12 February 1985: Acceptance of a 100 per cent loss guarantee 
for a loan of Commerzbank AG to Bremer Vulkan in the 
amount of DM 33.3 million with a maturity of 25 years for the 
financing of WAST
12 February 1985: Acceptance of a 100 per cent guarantee for 
a loan firom Hanseatische Gesellschaft fur offentliche 
Finanzierungen mbH Bremen (100 per cent company of 
HIBEG) for refinancing of credits to Bremer Vulkan in the 
amount of DM 13 million with a maturity of 9 years for the 
financing of mobile assets for shipbuilding_________________
None None
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STATE AID
CASE
PARTICIPATION OF
BREMEN LAND GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION
OF
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION OF
EUROPEAN UNION
Aid for Bremer 
Vulkan’s 
liquidity 
problems in 
1985
5 November 1985: Bremen Senate approved Bremer Vulkan’s 
application for a 100 per cent loss guarantee in the amount of DM 
22 million for an operating resources special credit 
17 December 1985: New shipbuilding 53 (end financing): 100 per 
cent guarantee for down-payment in the amount of DM 10.55 
million
17 December 1985: New shipbuilding 54 (end financing): 100 per 
cent guarantee for down-payment in the amount of DM 10.75 
million
17 December 1985: New shipbuilding 70 (building financing): 100 
per cent loss guarantee in amount of DM 26.7 million and (for 
backup of end financing) 100 per cent back guarantee for down 
payment in the amount of DM 11.4 million, 100 per cent loss 
guarantee for a ship-mortgaged loan in the amount of DM 5.9 
million
17 December 1985: New shipbuilding 80 (building financing): 100 
per cent loss guarantee in the amount of DM 20. 4 million and (for 
backup of end financing) 100 per cent back guarantee for down­
payment in the payment of DM 7.44 million, a 100 per cent loss 
guarantee of DM 4 million for a ship-mortgaged loan and finally, a 
100 per cent loss guarantee over DM 3 million for a supplementary 
operating resources special credit____________________________
None None
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STATE AID
CASE
PARTICIPATION OF
BREMEN LAND
GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION OF
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION OF EUROPEAN
UNION
Bremer
Vulkan’s
American
President Lines
(APL)
contracts
23 September 1986: DM 15 
million as a ‘ Werthaltig’ 
guarantee and DM 20 million 
for covering losses 
4 November 1986: Contract aid 
for the completion of the 
contract for two big container 
ships of APL_______________
None None
Sale of Bremer 
Vulkan’s ship 
shares in 1987
12 February 1987: Guarantee of 
DM 95 million for Bremer 
Vulkan’s third capital increase 
Guarantee for a DM 130 million 
credit
20 June 1988: Bremen 
Economics Senator informed the 
Federal Economics Senator 
about the DM 130 million credit 
in response to the EU 
communication
22 June 1988: Federal Economics 
Ministry representative contacted 
Geertz of the Bremen Senate -  
disagreed with the Bremen Senate 
argument
Federal Government did not 
initially notify the European 
Commission about the DM 130 
million credit guarantee 
negotiations and communications 
with EU in resolution of matter
6 May 1988: European Commission 
wrote to Federal Government about 
what they had come to know about the 
DM 130 million operating resources 
special credit from the Handelsblatt 
article of 27 April 1998 
22 July 1988: EU acknowledged the 
notification of acquisition of financial 
investment of Bremer Vulkan 
18 November 1988: EU specified to 
the Federal Government exactly which 
measures had been notified and 
requested for further information 
10 July 1989: European Commission 
opened proceedings________________
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Sale of Bremer 
Vulkan’s ship 
shares in 1987
16 October 1990: EU closed 
procedure -  approved aid because it 
lay below the annual ceiling allowed 
by the EU guidelines_____________
Bremer
Vulkan’s
structural
concept
16 January 1987: Meetings of 
economics and transport ministers of 
north German coastal Lander -  agreed 
on shipbuilding aid guidelines 
December 1987: Bremen Senate 
working group consisting of 
representatives of Senate and Bremer 
Vulkan -  formulation of structural 
concept
1-3 February 1988: Meeting of SPD 
Bremen Senate and SPD Parliament 
fraction -  reduction of shipbuilding 
capacity was required 
31 May 1988: Financial aid of DM 20 
million for the diversification concept 
13 December 1988: Financing of the 
diversification concept with a total of 
DM 31.1 million
28 June 1988: Federal 
Government notified the EU 
about the aid for the structural 
concept
26 August 1988: Federal 
Government notified the EU 
about the parallel acquisition of 
Seebeckwerft investments
None
317
STATE AID CASE PARTICIPATION OF
BREMEN LAND GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION
OF
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION OF
EUROPEAN UNION
Bremer Vulkan’s structural 
concept
DM 126.1 million as grant-in-aid 
DM 84.5 million covered by a guarantee 
Takeover of DM 256 million ship shares of 
Bremer Vulkan
HIBEG provided Mentool GmbH with DM 1 
million and a business loan of DM 300,000
10 Bremer Vulkan’s acquisition 
of Senator Linie GmbH and 
merger of Senator Linie with 
DSR
9 January 1987: Acceptance of a 90 per cent
failure/loss guarantee for an operating resources
credit in favour of Senator Linie GmbH in the
amount of DM 15 million
Two further guarantees of DM 7 million each for
the purchase of 2 Korean ships that were chartered
long term by Senator Linie
HIBEG took on more shares of Senator Linie in
merger of Senator Linie and DSR
Bremen Senate acquired 50 per cent of DSR-
Senator Linie
Loan from HIBEG to Bremer Vulkan of DM 2 
million for Bremer Vulkan’s shares in Senator 
Linie
None None
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11 Bremer 
Vulkan’s 
acquisition of 
Krupp Atlas 
Elekfronik 
(KAE)
Mayor Wedemeier suggested formation of 
Systemtechnik Nord 
Guarantee of capital of DM 196 million 
26 November 1991: Share exchange 
between Krupp and Bremer Vulkan in 
which Bremer Vulkan transferred 2.8 
million new shares (total value according 
to Bremer Vulkan of DM 350 million, DM 
125 per share) to Krupp while 74.9 per cent 
of Krupp shares in KAE went to Bremer 
Vulkan
Krupp and HIBEG together form 
Gesellschaft biirgerlichen Rechts (GbR)
31 December 1991: Krupp and HIBEG 
bring in both the agreed investments:
Krupp the 7.8 million Bremer Vulkan 
shares and HIBEG a cash investment of 
DM 350 million that was financed by a 
bank credit
Bremen Senate took over for a credit share 
of DM 126 million a guarantee including 
credit interest and costs
19 September 1991: Federal 
Economics Minister 
Mollemann wrote to the 
Bremen Senate asking them to 
consider EU state aid approval 
17 December 1991: Federal 
Economics Minister 
Mollemann notified EU of 
state aid for acquisition of 
KAE by Bremer Vulkan 
Federal Government, HIBEG 
and Bremer Vulkan filed a 
complaint against the European 
Commission at the ECJ -> ECJ 
overturned the European 
Commission Decision
6 May 1992: EU opened 
proceedings
EU found the state aid to be 
non-compatible and demanded 
its repayment -  Commission 
Decision 31993D0412 of 6 
April 1993 (OJ L 185, 28 July 
1993, pp. 43-50)
ECJ Joined Cases C-329/93, 
C-62/95 and C-63/95 
Commission Decision 
31998D0665 of 25 February 
1998 (OJ L 316,25 November 
1998, pp. 25-32)
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11 Bremer Vulkan’s 
acquisition of 
Krupp Atlas 
Eletoonik (KAE)
31 December 1991: On the basis of 
the agreement on founding GbR, 
GbR provides Krupp with a loan of 
DM 350 million
HIBEG, Federal Government and 
Bremer Vulkan filed a complaint 
against the European Commission 
at the ECJ -> ECJ overturned the 
European Commission Decision
12 Acquisition of 
East German 
shipyards
None 18 February 1992: Mayor Wedemeier 
wrote to Federal Chancellor Kohl 
rebutting Lower Saxony Minister 
President’s charges and requesting that 
the Federal Government considers 
Bremen’s interests
EU only approved the release 
of Treuhandanstalt funds to 
the East German yards under 
fixed conditions 
Spill-over clause was 
inserted into the 
Treuhandanstalt contracts -  
Bremer Vulkan had to issue 
spill-over quarterly reports 
EU set capacity limitations 
on MTW and VWS 
EU initiated procedure 
concerning suspected misuse 
of East German aid
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12 Acquisition of 
East German 
shipyards
• 11 August 1992: Treuhandanstalt signed purchase 
and transfer agreement on MTW and DMR with 
Bremer Vulkan acquiring 95 per cent and Schichau 
Seebeckwerft 5 per cent of the shares of Hanse 
Holding, the sole shareholder of MTW and DMR
• 7 July 1993: Neptun Industrie Rostock
• 18 December 1993: VWS
• Treuhandanstalt funds for East German shipyards 
acquired by Bremer Vulkan of DM 3472.8 million
• Treuhandanstalt requested clarification from Bremer 
Vulkan
13 Bremer Vulkan’s 
acquisition of 
Klockner Stahl 
GmbH
• Autumn 1993: Bremen 
Senate began talks with 
Bremer Vulkan about rescue 
of Klockner Stahl
• 14 December 1993: 
Takeover of Bremer 
Vulkan’s ship shares in the 
amount of DM 50 million
None None
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concept
November 1992: Information talks 
between Bremer Vulkan and the 
Bremen Senate on competition aid 
8 September 1993: Keller of the 
Bremen Senate asked Bremer Vulkan 
for documentation on Bremer Vulkan 
Verbund firms
14 December 1993: Dr. Hennemann 
was invited as a guest to the Bremen 
economics cabinet meeting 
19 January 1994: Bremen Economics 
Senator responded to Bremer Vulkan’s 
request for aid for the Bremerhaven 
yard, SSW and Schichau Seebeckwerft 
-  insisted on greater productivity 
April 1994: Talks between Mayor 
Wedemeier and Dr. Hennemann on 
state aid
13 April 1994: Bremen Economics 
Senator reminds Bremer Vulkan of 
concept
Conditions imposed by the Bremen 
Senate on Bremer Vulkan for 
provision of state aid_______________
26 October 1995: discussion among Prof 
Dr. Haller, Keller and Dr. Ollig about EU 
aspects of possible funding of Unterweser 
concept and Bremer Vulkan’s liquidity 
problems for investment in Mecklenburg- 
Western Pomerania
Federal Economics Ministry saw that the 
Bremen Senate’s support of the Unterweser 
concept must lie within the 8^  ^EU 
guidelines on shipbuilding aid 
14 November 1995: Talks in Federal 
Government on Bremen draft of EU 
notification of Unterweser concept
EU initiated procedure 
on contract-related given 
for the construction of 
Costa I vessel
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19 May 1994: Logemann wrote to Bremer Vulkan about link 
between a Bremerhaven concept and acceptance of a 
guarantee for Costa I
June 1994: Commissioned C & L Treuarbeit with two 
reports on Costa I
Spring 1994: Link between Costa I guarantee and 
Unterweser concept abandoned
August 1994: New Bremen Finance Senator, FluB, asked 
Bremer Vulkan for detailed information 
21 September 1994: Mayor Wedemeier expressed his 
concerns about Bremer Vulkan’s possible neglect of West 
German yards to Dr. Hennemann
Acceptance of a building time financing guarantee for two 
ro-ro ships built by SSW______________________________
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14 October 1994: Bremen Senate informed Bremer Vulkan 
in talks of time horizon and job guarantee conditions
18 October 1994: Bremen Economics Senate wrote to 
Bremer Vulkan about additional conditions 
26 October 1994: Discussion between the Bremen Senate 
and Bremer Vulkan about the Bremerhaven concept on the 
basis of these conditions
November 1994: Dispute between the Bremen Senate and 
Bremer Vulkan on release of C & L report to Bremer 
Vulkan
15 November 1994: Bremen Senate instructed Bremer 
Vulkan to bear the costs of the expert report
17 November 1994: Bremen Senate informed Bremer 
Vulkan that Vegesack should be included in the concept 
21 November 994: Talks between the Bremen Senate and 
Bremer Vulkan on agreement on new time plan for concept 
21 December 1994: Talks on the time plan 
January -  May 1995: Exchange of letters about financing 
and EU conformity of Unterweser concept______________
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19 January 1995: Senate requested Bremer Vulkan for 
documents on how balanced end year results will be achieved 
24 January 1995: Talks between Mayor Wedemeier and Dr 
Hennemann on new demands of the Senate 
27 January 1995: Mayor Wedemeier wrote to Dr Hennemann 
about lack of progress by Bremer Vulkan on providing 
documents
January and February 1995: Dispute between the Bremen 
Senate and Bremer Vulkan on state aid for Unterweser concept 
19 April 1995: Mayor Wedemeier wrote to Dr Hennemann 
about basic readiness of the Bremen Senate to support the 
Unterweser concept with DM 200 million with provisos
15 June 1995: Dr. Hennemann wrote to leaders of the SPD and 
CDU coalition regarding Bremer Vulkan and shipbuilding but 
he did not receive a reply
July 1995: Meetings between the Bremen Senate and Bremer 
Vulkan about Unterweser concept 
23 June 95: Meeting was cancelled
16 August 95: Dr Scherf invited Bremer Vulkan to a discussion 
about the Unterweser concept but cancelled the invitation on 
23 August 1995________________________________________
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September 1995: Talks 
between Finance and 
Economics Senators with 
EU on possible funding of 
Unterweser concept______
15 Ultimate 
crisis of 
Bremer 
Vulkan
Bremen Senate 
approached other Lander 
with Bremer Vulkan 
Verbund firms for 
involvement in crisis aid 
25 August 1995: Meetings 
on crisis aid including 
banks
August 1995: DM 300 
million credit package 
21 November 1995: 
Discussion on aggravated 
liquidity situation of 
Bremer Vulkan 
30 November 1995: 
Purchase of shares of 
DSR-Senator Lines GmbH 
for DM 50 million
17 January 1996: Meeting in Bonn 
between Bremer Vulkan, Federal 
Economics Ministry and BvS 
representatives -Federal Government 
refused co-operation in the solution of the 
short-term liquidity needs of Bremer 
Vulkan because of lacking EU 
compatibility
KfW rejected Bremen Senate’s request 
for credit for Bremer Vulkan
6 February 1996: Talks between EU 
and Bremer Vulkan management 
28 February 1996: EU initiated 
proceedings against misuse of DM 588 
million in aid intended for the 
restructuring of the Eastern German 
shipyards MTW-Schiffswerft and 
Volkswerft (NN 31/96 andN 806/95, 
O JC 150,24 May 1996)
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15 Ultimate crisis of 
Bremer Vulkan
• 30 November 1995: Purchase of shares of NSB for DM 
80 million
• December 1995: Senate addressed Bremer Vulkan to 
organise further action
• Harbours Senator Beckmeyer visited Lloyd Werft 
announcing need for EU conformity of Bremer Vulkan 
state aid
• mid December 1995: DM 132 million liquidity aid
• Guarantees for ship financing
Source: Author’s compilation from Bremische Biirgerschafl (1998).
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Appendix L
REFERENCE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION BY BREMER VULKAN. BY THE BREMEN LAND GOVERNMENT AND BY THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN CASES OF STATE AID PROVISION TO BREMER VULKAN VERBUND AG. 1980-1996
STATE AID 
CASE
BY BREMER VULKAN BY THE BREMEN LAND 
GOVERNMENT
BY THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT
1 Covering of 
losses of Bremer 
Vulkan in 1981
2 Proposed merger 
of Bremer 
Vulkan and AG 
Weser 1982-1983
3 Merger of 
Bremer Vulkan 
and Schichau 
Unterweser AG 
(SUAG)
4 Merger of 
Bremer Vulkan 
and Seebeckwerft 
AG
“With regard to a possible solution of 
EC state aid law, die departments made 
HIBEG the contract partner of Friedrich 
Krupp on one side and of Bremer 
Vulkan on the other.” -  Senate statement
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BY BREMER VULKAN BY THE BREMEN LAND 
GOVERNMENT
BY THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT
5 Merger of 
Bremer Vulkan 
and Hapag-Lloyd 
Werft Bremer 
Vulkan-Lloyd- 
Werft Verbund
16 January 1984: Finance Senator at the 
guarantee committee meeting - “With 
regard to the aspect of consultation with 
the European Commission, it was 
advisable to provide the loan through the 
shareholder HIBEG.” {Senator fu r  
Finanzen, Unterlagen Sitzungen 
Bürschaftsanschüsse, Bd. I, Sitzung vom 
16 Januar 1984, p. 15)
6 Aid for Bremer
Vulkan’s
liquidity
problems in 1985
7 Bremer Vulkan’s 
American 
President Lines 
(APL) contracts
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Sale of Bremer 
Vulkan’s ship 
shares in 1987
Economics committee meeting on 12 
February 1987: From the minutes of this 
meeting, it can be gathered that the 
provision of resources in the form of an 
increase of capital was a reaction to the 
EC legal position. “In view of the EC 
problem, this way is EC compliant.”
Federal Economics Ministry was 
not prepared to adopt the 
approach of the Bremen Senate of 
22 June 1988 with respect to 
proceedings of the European 
Commission on the DM 130 
million credit.
On the other hand, the Federal 
Government did not mention the 
intended acquisition of the 
financial investments of 
Seebeckwerft in its 
communication to the European 
Commission.
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Bremer Vulkan’s 
structural concept
Senator Grobecker commenting on 
the joint draft of the departments for 
economics, employment and finance 
for the Senate meeting on 31 May 
1988: “The draft is assailable by the 
EC. This vulnerability can only be 
reduced if the state aid for the 
Werftenverbund is provided in a 
packet with the structural concept.” 
(Bremische Biirgerschaft, 12, 
Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/245 
vom 9 August 1988)
Senate meeting on 13 December 
1988: Senator Grobecker 
acknowledges that it would be 
problematical to grant an EU- 
conforming loan.________________
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10 Bremer Vulkan’s 
acquisition of 
Senator Linie 
GmbH and 
merger of 
Senator Linie 
with DSR
• Memo from Theilen on 21 June 1989 
on the participation of HIBEG in 
VIH of DM 10 million that was 
decided by the Senate on 13 
December 1988: “need to find an 
EU-conforming solution” and “as a 
takeover of losses through Bremen is 
not EU-conforming, the method of 
an increase of capital is best”.
11 Bremer Vulkan’s 
acquisition of 
Krupp Atlas 
Elekfronik 
(KAE)
• 17 September 1991: Lehmkuhl of the 
economics department presented to 
Mrs Kolbeck-Rothkopf, Keller, 
Geertz, Logemann and Nordmann 
the notification of the takeover of 
KAE by Bremer Vulkan to the EU 
under diversification argumentation 
and explained to them the legal basis 
of the control of state aid by the 
European Commission under 
Articles 92 and 93 of the EU Treaty.
• Federal Economics Minister, 
Mollemann, letter to the Bremen 
Senate on 11 September 1991 -  “I 
assume that the question of an 
eventual state aid authorisation by 
the European Commission will be 
taken account of by you.”
• Assumption that should a 
notifiable procedure emerge, the 
European Commission would 
approve the measure as a 
diversification measure.
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12 Acquisition of 
East German 
shipyards
29 June 1995: Supervisory board 
meeting and general business 
meeting of 1995 -  board of 
directors reported that the BvS had 
delayed payments of DM 300 
million because of EU instruction
Letter from Treuhandanstalt to Dr. 
Hennemann on 20 December 1993: 
“delays in Brussels which made 
necessary quick and decisive steps” -  
asked Dr. Hennemann for 
clarification as soon as possible such 
that the multilateral working group of 
21 April 1994 would have the 
information needed for a positive 
European Commission decision.
13 Bremer Vulkan’s 
acquisition of 
Klockner Stahl 
GmbH
The interested parties model was 
developed by the Bremen Senate for the 
acquisition of Klockner Stahl shares 
because they knew that it would have 
been inadmissible by EU state law that 
the takeover of Klockner Stahl shares 
was realised entirely by the state and 
without the participation of private third 
parties.
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14 Unterweser
concept
• 21 April 1994: Report of board 
to directors to supervisory board 
on the Bremerhaven concept -  
“especially the comphance with 
EU state aid law is to be 
guaranteed”.
• Supervisory board meeting on 
29 September 1994: Dr. 
Hennemann stated ‘importance 
of shipbuilding and shipping for 
the competitiveness of the EU 
has been confirmed by 
statements by the EU’.
Conditions of state aid fi*om Mayor 
Wedemeier to Dr. Hennemann: 
Bremer Vulkan must provide money 
in equal measure, EU conformity 
and job guarantee.
Interview with Economics Senator 
Jager in Nordsee Zeitung on 15 April 
1994: when asked if the Land 
Government would participate 
financially in the Bremerhaven 
yards, Jager spoke of the strict 
controls by the European 
Commission.
4 May 1994: Reply of Mayor 
Wedemeier and Jager to the letter 
fi*om the SPD fi*action demanding 
decisive engagement in 
Bremerhaven -  mentioned that the 
gaze of the European Commission 
was directed at German and Bremen 
shipbuilding and that they could only 
use EU-conforming support 
measures.
26 October 1995: Discussion 
between Prof Dr. Haller and 
Keller with Dr. Ollig of the 
Federal Economics Ministry on 
the EU legal aspects of a possible 
fimding of the Unterweser concept 
by the Bremen Senate -  Federal 
Economics Ministry insistence 
that the state aid must lie within 
the EU shipbuilding guidelines 
14 November 1995: Lehmkuhl’s 
meeting in the Federal Economics 
Ministry -  Federal Government 
saw the opening of a procedure by 
the European Commission as 
inevitable -  saw rescue aid as a 
better way
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15 December 1994: Board of 
directors informed the 
supervisory board of the state of 
negotiations with the Bremen 
Senate on the Unterweser 
concept -  “it is difficult to 
obtain quickly the opinion of 
the Bremen Senate especially 
because the EU conformity is 
difficult to assess” and “the 
board of directors must respect 
this especially in view of its 
experiences in Wismar”.
28 February 1995: Letter firom 
Dr. Hennemann and Smidt to 
Mayor Wedemeier -  ‘a point of 
our talks should be the 
possibilities of EU conforming 
financing’
28 September 1994: Senator Jager 
issued a press release on the 
Unterweser concept and said that 
eventually necessary state aid must 
be EU compatible.
18 October 1994: Senator Jager 
wrote to Bremer Vulkan -  included 
among the conditions was that the 
state aid must be EU compatible 
Meeting on 26 October 1994 of 
Logemann, Keller, Geertz, Meinsen 
and Smidt -  “the measures must 
unequivocally be EU compatible”.
24 March 1995: Meeting of 
representatives of C & L and the 
Senate -  acknowledged that ship 
shares could not be taken over in an 
EU conforming way 
28 March 1995: Mayor Wedemeier 
wrote to Senator Flufi -  “naturally 
always under the condition of EU 
conformity and this is possible if one 
wants to”
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12 June 1995: Supervisory 
board meeting -  “the presented 
planning for the locations on the 
Weser, Bremerhaven and 
Vegesack originate from EU 
conforming support of the Land 
as confirmed in the letter from 
the Land Government of April 
1995"
Meetings between 22 August 
1995 and 3 November 1995 of 
involved parties: considerations 
about EU notification procedure
3 April 1995: Reply from FluB to 
Wedemeier -  FluB saw the greatest 
hurdle as the EU conformity of state 
aid as the upper ceiling of 
competition aid was now only 7 per 
cent
30 March 1995: Bicker in the Senate 
Chancellery dispatched a memo to 
Wedemeier and Dr Fuchs - any 
intended sale of ship shares must be 
notified in advance to the EU -  
referred to the European 
Commission Decision of 16 October 
1990 and the lack of notification by 
Germany
19 April 1995: Wedemeier wrote to 
Dr. Hennemann and declared the 
basic readiness of the Bremen Senate 
to support the Unterweser concept 
with DM 200 million with the 
proviso of EU conformity of the 
concept and measures_____________
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4 May 1995: Keller answered Welke 
that the Bremen Senate could not be 
the purchaser of non-operating 
sections of Bremer Vulkan because 
of the EU problem and that the 
provision of Bremen funds for the 
implementation of measures of the 
Unterweser concept would be 
difficult because there were barely 
any EU conforming solutions. 
Coalition treaty of 27 June 1995 
between SPD and CDU with regard 
to Bremer Vulkan -  “the coalition 
partners are basically willing to 
cooperate in the safeguarding of 
investments for the raising of the 
efficiency and thereby the 
competitiveness of the yards of 
Bremer Vulkan Verbund in Land 
Bremen under the proviso of EU 
conformity of concept and 
measures”.
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Meetings between 22 August 1995 
and 3 November 1995 of involved 
parties: considerations about EU 
notification procedure
20 September 1995: Article in 
Nordsee Zeitung -  Senator for 
Harbours, Uwe Beckmeyer, visited 
Lloyd Werft and said that the top 
priority for the Senate was to design 
state aid for Bremer Vulkan that 
complies with the guidelines of the 
EU as they wanted to behave as the 
model pupil.
21 September 1995: Senate press 
release -  emphasised EU conformity 
26 October 1995: Bremen Senate 
arranged discussion in the Federal 
Economics Ministry between Prof 
Dr. Haller and Keller with Dr. Ollig 
of the Federal Economics Ministry 
on the EU legal aspects of a possible 
funding of the Unterweser concept 
by the Bremen Senate____________
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• Economics and finance senators 
planned to conduct talks with the 
Federal Economics Ministry and the 
European Commission in parallel 
about the Bremer Vulkan application 
for state aid so as to counter  ^
reproaches and so that the measures 
fall within the EU shipbuilding 
guidelines.______________________
15 Ultimate crisis of 
Bremer Vulkan
Meeting of Traxel, Schniittgen, 
Smidt, Dr. Kohler, Keller and 
Kolbeck-Rothkopf -  all parties were 
concerned about the EU problem of 
a Land support measure.
16 January 1996: Telephone 
conversation between Keller and 
Dr. Ollig -  Dr. Ollig was 
convinced that a guarantee of 
operating aid would have no 
chance in notification to the EU
17 January 1996: Meeting of 
representatives of Bremer Vulkan, 
the Federal Economics Ministry 
and BvS in Bonn (initiated by 
BvS) -  cooperation of Federal 
Government in the solution of 
Bremer Vulkan’s short term 
liquidity problems was rejected 
under the reference to lacking EU 
conformity___________________
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15 Ultimate crisis of 
Bremer Vulkan
25 August 1995: Meeting in Senate 
Chancellery -  Dr. Scherf, Nolle, 
Perschau and Beckmeyer, their privy 
councils and Keller -  dealt with EU 
conformity of the state aid measures 
for the Bremer Vulkan’s liquidity 
crisis -  reached an agreement that 
Bremer Vulkan has until 27 August 
1995 to place a formal application 
for support of the Unterweser 
concept with the responsible 
government department so that 
notification to the EU in good time 
was possible - expected EU not to 
raise objections as HIBEG was 
acting as a private actor and decided 
that despite the associated risks, a 
notification to the EU could be 
dispensed with.
11 September 1995: SPD fi*action of 
Bremen Parliament -  Bremen fimds 
to be used for preservation of 
Bremer Vulkan Verbund insofar as it 
is EU compatible_________________
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22 November 1995: discussion in 
town hall -  Dr. Scherf, Nolle, 
Perschau, Prof Dr. Hoffmann,
Geertz and Keller -  the Bremen 
Senate was prepared to cooperate 
with the banks in a solution to cope 
with Bremer Vulkan’s liquidity crisis 
but acknowledged the difficult EU 
legal situation
20 December 1995: Meeting of 
Lander representatives of 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 
Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, 
Bremen and BvS -  EU conformity of 
possible state support discussed -  a 
general liquidity state aid would be 
considered by the EU as a rescue aid 
and is therefore notifiable -  not 
likely to be passed (Keller)
4 January 1996: Talks on the 
working plane on the wish of Bremer 
Vulkan -  Smidt, Schmidt and 
Kolbeck-Rothkopf - Kolbeck- 
Rothkopf emphasised that a 
guarantee of an operating aid is not 
EU compatible___________________
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Keller said that he had declined 
Smidt’s request for a guarantee for a 
bridging credit of DM 110 million as 
such an action would be operating 
aid and the guarantee of an EU- 
incompatible rescue aid
10 January 1996: Letter from Nolle 
and Perschau to Bremer Vulkan -  
state aid must be EU legal
11 January 1996: Inaugural visit of 
the new head of the Bremen 
Commerzbank branch -  Perschau 
mentioned the ‘well-known EU 
problem’ to de Maiziere and 
Weimann
12 January 1996: Brahms telephoned 
Müller-Gebel and acknowledged that 
because of EU regulation of the 
Lander, even if it wanted to, it was 
not possible to guarantee any 
additional money to the building 
time financing___________________
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15 January 1996: Guarantee 
committee meeting -  Nolle said that 
Bremen could not cover the liquidity 
gap of operating credit because of 
EU laws
Perschau reiterated that a guarantee 
of operating aid would lead to 
proceedings in the EU and because 
no Land or Federal Government 
could take this step 
17 January 1996: Meeting of 
representatives of Bremer Vulkan, 
the Federal Economics Ministry and 
the BvS in Bonn (initiated by BvS) -  
EU aspect of Bremer Vulkan aid 
discussed
22 January 1996: Senate Chancellery 
meeting -  Keller informed the 
senators about the question of 
notification obligation of the 
guarantee to the EU and about the 
request of the banks for confirmation 
that the guarantee met with EU 
requirements and was not notifiable
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• 24 January 1996: Conversation 
between Weimann and Keller on 
question of EU conformity of the 
guarantee
• 1 February 1996: Talks between 
Brahms and Weimann on EU 
conformity of Costa II guarantee
Source'. Author’s compilation from Bremische Biirgerschaft (1998).
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